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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
In the context of international trade, the use of subsidies is becoming an important issue. 
Politically, governments tend to use subsidies to achieve policy goals, such as correcting market 
failures, supporting infant industries, and decreasing regional disparity, etc. Economically, 
subsidies cause both beneficial and adverse effects. They contribute to the achievement of 
governmental goals in a certain degree. For instance, subsidies to small and medium sized 
enterprises create incentives for them to lower the costs and increase production, thus stimulating 
the growth of the enterprises.1  However, they can also lead to distortionary effects, such as 
distortion to the international trade market, inefficient allocation of resources, reduction of 
efficiency in the market, etc.2 Moreover, they have cross-border effects that can affect other 
countries’ trade strategies. They further influence competition in the international market. 
Therefore, to control the detrimental effects of subsidies at a transnational level, countries have 
reached a common agreement to subject the use of subsidies to an international legal framework.  
1.1.1 Subsidy rules of the WTO 
The most influential international legal institution that disciplines subsidies is the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO deals with the rules of trade between nations. Its ultimate 
objectives are the creation of an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system by 
ensuring a level playing field for all the Members to conduct trade and international business.3 The 
control of the adverse effects of subsidies worldwide is in line with the objectives of the WTO. In 
order to tackle the harmful effects of subsidies, the WTO provides specific rules, i.e. the 
                                                          
1 Alan O. Sykes, 'Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' in Patrick F.J. Macrory and others (ed), The 
World Trade Organization : Legal, Economic and Political Analysis vol 2 (The World Trade Organization : 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis Springer 2005) 83-85; Claire Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax 
Incentives under EU and WTO Law (Series on International Taxation, Volume 45, Wolters Kluwer, Law 
& Business 2014) 2-6. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization : Text, Cases and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) 85. The WTO’s main activities are negotiating the reduction or 
elimination of obstacles to trade (import tariffs, other barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the 
conduct of international trade (e.g. antidumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.); administering and 
monitoring the application of the WTO’s agreed rules for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related 
intellectual property rights; settling disputes among members regarding the interpretation and application 
of the agreements, etc. See the WTO’s official website, About the WTO 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm> accessed 11 February 2016. 
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Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ASCM).4 According to the ASCM, a 
subsidy is defined as a financial contribution made by a government or any public body, which 
confers a benefit that is specific.5 In addition, the WTO has its own dispute settlement mechanism, 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which addresses disputes between nations. Members of the 
WTO receive recommendations from the DSB to adjust domestic subsidy measures, which are 
deemed as a means to regulate the adverse effects of those measures.  
1.1.2 Tax incentives as subsidies  
Tax incentives are one of the most employed subsidy types, due to their efficiency and 
flexibility. The concept of tax incentives is vague, but it has certain features. A common element 
in the notion is a deviation from a benchmark tax system.6 In the context of international trade, tax 
incentives normally target economic development. 7  They can be considered as a transfer of 
government revenue that is achieved by reducing tax obligations based on a benchmark tax 
system.8 Governments prefer to use this form of subsidy since it is more efficient and flexible. It 
does not require a direct grant of cash that could become a burden on fiscal expenditure. By using 
tax incentives, tax that would otherwise be due is foregone in the end. 9 Tax incentive subsidies 
also serve governments’ policy goals, but they aim at specific objectives, such as attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and promoting exports.  
Similar to the rationale of regulating subsidies, it is also necessary to control the adverse effects 
of tax incentives. In the context of international trade, tax incentives have inbound and outbound 
effects. Inbound tax incentives are normally aimed at attracting FDI to a country’s domestic market; 
outbound tax incentives are meant to stimulate a country’s investment and enterprises to a foreign 
                                                          
4  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WTO), 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf. 
5 Article 1.1 of the ASCM.  
6 OECD, Tax Expenditures in OECD Countries (OECD 2010) 16. 
7 Yariv Brauner, 'The Future of Tax Incentives' in Yariv Brauner and Miranda Stewart (eds), Tax, Law and 
Development (Tax, Law and Development, Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 25-26. 
8 Governments of developing countries especially tend to use tax incentives to attract foreign investment, 
particularly foreign direct investment (FDI). In such a context, tax incentives for FDI mean a special tax 
provision is granted to qualified investment projects that represent a statutorily favorable deviation from a 
corresponding provision applicable to investment projects in general. See Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and 
Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law 15; A. J. Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment 
(Kluwer Law International 2004) 3.  
9 Carlo Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law (Kluwer Law International 2003) 2-3. 
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or the international market, generally in the form of exportation.10 Similar to the economic analysis 
of subsidies, the increasing adoption of tax incentives results in tax competition, i.e. the lowering 
of the tax burden in order to improve a country’s economy and welfare by increasing the 
competitiveness of domestic business and/or attracting FDI.11 It is also necessary to control the 
adverse effects of tax incentives, especially when they cause harmful tax competition. The adverse 
effects of tax incentives on tax competition are becoming a serious issue, since more and more 
countries start to seek transnational legal regulation. In 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) published a report on harmful tax competition, which 
identified the characteristics of harmful tax competition.12 More cooperation between countries at 
transnational level is going on.  
1.1.3 EU State aid law 
At the supranational level, the European Union (EU) also has a stringent internal subsidy control 
regime. State aid under the EU legal framework is a measure similar to the concept of a subsidy. 
The main object and purpose of the EU is the establishment of an internal market, which shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, 
and capital is ensured.13 The concept of State aid is defined as any aid granted by a Member State 
or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.14 It is obvious to see that 
this concept shares common elements with subsidies in the WTO’s ASCM.  
State aid law plays an increasing role in restricting the harmful effects of tax incentives in the 
internal market. In 1997, the European Commission adopted a code of conduct for business 
taxation (Code of Conduct) aiming at improving transparency in the tax area through the exchange 
                                                          
10 OCED, Subsidy Reform and Sustainable Development : Political Economy Aspects (OECD 2007).  
11 Pinto, Tax Competition and EU Law 1-2. 
12 The report identified characteristics of harmful tax competition. They include no or low effective tax 
rates; ring-fencing, i.e. specific tax incentives for foreign taxpayers; lack of transparency; lack of effective 
exchange of information; artificial definition of the tax base; failure to adhere to generally accepted transfer 
pricing principles; exemption of foreign-source income; negotiable tax rate or tax base; secrecy provisions; 
treaty network; active promotion of tax scheme. See OECD, Harmful Tax Competition, An Emerging 
Global Issue (OECD 1998).  
13 Article 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).  
14 Article 107 (1) TFEU.  
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of information.15 Subsequently, in 1998, the Commission introduced a notice on the application of 
the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation, 16  and a report on the 
implementation of the notice in 2004.17 The European Commission has systematically applied 
State aid law to the regulation of tax incentives.18 With the further development of State aid law 
under the State Aid Action Plan (SAAP) 19  and the programme on State aid modernization 
(SAM),20 the application of State aid rules to taxation is evolving as well. In 2016, the European 
Commission issued a notice on the notion of State aid, which provides specific guidance on the 
identification of tax measures as State aid.21 The trend in the EU is to strengthen the functionality 
of the State aid rules in relation to taxation.22  
                                                          
15 Code of Conduct, Council conclusions of the ECOFIN council meeting on 1 December 1997 concerning 
taxation policy [1998] OJ C2/1. 
16 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct business 
taxation [1998] OJ C384/3 (the 1998 Notice). 
17 Report on the implementation of the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation [2004] C (2004) 434. 
18 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law 9.  
19 The SAAP is a plan from 2005 to 2009 aiming at improving the enforcement of State aid by introducing 
an effect-based approach to identify State aid. See State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Targeted State 
Aid: a Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005-2009 [2005] COM (2005) 107 final. 
20 In 2012, the European Commission set out a new reform programme on State aid modernization with 
more ambitious objectives, i.e. to foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and competitive internal market; 
focus enforcement on cases with the biggest impact on the internal market; streamline rules and faster 
decisions. See EU State Aid Modernization (SAM), European Commission, Brussels, 8.5.2012, COM 
(2012) 209 final.  
21 On 19 May 2016, the European Commission published a Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to 
in Article 107 (1) TFEU. It explains how to identify tax rulings and tax settlements as State aid. See Section 
5.4, Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107 (1) TFEU [2016] OJ 
C262/1 (the 2016 Notice), see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016XC0719(05)&from=EN.  
22  EY Tax Insights, European Commission Publishes Guidelines Regarding State Aid 
<http://taxinsights.ey.com/archive/archive-news/european-commission-publishes-guidelines-regarding-
state-aid.aspx> accessed 25 May 2016; European Commission-Press release, State Aid: Commission 
Concludes Belgian “Excess Profit” Tax Scheme Illegal; Around 700 Million Euros to be Recovered from 
35 Multinational Companies (11 January 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-42_en.htm> 
accessed 18 January 2016; European Commission-Press release, Commission Opens Formal Investigation 
into Luxembourg’s Tax Treatment of McDonald’s (3 December 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6221_en.htm> accessed 18 January 2016; European Commission-Press release, Commission 
Decides Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are illegal 
under EU State Aid Rules (21 October 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm> 
accessed 18 January 2016; President Juncker, Commissioner Moscovici and Commissioner Vestager 
address the EP’s Special Committee on Tax Rulings, 17 September 2015. See European Commission State 
Aid Weekly e-News, No. 30/15, 17/09/2015, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/newsletter/17092015.pdf> accessed 12 October 2015. 
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1.1.4 Chinese tax incentives and the WTO  
    China became a Member of the WTO in 2001. After its accession to the WTO, China was party 
to an increasing number of international trade disputes with other Members in the area of subsidies 
and countervailing measures. In the past ten years, China became the country facing the biggest 
number of countervailing investigations in the world.23 Since 2004, when Canada launched the 
first countervailing investigation against China, more and more Members in the WTO had recourse 
to the subsidy rules to solve trade disputes with China.24 Countervailing measures, a seldom-used 
method for solving international trade disputes, are becoming the main means for Members in the 
WTO to deal with trade disputes with China. 
Among all the countervailing investigations against China, the main complaints were against 
Chinese tax incentives, such as specific tax reductions and exemptions, or specific tax preferences 
related to exports or imports.25 The first case on Chinese tax incentives in the WTO was brought 
by the United States (US) in 2004 on China’s preferential value-added tax (VAT) for domestically-
produced or designed integrated circuits.26 In 2007, the US requested a consultation in the WTO’s 
DSB in another case on certain Chinese measures granting refunds, reductions or exemptions from 
taxes.27 Subsequently, the EU also joined the group. In April 2010, the European Commission also 
claimed that Chinese tax incentives constituted subsidies under the ASCM in WTO law. 28 
Therefore, China faces compatibility issues in relation to tax incentives in the WTO.  
                                                          
23 By 31 December 2014, China had undergone 90 countervailing investigations: 46 were from the US, 20 
were from Canada, 10 were from Australia, 9 were from the EU, 2 were from India, 1 was from Mexico, 1 
was from South Africa, and 1 was from Egypt. See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Gateway, 
Statistics on subsidies and countervailing measures, countervailing initiations: reporting Member vs 
exporting country, 01/01/1995-31/12/2014> accessed 20 November 2015. 
24  Canada was the first country to initiate a countervailing investigation against China. The first 
investigation was launched on 13 April 2004 on the product of self-standing barbeques for outdoor use. It 
was a combined countervailing and anti-dumping investigation. For more information, see 
<www.cbsa.gc.ca> (Canada Border Service Agency): Anti-dumping and Countervailing-Investigations, 
accessed 20 November 2015.  
25 For a full list of subsidy investigations against China in the WTO, see Appendix I. 
26 WT/DS309/1, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, 23 March 2004, Panel Report.  
27 WT/DS358/1, China-Taxes, 7 February 2007.  
28 On 17 April 2010, the European Union also joined the trend to investigate Chinese subsidies on the 
product of coated fine paper. See Notice of Initiation of an Anti-subsidy Proceeding Concerning Imports 
of Coated Fine Paper Originating in the People’s Republic of China [2010] OJ C99/13.  
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1.1.5 The evolution of Chinese tax incentives  
Tax incentives in China have undergone an evolution. The People’s Republic of China was 
established in 1949, but tax incentives were introduced only after 1978 when China initiated the 
Reform and Open Policy.29 From 1978 to 2014, Chinese direct tax incentives experienced the “rise 
and fall” accompanied by the development of China’s economy and its integration into the world 
economy. Beginning in 1978, China started a transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-oriented economy, aiming at integrating more into the world economy. In order to benefit 
from capital, advanced technology, and the international market, China decided to attract FDIs. As 
a result, the Chinese government granted direct tax incentives to foreign enterprises (FEs) and 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) located in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and coastal cities. 
In addition to regional tax incentives, special FDI projects or activities received certain tax 
preferences as well, such as export-oriented and technologically-advanced projects.30 The decades 
from 1980 to 2001 witnessed an expansion of direct tax incentives to FDIs in more industries and 
regions. Those direct tax incentives were deemed to be significant factors responsible for drawing 
FDIs that could stimulate the economy.31 It was “the rise” of Chinese direct tax incentives. With 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the success of tax incentives for FIDs encountered 
challenges. As a Member of the WTO, China had to adjust its tax incentives in order to realize its 
promises of accession and obligations, i.e. to open its domestic market from the inbound 
perspective and to remove trade barriers, including subsidies from the outbound perspective. 
Subsequently, China began to change and clean up some tax incentives. 32  In 2007, the new 
Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) was promulgated33 which terminated the situation that 
                                                          
29 Before the Reform and Open Policy of 1978, China had experienced political campaigns and had few 
contacts with the world economy. The economic system was mainly a centrally planned economy. The role 
of taxation was diminished and simplified accordingly. See Pak K Auyeung, 'Taxation Trends and Issues 
in the People's Republic of China: 1949 to 2006' (2008) 62 Bulletin for International Taxation 248; Jinyan 
Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China (Greenwood Publishing Group 1991) 14. 
30 Jinyan Li, 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' 
(2007) 8 Florida Tax Review 675-676. 
31 Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons for Other Countries 
(Internat. Monetary Fund 2002); Samuel Tung and Stella Cho, 'The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign 
Direct Investment in China' (2000) 9 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 105-135. 
32 Li, 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' 677-
678; Chunlai Chen, China's Integration with the Global Economy, WTO Accession, Foreign Direct 
Investment and International Trade (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 29. 
33 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax, March 16, 2007. For the official 
English translation, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471133.htm. 
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foreign and foreign-invested enterprises enjoyed more preferential tax incentives than domestic 
Chinese enterprises. After this law, there was no longer an official tax incentive granting benefits 
only to foreign enterprises. Any enterprise satisfying certain conditions was eligible for the tax 
incentives stipulated in the law.34 In 2013, the Chinese government decided to further the reform 
of the tax systems, with the emphasis on the governance of tax incentives. The aim was to promote 
equality in tax burdens and fair competition in the market.35 The period from China’s accession to 
the WTO until today could be characterized as the “fall” of Chinese direct tax incentives.  
1.2 State of the art  
Although WTO law does not specifically aim at regulating Members’ tax policies, tax subsidy 
disputes indeed draw academic attention to the relationship between the two. Schön (2004) was 
among the first authors to study the connection between WTO law and tax law in general. He 
discussed the prohibitions on discrimination and protectionism on tax subsidies.36 Lang and others 
(2005) published a book containing articles studying the relationship between WTO law and direct 
tax. It also includes different country reports reflecting the influence of WTO law on different 
countries’ direct taxation.37 Daily (2005) also wrote a discussion paper on the influence of the 
WTO’s subsidy rules on the United States’ tax policies based on the development of the Foreign 
Sales Corporation (FSC) cases brought by the European Communities. 38  These publications 
                                                          
34 In order to ease the fear of foreign investors who previously enjoyed preferential tax treatment, the EIT 
law allowed existing FEs and FIEs to continue to enjoy the tax preferences until 2013 or until the specified 
period was over. See Article 57 of the EIT Law. 
35 See Section V of the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (the 2013 Decision). The 2013 Decision announced, “let the 
market decide the allocation of resources, the primary task is to build an open and unified market with 
orderly competition”. For non-official English version of the 2013 Decision, see the English version of the 
2013 Decision, China Daily (18 November 2013) <http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2013-
11/18/content_17112855.htm> accessed 10 March 2016. 
36 Wolfgang Schön, 'World Trade Organization Law and Tax Law' (2004) 58 Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 293. 
37  Michael Lang, Judith Herdin and Ines Hofbauer, WTO and Direct Taxation (Linde ; Kluwer Law 
International 2005). 
38 Michael Daly, The WTO and Direct Taxation (WTO Discussion Paper 2005). The first case in the WTO 
related to direct tax as subsidies was the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) Case, which was initiated by the 
European Communities (EC) in 1997 requesting consultations with the United States (US). FSCs were 
foreign corporations in charge of specific activities with respect to the sale or lease of goods produced in 
the US for export outside the US. The FSC legislation provided tax exemptions for foreign sales 
corporations in respect of their export-related foreign-source trade income. Thus, the US shareholders of 
the FSC were not subject to income tax on dividends received from the FSC. The EC contended that the 
special tax treatment for FSCs in the US constituted subsidies under the ASCM. For details, see 
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represent the interest of academics in the interaction between the WTO law and tax law. 
Nevertheless, they do not focus specifically on the WTO’s subsidy rules and tax incentives per se. 
With respect to subsidies in the WTO, there are also a number of publications on the economic 
analysis of subsidies. Trebilcock (2012) and Jackson (2002) introduced the rationale for designing 
subsidy rules in the WTO in general. Skyes (2005) carried out a comprehensive economic analysis 
on subsidies, which became the context of understanding the ASCM. Taylor (2006) also analyzed 
the regulation of subsidies from the perspective of competition law. Krugman and Obstfeld (2009), 
Friederiszich and others (2008), and Feldman and Serrano (2006) conducted an economic analysis 
on subsidies from the perspective of international economics and welfare economics. However, 
these publications did not specifically focus on the analysis of tax incentives as subsidies.    
More authors have discussed EU State aid and tax law since the EU paid attention to fiscal aid 
at an early stage. The application of State aid rules to taxation normally involves the identification 
of tax measures as State aid. Hancher, Ottervanger, and Slot (2012) addressed State aid 
comprehensively through the case law. This publication includes a chapter on applying State aid 
rules to taxation.39 Rust and Micheau (2013) edited a book on State aid and tax law, which contains 
various articles discussing the application of State aid to taxation from diverse perspectives.40 
However, there is still space for further debate on State aid’s regulation of tax incentives and on 
whether the State aid rules are appropriate to delve so deeply into tax issues.   
As to the comparative studies between subsidies in the WTO and State aid in the EU, only some 
authors carried out the comparison systematically. Luja (2003) carried out a research on the 
relationship between direct tax incentives and EU State aid, which involved a certain comparison 
with the WTO’s subsidy regime.41 Luengo (2007) and Rubini (2011) conducted comparisons of 
                                                          
WT/DS108/R, US-FSC, Panel Report, 8 October 1999; WT/DS108/AR/RW, US-FSC-Recourse to Article 
21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) by the EC, Appellate Body Report, 14 January 2002; 
WT/DS108/AB/RW2, US-FSC, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the EC, Appellate Body 
Report, 13 February 2006. C. Carmichael, 'Foreign Sales Corporations-Subsidies, Sanctions, and Trade 
Wars' (2002) 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 151; Hunter R. Clark, Amy Bogran and Hayley 
Hanson, 'The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporations : Costliest Battle Yet in An Escalating Trade 
War between the United States and the European Union?' (2001) 10 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 
291, 310. 
39 Leigh Ottervanger T. R. Slot P. J. Hancher, EU State Aids (Sweet & Maxwell 2012). 
40 Alexander Rust and Claire Micheau, State Aid and Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2013). 
41 Raymond H.C.Luja, Assessment and Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC and the WTO: A View on State 
Aids, Trade Subsidies and Direct Taxation, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003. 
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the two systems in more detail respectively.42 However, neither of these two publications carried 
out the research from the angle of taxation. In 2014, Micheau (2014) completed a comparative 
study of the WTO’s subsidy regime and EU State aid law, focusing on tax incentives in general.43  
With respect to Chinese tax incentives, there are a number of publications that discuss tax 
incentives for FDI before the implementation of the new EIT Law in China. For instance, Li (2007), 
Halkyard and Ren (2010) carried out historical reviews of Chinese corporate tax incentives for the 
attraction of FDI before the tax reform in 2007.44 After the reform, some authors wrote about the 
system of tax incentives in general, such as Wang (2012) and Li (2012). However, after the reform, 
most favorable tax treatment for FDI was abolished. There are few publications discussing the 
relationship between current Chinese tax incentives and subsidy rules of the WTO, not to mention 
providing a comparative analysis from the perspective of EU State aid law. Therefore, for the first 
time this research systematically concentrates on current Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s 
subsidy rules, with a further reference to EU State aid law.  
With respect to the background knowledge on Chinese law, history, and culture, there are many 
publications that address this in detail. Lubman (1999) and Peerenboom (2002) wrote about 
China’s legal system in general but did not include the recent developments in the past decade. 
Cao (2009) studied Chinese tax law against the background of comparing China with the US. With 
regard to an introduction to Chinese history and culture, for instance, Cambridge University (1986-
1991) published a series of books on Chinese history in different stages before the Reform and 
Opening. Goldin (2011) and Littlejon (2011) introduced Confucianism in China. All of these 
publications contribute to understanding the context surrounding Chinese tax incentives.  
In contrast, a number of publications on Western history and culture help to understand the 
context of the development of the WTO and the EU. For example, Cambridge University also 
published a series on the history of Capitalism (2014), which provides a basis to understand the 
                                                          
42 Gustavo E. Luengo, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in the WTO and EC Law, Conflicts in 
International Trade Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2007; Luca Rubini, the 
Definition of Subsidy and State Aid, WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
43 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law.  
44 Jinyan Li, the Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates, 
Florida Tax Review, Volume 8, No.7, 2007; Andrew Halkyard, Ren Linghui, China’s Tax Incentives 
Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an Eassionian Analysis, in Arthur Cockfield (Eds.), Globalization 




development of international trade and the development of the market economy. Weber (2002) 
explained the spirit of capitalism that also helps to understand the context of Western culture. They 
form basis from which the background of the WTO and the EU with its counterpart in China can 
be compared.  
1.3 Research questions and methodology 
1.3.1 Main research questions 
   The main research questions are:  
What is and what should China’s position be towards tax incentives in the international trade 
domain based on comparative studies between the subsidy rules of the WTO and EU State aid law? 
What should the WTO’s position be towards China and taxation with respect to subsidy rules 
based on the studies on Chinese tax incentives and EU State aid law respectively?  
In order to answer the main research questions, firstly, it is necessary to analyze the relationship 
between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules, especially with reference to EU 
State aid law. After finding out the extent of the compatibility of Chinese tax incentives with the 
two legal systems, it is easier to see whether there are tensions between Chinese tax incentives and 
both standards. Subsequently, if there are tensions, after analyzing the origins of those tensions, 
the research eventually answers the main research questions by providing recommendations for 
Chinese tax incentives to find a proper position in the international trade domain. On the other 
hand, the research also sheds light on the role of the WTO in relation to the regulation of taxation 
and subsidy rules per se by learning from its interactions with China and EU State aid respectively.  
However, it has to be emphasized that the first research question is the core of the research, 
while the second research question is a further thinking based on the first one. The concentration 
of the research is still Chinese tax incentives, not the WTO law. Recommendations for the WTO 
are logical results of the whole analysis, which sufficiently answer the second research question. 
The second research question actually could be a starting point for a new research with regard to 
how to improve WTO law per se so that it can integrate more on an international level. It has so 
many different Members with different economic, political, and cultural background, so there 
could be a new research on the WTO’s system itself on developing rules that can apply to countries 
that share common characteristics with China. Nevertheless, this research concentrates on the 
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relationship between Chinese tax incentives and WTO’s subsidy rules against the background of 
EU State aid, so answers to the second research question are not that in depth with regard to the 
WTO law. 
1.3.2 Sub-questions 
The sub-questions are:  
In the context of international trade and competition, what are tax incentives as subsidies? What 
is the rationale for regulating tax incentives as subsidies? 
What are the subsidy rules of the WTO and EU State aid law with regard to taxation respectively? 
Can a common benchmark be derived from the two systems that would serve for the evaluation of 
Chinese tax incentives against the rules of the two systems per se?  
What is the situation of Chinese tax incentives? Is there a domestic benchmark in China to 
evaluate the granting of tax incentives? If so, what is the relationship between the internal 
benchmark and the external benchmark derived from the WTO and EU? 
Are selected Chinese tax incentives compatible with the WTO’s subsidy rules? Under the EU 
State aid regime, are there differences in the results? 
What are the origins of the tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the Western approach 
to tax incentives? Is it possible to alleviate the tensions? 
What is the future for Chinese tax incentives with respect to the WTO’s subsidy rules and against 
the background of EU State aid? What is the role of the WTO’s subsidy rules in relation to the 
regulation of taxation and subsidy rules per se by learning from its interactions with China and EU 
State aid respectively? 
1.3.3 Methodology 
The major methodologies adopted in the research are legal analysis, comparative studies, legal 
testing, and historical analysis. 
To analyze the relationship between Chinese tax incentives, the WTO’s subsidy rules, and EU 
State aid law, the research tests selected Chinese tax incentives against the WTO’s subsidy rules 
and the EU State aid law respectively.  
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Firstly, the research provides a general overview of tax incentives as subsidies based on the 
theory of public finance and welfare economics, including reasons for the government to grant 
subsidies, their effects, and the rationale behind regulating the abuse of subsidies in the context of 
international trade and competition. Subsequently, the research describes subsidy rules in the WTO 
and EU State aid law, especially their application to taxation, and makes a comparison between 
the two. Based on the common object and purpose of the two systems, an external benchmark is 
developed to guide the further testing. Additionally, an internal domestic benchmark in China is 
also developed according to China’s domestic market conditions. It serves as a foundation for 
applying the international standard to Chinese tax incentives. Moreover, it exhibits differences 
between the Western originated benchmark and the Chinese counterpart. Considering the broad 
scope of tax incentives in China, the research selects specific tax incentives to complete the testing. 
It includes both direct tax and indirect tax that are related to business investment and international 
trade. Afterwards, those Chinese tax incentives selected are tested against the subsidy rules of the 
WTO and EU State aid law respectively to check their compatibility and to present differences in 
the testing results. These tax incentives are also under evaluation according to the benchmarks. 
Furthermore, the research examines whether there are tensions in the testing results and analyzes 
the origins of the tensions from an historical, economic, and cultural perspective. Consequently, 
the research provides legal recommendations for Chinese tax incentives to align with international 
trade rules. Further, it sheds light on the future of the WTO’s subsidy rules and their role in taxation, 
which is inspired by China’s influence and EU State aid law.    
1.4 Limitations 
In order to confine the scope of the discussion to answering the research questions, there are 
major limitations of the research.  
First of all, the boundary of the research is business taxation in the context of international trade 
and investment. WTO law covers diverse areas in international trade, which includes the separate 
regulation of agricultural products, the Regulation of Subsidies in the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AOA).45 This research concentrates on business investment in international trade. On the one 
                                                          
45 The AOA allows for domestic support to agricultural products but with annual limits for each Member 
in the specific Schedules of Commitments. See Gustavo E. Luengo Hernández de Madrid, Regulation of 
Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC law : Conflicts in International Trade Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2007) 207-243. 
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hand, most trade disputes on subsidies between China and other Members of the WTO are directly 
related to Chinese domestic market access for foreign investment or China’s exportation to foreign 
countries.46 On the other hand, in general, the target of most tax incentives is business investment, 
either for the attraction of FDIs or for the promotion of domestic investment abroad.47 Therefore, 
this research only focuses on business taxation that influences international trade. Tax incentives 
for agriculture, fisheries, and other non-business activities are not discussed in this research.  
Secondly, WTO law comprises a range of subsidy rules and case law, but the research focuses 
on the regulation on subsidies through the ASCM. The research conducts testing of selected 
Chinese tax incentives against the WTO’s subsidy rules, and therefore it requires relatively 
concrete rules and the definition of a subsidy to proceed with the testing. The ASCM is the outcome 
of previous negotiations in different phases of the development of WTO law.48 The most important 
feature of the ASCM is that it has an internationally agreed upon definition of the term subsidy 
and criteria on the classification of subsidies. Therefore, it provides a relatively clear reference to 
carry out the testing. Furthermore, the ASCM only aims at regulating subsidies on goods, but it 
does not cover subsidies on services.49 The major trade disputes between China and other WTO 
Members are on goods but not on services until now.50 Thus, the research focuses on subsidies on 
goods. Furthermore, the research does not refer to subsidy rules on agricultural products, i.e. the 
AOA.  
With regard to the term tax incentive, the research does not provide a comprehensive definition, 
but it recognizes its characteristics in order to clarify the use of the terminology. A major 
characteristic of a tax incentive is a deviation from the general benchmark of taxation.51 It is a 
                                                          
46 See Appendix I: Matrix of subsidy investigations towards China in the WTO.  
47  Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment; John Chown, 'Tax Competition' (2003) Tax 
Reform and Simplification 4. 
48 The development of subsidy rules in the WTO has been subject to negotiations in the period of the 
adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, the 1979 GATT Subsidies Code in 
the Tokyo Round, and the ASCM in the Uruguay Round. For a detailed description, see Section 3.2.2 in 
Chapter 3. 
49 Although there are discussions on referring to services in the definition of subsidy in the ASCM, there is 
no substantial progress in relation to this in the WTO’s negotiations. See Rüdiger Wolfrum and Peter-
Tobias Stoll, WTO : Trade Remedies (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law 2008) 352. 
50 See Appendix I: Matrix of subsidy investigations towards China in the WTO.  
51 Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment 3; Wolfgang  Schön, Tax Competition in Europe 
(IBFD Publications 2003) 14. 
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transfer of government revenue by decreasing tax obligations based on a reference tax system.52 
In the context of this research, it concentrates on tax incentives as subsidies. If a tax incentive 
applies to all, it is general, whereas if it is only limited to selected subjects or regions, it can be 
regarded as specific. Subsidy regulations in both the WTO and the EU State aid regimes target 
specific governmental measures. Thus, there is a distinction between general tax incentives and 
specific tax incentives. In this research, the term tax incentive mainly refers to specific tax 
incentives as subsidies. 
In addition, the research does not conduct a systematic comparison between the subsidy rules 
of the WTO and EU State aid law, and therefore it does not follow the typical methodologies in 
comparative law.53 The comparative study in this research aims at uncovering differences between 
the results of the separate testing. Thus, the focus is on the application of the rules of the two legal 
regimes to Chinese tax incentives. EU State aid law shares common objectives and has a similar 
legal design as the WTO’s subsidy rules. Therefore, the main purpose of the comparative testing 
is to see whether EU State aid law can be a source of inspiration for both the WTO and China.  
Moreover, the scope of Chinese tax incentives is limited to the present tax incentives, including 
both direct and indirect tax incentives. The evolution of tax incentives in China reveals that, in the 
area of corporate taxation, most preferential tax incentives for FDIs were abolished after the 
promulgation of the EIT law. Because the context of the research is business taxation of 
international trade and investment, the research focuses on corporate tax incentives after the 
promulgation of the EIT law. With regard to indirect tax, the research is limited to current value-
added tax (VAT) incentives that are related to imports and exports. The whole VAT system is still 
under reform in China and most previous consumption tax will be transferred into the VAT 
system.54 Thus, the research focuses on VAT incentives that have already experienced the reform.  
With regard to the source of tax incentives, the research selects tax incentives only from official 
laws, regulations, and circulars issued by the legislative authorities. The EIT law has a separate 
                                                          
52 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law 15. 
53  For typical methodologies in comparative law, see Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz and Tony Weir, 
Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd rev. ed. edn, Clarendon Press 1998); Maurice Adams, Dirk Heirbaut 
and Mark   Van Hoecke, The Method and Culture of Comparative Law : Essays in Honour of Mark Van 
Hoecke (Hart Publishing 2014).  
54 For a further introduction on VAT, see Section 4.7 in Chapter 4.  
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section on tax incentives which serves as a basis for the selection of corporate tax incentives. 
Moreover, the tax authorities in China are the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). They are endowed with legislative power to issue specific tax 
incentives. These official regulations or circulars are also considered tax laws in China.55 The 
research only addresses tax incentives from these official tax laws and selects tax incentives from 
the SAT’s official databases.56 Therefore, it only analyzes official tax incentives granted by the 
tax authorities at the central government level, but it does not examine local tax incentives that are 
discretionarily granted by local governments. The major reason is that the central government is 
working on cleaning up illegal local tax incentives granted by local governments.57 As a result, 
most local tax incentives are probably going to disappear. They are not reliable in this research to 
perform the testing and further analysis.  
Another issue concerning the selection of tax incentives is specificity. The research only selects 
tax incentives that are specific to certain enterprises or regions, since specificity is an essential 
standard in both the WTO’s subsidy regime and the EU State aid regime to qualify as a subsidy 
and a State aid. If a tax incentive is applicable to everyone, it is not likely to constitute a subsidy 
or a State aid, and therefore it probably will not become a problem. The research therefore analyzes 
specific tax incentives that are likely to be incompatible with the international criteria.  
When discussing the origins of tensions between China and the WTO and EU State aid law, 
respectively, the research uses the term “the West” to distinguish from China. The research 
presents China as having its own path towards the granting of tax incentives compared to the major 
Members of the WTO. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the differences between China and the 
WTO and the EU system, the research uses the term “the West”, which generally represents the 
context of the WTO and the EU. The distinction between China and the West is to present that the 
starting points of Chinese tax incentives differ from the Western counterpart. Therefore, the 
                                                          
55 Wei Cui, 'What is the'Law'in Chinese Tax Administration?' (2011) 19 Asia Pacific Law Review  
56 The SAT notice [2015] No.73, Notice on the Issuing of the Code Directory of Tax Incentives, by the 
SAT, 29 October 2015; the SAT notice [2015] No.76, Notice on the Issuing of Administrative Regulation 
of Corporate Tax Incentives, by the SAT, 12 November 2015. 
57 The Chinese State Council issued an official document with the purpose of establishing an open and 
competitive market system, which emphasized removing local discretionary tax incentives. See Guofa 




research does not discuss other transitional economies in the EU or the WTO that share similar 
characteristics with China.   
Lastly, the sources of the research, including literature, legislation, cases, news are updated until 
July 2016. 
1.5 Relevance of the research  
This research can inspire China on reviewing its attitude toward tax incentives, can benefit the 
WTO for rethinking its subsidy rules, and can shed light on the EU State aid law as well. To be 
specific, it provides insights to the alleviation of tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the 
WTO’s subsidy rules, thus further offering implications for both China and the WTO on 
integrating in the world economy. Moreover, doing a comparative study with EU State aid law can 
also provide China with a source of inspiration for reviewing its legal mechanism in respect of tax 
incentives and the WTO for rethinking its subsidy rules with regard to achieving its objectives and 
purposes. 
    First of all, this research can contribute to the settlement of trade disputes between China and 
other WTO Members. The understanding of the relationship between a number of the current 
Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules identifies whether these Chinese tax 
incentives can constitute subsidies under the WTO rules. As stated in the research background, 
China suffers most countervailing investigations from other Members of the WTO, especially with 
focus on tax incentives.58 The research analyzes the compatibility of some of the most recent 
Chinese tax incentives against the WTO’s subsidy rules. Thus, it sheds light on the settlement of 
trade disputes between China and other Members.  
Moreover, the research provides insights into the further integration of China into the world 
economy. In past decades, China’s economy was boosting, especially after its accession to the 
WTO. 59 It was not only considered as the “factory of the world” but also as the “market of the 
world” because of the increasing purchasing power of Chinese people.60 As a significant emerging 
                                                          
58 See Appendix I of the research; Han Xiuli and Gao Bo, 'Export Taxes under the WTO System: Chinas 
Way Out of the Dilemma' (2013) 10 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 336. 
59  China’s gross domestic product (GDP) ranks 2nd in the world in 2015. See the World Bank data, 
<http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table> accessed 4 December 2015.  
60  Interview with Deputy Commissioner Zhang Zhiyong, Strengthening Global Tax Cooperation and 
Combating International Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (8 December 2014), 
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power in the world economy,  the role of tax incentives in China is changing. If there are deeper 
tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules, it is important to analyze 
what the causes of these tensions are, because they will provide insights in how China can find 
solutions to alleviate them. By exploring China’s attitude towards those tax incentives and the 
rationale behind granting them, it is easier to make suggestions adjusting those controversial tax 
incentives if China aims to further integrate into the world economy. Taking into account the world 
standard when designing tax incentives will help China further to create a fair market that is 
familiar with and attractive for more international investment. As a result, such an approach will 
not only benefit China’s economic growth, but it will also create a better investment environment 
for foreign investors.  
This research can also inspire the WTO to rethink its subsidy rules and its role in respect of 
taxation. In case of tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules, it is a 
good opportunity for the WTO to review its rules, especially if its rules cannot function well to 
realize its objects and purposes. The alleviation of tensions not only requires China’s adjustment 
of tax incentives, but also requires the WTO to improve its rules. China is a young Member of the 
WTO, which has a quite different economic system compared to many other Members. With the 
increase of the number of Members of the WTO, the original rules should be adjusted accordingly 
in order to integrate further with an increasing number of national economies of a different nature.  
Additionally, similarities exist between the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid law. The two 
regimes share a common objective:  in order to guarantee a well-functioning international 
respectively internal market, it is necessary to regulate interventions of governments in the market. 
The common objective of creating a level playing field guides the design and functionality of the 
two regimes in a similar way. However, even though they share common objectives, the two 
systems are different, especially concerning tax matters. Actually, the two systems show distinct 
developments in how they apply to taxation. Therefore, doing a comparative study from the EU 
State aid perspective will provide an insightful and innovative angle to reflect on the relationship 
between the world’s general trade standard in respect of the regulation of subsidies and China’s 
attitude towards tax incentives.  The EU is one of the most integrated regional economic areas of 
                                                          
<http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c1353155/content.html> (in Chinese) accessed 4 
December 2015.  
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all regional economic areas. The internal market of the EU is closest to a domestic market. In the 
context of creating a level playing field in the internal market, the EU State aid rules play an 
essential role. Therefore, the EU State aid regime is most suitable for a comparative study. Indeed,  
EU State aid law is not a perfect system taking into account i.e. the current debate on strengthening 
the regulation  in respect of tax competition.61 However, EU State aid law, in particular the case 
law in this context, will provide a rich source for comparison since its body has strongly developed  
over a number of  decades. Considering its success of influencing the development of the EU by 
creating fair competition in the internal market, it can serve very well as a source of inspiration for 
China and the WTO. Therefore, the comparative study may not only inspire China to review the 
granting and regulation of tax incentives, but it may also shed light on the need for the WTO to 
rethink its subsidy rules and its position towards taxation.    
1.6 Structure of the research    
The structure of the research is developed according to the main research questions and sub-
questions, in accordance with the methodologies and limitations.  
Chapter 1 introduces the background of the research, research questions, methodologies, and 
limitations.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview on subsidies and tax incentives as subsidies in the context of 
international trade and investment. It analyzes the rationale of granting tax incentives as subsidies 
by governments and the corresponding effects of tax incentives as subsidies, especially the harmful 
effects. It also discusses reasons for the international legal regulation on tax incentives as subsidies.  
Chapter 3 introduces the subsidy rules of the WTO and EU State aid law respectively, with the 
focus on their application to taxation. Based on the common object and purpose of the two systems, 
the chapter first establishes an external benchmark to evaluate the following testing. Furthermore, 
by comparing the two legal systems, the chapter presents the major similarities and differences 
between them.  
                                                          
61  Rens Bondrager and others, 'The Impact of Fiscal State Aid Recovery Risks on Share Purchase 
Agreements' (2016) 56 European Taxation ; Jean Schaffner and Sophie Balliet, 'BEPS, EU State Aid 
Investigations and LuxLeaks: And What about Luxembourg?' (2016) 23 Internatinal Transfer Pricing 
Journal ; Anja Taferner and Jurjan Wouda Kuipers, 'Tax Rulings: In Line with OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, but Contrary to EU State Aid Rules?' (2016) 56 European Taxation  
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Chapter 4 introduces Chinese tax incentives. It includes two parts: the first part is a 
chronological review of the evolution of direct tax incentives in China. It introduces the “rise and 
fall” of tax incentives for FDI in China. The chapter then develops an internal benchmark for the 
evaluation of Chinese tax incentives. The second part is an introduction to current Chinese tax 
incentives, including corporate tax incentives and VAT incentives. 
Chapter 5 is the testing part in which selected Chinese tax incentives are tested against the 
WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid comparatively. The testing follows the steps synthesized in 
Chapter 3. This chapter also adopts the external and internal benchmarks to review the comparable 
testing. Consequently, it not only reveals the compatibility of certain Chinese tax incentives with 
the WTO’s subsidy rules, but it also displays differences in the testing results.  
Chapter 6 analyzes tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the Western treatment of tax 
incentives, which are revealed by the testing results. It further provides a rethinking of the origins 
of the tensions from both the Western and China’s perspective. It shows different paths that China 
and the West have taken historically, economically, and culturally. Nevertheless, it also presents 
possibilities to alleviate tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the Western standard.  
Chapter 7 answers the research questions by providing recommendations for Chinese tax 
incentives and future of the WTO’s subsidy rules, especially by referring to EU State aid law. On 
the one hand, it provides legal recommendations for China towards the granting of tax incentives 
considering its position in international trade and investment. On the other hand, considering EU 
State aid law and China’s influence, it presents the potential developments for the WTO’s subsidy 
rules and its role in taxation.  








Chapter 2 Overview of Tax Incentives as Subsidies in the Context of  
International Trade and Competition: Rationale for Granting and Regulating 
Tax Incentives 
2.1 Introduction 
    In the context of international trade and competition, the use of subsidies is becoming an 
increasingly important issue. Tax incentives are among the most popular type of subsidy that 
governments use to grant financial aid. By using this method, tax that otherwise would be due is 
foregone in the end.   
This chapter starts with the basic economic theories on market, trade, and competition. 
Afterwards, it defines subsidies and tax incentives as subsidies. Subsequently, according to the 
benchmarks of efficiency and equity, it analyzes how tax incentives as subsidies work in the 
international trade context and their effects for each participant in the market. Based on the effects, 
the chapter analyzes the rationale behind using tax incentives from a government’s perspective 
and, more importantly, the rationale behind regulating them. Moreover, it emphasizes the legal 
regulation of the harmful effects of tax incentives and the necessity for international regulation.  
The context of this research is international trade and competition, which limits the analysis of 
the effects of tax incentives to the basic theories on economics and public finance. They are also 
the starting points to gain an understanding of the rationale for granting and regulating tax 
incentives.   
2.2 Overview of subsidies  
With the development of globalization and the increasing international competition in relation 
to resources, subsidies are becoming a frequently used measure to sponsor certain economic 
activities in the form of governmental financial and fiscal assistance. Especially after the Second 
World War, governments have used more and more subsidies to reach social, economic, and 
political goals.62   
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2.2.1.1 Market, trade, and competition63 
Before discussing the concept, effects of subsidies, and the rationale for disciplining subsidies, 
it is necessary to clarify certain terms and the context of the discussion. The starting point is to 
understand market, trade, competition, and the relationship between them.64  
2.2.1.1.1 The market system 
Currently international trade refers to the circulation of productive factors, goods and services 
in domestic or international markets.65 The background to international trade is the existence of a 
market.66 As explained by economists, the market allocates scarce resources between competing 
end users. In a market, there are two major actors: producers and consumers. A market system 
actually describes the actual and potential transactions and decisions about production and 
consumption between producers and consumers. 67  In an international market, producers and 
consumers from different countries compete with each other through trade. Competition means the 
extent of the actual and potential rivalry between producers for the support of consumers within 
                                                          
63 The economic analysis of subsidies can be viewed from both the trade perspective and the competition 
or welfare perspective. Therefore, subsidies are the subject of international trade law and international 
competition law. See Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid : WTO and EC Law in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 2009) 25-26; Martyn D. Taylor, International 
Competition Law : A New Dimension for the WTO? (Cambridge University Press 2006) 163-184.  
64 To introduce the basic theories on market, trade, and competition, I have referred to some sources. See 
for instance, Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid : WTO and EC Law in Comparative 
Perspective; Taylor, International Competition Law : A New Dimension for the WTO?; Michael Trebilcock, 
Robert Howse and Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (Taylor and Francis 2012); John 
H. Jackson, The World Trading System : Law and Policy of International Economic Relations (2nd ed., 5th 
print. edn, MIT Press 2002); Kyle W. Bagwell, George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis, Law and 
Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade (Cambridge University Pres 2014); Micheau, 
State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law; Alan O. Skyes, Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (Springer 2005); Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th [rev. 
and updated] ed. edn, Oxford University Press 2012); Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, Welfare 
Economics and Social Choice Theory (Springer 2006); Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Röller and 
Vincent Verouden, 'European State Aid Control : An Economic Framework' in Paolo Buccirossi (ed), 
Handbook of Antitrust Economics (Handbook of Antitrust Economics, MIT Press 2008); Damien Neven 
and Vincent Verouden, 'Towards a More Refined Economic Approach in State Aid Control' in Wolfgang 
Mederer and Brice Allibert (eds), EU Competition Law vol IV (EU Competition Law Claeys & Casteels 
2008); Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics : Theory & Policy (The Addison-
Wesley Series in Economics, 8th ed. edn, Pearson/Addison-Wesley 2009); Dennis R. Appleyard, Alfred J. 
Field and Steven L. Cobb, International Economics (7th ed. / edn, McGraw-Hill 2009). 
65 Jackson, The World Trading System : Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 11-13. 
66 Ibid; Skyes, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 85-86; Taylor, International Competition Law : A 
New Dimension for the WTO? 8; Whish and Bailey, Competition Law 3-4.  
67 Taylor, International Competition Law : A New Dimension for the WTO? 9-15. 
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this market in price and non-price terms. 68  The relationship between market, trade, and 
competition can be generalized as “competition occurs through trade in a market.”69  
The standard for evaluating the functioning of the market is economic efficiency, which refers 
to the optimal use and allocation of resources by the market.70 Based on the theory of welfare 
economics, the ultimate objective of a well-functioning market is to maximize social welfare.71 
Social welfare consists of two basic elements: efficiency and equity.72 Efficiency means pushing 
the welfare frontier outward, i.e. “making the cake bigger”, but equity requires moving along the 
welfare frontier, i.e. “dividing the cake better”.73 
(1) Efficiency considerations 
From the perspective of efficiency, social welfare represents the measurement of the welfare 
gains arising from market transactions, which is the aggregate of the net welfare benefit accruing 
to both producers and consumers from the market transactions.74 Under perfect competition,75 an 
optimal operation of the market leads to greater economic efficiency, thereby maximizing social 
welfare. Furthermore, competition enhances efficiency in the market. For producers, competition 
will stimulate them to minimize the costs of production and to explore new products as well, which 
can result in production efficiency and dynamic efficiency. For consumers, the outcome of 
                                                          
68 Ibid 11.  
69 Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid : WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective 25. 
70 According to the modern neoclassical microeconomic theory, the standard economic efficiency is “Pareto 
efficiency”, which means a reallocation of resources that would increase the welfare of at least one person 
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competition between producers are better products or services, lower prices, and broad choices, 
which embody allocative efficiency.76  
However, in reality, perfect competition in the market is rather rare, whereas imperfect 
competition is the normal status. When the resources cannot be allocated appropriately by the 
market, market failures appear.77 There are several reasons for market failures, such as imperfect 
competition, public goods, externalities, incomplete markets, imperfect information, 
unemployment, and other macroeconomic disturbances.78 The main market failures that may be 
relevant in the context of subsidies are externalities79 and imperfect information.80 Therefore, 
economists suggest that government intervention in the market has the potential to offset market 
imperfections and to allocate resources to achieve optimal results.81 They developed the Theory of 
Second Best to depict the effects and risks of government intervention. 82  It reveals that 
governmental intervention aimed at correcting market imperfections in one market may cause 
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market imperfections in other markets. Thus, governments should only intervene when they can 
accurately identify and address the market imperfections.83  
(2) Equity considerations 
Another concern arises from the perspective of equity. The economic theory on efficiency 
proves that competition enhances efficiency in the market. Thus, it is necessary to create a level 
playing field for competition.84 However, the concept of equity is not only an economic term, but 
it also contains legal, social, and cultural values, which make it more subjective and distinctive 
internationally.85 In the context of the current discussion on market, trade, and competition, it also 
refers to the redistribution of social welfare to achieve social equity. As advocated by Rawls (1999), 
distributional fairness is a way to realize justice.86 Following the logic of creating fair competition 
in the market, the starting point here is the equity between producers, i.e. equal opportunities for 
all the producers in the market. The market mechanism itself actually distributes welfare between 
producers and consumers, since competition improves the allocative efficiency of producers. As a 
result, it ensures that producers do not get all the gains of productive efficiency, but it also transfers 
such gains to consumers via reduced prices. 87  However, as analyzed earlier, the market has 
imperfections meaning that it does not always distribute welfare to the optimal extent. Intervention 
by the government therefore has the objective of achieving distributional equity between producers 
and consumers. The ultimate goal is to distribute welfare among society more fairly, i.e. “dividing 
the cake better”. To summarize, the creation of a level playing field for competition aims to achieve 
efficiency in the market as a starting point. The objective can be to realize distributional equity for 
all the participants in the market with respect to social welfare. Nevertheless, there are always 
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trade-offs between efficiency and equity depending on different governments’ social and economic 
objectives.88  
In summary, the relationship between market, trade, and competition serves as the foundation 
to further understand subsidies. The premise for the discussion of subsidies is the existence of the 
market system, liberalized trade, and competition in the market.89 Moreover, market, trade, and 
competition are dynamic processes. This means that the economic analysis of subsidies is not static.  
2.2.1.2 The theory of comparative advantage 
    The theory of comparative advantage, promoted by David Ricardo (1871), explains the 
reasoning for the existence of international trade.90 The theory maintains that each country has an 
absolute advantage with respect to one of the products, i.e. each country can produce greater 
quantities of one product more cheaply than the other country, and that trade between these two 
countries improves their economic situation. If one country has an absolute advantage with respect 
to one product and the other country has an absolute advantage with respect to another product, 
the exchange between both countries will be advantageous if the relationship between the internal 
costs of producing the two products is different. 91  
Further, Heckscher and Ohlin developed the theory to include factors of production in 1920s 
(the Heckscher-Ohiln Theorem), which emphasized that international trade arises due to 
differences in each country’s resources. 92  In the Ricardian theory, costs of production are 
exogenously determined by the available technology. Countries specialized in the production of 
those goods can produce with the lowest cost. On the contrary, the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem 
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views cost as endogenously determined and predicts that a country will produce and export the 
commodity that intensively uses the factor which that the country has in abundance.93  
However, the limitation of these theories is that the market is in perfect competition, i.e. 
producers believe that they can sell all their production at the market price and they cannot 
influence the fixing of such a price.94 As mentioned before, in reality, this situation can hardly 
exist. More often, the market is in imperfect competition, where companies are aware that they 
can set the price of their products and will sell more if they reduce their prices.95  
    The theory of comparative advantage and the factor proportion hypothesis serve as the 
foundation to understand the economics of international trade, which is also the precondition for 
analyzing subsidies further. 
2.2.2 Concept of subsidies  
2.2.2.1 Economic and legal concepts of subsidies  
    The issue of subsidies has been discussed a lot, but it is still difficult to find a precise concept 
of subsidies.96 To understand the concept, it is better to analyze it from both economic and legal 
perspectives. Because the concept can be very broad, the research focuses on understanding it 
within the scope of international trade and competition.  
    From the perspective of economics, subsidies are generally considered as a government transfer 
of money to an entity in the private sector or the provision of a good or service at a price below 
what a private entity would otherwise have to pay for it.97 A subsidy may also be defined as any 
government program or practice that benefits certain enterprises or sectors and increases their 
profitability.98 This section describes subsidies by firstly identifying certain features. A subsidy is 
a form of governmental action; forms of subsidies can be diverse; and the outcome of subsidies 
can benefit certain subjects, thus affecting competition in the international market and international 
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trade, etc. In addition, subsidies usually have specific targets, i.e. specific sectors or industries in 
the market. 99 
From a legal perspective, although each state has its own regulations on subsidies, the lack of a 
unified definition of subsidy can cause misunderstandings and abuse of the application of those 
regulations. Therefore, the concept of a subsidy is defined respectively by the World Trade 
Organizations (WTO) and the European Union (EU), the two most developed systems for 
regulating this governmental measure internationally.100 In the WTO, there is a set of rulings with 
respect to the regulation of subsidies, the main regulation of which is provided in the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ASCM). Under the ASCM, a subsidy is defined 
as a financial contribution made by a government or any public body which confers a benefit that 
is specific.101 In the EU, a similar concept of subsidy is developed and referred to as State aid. A 
State aid means any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods and shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be 
incompatible with the internal market.102  
2.2.2.2 Nature of subsidies  
(1) Governmental intervention into the economy via fiscal revenue 
According to the theory of the market economy, under a market economy system, subsidies are 
the governmental use of fiscal revenue to intervene the economy.103 Subsidies are funded from tax 
revenue paid by taxpayers, which can involve direct and indirect budgetary costs through forgone 
tax revenues. Therefore, the provision of subsidies is a redistribution of national income. 104  
(2) Instruments to achieve governmental objectives 
Governments grant subsidies. From agovernment’s perspective, subsidies are instruments used 
to achieve certain social or economic goals, such as adjusting resource allocation, boosting the 
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economy, attracting investment, and improving equality. Subsidies are instruments.105 There is a 
distinction between general subsidies and specific subsidies. Governments are free to offer general 
subsidies to industries, but, in reality, governments often grant subsidies to specialized sectors or 
activities. Specific subsidies reveal a government’s particular objectives to support certain 
industries or regions.106  
2.3 Tax incentives as subsidies     
2.3.1 Concept of tax incentives  
The concept of tax incentives is vague, but it has certain features. A common element in the 
notion is that there is a deviation from a benchmark tax system.107 In the context of international 
trade, tax incentives normally target economic development. 108  They can be considered as a 
transfer of government revenue that is achieved by reducing tax obligations based on a benchmark 
tax system.109 It does not require a direct grant of cash that may become a burden on fiscal 
expenditure. By using tax incentives, tax that otherwise would be due is foregone in the end. 110  
2.3.2 Tax incentives as subsidies  
2.3.2.1 The term “tax incentives as subsidies” 
Tax incentives are one of the most popular subsidy types used to grant financial assistance. 
When subsidies are in the form of tax incentives, the effects on international trade or international 
competition can be significant.111  
It has to be clarified that not every tax incentive falls within the scope of subsidies. Similar to 
subsidies, tax incentives deviate from the normal benchmark and there is a distinction between 
general and specific tax incentives. If tax incentives are embedded in the tax law system and are 
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applied to all, the tax incentive is general. In contrast, if tax incentives are only limited to selected 
recipients, which deviates from the normal tax rules, these tax incentives can be regarded as 
specific. This research focuses on the analysis of tax incentives as subsidies in the context of 
international trade and competition, and therefore it focuses on specific tax incentives.  
2.3.2.2 Reasons for governments to use tax incentives as subsidies  
(1) Efficiency 
Governments prefer to use tax incentives rather than direct subsidy instruments because they 
consider tax incentives to be more efficient than direct subsidies. This is especially the case in 
relation to developing countries when they intend to attract FDI.112  
    At the stage of legislation, it is possible to grant tax incentives faster compared to granting direct 
subsidies. The source of the financing of subsidies is tax revenue and subsidies are granted through 
the redistribution of national income. To grant direct subsidies, it always requires a budgetary 
scrutiny procedure. In fact, it becomes more and more difficult for governments to get approval 
for subsidy programs, especially in a period of a budget crunch or financial crisis.113 Hence, by 
providing subsidies through tax incentives, the government does not have to go through an 
independent and time-consuming budgetary scrutiny procedure. 114  Although the lawmaking 
process itself may require a formal and complicated procedure as well, once it is stipulated in the 
tax legislation, the provision of tax incentives can be direct and efficient.115  
    At the stage of implementation, tax administrators are experts on tax issues, and they are well 
trained and fast to take action. Governments always trust tax administrations can achieve their 
policy goals by administering the implementation of tax incentives. The automatic implementation 
of tax incentives also results in efficient enforcement, since governments do not have to set up a 
special institution to carry out and supervise the subsidy programs. However, governments often 
overestimate the capability of tax administrations, thus overly relying on them to implement very 
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technical and complex tax incentives. In such situations, tax administrations are overloaded and 
lack concrete guidance to perform. Since tax administrations have limitations as well, the 
efficiency of the tax incentives can be affected.116   
(2) Flexibility 
    Another reason that governments prefer to use tax incentives is that they believe tax incentives 
are more flexible than direct subsidies.117 For the recipients of tax incentives, there are various 
forms and levels of tax incentives that can be used individually or combined, thereby allowing 
individuals or firms to determine how much the particular activity is to be supported and how to 
maximize the benefits derived from using these instruments. Furthermore, taxpayers themselves 
can decide how to apply tax incentives to fit their interests best. In addition, payments to 
beneficiaries through the tax system are automatic, which seems more simplified for them.118 
Nevertheless, the so-called flexibility is not always flexible once tax incentives are stipulated in 
the legislation, as it is more difficult to alter tax laws than direct subsidy programs. The amendment 
of tax laws always has to go through the legislative process, while changing a direct subsidy 
program could take place within the government. 119   
(3) Transparency 
    To a certain degree, tax incentives can be considered less transparent than direct subsidies, and 
therefore, for governments, tax incentives might be less debated or investigated.120 Direct subsidies 
are always controlled by a special entity in the government, thereby resulting in a higher 
administrative authority. This administrative entity can ensure stricter supervision of the outgoing 
capital for both the government and the beneficiaries.121 With regard to the tax incentives, they do 
not always go through the supervision process required for direct subsidies. For instance, direct 
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subsidies always target particular subjects providing a specific preferential treatment, however, a 
tax incentive, for instance, might appear to apply in general to all subjects, but de facto it may only 
benefit certain taxpayers. The latter is obviously less transparent than direct subsidy programs, and 
this kind of tax incentive is regarded as a disguised subsidy. With the development of globalization, 
especially in the context of international trade, direct subsidies can easily be considered to be trade 
barriers, and therefore governments are gradually abolishing direct subsidy programs and creating 
more tax incentives to achieve certain objectives.122  
    However, it is not always the case that direct subsidies are more transparent than tax incentives, 
because, if tax incentives are to be stipulated in tax laws, the launch of new laws and the 
amendment of previous laws have to go through a formal and complicated procedure as well. This 
exposure can increase the transparency of new tax incentives.  
2.3.3 Tax incentives and tax expenditures 
    The concept of a tax expenditure was firstly promoted by an American scholar Stanley Surrey 
in 1970, and it was widely accepted across countries. 123  The concept describes special tax 
provisions that represent government expenditures made through the tax system to achieve 
economic and social objectives. These special tax provisions provide deductions, credits, 
exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates, and serve the same purpose as direct 
government expenditures programs.124  
    Kraan (2004) defined a tax expenditure as “a transfer of public resources that is achieved by 
reducing tax obligations with respect to a benchmark tax, rather than by a direct expenditure”.125 
The most obvious feature in the notion is a deviation from a tax system benchmark. 126  The 
benchmark includes the rate structure, accounting conventions, deductibility of compulsory 
payment, provisions to facilitate tax administration, and international fiscal obligations, etc.127 
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Governments do not bother to collect tax first and then distribute revenues again. Therefore, it can 
be less costly to the tax administration if the procedure is less complicated.128     
It seems that tax incentives are similar to tax expenditures, but there are still differences between 
the two.129 The term tax expenditure is from the government’s perspective, which focuses more on 
national fiscal and budgetary control system. In contrast, the concept of tax incentives is more 
from the taxpayers’ perspective, who are beneficiaries of the tax incentives. The establishment of 
tax expenditures actually aims at managing tax incentives from the budget, which is always subject 
to the authorization and supervision of the legislative authorities. Thus, it refers to a higher level 
in relation to the administration of tax incentives.130 Accordingly, tax incentives are embedded in 
the national budgetary control system through tax expenditures, so the concept of tax incentives is 
included within the meaning of tax expenditures. 131  Additionally, tax expenditure is a more 
generalized and broader concept compared to tax incentives. Tax expenditures aim at providing 
general incentives for social or economic activities, but tax incentives can have more precise 
objectives, such as attracting investment and promoting particular sectors.132  
2.3.4 Tax incentives as a method of tax competition 
Governments usually introduce tax incentives to increase competitiveness in tax competition. 
Tax competition can be regarded as an outcome of the application of tax incentives by countries. 
As defined by Pinto (2003), tax competition is “the lowering of the tax burden in order to improve 
a country’s economy and welfare by increasing the competitiveness of domestic business and/or 
attracting foreign investment.”133 It is also defined by Kiekebeld (2004) as “improving the relative 
competitive position of one country vis-à-vis other countries by reducing the tax burden on 
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business and individuals in order to remain, gain or regain mobile economic activities and the 
corresponding tax base, whether at the expense of other countries or otherwise”.134 In general, tax 
competition exists when enterprises or individuals can reduce tax burdens by shifting capital or 
labor from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.135  
The main classification of tax competition is vertical tax competition and horizontal tax 
competition.136 The former means competition between governments of different levels, such as 
between the central government and the local government. Horizontal tax competition means tax 
competition between different countries or competition between governments, such as tax 
competition between the Member States in the EU.137 
In an international context, countries involved in tax competition intend to achieve certain goals, 
such as increasing their international competence. This also implies a way of classifying tax 
competition, i.e. inbound tax competition to attract foreign investment or capital, and outbound 
tax competition to stimulate domestic economy and encourage exportation.138 
Tax competition flourishes with the development of globalization.139 Historically, tax policies 
primarily address domestic economic and social concerns, but the globalization of trade and 
investment has increased the potential impact that domestic tax policies can have on other 
economies. It has led to increased competition among businesses in the global market. 140 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) and investors are free to choose among various countries 
systems. Therefore, with the internationalization of MNEs and their cross-border transactions, tax 
competition is becoming more and more fierce and advanced.  141  
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2.4 Rationale for granting tax incentives as subsidies  
Governments grant tax incentives and they do so with certain economic or social objectives. 
The rationale for them to grant tax incentives is that they believe such powerful instruments are 
helpful to achieve their goals. Indeed, according to economic theories, tax incentives can bring 
benefits, thereby realizing governments’ policy goals. Moreover, tax incentives, as a government’s 
intervention into the market, can increase economic efficiency under specific conditions. The 
economic analysis on tax incentives shows the positive effects of tax incentives. In order to present 
the effects of tax incentives, it is assumed that there are three main actors in the market: 
governments as the incentive providers, producers (firms) as the incentive receivers, and 
consumers as third parties whose interests are affected. The analysis of the rationale is from both 
efficiency and equity perspectives, based on the relationship between market, trade, and 
competition that has been discussed. Considering the specific and direct influence of tax incentives 
on tax competition, the analysis also addresses the effects on tax competition.   
2.4.1 Efficiency rationale 
2.4.1.1 Correcting market failures 
Tax incentives are an instrument used by governments to influence the market. Governments 
always find justifications for granting tax incentives namely as correcting market failures.  
    Firstly, tax incentives can reallocate resources properly.142 One form of market failure is an 
imbalance between demand and supply, i.e. the amount of goods and services on the market 
outweighs the consumption ability or vice versa. In this situation, tax incentives can adjust the 
imbalances by stimulating the production when there is short supply or by controlling the 
production in oversupply.  
    Secondly, governments can sponsor investments in industries that require large amounts of 
money and in which private enterprises usually will not invest.143 It is especially important to 
subsidize activities such as employment, research and development (R&D) development, and the 
protection of environment etc. In addition, the public goods that the market cannot provide can 
also be offered through governmental subsidization.    
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    The ultimate goal of correcting market failures is to increase domestic market efficiency. 
Governments adopt tax incentives to improve domestic market efficiency, which contributes to the 
country’s competitiveness in foreign markets. 144  For example, when domestic efficiency has 
improved, domestic enterprises tend to export, especially when there is over capacity in the 
domestic market. However, facing protectionism in the importing country, export subsidies are 
able to assist domestic producers to re-establish a competitive status in the foreign market.145  
2.4.1.2 Supporting infant industry 
Granting protective tax incentives to domestic infant industries can help start-ups to take the 
time to grow stronger.146 Tax incentives may reduce their costs of production and stimulate them 
to expand production or to make decisions to enter or exit a market. With the increase of their 
production, infant industries can even grow faster than mature competitors. To a certain degree, 
without tax incentives, a producer may not expand its production because it would not be profitable. 
However, when other conditions remain the same, a tax incentive may make it profitable for the 
producer to invest in new production or to invest in foreign markets.147 In the long run, this kind 
of subsidy will assist domestic producers to participate more and even enjoy a beneficial status in 
foreign markets.  
It is obviously beneficial for governments because they appreciate the associated outcome 
derived from the growth of those infant industries, such as technology transfer, increase of 
employment, and improvement of core competences, etc..148  
2.4.1.3 Strategic trade theory 
Strategic trade theory was promoted by Barbara Spencer and James Brander (1986),149 who 
reviewed subsidies according to the maximization of national welfare. According to Spencer and 
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Brander, because of imperfect competition in the international market, many industries gain 
significant profits. Using subsidies, governments can encourage resources flowing to certain 
domestic sectors, thereby increasing the strategic advantages in those sectors and shifting those 
international profits to domestic firms, consequently increasing domestic income.150   
    From a dynamic analysis, domestic tax incentives may have the objective effect of reducing the 
net costs of production, which could also stimulate the exportation of those products. As a result, 
the expansion of exports can assist the domestic producers to accumulate capital, improve 
technology, accumulate resources, and accordingly improve the overall welfare.151  
2.4.2 Equity rationale  
Tax incentives not only can improve efficiency in the market, but they can also readjust 
inequities. They work as instruments for governments to redistribute social welfare and adjust 
inequalities. For example, , private investors are rarely willing to invest in underdeveloped regions 
without preferential incentives such as regional tax incentives, since it is difficult to generate 
revenues in such regions, compared to investing in developed regions where the market and 
resources are better. However, if governments can offer tax incentives for investment in those 
underdeveloped regions, the situation may be changed. Also, as a method redistributing national 
income, the use of tax incentives can support the establishment of public infrastructure and services 
and reduce inequity between different regions. 152 
2.4.3 Sound tax competition 
    When considering the effects on tax competition, the above-mentioned rationale is the same for 
countries to grant tax incentives. 
    High tax rates may inhibit economic growth, but tax competition, which encourages lower tax 
rates, could be beneficial to the economy. This is known as the Tiebout hypothesis. 153  This 
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hypothesis argues that competition for mobile households is welfare enhancing and subsequent 
work has applied similar ideas to competition for mobile firms. The hypothesis also deals with the 
idea of “voting with one’s feet”, i.e. households and firms leave the jurisdiction of a particular tax 
authority if they feel that the tax burden is too great in that jurisdiction. The taxpayers  decision-
making process can stimulate the provision of local public goods according to the taste of 
residents.154  
    Sound tax competition means that a general reduction of the tax burden is usually acceptable if 
it is directed towards internal tax efficiency and improving a country’s attractiveness compared to 
other countries.155 Tax competition can facilitate economic growth by encouraging governments 
to adopt reasonable tax policies. Moreover, sound tax competition forces governments to maintain 
reasonable levels of public expenditure and improves the efficiency of the public administration, 
leading to a reduction of its size in relation to public services. 156 
    In summary, sound tax competition is beneficial given that it prevents high tax rates and low 
efficiency, and it promotes investment and economic growth. It also stimulates productivity and 
innovation.157 Tax competition puts pressure on states to become more efficient with regard to how 
they raise and spend taxes. Therefore, it can provide a better economic environment at the lowest 
possible tax cost.  
2.5 Rationale for regulating tax incentives as subsidies  
Economics are in dynamics. Although governments claim the beneficial effects of tax 
incentives as reasons for granting them, the actual effects can be contradictory. Therefore, the 
alleged benefits can turn into harms or negative effects. The following sections demonstrate that 
the alleged benefits mentioned above are likely to be harmful for other market participants or even 
for the governments themselves. By analyzing the adverse effects of tax incentives, it is much 
clearer to assess tax incentives and the rationale for regulating them.  
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2.5.1 Efficiency rationale 
2.5.1.1 Distortion caused by correcting market failures 
(1) Distortion of resource allocation 
    Tax incentives can artificially change the comparative advantage of a country, producing an 
inefficient allocation of resources.158 In a country’s domestic market, for instance, if a government 
provides a tax incentive to the producer of a certain good, the incentive reduces the cost of 
production. However, resources are employed to produce selected goods rather than other goods 
of greater value. As a result, such resources are not allocated most efficiently, since they are not 
allocated to their most productive use.  
    Moreover, in the international market, tax incentives, especially export-oriented incentives, 
divert resource allocation in the importing country’s market.159 Thus, tax incentives reduce global 
welfare by promoting the production of goods in one country that another country could have 
produced more efficiently, leading to lower economic welfare worldwide. From this perspective, 
tax incentives are assumed to “tilt the playing field” as opposed to maintain a “level playing 
field”.160 
(2) Distortion effects on third countries 
    Products with export subsidies to a foreign country not only affect the importing country itself, 
but they also influence other countries in the international market. 161  For example, Country A 
exports to Country B, meanwhile, Country C also exports to Country B. When Country A provides 
subsidies to its domestic enterprises exporting to Country B, Country B can take countermeasures 
towards Country A when encountering distortion and a reduction of welfare to counteract the 
subsidy influence caused by Country A. However, as a competitor of Country A, Country C cannot 
compete with Country A’s enterprises. As a result, the enterprises of Country C may exit from 
Country B’s market. Consequently, Country C’s producers will encounter losses that cannot be 
compensated by Country B’s countermeasures.162 Hence, subsidies can create new market failures 
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in another market or just transfer those failures to other countries. As a whole, they do not solve 
the problem, but they can create new distortions and welfare losses.  
(3) Governmental failures 
    The decisions of governments may bring about detrimental outcomes. Usually, when private 
choices face failures, they are easily adjusted since the scale is always small; however, public 
choices by governments are more difficult to change or abandon if the scale is large and the effects 
are concentrated in certain sectors or activities. 163  Once the effects of subsidies cannot be 
controlled well, the distortion and social welfare losses may be more severe than the original 
market failures.  
    In addition, government intervention is costly and its administrative costs may exceed the 
benefits of correcting the market failures.164 The decision can also be taken on misinformation if 
regulators have less information than market participants have. Above all, governments are in 
principle as self-interested as market participants are, and therefore they might be more concerned 
with maximizing their private utility than the welfare of whole society.165 Therefore, the efficient 
correction of market failures actually depends on the correction cost.  
Furthermore, excessive government intervention can also trigger political lobbying and 
corruption that may easily cause power rent-seeking. 166 For example, interest groups can influence 
governments to adopt their suggestions on tax incentives, which mainly represent their interests 
developed via lobbying and financial sponsorship. Consequently, the use of tax incentives for 
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certain sectors or activities is not always based on the consideration of social welfare or domestic 
efficiency, but instead, it is affected by special interest groups. On the other hand, the lobbying of 
related interest groups can also easily result in corruption.167 Therefore, the results of governmental 
failures can be more severe than market failures. 
2.5.1.2 Side effects of supporting infant industries  
As analyzed before, tax incentives can help start-ups to learn and grow more quickly. However, 
infant industries may eventually grow into mature industries, and they can enjoy a more 
advantageous competition status in the domestic market with continuous subsidies.168 Moreover, 
subsidies protect infant industries from pressure from competition in the market, and cause them 
to lack the motive to innovate.169 In this situation, the extreme case could be that enterprises would 
be more reliant on governmental support, resulting in enterprises that otherwise would be out of 
the market continue to be able to stay on the market. This is an artificially caused deviation from 
market rules, which means that, once subsidies are cancelled, those enterprises may end up in a 
worse-off situation.170   
Tax incentives can also result in protectionism. In the long run, infant industries with subsidies 
are likely to form monopolies in the market and make domestic consumers worse off.171 Provided 
that other conditions on the market do not alter, in this case, other competitors may gradually leave 
the market or be left with only a small share of the market. Hence, the subsidized producers are 
likely to be able to manipulate the price of products, thereby affecting customers’ welfare.172 
However, this situation appears only under the assumption that the tax incentive is the only variant 
that affects the market position of enterprises, while other variants stay stable. In reality, this 
situation will rarely exist, but the role tax incentives play should not be neglected.173 
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2.5.1.3 Strategic trade policy leading to game theory 
    Subsidies granted in the name of strategic trade policies can turn into a prisoner’s dilemma,174 
which makes both subsidized and unsubsidized parties worse off.175  
       No Subsidy        Subsidy 
Country B               





Country A       






    Supposing that there are two countries in the market, Country A and Country B, the use of export 
subsidies as a strategic trade policy can be illustrated in the following three situations:  
(1) One country grants subsidies while the other does not. For instance, Country A subsidizes 
domestic enterprises to export to Country B, but Country B does not have countermeasures. It can 
be speculated that the enterprises of Country A would be better off in the market of Country B, 
because, with Country A’s subsidies, products can enter B’s market with more competitive prices, 
and therefore will occupy larger market shares. In the long run, they can also force enterprises 
without B’s subsidies to withdraw from the market. From the perspective of international trade, A 
would be better off, but B would incur losses. Vice versa, if Country B provides export subsidies 
to products entering Country A’s market, the result is the same. B will be better off by sacrificing 
A’s benefits.  
(2) Both countries grant subsidies. In this case, suppose that Country A grants export subsidies 
to domestic products exporting to Country B. However, Country B has an identical strategy 
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towards Country A, namely, export subsidies provided to domestic products exporting to Country 
A and protective subsidies to local enterprises to compete with A’s subsidized products. In the end, 
the situation can develop into a trade war. Consequently, neither A nor B could gain advantages 
in the international market, as both of them would end up worse.  
(3) Neither country grants subsidies. Without the use of subsidies, trade between Country A and 
Country B just follows the theory of comparative advantages and free-market theory. Nevertheless, 
either Country A or Country B should try to avoid becoming the first grantor of subsidies in order 
to gain unilateral advantages. Otherwise, the result will evolve into the situations mentioned in (1) 
or (2). 
    In the situation of tax incentives as export subsidies, domestic products can enter a foreign 
market with lower prices, which may benefit foreign consumers in general. 177  Nevertheless, 
foreign local producers may have an opposite attitude, because they encounter unfair competition. 
Without the same subsidization, local competitors cannot afford to have prices of products as low 
as the subsidized imported products; consequently, they may exit the market.178 However, in the 
long run, tax incentives as export subsidies can still damage the consumers’ welfare since, when 
competitors exit the market, there is an increasing dependence on subsidized imported products 
and the producers are subsequently able to act as monopolies.179 In this case, subsidies can be used 
as a form of predatory competition, i.e. the prices of the subsidized products are very low so that 
other competitors in the market would not be able to compete.180  
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From a dynamic perspective, the strategic trade policy not only damages the country who grants 
the subsidies but it also distorts competition and results in a reduction of global welfare. What is 
worse, if there is no control of the use of subsidies, more and more countries would be involved in 
upgrading the subsidy-granting competition, which can eventually make all the participants worse 
off and impair global welfare.  
2.5.2 Equity rationale 
    Despite that the objective of subsidies is to remove inequality between individuals, enterprises, 
and regions, the effect or the result can be unequal. This is because subsidies are not granted to all 
but only to a selected group of individuals or enterprises. The selective nature means that it has to 
distinguish between different potential recipients. Indeed, the selected groups might originally be 
in a disadvantageous position and subsidies just help to readjust their impartial position. However, 
subsidies could also result in a new situation of inequality.  
Tax incentives for specific regions can lead to regional tax competition. 181  Governments 
provide tax incentives in less-developed regions with the purpose of attracting investment to the 
regions that could bring more capital, technology, and employment, etc. However, even within a 
country, different regions compete on a horizontal level, and this is especially the case in federal 
countries. States launch various tax incentives to draw investment and resources. Regions that have 
the government’s support are likely to be better off. In the long run, if they continue to enjoy those 
incentives, the level playing field is tilted again. In order to compete with these regions, other 
regions have to grant more tax incentives, which may end up with the worst situation in a prisoner’s 
dilemma.  
In addition, most tax incentives aim at the attraction of FDI to the domestic market, thus offering 
preferential treatment to foreign enterprises. This is especially typical in developing countries.182 
Nevertheless, this action harms the equity between domestic and foreign enterprises. Foreign 
enterprises are able to enjoy public goods without contributing significantly to their financing 
through corporate tax, but domestic enterprises who do not have access to those incentives must 
                                                          
181 Fiona Wishlade, 'When Policy Worlds Collide: Tax Competition, State Aid, and Regional Economic 
Development in the EU' (2012) 34 Journal of European Integration 585. 
182 Brauner, 'The Future of Tax Incentives' 25-26. 
44 
 
pay for the revenue loss resulting from the incentives to those foreign enterprises. This situation 
eventually distorts the fair competition between domestic and foreign enterprises.183  
Furthermore, although governments intend to use tax incentives to improve equality, it is critical 
to analyze who is the real beneficiary. From the government’s point of view, tax incentives are 
aimed at the taxpayers, and particularly the high-income taxpayers. They provide most benefits to 
wealthy taxpayers and non-taxpayers do not benefit. Only eligible taxpayers can benefit from those 
tax incentives; this upside-down effect can cause the same problem as unequal treatment.184 
2.5.3 Harmful tax competition 
Another reason to restrict the use of tax incentives is harmful tax competition. According to the 
OECD report on harmful tax competition, “harmful” features can be listed as: no or low effective 
tax rates; “ring-fencing”, i.e. specific tax incentives for foreign taxpayers; lack of transparency; 
lack of effective exchange of information; artificial definition of the tax base; failure to adhere to 
generally accepted transfer pricing principles; exemption of foreign-source income; negotiable tax 
rate or tax base; secrecy provisions; treaty network; and active promotion of tax scheme.185 
The EU has a similar standard for identifying harmful tax measures, which is in the 1997 EU 
Code of Conduct. It includes an effective level of taxation considerably lower than the general 
level of taxation in the country concerned; tax advantages that are granted only to non-residents; 
tax incentives for activities that are isolated from the domestic economy and, therefore, have no 
effect on the national tax base; the granting of tax advantages without any real economic activity 
and substantial economic presence; a basis for the profit determination for companies that departs 
from internationally accepted rules, particularly those approved by the OECD; and a lack of 
transparency.186  
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    Tax competition can result in a “race to the bottom”. As discussed before, countries always 
employ tax incentives to attract foreign investment. This method creates opportunities for 
enterprises to shift investments much more easily throughout the world. However, countries 
compete to draw investments flowing into the domestic market at the expense of other countries’ 
opportunities of gaining tax revenues. 187  This consistent competition leads to a “race to the 
bottom”, which can also be explained by a prisoner’s dilemma. Without exchange of information 
and a consistent agreement on a coordinated approach, when facing this competitive rivalry, 
countries feel forced to keep their special tax incentives and countermeasures, but the situation 
damages the interests of all the parties. Eventually, everyone ends up poorer.188 
To summarize, when harmful tax competition occurs, investors may modify their decisions in 
order to take advantage of incentives, thus resulting in a misallocation of resources. It has further 
potential to cause countries to race to the bottom, after which every party is worse off. It also 
distorts fair competition between firms with and without the incentives.  
2.6 Matrix: comparing the rationale for granting and regulating tax incentives 
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Rationale for granting tax incentives as subsidies: 
benefits   
Rationale for regulating tax incentives as 






1. Correcting market failures: 
a. Allocate resources properly 
b. Support large investment 
c. Increase domestic market efficiency 
1. Distortion caused by correcting market 
failures: 
a. Distortion of resource allocation 
b. Distortion effects on third countries 
c. Governmental failures 
2. Supporting infant industries:  
Infant industries can grow into mature 
industries 
2. Side effects of supporting infant industries:  
Preferential position, protectionism, monopoly 
3. Strategic trade theory: 
Support exportation, better position in 
the international market 
3. Strategic trade policy leading to game theory: 
Game theory: prisoner’s dilemma 
Tax competition: race to the bottom 
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2.7 International legal regulation of tax incentives  
2.7.1 Benchmarks for regulation: efficiency and equity 
Previous analysis shows that tax incentives can have both beneficial and adverse effects based 
on the benchmark of efficiency and equity in the market. As discussed, the relationship between 
market, trade, and competition serves as the basis and context for understanding the effects of tax 
incentives. Although the evaluation of a certain tax incentive is carried out on a case-by-case 
basis,189 efficiency and equity in the market are general benchmarks for introducing regulations on 
tax incentives. The operation of the market, especially in the context of international trade and 
competition, requires that governmental intervention causes as little harm as possible, considering 
the increase of market efficiency. Moreover, since competition enhances efficiency, in order to 
maintain a level playing field for competition, the distortionary effects of tax incentives should 
also be controlled. This is also the requirement of achieving distributional equity in society by 
regulating the abuse of tax incentives.  
2.7.2 Regulating the harmful effects of tax incentives  
Due to the potential harmful effects of tax incentives in the context of international trade and 
competition, it is necessary to regulate the use of tax incentives. Economics is in flux, which means 
that a tax incentive granted with the objective to increase efficiency or equity in the market can 
still bring adverse effects to the market, trade, and competition. This is evident in the previous 
sections.  
    The regulation of tax incentives actually aims at their regulation of the harmful effects. When 
determining the regulation of the harmful effects, normally there are three situations: the tax 
incentive generates benefits and brings little or no harm; the tax incentive leads to harm, but 
balancing the harm with the benefits, the harm is affordable since the overall benefits are higher; 
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e.g. decrease regional disparity 
Create new inequality due to selectivity 
Tax 
competition 
Sound tax competition: 
Increase efficiency and equity 
Lower tax rates 
Better allocation of national income 
 
Harmful tax competition: 
Decrease efficiency and equity 
Inefficient resource allocation 




harm caused by the tax incentive outweighs the benefits.190 The regulation interferes more in the 
latter two situations when the harm caused by the tax incentives substantially affects trade and 
competition in the market and further damages economic efficiency and equity.   
2.7.3 Legal regulation based on the rule of law 
Regulation here means legal regulation, which imposes restrictions on governmental behaviors. 
The market economy is actually a rule of law economy.191 The key feature of the market economy 
is private ownership, i.e. resources are owned by private individuals. It makes both trading parties 
better off.192 Economic interest is very important for individuals and personal choice is the basis 
of transactions. Thus, the proper functioning of the market requires a guarantee of effective laws 
and institutions that restrain the discretionary power of governments. The rule of law provides the 
basic guarantee that has replaced the social order of human relationships.193 In order to limit the 
harmful effects of tax incentives, governments should be subject to the rule of law.194  
The rule of law is a very broad and intensive concept, which reflects different values in different 
social circumstances.195 However, it is commonly acknowledged that the threshold conditions of 
the rule of law are to restrain the arbitrary and inequitable use of state power and to protect 
individual rights.196 In an economic context, a government’s behavior is regulated by the rule of 
law which ensures efficiency in the market, since it entails freedom of entry into the market, access 
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and the French État de droit. See Pietro Costa, Danilo Zolo and Emilio Santoro, The Rule of Law History, 
Theory and Criticism (Springer 2007) 7. 
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to relevant information, and the security of contracts. 197 Based on the basic theory of public 
finance, in the field of taxation, governments should confine the main economic functions to the 
stabilization of economic activity, redistribution of income and wealth, and the allocation of 
resources, so that the market still functions as the major actor in allocating resources.198 A rule-
based system can increase the transparency and accountability of governments and minimize the 
harmful effects caused by government intervention into the market.199 In order to control the 
harmful effects of tax incentives, the legal regulation normally entails both ex-ante and ex-post 
assessment.200 Ex-ante assessment means that, before introducing a tax incentive, governments 
should estimate the effects of the incentive according to certain legal and economic criteria. Ex-
post assessment refers to the termination of tax incentives after periodical reviews on their effects. 
If there is no renewal, they should be terminated. Further analysis on the rule of law regulation of 
tax incentives will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
2.7.4 International regulation 
Considering the cross-border or supranational effects of tax incentives, it is important to 
determine the supranational or international regulation of those incentives.201 In the context of 
international trade and competition, one country’s tax incentives affect other countries’ status of 
competition on the international market. Regardless of which justification is given for granting tax 
incentives, they can all lead to distortions in other countries. Particularly, in the specific context of 
tax competition, the abuse of tax incentives becomes an international issue that requires 
international regulations.202 The race to the bottom is a typical example which results from harmful 
tax competition internationally. All countries would be better off if they would cooperate on an 
international level. Therefore, based on the benchmark of promoting economic efficiency and 
equity in the international market, it is necessary to regulate the harmful supranational effects of 
tax incentives. 
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Additionally, one country’s domestic interest groups have less chances to influence the rules 
and institutions on the international level, and therefore the international regulations create rather 
a fair platform for competition.203 This serves the equity objective in relation to the regulation of 
tax incentives, which reduces governmental failures that usually occur domestically.  
Internationally, there are two major legal systems that regulate governmental actions that create 
trade barriers or affect competition in the market. The WTO and the EU, the most developed 
international organizations in the area of international or transnational trade, have specific 
regulations on subsidies, with the focus on taxation.204 The following chapter introduces and 
analyzes these two legal systems more in depth.   
2.8 Conclusion 
    Governments use tax incentives as subsidies to achieve different objectives, such as correcting 
market failures, supporting infant industries, stimulating exportation, attracting FDI, and 
improving equality. Indeed, they play a role in realizing these goals and bring with them beneficial 
effects, which become the main reasons for governments to employ such instruments. However, 
economics is constantly in flux. The analysis on effects of tax incentives also demonstrates harmful 
effects with respect to efficiency and equity in the market. The alleged benefits pursued by 
governments can nevertheless cause disadvantages. Tax incentives aiming at correcting market 
failures can cause worse welfare loss and new failures; tax incentives targeting at supporting infant 
industries can prompt them into becoming monopolists in the market; export subsidies could 
trigger subsidy competition and the situation of racing to the bottom that everyone ends up poorer; 
tax incentives with the purpose of improving equity can actually be discriminatory. Therefore, it 
is also essential to control the use of tax incentives as subsidies.  
In the context of international trade and competition, the benchmarks to evaluate tax incentives 
are efficiency and equity in the market, which are the starting points for conducting trading 
activities. In order to prevent these harmful effects, it is necessary to regulate the use of tax 
incentives, which should mainly be in the form of legal regulation. Furthermore, the rule of law 
regulation should normally entail the ex ante and ex post assessment of tax incentives. Moreover, 
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considering the transnational effects of tax incentives, it is necessary to regulate the use of these 
incentives at an international or supranational level, with the purpose of decreasing the inefficient 
allocation of global economic resources and maintaining a level playing field in international trade.   
Consequently, it is essential to establish systematic regulations and rules to restrict the use of 
tax incentives as subsidies. Internationally, the WTO and the EU respectively have developed 
specific regulations on subsidies, with the focus on taxation. The next chapter contains a further 




















Chapter 3 Subsidy Rules of the WTO and State Aid Law in the EU 
3.1 Introduction 
Internationally, the most influential legal organization regulating subsidies is the WTO.205 It 
has specific rules on the regulation of subsidies contained in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). As an international trade organization, the WTO has a main 
objective of trade liberalization.206 The ASCM serves this objective but it has a more specific 
object and purpose on regulating subsidies.  
The European Union is a unique Member in the WTO, which has a stringent internal subsidy 
regime.207 A subsidy in the EU is regarded as a measure of State aid. There are many similarities 
between the EU State aid regime and the subsidy regime in the WTO, and therefore a comparative 
study from the EU State aid perspective may contribute to a better understanding of various 
approaches that can achieve similar objectives. In this way, a systematic study on the EU State aid 
law can contribute to a deeper analysis of subsidies, and especially fiscal subsidies.   
In order to develop a benchmark for a further evaluation of Chinese tax incentives, it is 
important to connect the rationale of regulating tax incentives in the previous chapter with the 
objects and purposes of the two legal systems. This will contribute to finding out whether they 
share common objectives that can become an external benchmark for evaluation.   
This chapter first analyzes the objects and purposes of the two systems and the particular 
objectives of the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid law. It subsequently develops a benchmark 
based on the common objects and purposes of the two legal regimes with respect to the efficiency 
and equity considerations established in the previous chapter. Afterwards, it introduces the WTO 
subsidy rules and EU State aid law respectively and compares the two legal systems to discover 
similarities and differences under their common objectives. The common benchmark and the 
introduction to the rules of the two systems are the basis for testing the compatibility of Chinese 
tax incentives in the following chapters.  
The premise of both systems for the regulation of subsidies is the market economy, as both 
systems are based on the operation of market economy. According to the theory of public finance, 
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under a market economy, the relationship between the government and the market is that the 
market plays a major role in resource allocation, while the role of governments shall be limited.208  
3.2 External benchmark: based on the common object and purpose of the WTO’s subsidy 
rules and EU State aid  
3.2.1 Introduction 
It is important to develop a benchmark to evaluate the following testing. As analyzed in the 
previous chapter, the starting points of regulating tax incentives as subsidies are the efficiency and 
equity considerations for the operation of the market. Therefore, the analysis of the objects and 
purposes of the two systems contributes to further understanding the rationale of the two systems 
for regulating subsidies respectively. The common objectives and purposes of the two systems can 
become a benchmark for the evaluation of the following testing.  
3.2.2 The WTO regulation of subsidies  
3.2.2.1 Object and purpose of the WTO  
The WTO, considering its number of Members, is the world’s most influential international legal 
institution that provides for trade rules.209 Since the establishment of the WTO, the organization 
has dealt with the rules on trade between nations. As a result, WTO laws are constituted in a series 
of agreements negotiated and signed by Members.210  
The WTO aims to create an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, with an 
emphasis on the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development.211 
The two main instruments to achieve these objectives are the reduction of tariff barriers and other 
barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. 
Additionally, the WTO endeavors to create a level playing field for all the members to conduct 
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trade and international business.212 Therefore, the regulation of subsidies worldwide fits exactly 
within the objectives of the WTO. 
3.2.2.2 Historical development of subsidy rules in the WTO 
A subsidy in the WTO framework is regarded as a distortion of international trade.213 The major 
agreement in the WTO disciplining subsidies is the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures of 1994 (the ASCM).214 It contains an internationally agreed definition of the term 
subsidy and the standard for the classification of subsidies. This agreement resulted from the 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1986 to 1994) in 1994 and became the universally applicable 
benchmark for subsidies and countervailing measures.215  
However, the process to reach an agreement on the ASCM was rather complex. As early as in 
1947, the predecessor of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
recognized that subsidies and countervailing measures could constitute non-tariff barriers to trade. 
Therefore, the GATT 1947 set out rules on the use of subsidies and countervailing measures.216 
Nevertheless, the negotiations did not achieve a consensus on the definition of a subsidy, thereby 
resulting in the limited effectiveness of the rules.217  In order to address the increasing trade 
disputes in the area of subsidies, the GATT Subsidies Code was concluded in 1979 during the 
                                                          
212 The WTO’s main activities are negotiating the reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade (import 
tariffs, other barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct of international trade (e.g. 
antidumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.); administering and monitoring the application of the 
WTO’s agreed rules for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights; 
settling disputes among Members regarding the interpretation and application of the agreements, etc. See 
the WTO’s official website, About the WTO 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm> accessed 11 February 2016.  
213 Warren F. Schwartz and Eugene W. Harper, 'The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade' 
(1972) Michigan law review 831, 831-833.  
214  The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ASCM). See 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf. 
215 Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 30-35. 
216 Article VI (3), Article VI (4); Article VI (5); Article VI (6) of the GATT provide rules on the use of 
subsidies and anti-dumping duties, see Article VI of the GATT 1947. See 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf. 
217 Peggy A. Clarke and Gary N. Horlick, 'The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' in 
Authur Appleton Patrick Macrory, Michael Plummer (ed), The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
Economic and Political Analysis, vol II (The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, Springer 2005) 681-682.  
54 
 
Tokyo Round negotiations.218 The Code included two tracks: the first track introduced a procedure 
to adopt countervailing duties, while the second track focused on regulating the use of subsidies 
and government’s obligations in relation to the use of subsidies.219 However, due to the lack of a 
concrete definition of subsidies, not many countries singed the Code,220 which limited its validity. 
Concerning the failure of the Subsidies Code to achieve trade liberalization, later a new round of 
negotiations were undertaken, the Uruguay Round, which aimed at counteracting subsidies and 
the abuse of countervailing measures. Consequently, in 1994, Members agreed to adopting the 
ASCM as the main body of rules regulating subsidies. In 1995, the WTO was established, 
substituting the GATT. The ASCM also became an essential part of WTO law.221  
Nevertheless, the ASCM only disciplines subsidies for goods but not for services. Subsidies for 
services are regulated under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which 
addresses the liberalization of trade in services.222  
Compared to the regulation of subsidies for goods, the regulation of subsidies for services in the 
WTO regime is not very strict, because there is no clear definition of subsidies for services and no 
precise remedy for the adverse effects of service subsidies. It only mentions that a future work 
program shall be determined according to multilateral negotiations,223  which implies that the 
GATS has not yet developed a complete legal framework for subsidies for services. Therefore, for 
Members of the WTO, there is little guidance for determining their activities or solving trade 
disputes on services. 224  However, this does not mean that subsidies for services are not as 
important as subsidies for goods. Actually, they do not differ with respect to their distorting effects 
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to trade. Although there are discussions on transplanting the definition of a subsidy from the 
ASCM to the GATS, no substantial progress has been made in this respect.225  
Therefore, only in the testing part, the research focuses on subsidies for goods and the relative 
regulations in the ASCM, because, to conduct testing, it is necessary to have relatively clear criteria 
to identify subsidies. However, when analyzing tax incentives in general, the research analyzes 
subsidies both for goods and services. 
3.2.2.3 Object and purpose of the ASCM   
Although the ASCM does not explicitly stipulate its object and purpose, in many cases settled 
by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO,226 the Panel or the Appellate Body explained 
the object and purpose of the Agreement in the context of the WTO’s general object and purpose.  
In the case of Brazil-Aircraft, 227 the Panel considered that the object and purpose of the ASCM 
is to impose multilateral disciplines regulating subsidies that distort international trade.228 In the 
case of Canada-Aircraft,229  the Panel stated that the object and purpose of the ASCM could 
appropriately be summarized “as the establishment of multilateral disciplines ‘on the premise that 
some forms of government intervention distort international trade, or have the potential to distort 
international trade’”.230 In US-Export Restraints,231 the Panel emphasized again that the ASCM 
aimed at regulating distortions caused by governmental subsidies.232  
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From the Panels’ statements in various cases, it is clear that the ASCM constitutes an essential 
part of the WTO law disciplining subsidies that distort international trade. Accordingly, it serves 
the objective of creating a level playing field for participants in international trade. 
3.2.2.4 The WTO’s regulation of tax subsidies  
The main object and purpose of the WTO is the liberalization of trade, resulting in the creation 
and maintenance of a level playing field for free trade. With respect to taxation, each Member fully 
enjoys sovereignty over its own tax regime. Only when a Member’s tax measures constitute trade 
barriers, and breach the WTO’s rules, the WTO will function as a regulator or adjudicator for those 
incompatible tax measures.233 The WTO has also developed rules to counteract subsidies in the 
form of tax incentives.234 However, the WTO per se, is not a specific international organization 
established to tackle complicated tax issues, such as tax competition or tax treaties.235 
3.2.3 The European Union’s regulation of State aid  
3.2.3.1 Object and Purpose of the European Union 
The object of the European Union is described in Article 3 (3) of the Treaty on European Union: 
“the Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological 
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advance.”236 Also according to Article 26 of the TFEU, “the internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.”237  
The establishment of an internal market is the ultimate objective of the EU with respect to 
economic activities. The intention of creating the internal market is that a market based economy, 
open to free trade, can best guarantee the welfare of the EU.238 Thus, basic economic theories of a 
market economy apply to the EU internal market. In order to increase efficiency and equity in the 
market, it is important to create a fair competition environment for participants in such a market. 
Therefore, EU law prohibits Member States’ actions that distort competition in the market.   
3.2.3.2 Historical development of EU State aid law 
    State aid control was first introduced in the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (the EEC Treaty) in 1957 as one of the strategies to strengthen Europe’s position in 
the world.239 Although the Treaty established principles on the prohibition of State aid, the concept 
of State aid in this Treaty was not precise enough for Member States to implement specific actions. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, State aid provisions experienced a standstill period because of the 
economic crisis.240 In this period, Member States competed to use subsidies to stimulate the 
economy, but the Community was not capable of controlling the abuse of subsidies by Members. 
From the late 1980s, the regulation of State aid gained the Community’s attention again, since 
governments were willing to overcome the problem cooperatively because more industries and 
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sectors were open for competition, thereby requiring a unified regulation of State aid.241 Since then, 
State aid law started to develop into a system in the context of the establishment of a single market.  
In the 21st century, State aid control entered into a process of modernization. It started with the 
introduction of the State Aid Action Plan (SAAP)242 from 2005 to 2009, aiming at improving 
enforcement by introducing an effect-based approach to identifying State aid. Moreover, with the 
implementation of the TFEU in 2009, State aid was defined comprehensively in the Treaty. In 
2012, the European Commission set out a new reform program on State aid modernization (SAM) 
with more ambitious objectives, i.e. to foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and competitive 
internal market; focus enforcement in cases with the biggest impact on the internal market; 
streamlined rules and faster decisions. 243  With these objectives, State aid law is developing 
extensively. 
3.2.3.3 Object and purpose of EU State aid law 
As a part of EU law, State aid law shares the same object and purpose of the EU at the macro 
level, aiming at creating and safeguarding an internal market. In order to realize the aim of an 
internal market, distortion of competition is forbidden, since, if certain economic participants are 
favored unfairly by State aid measures, the level playing field may become at risk. 244 Therefore, 
State aid law, as a part of EU competition law, is designed to limit the negative effects of State aid 
and to create a level playing field for all Member States. It delivers both the integration and the 
prosperity objective through ensuring open markets and competition on merits.245 
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3.2.3.4 The EU State aid’s regulation of tax aid 
With respect to taxation, State aid law plays an increasingly important role in restricting the 
harmful effects of taxation in the internal market. In 1997, the European Commission adopted a 
code of conduct for business taxation (Code of Conduct) aiming at improving transparency in the 
tax area through the exchange of information. 246  Subsequently, in 1998, the Commission 
introduced a notice on the application of State aid rules to measures relating to direct business 
taxation (the 1998 Notice)247 and a report on the implementation of the notice in 2004.248 The 
European Commission has systematically applied State aid law to the regulation of tax 
incentives.249 With the further development of State aid law under the SAAP and the program on 
SAM, the application of State aid rules to taxation is also evolving as well. The trend in the EU is 
to strengthen the functionality of the State aid rules in relation to taxation.250 In 2016, the European 
Commission published a Notice, which explains how to identify tax rulings and tax settlements as 
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State aid.251 Therefore, State aid law plays an increasingly important role in combating harmful 
tax competition in the EU.252  
3.2.4 External benchmark: the creation of a level playing field based on the common object 
and purpose of the WTO and the EU  
3.2.4.1 Efficiency considerations 
From an economic perspective, the premise of both systems regulating subsidies in the EU and 
under the WTO is the market economy. In order to increase efficiency in the market, it is necessary 
to control governmental intervention into the market. The two systems regulate governmental 
action through their laws. Both systems aim to regulate the adverse effects caused by subsidies in 
order to provide a level playing field for other unsubsidized economic participants in the market. 
“The underlying basis of both systems is that the benefits of liberalized markets arising from 
increased economic efficiency should not be neutralized by government interventions.”253 Thus, 
the efficiency consideration is significant in the control of the use of subsidies by governments.   
3.2.4.2 Equity considerations 
Both the EU and the WTO emphasize the creation of a level playing field for competition, which 
is the embodiment of equity considerations. As explained in last chapter, the rule of law here is 
considered to contribute to equity between producers in competition and it has also the purpose of 
realizing distributive equity between producers and consumers.254 When applying this rationale to 
the common object and purpose of the two legal systems, it is obvious that a level playing field 
firstly aims to  ensure equity between competitors or producers. No country can offer specific 
preferential subsidies to certain enterprises or regions to gain an advantageous position compared 
to other enterprises or regions. There should be an equal starting point for each participant in the 
market. Therefore, the two systems share a common goal of maintaining a level playing field for 
members in the international market. In addition, the laws should also ensure distributive equity, 
namely, equity between producers and consumers when the market fails to achieve it. Although it 
                                                          
251 On 19 May 2016, the European Commission published a Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to 
in Article 107 (1) TFEU. It explains how to identify tax rulings and tax settlements as State aid. See Section 
5.4, Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107 (1) TFEU. See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016XC0719(05)&from=EN. See Section 1.1.3 
in Chapter 1.  
252 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law 40-42. 
253 Ben Slocock, 'EC and WTO Subsidy Control Systems : Some Reflections' (2007) European State Aid 
Law Quarterly  250.  
254 See Section 2.2.1.1 in Chapter 2. 
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is the aim of the two systems to regulate the behavior of governments, it does not deny the 
possibility for governments to correct market failures. By using tax incentives as subsidies, 
governments could realize the objective of distributive fairness. Hence, the two legal systems 
should inherently embed in the regulation the common goal of distributive equity, which is an 
essential element in order to increase social welfare. 
However, the notion of fairness is still ambiguous. 255  “It is inherently subjective and is 
internationally nuanced and culturally distinctive.” 256  According to the theories of legal 
jurisprudence, there are two types of fairness, formal and substantive.  257 An illustration of formal 
fairness is Aristotle’s notion of formal justice, i.e. equals are to be treated equally and those that 
are unequal are to be treated unequally.258 However, this is a general principle that does not specify 
further detail in order to make substantive distinctions between these two categories. Thus, some 
authors contend that a fair outcome cannot be reached without a fair process, and therefore they 
advocate a procedural theory of fairness that can lead to justice.259 According to Rawls, there are 
two basic principles of fairness. First, everyone will have an equal right to the most extensive basic 
liberties compatible with similar liberty for others; second, social and economic inequalities must 
satisfy two conditions: they are attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity and they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.260 Nevertheless, the 
Rawls criterion of fairness does not necessarily mean that it will lead to the optimal welfare and it 
can even contradict the usual economic criterion.261 It seems that procedural justice is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for substantive fairness.262  
                                                          
255 Thomas Martin Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press 1995) 49; Carl 
Davidson, Steve Matusz and Doug Nelson, 'Fairness and the Political Economy of Trade' (2006) 29 World 
Economy ; Sobel, 'Welfare Economics and Public Finance' 24-25; Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, 
'Fairness and the Rawls Criterion' in Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano (eds), Welfare Eocnomics and 
Social Choice Theory (Welfare Eocnomics and Social Choice Theory, Springer 2006) 217-225.  
256 Taylor, International Competition Law : A New Dimension for the WTO? 26. 
257 Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland, Equality : Selected Readings (Oxford University Press 1997) 
2-4. 
258 Ibid. 
259 This theory was advocated by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice; Robert 
Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basil Blackwell 1974).  
260 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 4.    
261 Feldman and Serrano, 'Fairness and the Rawls Criterion' 224-225; Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness versus 
Welfare 69-81.  
262 Bert Van Roermund, 'Fairness', The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (The Encyclopedia of Political 
Thought, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 2014). 
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When discussing the two legal systems’ role in achieving distributive fairness, the focus should 
still be on the control of governmental behaviors, but it raises further questions such as the degree 
and criteria of that control. Referring to the basic theory of public finance, perhaps the principle of 
proportionality can shed light on the interpretation of fairness here. To be more specific, the 
intervention by the government shall be examined against the principle of proportionality, 
according to which two conditions have to be met: there is a legitimate goal of the government 
policy; and there is a reasonable proportionality between the means used and the intended goal.263 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, by creating and maintaining a level playing field for competitors in the 
international market, the common objects and purposes of the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State 
aid law can become a common benchmark for assessing Chinese tax incentives. The common 
benchmark actually reflects the efficiency and equity rationale of regulating subsidies, as analyzed 
in the previous chapter. The laws are legal regulations addressing governmental intervention into 
the market. The rationale for such laws is the desire to increase market efficiency. On the other 
hand, the laws embody the values of equity, including equity between competitors and equity for 
distributive purposes. The principle of proportionality actually can become a standard to interpret 
fairness that guides governments’ actions.   
3.3 Overview of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the ASCM) 







                                                          
263 Hans Gribnau, 'General Introduction' in G.T.K. Meussen (ed), The Principle of Equality in European 






                                                                   
 




                                Direct tax                  Adverse effects                          Not specific 
                                Indirect tax                Causal link                                Specific but permitted  
                                                                                                                     (Terminated in 1999) 
Chart 1 
3.3.1 Definition of subsidies  
    Article 1.1 of the ASCM defines a subsidy as follows: (a) a financial contribution made by a 
government or any public body which (b) confers a benefit that (c) is specific within the meaning 
of Article 2 of the ASCM.  
3.3.1.1 Financial Contributions 
    The first element to identify a subsidy refers to “a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member”. According to this definition, it seems that the 
ASCM targets governmental actions of WTO Members, and therefore the actions of private 
entities are not likely to be inconsistent with the ASCM. However, if private entities are controlled 
or directed by the government and engage in actions which constitute financial contributions to 
the recipient, these private entities can also fall within the notion of “government or any public 
body” within the meaning of the definition.264  
Article 1.1(a) (1) also illustrates different forms that a contribution can take: 
                                                          
264 Madrid, 'Preliminary Remarks and Economic Analysis of Subsidies' 104.  











i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds, potential direct transfers of funds 
or liabilities; 
ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected; 
iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases 
goods; 
iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private 
body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would 
normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices 
normally followed by governments. 
    Tax incentives result in government revenue that is otherwise due, is foregone or not collected. 
Although Article 1.1(a) (1) does not provide an explanation as to what constitutes government 
revenue, it can be regarded as any compensation that the state receives by exercising their 
governmental faculties, such as taxes, duties, and social welfare charges.265  
    With regard to the phrase “that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected”, it is important to 
compare the situation caused by the government measure with the situation that would have 
occurred but for the measure foregoing the revenue by the government. The Appellate Body in the 
US-FSC case266 pointed out that the “foregoing” of revenue “otherwise due” implied that less 
revenue had been raised by the government than would have been raised in a different situation or 
that was raised “otherwise”. The word “foregone” suggests that the government had given up an 
entitlement to raise revenue that it could “otherwise” have raised. If a certain condition led to a 
greater decrease in government revenue than the same situation without this condition, whether 
                                                          
265  WT/DS108/R, US-FSC, 8 October 1999, Panel Report, at para.7.102 and WT/DS139/R and 
WT/DS142/R, Canada-Autos,11 February 2000, Panel Report, at para.10.160. However, this contribution 
does not include the exemption of an exported product from duties or tax borne by such a product when 
destined for domestic consumption. Interpretive Note 1 to the ASCM establishes that: “in accordance with 
the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through 
III of this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product 
when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess 
of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.” 
266 WT/DS108/AB/R, US-FSC, 24 February 2000, Appellate Body Report. 
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the change of this certain condition was through tax policy or otherwise due, the financial 
contribution would be deemed to exist.267  
    Therefore, it is necessary to analyze whether the government measure impedes the collection of 
revenue that would have been collected otherwise, and the analysis shall be carried out on a case-
by-case basis. 
3.3.1.2 Benefit conferred 
    Pursuant to Article 1.1 (b) of the ASCM, a benefit can be regarded as the financial contribution 
made by the government or income or price support conferred on a recipient. However, the term 
“benefit” is not defined in the ASCM itself.  
    The Panel in the Canada-Aircraft case268 stated that the ordinary meaning of “benefit” clearly 
encompassed some form of advantage. In order to determine whether a financial contribution 
confers a “benefit”, it was necessary to determine whether the financial contribution placed the 
recipient in a more advantageous position than it would have been otherwise.269 Therefore, to 
prove the existence of a benefit, a comparison must be undertaken between the benefits received 
from the government and the benefits that would have been obtained under normal market 
conditions.270 In the case of US-Lead and Bismuth II,271 the Appellate Body stated: “the question 
whether a ‘financial contribution’ confers a ‘benefit’ depends, therefore, on whether the recipient 
has received a ‘financial contribution’ on terms more favorable than those available to the recipient 
in the market”.272 
3.3.1.3 Specificity 
    Specificity refers to the question of whether a subsidy is generally available for all industries 
within the region to which the government grants assistance or whether, on the contrary, such a 
subsidy is only granted to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.  
                                                          
267 Ibid at para. 90. 
268 WT/DS70, Canada-Aircraft, 14 April 1999, Panel Report. 
269 Ibid at para. 9.112-9.113. 
270 The same interpretation of the term “benefit” can be found in other disputes. See WT/DS139/AB/R and 
WT/DS142/AB/R, Canada-Autos, 11 February 2000, Panel Report, at para.10.165; WT/DS46/AB/R, 
Brazil-Aircraft, 2 August 1999, The Appellate Body Report, at para. 165-187; WT/DS138/AB/R, US-
CVDs on EC Steel Products, 6 July 1998, at para.68. 
271 WT/DS138, US-Lead and Bismuth II, 10 May 2000, Appellate Body Report. 
272 Ibid at para. 157. 
66 
 
(1) Subsidies limited to certain enterprises 
    Article 2 of the ASCM stipulates the criteria for determining the specificity of subsidies. There 
are two general categories of specificity. 
    De jure specificity: where access to a subsidy is explicitly limited to certain enterprises (or 
groups or enterprises, or industries, etc.) by the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to 
which it operates.273 
    De facto specificity: a subsidy may be considered to be specific even in the absence of an explicit 
limitation to certain enterprises or the presence and adherence to objective criteria or conditions. 
If there are reasons to believe that a subsidy may in fact be specific, other factors will be considered, 
such as: the use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises; the 
predominant use by certain enterprises; the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy 
to certain enterprises; and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting 
authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.274  
(2) Regional subsidies 
Article 2.2 of the ASCM discusses the specificity of subsidies limited to certain enterprises 
located within a designated geographical region within the granting authority’s jurisdiction. 
However, it is still difficult to identify regional specificity based on this provision. There are two 
conflicting interpretations of the provision. One holds that the wording “limited to certain 
enterprises” suggests that subsidies destined to all enterprises in a geographical region are not 
considered specific.275 The other takes an opposite approach that regardless of the fact that the 
                                                          
273 Article 2.1 (a) of the ASCM. Article 2.1(b) of the ASCM stipulates that specificity does not exist where 
the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, establishes 
objective criteria or conditions defined as criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do not favor certain 
enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as the number 
of employees or the size of the enterprise governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy and 
provided that eligibility is automatic and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. In addition, 
the criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in the law, regulation, or other official document, so 
as to be capable of being verified. 
274 Article 2.1(c) of the ASCM. The Panel in Lumber IV case held that the determination of specificity did 
not need to be based on an examination of all four of these factors listed above, but could be based on only 
some. See WT/DS257/R, US-Softwood Lumber IV, 29 August 2003, Panel Report, at para.7.123. 
275 Claus-Dieter Ehlerman and Martin Goyette, 'Interface between EU State Aid Control and the WTO 
Disciplines on Subsidies' (2006) 4 European State Aid Law Quarterly 702, footnote 50. The author 
explained that the earlier draft of this Article used the wording that “a subsidy which is available to all 
enterprises located within a designated geographical region”. Nevertheless, the present Article adopted the 
wording of “certain enterprises” instead of “all enterprises”, thus revealing a distinction between the two. 
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subsidy is granted to all undertakings or certain undertakings, if it is only confined to a designated 
region it is specific.276  
When reading the Article, the wording “within the granting authority’s jurisdiction” contributes 
to the understanding of specificity. According to Wolfrum, Stoll, and Koebele (2008), there is a 
distinction between subsidies granted by the central government and by the sub-central or regional 
government. 277 If the subsidy is granted by the central government, “the granting authority’s 
jurisdiction” is the country’s overall territory, and therefore the limitation to a designated region 
is specific regardless of whether the beneficiaries are all enterprises or certain enterprises in that 
region. Nevertheless, if the subsidy is provided by a regional government within the jurisdiction 
of that region, only when the subsidy is limited to certain enterprises will it be considered to be 
specific. On the contrary, subsidies available to all enterprises should not be regarded as specific. 
In the situation that both the central and regional government have participated in the granting of 
a regional subsidy, “such subsidy should be regarded as being granted by the central authority if it 
is established that the subsidy would not have taken place in the absence of the central 
authority”.278 Therefore, a regional subsidy is specific even if it is granted to all enterprises within 
the region.  
This interpretation is more convincing than the two conflicting views mentioned earlier, 
because it goes back to the wording of the Article itself and distinguishes between scenarios based 
on the granting authority. Indeed, it cannot simply rely on the criteria of the subsidy being granted 
to “all” or “certain” enterprises to make a judgment on of the specificity of the regional subsidy. 
After all, the regional characteristic is the defining characteristic of this category.  
The second sentence of this Article addresses the special case of subsidies granted through fiscal 
measures. According to this sentence, “the setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by 
                                                          
Therefore, the author believed that only subsidies limited to certain enterprises in a region are specific, but 
those available to all enterprises in a region are non-specific. This view is also confirmed by Luengo. See 
Madrid, 'Preliminary Remarks and Economic Analysis of Subsidies', 139-140. 
276 Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid : WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective, 370-
371. The argument is that regional subsidies distort resource allocation between regions, and therefore even 
subsidies that are granted to all enterprises in the region, compared to other regions, results in this region 
having an advantage over others.  
277 Wolfrum and Stoll, WTO : Trade Remedies 460-461, 467-468.  
278 Ibid 461. 
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all levels of government entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the 
purposes of this Agreement”. Thus, different tax rates of different provinces and autonomous 
regions, with authority, are therefore “non-specific”. In other words, regional tax incentives 
granted by the regional government not available to all enterprises are specific.279  
(3) Prohibited subsidies 
Subsidies covered by Article 3 of the ASCM are also specific. Article 3 contains two types of 
prohibited subsidies, i.e. export subsidies and import substitution subsidies.280 Since these types 
of subsidies are considered to be more harmful to international trade, to ensure that they do not 
escape from the application ASCM, once they fulfill the requirements to be considered prohibited 
subsidies, they are automatically deemed to be specific.281  
3.3.2 Classification of subsidies  
    There are two types of subsidies in the ASCM: prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies.282 
Prohibited subsidies are absolutely prohibited by the ASCM since they can cause a serious 
distortion to international trade. However, actionable subsidies are subject to the Agreement only 
because they have negative effects on trade. The criterion for considering specific subsidies as 
falling into the category of actionable subsidies is that they cause adverse effects to the interests 
of other Members.283 
3.3.2.1 Prohibited subsidies 
(1) Export Subsidies 
    Subsidies contingent in law or in fact upon export performance are prohibited in the ASCM.284 
In order to clearly define concrete measures that constitute export subsidies, an illustrative list is 
attached in Annex I of the ASCM to identify measures that are considered export subsidies.285  
                                                          
279 Ibid 468. 
280 The next section contains a further introduction to the classification of subsidies.  
281 William A. Kerr and others, Handbook on International Trade Policy (Edward Elgar 2007) 302-308. 
282 Article 3 and Article 5 of the ASCM respectively addresses prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies. 
There was a third category of subsidies, i.e. non-actionable subsidies. Subsidies for research and 
development, environmental protection, and regional development can be categorized as non-actionable 
subsidies. However, due to the failure of agreement on the extension of this category, it expired in 1999. 
See Article 8 of the ASCM. The latter sections introduce more on non-actionable subsidies.  
283 Article 5 of the ASCM. 
284 Article 3.1 of the ASCM. 
285 Annex I of the ASCM, Illustrative list of export subsidies. The list gives examples of export subsidies, 
such as rebates of taxes paid on the export of products and special tax treatment of income earned through 
export sales.  
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This list not only provides examples of export subsidies, but it also includes further interpretations 
for defining prohibited subsidies. Furthermore, to prevent disguised export subsidies granted by 
members, a distinction is made between de jure and de facto subsidies.  
(2) Import-substituting Subsidies 
Import-substituting subsidies aim at reducing imports of products from other countries, thereby 
favoring domestic production. However, it is not clear whether import-substituting subsidies can 
also be de facto inconsistent subsidies or not.286 Article III of the GATT 1994 also addresses 
measures that favor the use of domestic over imported goods, albeit with different legal terms and 
with a different scope.287 Because Article III of the GATT can apply to measures that require the 
use of domestic goods over imports and it covers both de jure and de facto inconsistency, and 
therefore this Article can be used as the context for interpreting Article 3.1 (b), which concerns the 
same situation. Therefore, import-substituting subsidies in Article 3.1 (b) may also be extended to 
subsidies contingent “in fact” upon the use of domestic over imported goods.288  
3.3.2.2 Actionable subsidies 
    The second type of subsidies is actionable subsidies, which are defined by their effects: a subsidy 
is actionable when it causes adverse effects to another Member’s interests. To determine whether 
a subsidy is actionable requires an examination whether there is: (1) injury to the domestic industry 
of another Member; (2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to 
other Members under the GATT 1994, in particular the benefits of concessions bound under 
Article II of the GATT1994; (3) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.289      
3.3.2.3 Non-actionable subsidies 
    Except for prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies, Article 8 of the ASCM introduces the 
category of non-actionable subsidies. They include subsidies that are not specific and subsidies 
that are specific but can be exempted from being considered actionable subsidies. This kind of 
                                                          
286 The Appellate Body in the Canada-Autos case held that the fact that the words “in law or in fact” are 
stated in Article 3.1 (a) but were absent from Article 3.1 (b) did not necessarily mean that Article 3.1 (b) 
extended only to de jure contingency. Other contextual aspects should also be examined. See 
WT/DS139/AB/R, Canada-Autos, 31 May 2000, the Appellate Body Report, at para. 139-143. 
287 In particular, Article III (4) of the GATT states that: “The products of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable 
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use…”. 
288 WT/DS139/AB/R, 31 May 2000, Canada-Autos, the Appellate Body Report, at para. 139-143. 
289 Article 5 of the ASCM lists forms of adverse effects.  
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subsidy can be categorized as being either for assistance for R&D activities, assistance to 
disadvantaged regions, or assistance for adapting infrastructures to new environmental 
requirements. The ASCM initially set very strict conditions for a measure to be identified as non-
actionable subsidies.290   
    However, the category of non-actionable subsidies does not exist any longer, because they were 
initially included for a five-year provisional period but, without an agreement on extending the 
application of this category, non-actionable subsidies ceased to exist as of 1 January 2000.291 
Therefore, the previous non-actionable subsidies, such as subsidies to R&D activities, for 
disadvantaged regions, and for adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements, 
have become actionable currently and are deemed to have potential adverse effects to other 
members unless the Article will be reinstated in the future.  
3.3.3 Remedies 
In order to control the use of subsidies and eliminate the adverse effects caused by subsidies, 
the ASCM has introduced remedies for subsidy measures. Because of the different types of 
subsidies, diverse remedies have been designed accordingly.292 In general, for prohibited and 
actionable subsidies, the DSB of the WTO normally recommends that the subsidizing Member(s) 
withdraw the subsidies without delay, otherwise, the complaining Member(s) can take 
countervailing measures towards the subsidizing Member(s).  
Therefore, there are (currently) two types of remedies at both the international and domestic 
levels. At the DSB level, for prohibited subsidies, the subsidizing Member should withdraw the 
subsidy without delay; for actionable subsidies, the subsidizing Member should remove the 
adverse effects or withdraw the subsidies without delay; for non-actionable subsidies, the 
subsidizing Member could remove the serious effects. As to remedies at the Members’ domestic 
level, with the authorization of the DSB or the Committee, Members could take appropriate 
countermeasures commensurate with the nature and degree of the effects determined to exist.  
                                                          
290 Article 8 of the ASCM.  
291 Article 31 of the ASCM.  
292 Article 4, Article 7, and Article 9 of the ASCM respectively include remedy measures for prohibited, 
actionable, and non-actionable subsidies.  
71 
 
3.3.4 The impact of the ASCM on taxation 
    As discussed in the previous chapter, tax incentives are a popular type of subsidy, and therefore 
the ASCM can also apply to tax incentives once they fulfill all the criteria.   
    Subsidies granted in the form of tax incentives are a special category of subsidies, and therefore 
the ASCM has included specific rules to counteract fiscal subsidies. A distinction is made between 
direct and indirect taxes, especially in the category of prohibited subsidies. The ASCM allows tax 
adjustments by granting remissions, rebates, or exemptions for indirect taxes to avoid double 
taxation but not for direct taxes. Therefore, the rebate of indirect taxes on exports is not an export 
subsidy, whereas the rebate of direct taxes would be considered to be a prohibited subsidy.293  
3.3.4.3 Reasons for the distinction between direct and indirect taxation in the ASCM 
Taxes are normally divided into direct and indirect taxes for different reasons, most of which 
are still controversial.294 Some economists hold that producers will shift the cost of indirect taxes 
forward to consumers as a component of the price of the goods. Such costs are added to the 
consumers’ costs for the goods, but this forward shifting will not occur with respect to direct 
taxes.295 However, other authors doubting this reasoning claim that direct taxes may also be 
                                                          
293 In the illustrative list of export subsidies, provision (e) and (f) list direct tax incentives that can constitute 
export subsidies, and provision (g) and (h) list indirect taxes that constitute export subsidies. They are (e) 
the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social 
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises; (f) The allowance of special 
deductions directly related to exports or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to 
production for domestic consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged; (g) 
the exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of exported products, of indirect 
taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products when sold for 
domestic consumption; (h) the exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the exemption, remission or 
deferral of like prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services used in the production of like 
products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, however, that prior-stage cumulative indirect 
taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or 
deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes 
are levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal allowance 
for waste). 
294 A detailed historical review on distinctions between direct and indirect taxes can be seen in Charles J 
Bullock, 'Direct and Indirect Taxes in Economic Literature' (1898) 13 Political Science Quarterly 442-476; 
Alan Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach (Cambridge Tax Law Series, 
Cambridge University Press 2007) 5.  
295 Anthony Barnes Atkinson, Joseph E Stiglitz and LL Lûbimov, Lectures on Public Economics (1980)427; 
Bullock, 'Direct and Indirect Taxes in Economic Literature' 463; Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented 
International Legal Environment-WTO, International Tax and Internal Tax Regulations 4. 
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shifted.296 They consider that the distinction between direct and indirect taxes relates to “whether 
the person who actually pays the money over to the tax collecting authority suffers a corresponding 
reduction in his income. If he does, then-in the traditional language-impact and incidence are on 
the same person and the tax is direct; if not and the burden is shifted and the real income of 
someone else is affected (i.e. impact and incidence are on different people) then the tax is 
indirect.”297  
The theoretical justification for export rebates is found in the destination principle.298 According 
to this theory, personal consumption is taxed in the country of destination, which is assumed to be 
the country of consumption. In other words, tax is only imposed in the country of consumption.299 
Under the destination principle, indirect taxes paid by the exporter on its purchases are refunded, 
i.e. exports are zero-rated.300 As a result, exports are relieved from indirect taxes in the country of 
origin (exporting country) and imports are subject to indirect taxes in the country of destination 
(importing country). Therefore, export rebates ensure that cross-border trade is free from double 
taxation under the indirect tax system, which means that border tax adjustments for indirect taxes 
do not constitute subsidies for exports or a disadvantage to imports. This is also the reason why 
the ASCM admits that only the excess of the remission or exemption of indirect taxes are export 
subsidies.301  
3.3.5 The application of the ASCM to tax incentives  
For a tax incentive to constitute a subsidy under the ASCM, it has to fulfill all the elements of 
a subsidy, namely the demonstration of a financial contribution, benefits, specificity, and other 
existing conditions related to different categories of subsidies. To clarify the application procedure, 
there are three main testing steps (See Chart 1 at the beginning of Section 3.3). 
                                                          
296 For instance, Victor Thuronyi, Comparative Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2003) 54-55.  
297 Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 5. John Stuart Mill, Principles of 
Political Economy : with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (University of Toronto Press 
 1965) 
298 Schön, 'World Trade Organization Law and Tax Law'.  
299 Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 35.   
300  K. Messere, 'International: Consumption Tax Rules' (1994) 48 Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 665. 
301 Footnote 1 of the ASCM states that the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by 
the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in 
amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed a subsidy. 
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The first step is to prove the existence of a financial contribution. As analyzed in the definition 
of subsidies, there are four forms of financial contributions. With respect to tax incentives, this 
financial contribution takes the form of government revenue that is otherwise due, but which is 
foregone or not collected. Taxes are the main source of governmental revenue, but if the 
government abandons the tax collecting right by means of providing tax incentives, such as tax 
reductions or tax exemptions, it has the same effect as providing a direct financial contribution. 
Therefore, the granting of tax incentives is a kind of financial contribution by governments.  
    After demonstrating that there is a financial contribution, the next step is to prove that tax 
incentives confer benefits. As discussed earlier, to determine whether a financial contribution 
confers a benefit, a normal method is to examine whether it places the recipient in a more 
advantageous position than they would have been in otherwise. Tax incentives are actually 
deviations from the normal tax benchmark, and therefore they enable recipients to enjoy a better-
off position compared to those who do not receive the tax incentive and who have to meet the 
normal benchmark. Without tax incentives, the recipients would not have access to those 
advantages in normal market conditions. Thus, tax incentives grant benefits to recipients. 
Subsequently, subsidies identified by the ASCM are specific, and therefore it is vital to show 
the specificity of tax incentives. The test has to be undertaken based on the category of subsidies. 
Prohibited subsidies are deemed specific automatically. If the tax incentive is contingent in law or 
in fact upon export performance or the use of domestic over imported goods, it falls within the 
scope of export subsidies or import-substituting subsidies. Thus, it is not necessary to prove the 
specificity of these tax incentives. On the contrary, for actionable subsidies, specificity is an 
essential element. To identify a tax incentive as an actionable subsidy, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that it is confined to certain enterprises or specific regions. When the tax incentive is 
specific, it is further required to prove that it results in adverse effects to other Members and that 
there is a causal link between the incentive and those adverse effects.  
3.3.6 Conclusion 
The ASCM can be considered to be an achievement of the previous negotiation rounds of the 
WTO which has promoted significant improvements with regard to international subsidy rules. 
The Agreement not only provides a definition of a subsidy, classification of subsidies, but it also 
includes remedies for subsidies and procedures for taking countermeasures. Most importantly, 
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subsidies in the form of tax incentives are also included in the legal framework. Therefore, it has 
provided a novel perspective to observe the use of fiscal subsidies and the impact on tax 
competition. Nevertheless, it does not mean that that WTO law can solve all the problems caused 
by fiscal subsidies and tax competition. In fact, there have been few cases before the WTO dispute 
settlement body on tax issues after the FSC cases. By addressing WTO law here, the aim is to find 
more juridical perspectives for a deeper understanding of the issue of subsidies in the form of tax 
incentives. It is also favorable to conduct a comparative research with a similar system which can 
be found in the European Union (EU), the EU State aid system.   
3.4 Overview on the EU State aid law     
Articles 107, 108, and 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are 
the main articles addressing State aid measures. Article 107 provides a definition of aid, which is 
widely used as a benchmark to identify State aids, and Article 108, Article 109 introduces 
procedures on State aid control, such as the interaction between the Commission, the Member 
States and the Council.302 In addition, the Commission has issued a notice on the notion of State 
aid, as referred to in Article 107 (1) (the 2016 Notice).  
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3.4.1 The concept of State aid  
    Article 107 (1) TFEU stipulates that: “any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market”.     
Since State aid rules apply to aid measures ‘in any form whatsoever’, it applies to taxation as 
well. 303  As mentioned earlier, to address harmful tax competition and fiscal State aid, the 
Commission introduced rules on the application of State aid regulation to tax measures, which are 
merged in the 2016 Notion of State aid.304 The steps to identify a fiscal State aid are identical to 
the steps for identifying a general State aid measure, but there are special procedures required to 
determine certain elements.305 
3.4.1.1 Granted by the Member State or through State resources    
    The State, which grants aid, includes all public authorities such as the legislator, the judiciary, 
regional authorities, and public or private bodies designated by the state to grant aid.306  
The provision of State aid through tax incentives generally would entail a loss of revenue. A 
loss of tax revenue is equivalent to a consumption of state resources in the form of fiscal 
expenditure. This rationale also applies to regional or local public bodies below the central state 
level.307 Meanwhile, the fact that a tax aid scheme has a positive overall effect on national revenue 
is not sufficient to rule out the presence of state resources. The concept of state resources must be 
                                                          
303 Article 1 (a) of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 mentions: “aid shall mean any measure fulfilling 
all the criteria laid down in Article 107 (1) of the Treaty”. See Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 
July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union [2015] OJ L248/9, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R1589&from=EN. 
304 Section 5.4, Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107 (1) TFEU 
[2016] OJ C262/1 (the 2016 Notice); Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to 
measures relating to direct business taxation [1998] OJ C384/3 (the 1998 Notice); Report on the 
implementation of the Commission notice on the application of the state aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation [2004] C (2004) 343. 
305 Ibid.  
306 See Section 3.1 imputability of the 2016 Notion of State aid; Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, EU State 
Aids 60-61. 
307 Paragraph 48 of the 2016 Notion of State aid; Report on the implementation of the Commission notice 
on the application of the state aid rules to measures relating to direct business taxation [2004] C (2004) 343, 
at para. 18. 
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assessed in the light of the recipient’s situation, without reference to the induced effects of the 
measure in economic or budgetary terms.308   
3.4.1.2 Economic advantage (any aid in any form whatsoever) 
The identification of an economic advantage takes an effect-based approach.309 According to 
the 2016 Notice, an advantage means any economic benefit that an undertaking310 would not have 
obtained under normal market conditions, namely, in the absence of State intervention.311 In Italy 
v. Commission,312 the Court explained that, to assess the existence of an advantage, a comparison 
should be made between the financial situations of the undertaking before it received the aid and 
after receiving the aid to examine whether the undertaking was better off or not.313 Thus, the form 
does not matter much when identifying the aid, and the focus shall be on the evaluation of the 
effects, i.e. the evaluation of the financial situation of the undertaking, such as whether or not the 
aid can improve the undertaking’s financial situation or prevent a deterioration of the undertaking’s 
financial situation.314 The notion of an advantage is based on the analysis of the financial situation 
of an undertaking in its own legal and factual context with and without the aid.315  
To determine whether a tax measure constitutes State aid, the first element is that the measure 
must confer on recipients an advantage, which relieves them of charges that are normally borne 
from their budgets. The advantage may be provided through a reduction in the firm’s tax burden 
in various ways, including a reduction in the tax base (such as special deductions, special or 
accelerated depreciation arrangements or entering reserves on the balance sheet), a total or partial 
                                                          
308 Ibid at para. 20. 
309 The 2016 Notice, at para. 67 and 68. The effect-based approach has been confirmed in CJEU Case C-
30/59 Steenkolenmijnen v. High Authority: “The concept of aid is…wider than that of a subsidy because it 
embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also interventions…which are similar 
in character and have the same effect”. Also in CJEU Case 173/73, Italy v. Commission, the Court affirmed: 
“Article 107 (1) does not distinguish between the measures of state intervention concerned by reference to 
their causes or aims but define them in relation to their effect”. 
310 The entity carries out economic activities. For the notion of undertakings, see section 3.4.1.3 (1). 
311 The 2016 Notice, at para. 67; CJEU Case C-342/96 Spain v. Commission [1999] ECR I-2459, at para. 
41.  
312 CJEU Case C-173/73, Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR 709. 
313 Ibid, at para. 13. 
314 The 2016 Notice, at para.68; CJEU Case C-241/94 France v. Commission [1996] ECR I-4551, at para. 
40. 
315 The 2016 Notice, at para 68; CJEU Case C-173/73 Italy v. Commission [1974] ECR 709, at para. 17. 
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reduction in the amount of tax (such as an exemption or a tax credit), deferment, cancellation or 
even a special rescheduling of tax debt.316   
3.4.1.3 Selectivity 
(1) The notion of undertakings 
The object of State aid shall be undertakings who engage in economic activities, regardless of 
their legal status and the way in which they are financed.317 The decisive condition is that the entity 
carries out economic activities. The case law has consistently held that any activity consisting of 
offering goods and services in a market is an economic activity.318 Thus, if these elements are 
satisfied, it is irrelevant that the entity is not in fact making profit or that it is not set up for an 
economic purpose.  
(2) Selectivity criteria 
    Only selective measures may constitute State aid and general measures that apply to all 
undertakings are not State aid.319 Tax measures, open to all economic agents operating within a 
Member State, are in principle general measures. If a tax measure favors certain undertakings or 
the production of certain goods, the measure can be regarded as selective. In the situation of 
determining selectivity stemming from discretionary administrative practices, to distinguish 
selective measures from general measures, it is necessary to determine the general benchmark as 
a reference first and, consequently, a comparison should be made between undertakings in the 
same circumstances.320  
In order to identify selectivity, the 2016 Notice provides a three-step analysis.321 Firstly, the 
reference system must be recognized. The reference system is composed of rules that generally 
apply to all undertakings.322 In the case of taxes, the reference system is based on elements such 
as the tax base, the taxable persons, the taxable event and the tax rates. For special-purpose (stand-
                                                          
316 The 1998 Notice, at para. 9.  
317 The 2016 Notice, at para. 7. 
318 CJEU Case 118/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR 2599, at para.7; CJEU Case C-35/96 Commission 
v. Italy [1998] ECR I-3851, at para. 36; CJEU Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavlov and Others [2000] 
ECR I-6451, at para. 75.  
319 Even measures which are open to all sectors can be considered selective because de facto they are not 
open to all undertakings in the territory concerned. The 2016 Notice, at para. 117 and 118. See also CJEU 
Case C-143/99 Adria Wien Pipeline GmbH [2001] ECR I-8365, at para. 41. 
320 CJEU Case C-143/99 Adria Wien Pipeline GmbH [2001] ECR I-8365, at para. 41. 
321 The 2016 Notice, at para. 128.  
322 Ibid at para. 133.  
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alone) levies, such as levies on certain products or activities having a negative impact on the 
environment or health, the reference system is in principle the levy itself. However, it is on the 
condition that the practical effects are not selective.323 Secondly, it must be determined whether or 
not the measure at issue deviates from the reference system.324 ‘Favoring’ certain undertakings 
means that selected undertakings have more advantages than other non-favored undertakings and, 
as a result, the favored undertakings are better off.325 To determine the deviation, it is inclined to 
adopt an effect-based approach, i.e. evaluating the effect of the measure.326 To evaluate a “better 
off” position, it is necessary to view the favored undertakings compared with other undertakings 
that are in a similar legal and factual situation.327 Lastly, even if there is a deviation from the 
reference system, one has to testify whether the measure can be justified on the basis of the nature 
or general scheme of the system.328 This justification means that a measure derives from the 
intrinsic basic or guiding principles of the reference system or it is the result of inherent 
mechanisms necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the system.329 For instance, the 
basis for a possible justification could be the need to fight fraud or tax evasion, the need to take 
into account specific accounting requirements, administrative manageability, the principle of tax 
neutrality, the progressive nature of income tax and its redistributive purpose, the need to avoid 
double taxation, etc.330 However, even if a derogation measure could be justified in this situation, 
the measure has to be proportionate to achieve the objective.331 It is the Member State’s obligation 
to prove how the derogation is justified by the nature and general scheme of the system.332 Only 
in a few cases is this justification recognized by the court to justify tax treatment that has departed 
                                                          
323 Ibid at para. 134.  
324 Ibid at para. 128. 
325 The 2016 Notice, at para. 135. 
326 CJEU Case C-487/06 British Aggregates Association v. European Commission [2008] ECR I-10505, at 
para. 85 and 89.   
327 The 2016 Notice, at para. 135. 
328 Ibid at para. 128. 
329 Ibid at para. 138; CJEU Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others [2011] ECR I-7611, 
at para. 69. 
330 Ibid at para. 139. 
331 Ibid at para. 140. 
332 Ibid at para. 141. 
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from the standard system.333 If the first two steps are fulfilled, the tax measure can be considered 
to be selective, but if the justification can be established, no selectivity can be recognized.  
To understand the issue more clearly, it is useful to distinguish different types of selectivity. 
a. Material selectivity 
    De jure selectivity: a tax incentive is stipulated in legislation, regulations, or any legal document 
and it is evident how undertakings can access the incentive.334 
De facto selectivity: the formal criteria for the application of a tax incentive appear to be open 
to all undertakings and its effects favor certain undertakings in practice.335  
    In practice, it is complicated to give a definite answer as to how to determine de facto selectivity. 
According to Italy v. Commission, if some measures are not actually open to all economic 
participants, even if they do not aim at certain sectors or regions, they are still regarded as 
selective.336 Therefore, the test of selectivity “is not based on the existence of concentration on 
certain sectors but rather on the imposition by Member States of conditions or barriers that prevent 
certain undertakings to benefit from the measure.”337 For instance, tax incentives that only apply 
to investments exceeding a certain threshold may mean that the measure is de facto reserved for 
undertakings with significant financial resources.338  
b. Regional selectivity 
    If a measure does not apply to the whole territory of the country, it may be deemed to be selective 
for certain regions.339 This kind of selectivity becomes complicated because of the allocation of 
power between the central government and intra-state authorities, i.e. autonomous regions. 
                                                          
333 Decision of 5 June 2002 on state aid granted by Italy in the form of tax exemptions and subsidies loans 
to public utilities with a majority public capital holding [2003] OJ L77/21, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003D0193&from=EN. 
334 The 2016 Notice, at para. 121. 
335 Ibid. 
336 CJEU Case 173/73 [1974] ECR 709, at para. 27. See also Koen Van de Casteele and Mehdi Hocine, 
'Favouring Certain Undertakings or the Production of Certain Goods: Selectivity' in Wolfgang Mederer, 
Nocola Pesaresi and Marc van Hoof (eds), EU Competition Law vol 4 (EU Competition Law Claeys & 
Casteels 2008) 254.  
337 Ibid 257. 
338 The 2016 Notice, at para. 122. 
339 Ibid at para. 142. 
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    In Portugal v. Commission,340 conflicts existed between fiscal autonomy at the sub-national 
level and fiscal rights at the central government level. The court held that to be considered as 
having the status of fiscal autonomy, a test should be carried out: does the sub-national body enjoy 
institutional, procedural and financial autonomy from central authorities? If all these conditions 
are met, the region is considered to be a fiscally autonomous region, and therefore the selective 
measure confined to this region does not constitute State aid.341 The 2016 Notice has confirmed 
the test to identify autonomous regions.342 Institutional autonomy means that the local authority 
has its own self-governing institutions that can grant incentives within its own constitutional, 
political and administrative status that is separate from that of the central government. 343 
Procedural autonomy means a decision can be made without the central government being able to 
intervene directly in determining its content.344 Financial autonomy can be established where the 
region is responsible for managing a budget and tax reductions.345     
3.4.1.4 Affect competition and trade between Member States 
Distortion of competition or the threat of a distortion of competition is regarded as the result of 
State aid. Whether it is considered that State aid is at issue is effect based. Therefore, potential 
distortion, which may harm competition between Member States, is prohibited by the treaty as 
well as actual distortion.346 The Commission enjoys a wide discretion in determining whether there 
is a (potential) distortion of competition. In the case law, the Court confirmed that trade is affected 
if State aid measures strengthen the competitive position of the recipient compared to the other 
economic participants.347  
Distortion of competition is the prima facie condition for a state measure to be defined as State 
aid. The constituent element is that the measure affects trade between Member States. An 
advantage granted to an undertaking, compared to other undertakings, will be assumed to distort 
competition and be liable to affect trade between Member States.348   
                                                          
340 CJEU Case C-88/03 Portugal v. Commission [2006] ECR I-7115. 
341 Ibid at para. 67. 
342 The 2016 Notice, at section 5.3. 
343 Ibid at para. 145. 
344 Ibid at para. 147. 
345 Ibid at para. 152. 
346 Ibid at para. 188. 
347 The 2016 Notice, at para.187. 
348 Ibid at para 190.  
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De minimis aid 
The implementation of the 2005 State Aid Action Plan (SAAP) proposed a more refined 
economic approach on the evaluation of distortions. To attain the aim of less and better targeted 
State aid, de minimis aid is designed to exempt a small number of aid measures from the scope of 
State aid since they have little effect on competition and trade between Member States.349 On the 
other hand, the Commission is more willing to focus on the most distortive and problematic public 
subsidies by freeing up resources previously devoted to dealing with minor cases.350 Therefore, if 
measures can be defined as de minimis aid, they will be disregarded from being considered a 
measure that “affects trade between Member States”, and therefore  no State aid is identified in 
these cases.351   
To comply with the WTO obligations and to control the risk of competition, some aid is 
exempted from the de mimimis regulation, such as export aid, sectorial aid including agriculture 
and fisheries sectors, transport sector. Additionally, de minimis aid only covers transparent aid, for 
which the precise amount of aid can be determined in advance, such with as loans, guarantees, risk 
capital, and capital injections, etc.352 
3.4.2 Compatible State aid  
Some aids are regarded as compatible with the internal market because they are in line with the 
objectives of the internal market despite their distortionary effect. However, compatible State aid 
has to satisfy strict conditions according to the TFEU and Commission regulations. The main rules 
                                                          
349 The total amount of the aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking shall not exceed EUR 
200,000 over any period of three fiscal years; a specific ceiling of EUR 100,000 applies to road freight 
transport. See Commission regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid [2013] OJ 
L352/1, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/de_minimis_regulation_en.pdf. 
350 Article 3, Commission regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid [2013] OJ 
L352/1, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/de_minimis_regulation_en.pdf. 
351 However, the 2016 Notice also confirms that the relatively small amount of aid or the small size of the 
undertaking which receives its does not exclude the possibility that trade between Member States might be 
affected. See the 2016 Notice, at para. 192; Harold Nyssens, 'De mininis' in Wolfgang Mederer, Nocola 
Pesaresi and Marc van Hoof (eds), EU Competition Law, vol 4 (EU Competition Law, Claeys & Casteels 
2008) 417-423.  
352 Commission regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid [2013] OJ L352/1, Article 4. 
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concerning compatible State aid are stipulated in Article 106 (2), 107 (2) (3), and the General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). 
3.4.2.1 Mandatory exemptions 
As established in Article 107 (2) of the TFEU, the following measures shall be deemed 
compatible with the internal market: 
(a) aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is 
granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by 
the division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the 
economic disadvantages caused by the division. Five years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a 
decision repealing this point.353 
The reason for this category of mandatory exemptions is that it is in line with the EU’s objective 
of social protection, cohesion and solidarity among Member States. However, to be qualified as 
falling within one of these legal exemptions, a notification to the Commission is still necessary. 
After the notification, the Commission will evaluate whether or not the measures are compatible 
with the internal market and, once all the conditions are fulfilled, the measures will be considered 
to be compatible State aids.  
3.4.2.2 Discretionary exemptions 
(1) Article 107 (3) of the TFEU 
Except for qualified State aid that shall be deemed compatible with the internal market, Article 
107 (3) of the TFEU lists the other five items that may be considered to be compatible with the 
internal market which are at the discretion of the European Commission.  
(a) Regional aid for areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious 
underemployment; 
                                                          
353  In practice, this article is hardly employed especially since the re-unification of Germany in 1990. The 
Commission also stated that it considered that there was no longer any economic justification for 
subsidizing these areas. See Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, EU State Aids 144-145. 
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(b) Aid for a project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State; 
(c) Sectoral aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities and regional aid to 
certain economic areas; 
(d) Cultural aid to promote culture and heritage conservation;      
(e) Aids approved by the Council. 
    For all these aids, a notification to the Commission is required as well. 
(2) Article 106 (2) of the TFEU 
According to the Article 106 (2) of the TFEU, assistance granted to offset public service 
obligations may be permitted, such as transport services, health services, social housing, and 
assistance to elderly people. 354  In practice, the case law has set criteria for identifying the 
compatibility of SGEI measures and the Altmark case355 is a landmark case for this interpretation. 
In this case, there was no advantage if the Member State only compensates the service provider 
for the costs of the service. However, the Altmark criteria must be fulfilled in order for it to be 
considered that State aid is not at issue.356 Moreover, even in this situation, a notification to the 
Commission is also required. 
(3) The Commission’s assessment 
Except for mandatory exemptions, the Commission enjoys more margins for appreciation to 
evaluate the compatibility of a State aid measure. It involves a more in-depth economic assessment 
of State aid. The Commission stated in the 12th report on Competition policy that it considered the 
following factors when reviewing proposed aid: the aid must promote or further a project that is 
in the Community interest as a whole; the aid must be necessary for the achievement of this result 
                                                          
354 Article 106 (2) of the TFEU: “undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in 
the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of 
trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union”. 
355 CJEU case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
356 The Altmak criteria shall be fulfilled in order not to be regarded as State aid: clearly defined and 
entrusted public service obligations; compensation parameters established beforehand in objective and 
transparent manner; compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover net costs of service and 
reasonable profit; and public procurement procedure or compensation based on costs of typical undertaking. 
Ibid, at paras. 87-95.  
85 
 
and the objective could not have been attained in its absence; the duration, intensity and scope of 
the aid must be proportional to the importance of the intended result.357 
Following these evaluation standards, the SAAP and SAM have established a balancing test to 
carry out an assessment which balances between the distortion of competition created by the aid 
and the positive effect of the aid.358 
The test includes the following consecutive questions: 
1. Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, like an efficiency 
objective, an equity objective, or a transition to better functioning markets? 
2. Is the aid well designed to reach the objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed 
aid address the market failure or other objectives? 
Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument? 
Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change the behavior of firms? 
Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behavior be obtained with less 
aid? 
3. Are the distortions to competition and the effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance 
is positive? 
4. Is the aid transparent in this way that Member States, the Commission, economic operators, 
and the public have easy access to all relevant acts and information about the aid? 
To make the test, the Commission adopts a more in-depth economic analysis towards an overall 
evaluation. However, the Commission itself should also be regulated or supervised, such as by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), to exercise its discretionary power within the 
scope of the Community interest.359 Additionally, the intensity of judicial review should be limited 
                                                          
357  The Twelfth Report on Competition Policy [1982], at para.160, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/ar_1982_en.pdf. 
358  The test is adopted in the R&D&I framework and the Guidelines on Risk Capital in SMEs. See 
Community framework for State Aid for Research and Development and Innovation [2006] OJ C323/1; 
Community Guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises [2006] OJ C194/2. 
359 As established in Philip Morris v. Commission, the Commission has discretion in approving State aid 
under Article 107 (3), the exercise of which requires that economic and social assessments must be made 
in the Community interest.  
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to verify the material accuracy of the facts and that there is no manifest error in the assessment.360 
With respect to taxation, the Commission assesses the compatibility of tax incentives in light of 
the general rules for compatible State aids.  
3.4.2.3 The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
The Commission launched the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) in the context of 
the SAAP to achieve the objective of creating a simple, user-friendly and coherent set of legislative 
rules. In order to simplify the assessment procedure, several categories of aid are considered 
compatible that do not require a notification to the Commission. 
 According to the GBER, block exempted aids include regional aid, small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) investment and employment aid, aid for the creation of enterprises by female 
entrepreneurs, aid for environmental protection, aid for consultancy in favor of SMEs and SME 
participation in fairs, aid in the form of risk capital, aid for research, development and innovation, 
training aid, and aid for disadvantaged or disabled workers.361  
In order not to conflict with the EU’s obligations in the WTO, aid to export-related activities 
and aid contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods are exempted from the GBER. 
To fulfill the exemption conditions, some ex-ante criteria have to be met, for instance, the aid must 
be transparent and have an incentive effect.362  
                                                          
360  CJEU Case T-244/94, Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl and Others v. Commission of the European 
Communities [1997], at para. 3 “since the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in relation to State aid 
involves complex economic and technical assessment, the Court’s review of the legality of decisions 
adopted must be limited to verifying that the facts are materially accurate and that there has been no manifest 
error of assessment.” 
361  Commission regulation (ECU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (General Block 
Exemption Regulation, GBER) [2014] OJ L187/1, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0651&from=EN. 
362 Article 5 of the GBER provides examples of frequently used forms of transparent aid, such as aid 
comprised of grants and interest rate subsidies, loans, and fiscal measures, etc. As to the incentive effect, 
Article 6 of the GBER stipulates that aids granted to SMEs are deemed to have incentive effects, but, for 
aid granted to large enterprises, the Member State has to prove that the aid can bring positive effects, such 
as a material increase in the size, scope, the total amount, and the speed of completion of the project due to 
the aid. See Article 5 and Article 6 of the GBER.  
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3.4.3 Controlling procedure of State aid  
In order to minimize the disadvantages of State aid and carry out the ex-ante assessment, the 
Commission has established specific controlling procedures in Article 108 TFEU and in 
procedural regulation.363  
3.4.3.1 Controlling procedure for notified aid 
Compatible State aid, such as mandatory exemptions, discretionary exemptions shall be notified 
to the Commission before their implementation. However, in the context of the SAM, which aims 
to simplify the State aid controlling procedure, no notification is required for de minimis aid, 
GBER, and individual aid awards covered by an authorized aid scheme. 
For aid that must be notified, the controlling procedures are different for existing aid and new 
aid. 364  For existing aid, no notification is required, but the Commission shall review them 
continually and propose any appropriate measures to be taken in relation to the aid required by the 
progressive development or by the functioning of the internal market. If the recommendation with 
regard to the amendment is not taken by the Member State, the Commission can start an 
investigation into the aid immediately. For new aid, the Member State shall notify the Commission 
and the Commission, therefore, shall examine the aid as soon as the notification is received. During 
the investigation period, the Member State shall not put the measure into effect before the 
Commission’s official decision.  
When the Commission has received the notification of State aid, it shall start a preliminary 
investigation to examine the compatibility of the aid measure. After the examination, if the notified 
measure does not constitute aid or the measure is compatible with the common market, the 
Commission shall communicate the finding by way of decision. If the Commission finds that 
                                                          
363 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2015] OJ L248/9 (the Procedural 
Regulation). 
364 Existing aid includes aid that exists prior to the entry into force of the Treaty; aid authorized by the 
Commission; aid that the Commission has approved by default; aid that was held to be unlawful, but the 
10-year limitation period for recovery has expired; and aid that was put into effect at a time when it did not 
constitute an aid and subsequently became an aid due to the evolution of the common market and has not 
in the meantime been altered by the Member State. New aid means all aid that is not existing aid, including 
alterations to existing aid. See Article 1 of the Procedural Regulation. 
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doubts are raised as to the compatibility of the measure, it shall initiate a formal investigation 
procedure.365  
When entering the process of a formal investigation procedure, the Commission can request 
information from the Member State and interested parties may submit comments within one month 
to order to be involved in the assessment.366 After the formal investigation, the Commission shall 
communicate its decisions in the Official Journal. The result of the investigation can be that the 
notified measure does not constitute aid, or it is compatible aid, or it may be compatible with the 
common market but only under certain conditions (the action may be monitored) or it constitutes 
State aid that shall not be implemented.   
3.4.3.2 Recovery for incompatible unnotified aid 
If a Member State is under an obligation to notify the Commission, but fails to do so and 
nevertheless implemented the aid, or has notified the aid but without the Commission’s approval 
to put the aid into effect, the aid will be considered unlawful State aid. The Commission shall 
decide that the unlawful aid has to be recovered by the Member State with interest at an appropriate 
rate fixed by the Commission.367  
The reason to recover aid is to ensure that the internal market remains a level playing field in 
all economic sectors by re-establishing the situation that existed in the market prior to the granting 
of the aid. Therefore, the Member State is responsible for recovering the aid from the beneficiary 
including interest.  
In order to implement the recovery of the aid, the Commission has issued a notice to guide the 
recovery procedure in practice.368 In terms of the recovering procedure, both the Commission and 
the Member States have an essential role in the implementation of the recovery decisions. In the 
recovery decision, the Commission provides a clear indication to Member States to recover a 
certain amount of aid from a beneficiary or a number of beneficiaries within a given period. After 
receiving the recovery decision from the Commission, the Member State shall determine the 
                                                          
365 If, within the two months of the examination period, the Commission does not take a decision, the aid 
shall be deemed to be authorized by the Commission, and thus the Member State may implement the 
measures thereafter. 
366 Article 6 of the Procedural Regulation. 
367 Article 13 of the Procedural Regulation. 
368 Notice from the Commission towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering 
Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid [2007] OJ C272/4.  
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undertakings from whom the aid must be recovered and the precise amount of aid to be 
recovered.369  
3.4.4 The application of the EU State aid law to tax incentives 
To identify a tax incentive as a State aid, there are five testing steps (see Chart 2 at the beginning 
of Section 3.4). 
Firstly, the tax incentive should be granted by a Member State or through state resources. The 
provision of State aid through tax incentives generally would entail a loss of revenue, which is 
equivalent to the consumption of state resources in the form of fiscal expenditure. 
Secondly, there should be an economic advantage granted by the tax incentive. The advantage 
is effect based, so when the tax incentive grants the undertaking a better-off position compared to 
the non-recipients, an advantage is conferred. Tax incentives are deviations from normal 
benchmarks, which normally offer the recipients benefits in the form of a lower tax liability. Thus, 
compared with the non-recipients of the aid, a tax incentive enables the recipient to have a better-
off position in the market.  
Thirdly, it is necessary to demonstrate that the tax incentive is selective. Selectivity generally 
means that the tax incentive favors certain undertakings or certain regions. It can be de jure or de 
facto selective. The first step is to fix a general or normal standard, i.e. the tax benchmarks 
applicable to all undertakings. The next step is to examine whether there is a deviation from the 
general standard. The deviation is also effect based. It has to be established whether the tax 
incentive grants certain undertakings a better-off position when compared to other undertakings in 
a similar legal and factual situation. If it is considered that the tax incentive deviates from the 
normal benchmark, the following step is to establish whether the measure can be justified on the 
basis of the nature or general scheme of the system. If the justification cannot be established, the 
tax incentive can be recognized as selective.  
Subsequently, the tax incentive must affect competition and trade between Member States. If 
the tax measure strengthens the competitive position of certain undertakings, it is assumed that 
                                                          
369 However, Member States may always encounter difficulties in relation to recovery, but the Court takes 
a very strict attitude towards the inability of recovery. Only under exceptional circumstances, when it is 
absolutely impossible to recover the aid, is the Member State permitted to terminate the execution of the 
recovery. See ibid. 
90 
 
competition and trade are affected between the Member States by the measure. However, if the aid 
fulfills the conditions of de minimis aid, it will be exempted. 
The last step is to verify the compatibility of the tax incentive. When a tax incentive satisfies 
all of the above elements, it is likely to constitute a State aid. However, the Member State can still 
find justifications allowing it to be exempted as a compatible State aid. The most frequently 
adopted justifications for an aid measure are discretionary exemptions and the GBER, including 
tax incentives for regional development, SMEs, environmental protection, research, development 
and innovation, etc. Once the tax incentive meets those conditions, it is considered to be compatible 
State aid for which it is not obliged to notify the Commission. Moreover, the Commission has 
discretionary power to assess the compatibility of aid according to the assessment criteria listed 
before.    
3.4.5 Conclusion 
State aid law in the EU is developing very fast, especially under the promotion of the SAM, 
which aims to foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and competitive internal market. Thus, the 
regulation of State aid is becoming stricter but within a rational legal framework. In this context, 
tax incentives in the form of fiscal State aid are becoming important for the EU in the context of 
countering harmful tax competition and maintaining a level playing field for all the undertakings. 
Case law has demonstrated that State aid is adopted as a powerful instrument to deal with harmful 
tax competition, especially via the strict remedies. Compared with the WTO system, the EU State 
aid law provides another systematic model to address the adverse effects of tax incentives as 
subsidies. 
3.5 Comparison of subsidy rules in the WTO and EU State aid law 
3.5.1 Preliminary remarks 
A significant function of comparative law is to provide a richer range of model solutions for a 
common problem existing in different legal systems or legal cultures.370 Similarly, a comparison 
of subsidy rules in the WTO and EU State aid law can provide a better solution for the problems 
caused by subsidies. 
                                                          
370 Zweigert, Kötz and Weir, Introduction to Comparative Law 15-16. 
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The basic methodology of comparative law is functional analysis.371 To perform the functional 
analysis, a comparison of similarities and differences is the fundamental way of “discovering 
resemblances between the ‘similar’ or even similarities between the ‘different’, but more 
fundamentally by finding the explaining similarities between the ‘different’, and differences and 
divergences between the ‘similar’”.372 Therefore, a comparison of similarities and differences in 
the WTO’s subsidy system and the EU State aid system can be the basic methodology to carry out 
the comparative analysis. 
Some authors have already conducted systematic comparisons of the two systems. 373  The 
purpose of the comparison in this section is not to compare the two systems comprehensively, but 
to establish a framework for a further evaluation in the following testing. Therefore, the 
comparison does not go into every detail, but only covers the most explicit similarities and 
differences.  
3.5.2 Matrix of the comparison 
 Subsidies in the WTO The EU State aid  
Object and 
purpose 
The WTO:  
The reduction of tariff barriers and 
other barriers to trade and the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment 
in international trade relations;  
to create an open and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading 
system; to create a level playing field 
for all the members to conduct trade and 
international business  
The EU:  
Creating and safeguarding an 
internal market: an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of 
the treaties 
 
Mechanism the ASCM:  
To regulate subsidies that distort 
international trade 
State aid:  
To control the negative effects of 
State aid and to create a level 
playing field for Member States in 
the internal market                                                                        
Scope Goods in the ASCM, services in 
GATTS 
Goods and services 
                                                          
371 Ibid 34. 
372 Pierre Legrand and R. J. C. Munday, Comparative Legal Studies Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge 
University Press 2003) 240. 
373 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law; Rubini, The Definition of 
Subsidy and State Aid : WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective; Luengo Hernández de Madrid, 
Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC law : Conflicts in International Trade Law; Luja, 
Assessment and Recovery of Tax Incentives in the EC and the WTO : A View on State Aids, Trade Subsidies 
and Direct Taxation.  
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Definition  I. Financial contribution made by a 
government or any public body 
Government revenue that is otherwise 
due is foregone or not collected 
           
I. Any aid granted by a Member 
State or through state resources      
Tax incentives: loss of revenue 
  
 II. Confers a benefit  
Whether the financial contribution 
places the recipients in a more 
advantageous position than they would 
have been in (effect-based) 
A comparison must be conducted 
between the benefits received from the 
government and the benefits that would 
have been obtained under normal 
market conditions  
II. Economic advantage          
Whether or not the aid can improve 
the undertaking’s financial situation 
or prevent a deterioration of the  
undertaking’s financial situation 
Effect-based approach to judge the 
existence of aid                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Advantage: any economic benefit 
which an undertaking would not 
have obtained under normal market 
conditions in the absence of state 
intervention                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 III. Specificity  
1. Subsidies limited to certain 
enterprises 
De jure: where access to a subsidy is 
explicitly limited to certain enterprises 
by the granting authority or the 
legislation pursuant to which it operates 
De facto: use of subsidy program by a 
limited number of certain enterprises; 
predominant use by certain enterprises; 
the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidies to certain 
enterprises; the manner in which 
discretion has been exercised by the 
granting authority in the decision to 
grant a subsidy.  
2. Regional subsidies 
Subsidies limited to certain enterprises 
located within a designated 
geographical region within the granting 
authority’s jurisdiction.  
Different tax rates of different 
provinces, autonomous regions are non-
specific. 
Regional tax incentives granted by the 
regional government that are not 
available to all enterprises are specific. 
3. Prohibited subsidies 
III. Selectivity 
1. Material selectivity 
De jure: State aid measures are 
stipulated in the legislation, which 
has set criteria for undertakings  
De facto: measures apply to all 
undertakings but favor certain 
undertakings in practice. 
The test for de facto selectivity: the 
imposition by Member States of 
conditions or barriers that prevent 
certain undertakings to benefit from 
the measure, e.g. selectivity granted 
by an administration’s discretionary 
power 
2. Regional selectivity 
If a measure does not apply to the 
whole territory of a country, it may 
be deemed selective for certain 
regions.  
Regions that have fiscal autonomy 
(institutional, procedural and 
financial autonomy) may not 
constitute State aid.  
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Export subsidies and import-
substituting subsidies are deemed 
specific. 
 IV. Adverse effects 
Prohibited subsidies: 
Export subsidies and import-
substituting subsidies are prohibited 
because of their adverse effects, so 
Members are not required to prove 
additionally that they cause adverse 
effects.  
Actionable subsidies:  
Injury to the domestic industry of 
another Member; nullification or 
impairment of benefits accruing 
directly or indirectly to other member 
under the GATT 1994, in particular the 
benefits of concession bound under 
Article II of the GATT 1994; serious 
prejudice to the interests of another 
member.         
IV. Affect competition and trade 
between Member States 
The State aid strengthens the 
position of an undertaking as 
compared to other undertakings 
competing in intra-Community 
trade.  
De minimis aid: is disregarded from 
State aid  
 
Exemptions Non-actionable subsidies 
Assistance for R&D, assistance to 
disadvantaged regions, assistance for 
adapting infrastructure to new 
environmental requirements. 
This category ceased to exist at the end 
of 1999. 
Compatible State aid  
1. Mandatory exemptions 
2. Discretionary exemptions 
3. GBER: regional aid, SME aid, aid 
for the creation of enterprises by 
female entrepreneurs, 
environmental protection, aid for 
risk capital, aid for R&D&I, training 
aid, aid for disadvantaged workers 
Ex-ante 
assessment 
Article 25 of the ASCM: Members shall 
notify all specific subsidies to the 
ASCM Committee. 
Existing aid: no notification is 
required, but the Commission shall 
keep constant review of the existing 
aid 
New aid: shall be notified to the 
Commission for a preliminary 
investigation and, if there is doubt 
on the compatibility, the measure 
will go through a formal 
investigation procedure. 
Assessment: is the aid aimed at a 
well-defined objective of common 
interest; is the aid well-designed to 
deliver the objective of common 
interest; is the aid appropriate; is 
there an incentive effect; is the aid 
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proportional; are the distortions of 
competition and effect on trade 
limited, so that the overall balance is 
positive; is the aid transparent? 
Remedies At the DSB level: Members are 
recommended to withdraw the subsidy 
without delay; 
At the domestic level: the complaining 
members can take countermeasures 
towards the subsidizing members.  
Unlawful State aid shall be 
recovered by the Member State 
with interest   
Taxation For prohibited subsidies 
There is a distinction between direct 
and indirect taxation: 
Rebate of indirect taxes on export is not 
an export subsidy, whereas the rebate of 
direct taxes is prohibited subsidy 
Application to tax incentives 
1. Financial contribution: government 
revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected 
2. Benefit conferred: recipients enjoy a 
better-off position compared non-
recipients under the normal tax 
benchmarks 
3. Specificity: 
Export or import-substituting subsidies: 
tax incentives contingent upon export 
performance or the use of domestic 
over imported goods 
Actionable subsidies: tax incentives 
confined to certain enterprises or 
specific regions; adverse effects; causal 
link 
Fiscal State aid  
1. Granted by Member State or 
through state resources 
Loss of tax revenue 
2. Advantage 
Tax incentives relieve recipients 
from the charges normally borne 
from the budgets   
3. Selectivity:  
(1) General standard 
(2) Deviation from the standard 
(3) Justified by the nature or general 
scheme of the system 
4. Affect competition and trade 
between Member States:  
the tax incentive strengthens the 
competitive position of one or more 
companies in the competition 
5. Compatible State aid in the form 
of tax incentives 
Based on the criteria of the 
Commission’s assessment 
 
3.5.3 Reasons for differences 
Differences of treaty provisions can be a result of the differences in the objects and purposes.374 
As mentioned earlier, the object and purpose of the WTO is the reduction of trade barriers, the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations, the creation of an open and 
non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and the creation of a level playing field for all the 
Members to conduct trade and international business. As an essential part of WTO law, the ASCM 
                                                          
374 Marco Slotboom, Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation?  A Comparison of 
WTO and EC law (Cameron May 2006) 54-55.  
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is designed to regulate subsidies that distort international trade by providing a system that enables 
the Members to protect their domestic industries against injury caused by subsidized products.375  
In contrast, as some authors have pointed out, the EU has a further-reaching object and purpose 
than the WTO.376 The main object and purpose of the EU is to create and safeguard an internal 
market, an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, 
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the treaties.377 To achieve this ambitious 
objective, EU State aid rules, as an important part of competition policy, aim at preventing trade 
barriers created by aid that is incompatible with the common market.  
To summarize, the WTO aims exclusively at “trade liberalization”, but the EU has embarked 
on a process of deeper economic as well as political integration.378 Accordingly, in the field of 
taxation, with respect to different levels of tax practice, the EU has a more stringent application of 
State aid law to taxation. Therefore, the control of subsidies in the WTO is not as strict as under 
EU State aid.379 In addition, the WTO has 162 Members, many more than the number of EU 
Member States. It is more difficult to reach an agreement in the WTO than in the EU.380 This is an 
important reason why the subsidy rules in the WTO develop slower than the EU State aid law. 
Moreover, the CJEU plays a fundamental role in promoting the development of State aid law. A 
major part of State aid law is case law, issued by the CJEU. It is considered primary law for EU 
                                                          
375 Sanford E. Gaines, Birgitte Egelund Olsen and Karsten Engsig Sorensen, Liberalising Trade in the EU 
and the WTO, a Legal Comparison (Cambridge University Press 2012) 291. 
376 Federico Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of 
EU and WTO Law (Hart Publishing 2004) 2; Slotboom, Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty 
Interpretation?  A Comparison of WTO and EC law 58-59; Sanford E. Gaines, Birgitte Egelund Olsen and 
Sorensen, Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, a Legal Comparison 291; Ehlerman and Goyette, 
'Interface between EU State Aid Control and the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies' 717; Slocock, 'EC and 
WTO Subsidy Control Systems : Some Reflections' 250.  
377 See Section 3.3.3 of this Chapter.  
378 Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EU and 
WTO Law 2.  
379 Luengo Hernández de Madrid, Regulation of Subsidies and State Aids in WTO and EC law : Conflicts 
in International Trade Law 482-491.  
380 The current decision making is based on the principle of consensus that if there is no objection to a 
decision, it will be passed. It is similar to unanimity, which requires that all parties explicitly agree to the 
decision. See Patrick Low, 'WTO Decision-Making for the Future' (2011) Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrncom/abstract=1833391 ; Jeffrey J Schott and Jayashree Watal, 'Decision Making in the WTO', 
The WTO after Seattle (The WTO after Seattle, Peterson Institute 2000) 283. 
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Member States. In contrast, decisions of the WTO’s DSB are soft law for Members, are not directly 
enforceability against Members.381  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces and analyzes the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid law and their 
application to taxation respectively. It started with an analysis of the objects and purposes of the 
two systems, with the purpose of looking for an external benchmark for evaluating the testing of 
Chinese tax incentives in the following chapters. It was revealed that the two legal regimes share 
the common objective of creating a level playing field for competition in the international market 
by regulating the abuse of governmental subsidies. It matches with the rationale analysis in the last 
chapter. It is the market operation, taking into account efficiency and equity considerations, that 
requires the two legal systems to regulate governmental intervention into the market economy. 
The creation of a level playing field actually implicates equity between competitors and equity for 
distributive purposes. Moreover, the principle of proportionality helps to further clarify fairness in 
the context of controlling governmental intervention legally. Thus, the intervention of 
governments shall be examined against the principle of proportionality as well.  
This chapter also systematically analyzes the legal rules of the two systems, especially their 
application to tax incentives, thus formulating the testing steps for identifying a tax incentive as a 
subsidy in the WTO and a State aid in the EU. The two systems share common objective of 
regulating subsidies or State aid, but it seems that the EU State aid law develops further and faster 
than the WTO’s subsidy rules. The chapter outlined the justifications for compatible State aid 
based on the efficiency and equity rationale and a strict procedure for ex-ante assessment. It also 
addressed concrete rules and the case law applying State aid law to taxation. Therefore, a 
comparative study on the issue of regulating subsidies from the two legal systems not only 
contributes to a deeper understanding of how to regulate subsidies legally, but it also provides a 
background to evaluate whether the law functions well to meet its objectives.  
To conclude, the subsidy rules of the WTO are the legal standard for testing the compatibility 
of Chinese tax incentives, since China is a Member of the WTO. However, due to the similar 
objectives, the EU State aid law is a reference system for comparative testing, which presents 
                                                          
381 Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and WTO Law 454-455. 
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differences in the testing results. The common benchmark derived from the common objects and 
purposes of the two systems is the criterion used to evaluate the testing results and the basis for 
further recommendations in following chapters. Since China has its own regulations on tax 
incentives in the context of domestic tax competition, the benchmark here is an external one rather 
than the domestic one. The next chapter introduces more information on Chinese tax incentives 





















Chapter 4 The Internal Benchmark and Chinese Tax Incentives 
4.1 Introduction 
China is a country with a very long history. Compared to the Western world, it has its own path 
of development. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, but China’s 
economy started to grow rapidly since 1978 when it initiated the Reform and Opening Policy. 
Since the Reform and Opening, China started to adopt tax incentives mainly to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI). However, with the growth of China’s economy, especially after China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, other Members of the WTO contended that Chinese tax incentives 
affected international trade and requested an adjustment or termination of them.  
In order to understand the relationship between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy 
rules, this chapter has two parts. The first part introduces the chronological evolution of Chinese 
tax incentives and the background for discussing China’s attitude towards tax competition. It 
therefore establishes an internal benchmark to evaluate China’s granting of tax incentives. The 
second part focuses on current direct and value added tax (VAT) incentives that are specific 
according to the criteria of the subsidy rules in the WTO and EU State aid law. The overview of 
the present tax incentives prepares for the following testing and understanding of the interactions 
with the international benchmark. In direct tax, in 2007, China promulgated a new Enterprise 
Income Tax Law (EIT Law) that terminated most foreign related tax incentives and unified tax 
incentives in a separate chapter in the law.382 In VAT, tax incentives are discussed in the context 
of transforming business tax (BT) to VAT. The research concentrates on the latest tax incentives 
for the testing. However, a chronological review and analysis of the background of Chinese tax 
incentives is necessary to understand China’s rationale for granting the current tax incentives. It 
has to be clarified that, since the beginning of the adoption of tax incentives in China, they have 
been provided in the form of direct tax incentives, mainly corporate tax. Thus, the chronological 
review concentrates on direct tax incentives for FDI. 
    Before discussing Chinese tax incentives, this chapter introduces the background of China’s 
fiscal system and tax legislation. China is a unitary country composed of 31 province-level 
                                                          
382 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax, March 16, 2007, by the National 




jurisdictions.383  It is fiscally centralized at the central government level, although there is a 
distribution of spending powers among the central and sub-national governments.384 Legally, the 
central government is the sole authority to grant tax incentives. Local governments do not have 
the discretionary power to grant tax incentives unless it is with the central government’s 
authorization.385 In China, tax legislation includes national tax “laws” (fa lü)386 enacted by the 
National People’s Congress (NPC, the legislator), 387  “administrative regulations” (fa gui) 388 
promulgated by the State Council (the government branch),389 as well as administrative rules 
introduced by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), 
which are ministries of the State Council.390 The Legislation Law (LL) is the foundational statue 
                                                          
383 Excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, there are 4 centrally administered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, and Chongqing), 22 provinces and 5 ethnic autonomous regions (Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia 
and Inner Mongolia). 
384 Some authors regard China as fiscally decentralized, considering the distribution of taxing powers 
between central and local governments. Zhiguo Wang and Liang Ma, 'Fiscal Decentralization in China: a 
Literature Review' (2014) 15 Annals of Economics and Finance 751-770; Meili Niu, 'Fiscal 
Decentralization in China Revisited' 72 Australian Journal of Public Administration 251-263; Chunli Shen, 
Jing Jin and Hengfu Zou, 'Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps' 
(2012) 13-1 Annals of Economics and Finance 1-51; Wei Cui, 'Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation' 
(2011) October World Tax Journal 455-480. 
385 Ibid.  
386 Chinese pin yin. 
387 The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the supreme organ of state power in China. It is composed of 
NPC deputies who are elected according to law from 35 electoral units from the people’s congress of 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the central government, the People’s 
Liberation Army, the deputy election council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region and the 
Taiwan compatriots' consultation election council. The NPC has the power to amend the Constitution and 
oversee its enforcement, to enact and amend basic laws governing criminal offences, civil affairs, state 
organs and other matters, to elect and appoint members to central state organs, and to determine major state 
issues. The NPC Standing Committee is the permanent body of the NPC. It normally meets once every two 
months, and is responsible to the NPC and reports to it on its work. It has legislative power, supervisory 
power, the power to decide upon major state issues, and the power to appoint and remove from office 
members of state organs. See Article 7, 8, 9 of the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (LL). 
See also the NPC’s official website <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm> 
accessed 24 November 2015. 
388 Chinese pin yin. 
389 The State Council is China’s central government, which is the executive body of the supreme organ of 
state power and also the supreme organ of State administration. See Article 65, 66, 67, and 68 of the LL. 
For the functions of the State Council, see <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-
12/06/content_1382098.htm> accessed 24 November 2015. 
390 For more information, see Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China; Jinyan Li, 'The Rise and Fall 
of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' (2007) 8 Florida Tax Review 




that governs the hierarchy of the laws in China.391 According to the LL, the Constitution has the 
highest legal authority in China.392 National law has a higher legal authority than administrative 
regulations, local decrees and administrative or local rules; administrative regulations have higher 
legal authority than local decrees and administrative or local rules; 393 administrative rules and 
local rules have the same legal authority. 394  
It is not the aim of the research to debate on ideologies, which have already been argued from 
the perspectives of economics, sociology, history, etc. The use of the terms “socialism” and 
“capitalism” is only with the purpose of presenting the background of taxation in China.395 
4.2 Chinese taxation from 1949 to 1978 
Before introducing the historical evolution of taxation in China, it is necessary to have some 
knowledge about Chinese history as a background. According to the general historical division, 
contemporary China refers to the time after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.396 The focus of 
the chapter is taxation in the PRC, especially tax incentives after the Reform and Opening in 1978, 
and therefore it does not describe the taxation before 1978 in detail.  
Since the establishment of the PRC, China has pursued a socialist system, compared to the 
capitalist system in most Western countries. Before the Reform and Opening, China was isolated 
from the world economy, except for the contact with the former Soviet Union from 1950 to 
                                                          
391 Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015 Amendment) (LL), by the NPC, 15 March 
2015. See Cui, 'What is the Law in Chinese Tax Administration?' 75-77. 
392 Article 87 of the LL. 
393 Article 88 of the LL. 
394 Article 91 of the LL. 
395 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, socialism means “any of various economic and political 
theories advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production 
and distribution of goods”; capitalism means “an economic system characterized by private corporate 
ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision and by prices, 
production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market”. See 
Merriam-Webster online dictionary, <http://beta.merriam-webster.com> accessed 20 November 2015. 
396 Before 1949, the history of China can be divided into ancient China, imperial China, and modern China. 
Ancient China covers the time from 2070 BC to 221 BC before the Qin dynasty, which mainly includes 
Three Dynasties, Xia dynasty, Shang dynasty, and Zhou dynasty; Imperial China is from the time of Qin 
dynasty starting in 211 BC to the end of the Qing dynasty in 1911; Modern China refers to the establishment 
of the Republic of China in 1912 to the establishment of the PRC in 1949. See Ray Huang, China, A Macro 
History (M.E. Sharpe 1988); Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy, 'The Cambridge History of 
Ancient China from the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C' (1999) ;Morris Rossabi, Blackwell History of 
the World : History of China (John Wiley & Sons 2013); Xu Zhuoyun, T.D. Baker and M.S. Duke, China: 
A New Cultural History (Columbia University Press 2012).   
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1960.397  Politically, China experienced political campaigns and chaos,398  while the economic 
system was mainly a planned economy that the central government controlled and planned for the 
overall economic activities, and the means of production were publicly owned.399  
The fiscal system at that time was a centrally controlled system, i.e. unified revenue collection 
and unified spending. Under the planned economy, the provincial governments collected most of 
the revenue from their own provinces and the central government made a spending plan for every 
province.400 This kind of fiscal system was simple and efficient, but it restricted the initiatives of 
local governments and enterprises, as well as the development of the economy.401 In this context, 
the function of taxation was very limited and simplified, since the majority of the economy was 
public, the mere function of taxation at that time was to levy tax from limited private businesses. 
During the political campaigns, the function of taxation was further diminished.402  
After the political campaigns, China decided to concentrate on economic development and the 
improvement of people’s living standard. In 1978, China announced the program of Four 
Modernizations, the modernization of industry, agriculture, defense, and science and 
technology.403 In addition, China intended to introduce the market system to initiate a transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy. To achieve this goal, the Chinese 
                                                          
397 Following the international background of the Cold War, China signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Assistance with the Soviet Union to receive technology transfers from the Soviet Union to stimulate the 
industrialization of China. The Cold War was a state of political and military tension after World War II 
between powers in the Western countries (led by the US and its allies) and powers in the Eastern countries 
(led by the former Soviet Union and its allies). See Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume 1, Origins, 1945-1962 (Cambridge University Press 2010); 
Roy Bin Wong, China Transformed : Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Cornell 
University Press 1997) 179-190.   
398 From 1958 to 1976, China experienced the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution, 
which resulted in great chaos. See Kenneth Lieberthal, The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yenan 
Leadership, in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China Volume 14. 
The People's Republic (Cambridge University Press 1987) 291-359; Auyeung, 'Taxation Trends and Issues 
in the People's Republic of China: 1949 to 2006'. 
399 Joseph C. H. Chai, China : Transition to a Market Economy (Clarendon Press 1997) 3. 
400  Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, 'Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese style' (2005) 89 Journal of Public Economics 1719 1723. 
401  Christine Wong, 'Central-local Relations Revisited: the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform and Public 
Expenditure Management in China' (Central-Periphery Relations in China: Integration, Disintegration or 
Reshaping of an Empire?).   
402 Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China 14. 




government introduced the Reform and Opening policy, including opening to the outside world 
and reforming the domestic economic system. After a long isolation from the outside world, China 
had been left behind compared to developed economies. Even within Asia, China could not catch 
up with the neighboring countries.404 Thus, China decided to cooperate more with the international 
world to use the capital, skills, and technology from foreign investment, changing from an attitude 
of trade aversion to trade proclivity.405  
In order to coordinate with the Reform and Opening policy, the existing tax system could not 
accommodate the economic changes; therefore, it was necessary to establish a new comprehensive 
and enforceable tax system, especially for the attraction of FDI. 
4.3 Chronological review of direct tax incentives for FDI 
4.3.1 1980-1991: separate tax incentives for FDI in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
The implementation of the Open Door Policy was an initiative to introduce preferential tax 
regimes to China to attract FDI. At that time, China was in need of capital, technology, 
management skills, and access to international markets, but China did not have experience or a 
history of using tax incentives for FDI before.406 Meanwhile, the neighboring Asian countries were 
offering various tax incentives for FDI, which put some pressure on China.407 Therefore, the 
Chinese government consulted international experts on the design of tax incentives, as well as the 
benefits and problems that accompany them.408 Consequently, China decided to introduce tax 
incentives for foreign enterprises (FEs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). On the one hand, 
they were aimed at realizing policy goals of economic development and competition with other 
                                                          
404 The 1970s witnessed impressive economic successes of the regions of Eastern Asian, such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.  
405 Chai, China : Transition to a Market Economy 139.  
406 Yasheng Huang, ‘the Benefits of FDI in a Transitional Economy: the Case of China’ in OECD, OECD 
Global Forum on International Investment New Horizons for Foreign Direct Investment (OECD Publishing 
2002).   
407 From the perspective of tax competition, if China failed to build similar preferential tax regimes, China 
would be in a disadvantaged position compared to these regions. Ibid. 
408 Richard D. Pomp and Stanley S. Surrey, 'The Tax Structure of the People's Republic of China' (1979) 
20 Virginia Journal of Intenational Law 1, cited by Halkyard Andrew and Linghui Ren, ‘China’s Tax 
Incentives Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an Eassionian Analysis’, in Arthur J. Cockfield, 
Globalization and Its Tax Discontents : Tax Policies and International Investments : Essays in Honour of 
Alex Easson (University of Toronto Press 2010) 4-5; Li, 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and 
Implications for International Tax Debates' 673.   
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Asian countries; on the other hand, they also announced to the world that China was ready to open 
the door by granting tax preferences.409  
Accordingly, China established the corporate income tax for foreign and foreign invested 
enterprises by introducing the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-
foreign Equity Joint Ventures (EJV Income Tax Law) (expired)410 and the Income Tax Law on 
Foreign Enterprise in the People’s Republic of China (FEIT) (expired)411 as the initial taxation 
setup for foreign enterprises. These tax incentives were mainly granted to foreign enterprises 
established in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in coastal areas, since the locations had a long 
history of contact with the outside world.412   
In 1984, more tax incentives were granted to foreign enterprises in SEZs and 14 coastal cities413 
in the form of direct tax incentives, such as a lower tax rate for foreign enterprises, tax holidays 
for certain industries, tax refunds for foreign reinvestment, and a portfolio of tax incentives under 
the location-specific and industry-specific tax incentive regimes.414 In addition to regional tax 
                                                          
409 Zhaodong Jiang, 'China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture and Modern Concepts' 
(1997) 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 557-559. 
410 Issued by the NPC on 1 July 1979. 
411 Issued by the NPC on 13 December 1981. 
412 The SEZs include Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanto in Guangdong province, and Xiamen in Fujian province. 
The main tax incentives were reduced tax rate, tax holidays, and tax exemptions.  
413 From north to the south, they include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, 
Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. See GuoFa [1984] 
No.161, Provisional Regulations for Special Economic Zones and 14 Coastal Cities on Reduction and 
Exemption of Enterprises Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax, by the State 
Council, 15 November 1984 (expired).  
414 For instance, Article 1 of the Provisional Regulations for Special Economic Zones and 14 Coastal Cities 
on Reduction and Exemption of Enterprises Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax 
by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China: “a 15 percent preferential enterprise income tax 
shall be levied on the income derived from production, business and other sources by any joint venture, 
cooperative enterprises or wholly foreign-owned enterprises, for enterprises engaged in industry, 
communications and transport, agriculture, forestry and livestock breeding, which have a contract life of 
10 years or longer, a two-year tax holiday commencing from the first profit-making year is granted followed 
by a 50 percent reduction from the third to the fifth year, upon application and approval by the special zone 
tax authorities”. See by Halkyard Andrew and Linghui Ren, ‘China’s Tax Incentives Regimes for Foreign 
Direct Investment: an Eassionian Analysis’, in Cockfield, Globalization and Its Tax Discontents : Tax 
Policies and International Investments : Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (2010) 6-7. 
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incentives, special FDI projects or activities received certain tax preferences as well, such as 
export-oriented and technologically-advanced projects.415  
Since 1980, the government also adjusted the central and local tax systems to raise revenue and 
promote economic development. A fiscal contracting system was implemented instead of the 
centrally controlled system in the planned economy period.416 Under the fiscal contracting system, 
the revenues were divided into central-fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues, and shared revenues. 
The local revenue was divided between the central and provincial governments according to 
predetermined sharing schemes. The idea was to apportion revenue and expenditures between the 
central and the local governments and to make the local governments responsible for their own 
profits and losses.417 This system allowed the local governments some discretionary power to 
collect local revenues, but it led to a decrease of the central revenues. Once the provincial 
governments fulfilled their fiscal contracts, the central government could exercise little control 
over them.418 Moreover, due to the complexity of the contracting methods, the fiscal gap between 
different regions also increased. 419  
4.3.2 1991-1993: expansion of tax incentives for FDI in the transition from the planned 
economy to a socialist market economy 
The historical background for the tax reform was the transition to a market economy. In 1993, 
China officially announced its transition to a market economy.420 It was considered as a watershed 
in China’s economic reforms, which symbolized China’s further transformation into a socialist 
market economy. The model of the market economy, which originated in the West and was 
                                                          
415 Export-oriented enterprises were defined as “enterprises that produce goods mainly (over 70%) for 
export and maintain a net positive foreign exchange balance at the end of the year”; technologically-
advanced enterprises were “enterprises which, with advanced technology provided by foreign investors, are 
able to develop new products, or upgrade existing products, and therefore earn foreign exchange through 
exports or import substitution”. See footnote 32 and 33, cited by Jinyan Li, 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese 
Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' (2007) 8 Florida Tax Review 675-676.  
416 Shen, Jin and Zou, 'Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps' 9. 
417 There were six forms of contracts: incremental contracting, basic proportional sharing, proportional 
sharing, and incremental sharing, remittance incremental contract, fixed remittance, fixed subsidy. See Su 
Ming and Zhao Quanhou, 'China's Fiscal Decentralization Reform' (The International Symposium on Fiscal 
Decentralization in Asia). Paper presented at the International Symposium on Fiscal Decentralization in 
Asia Revisited. http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~kokyo/APPPsympo04/China.pdf. 2004.   
418 Cui, 'Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation' 461. 
419 Ibid.  
420 Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure, the third 
plenary session of the 14th central committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 14 November 1993. 
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adopted widely in capitalist countries, was for the first time used in a socialist country.421 The core 
of the reform was to change the relationship between the government and the market by 
establishing a system of free and competitive enterprises so that the nature of the government-
business relationship was changed into one operating at arm’s length.422 As analyzed by Wu (2003), 
the problem of the planned economy was that the administrative bodies allocating resources and 
setting tasks overlooked the importance of economic levers such as price, monetary incentives, 
and taxation to shape and guide the economy. The division between the economy and the society 
obstructed the allocation of resources, thus resulting in no competition in the market, which 
resulted in Chinese enterprises having difficulty to integrate into the global economy.423 Therefore, 
to participate actively in the world economy, China started to transition to a market economy.  
In this period, tax incentives for foreign enterprises expanded quickly with the development of 
the economic zones, including SEZs, coastal open cities, coastal economic zones, and inland 
zones.424 In 1991, the State Council promulgated the Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of 
China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (FIETL) (expired), which 
unified the corporate income tax provisions for foreign invested enterprises and foreign 
enterprises.425 In 1992, the Law of the Administration of Tax Collection426 (revised) also became 
applicable to foreign enterprises.  
                                                          
421 As Deng Xiaoping, the second generation leader of China and chief architect of the Reform and Opening 
Policy, pointed out, socialism was not to be judged according to whether it was based on a plan or the 
market but on whether or not it can expand and develop the productive forces and raise people’s living 
standard. He also explained “we should not hesitate to draw on the achievements of all cultures and to learn 
from other countries, including the developed capitalist countries, all advanced methods of operation and 
techniques of management that reflect the laws governing modern socialized production”. Deng Xiaoping, 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol III: 1982-1992 (Foreign Language Press 1994) 361-362.  
422 Yingyi Qian and Jinglian Wu, ‘China’s Transition to a Market Economy, How Far across the River?’, 
in Nicholas C. Hope, Dennis Tao yang, and Mu Yangli (Eds.) ‘How Far Across the River?: Chinese Policy 
Reform at the Millennium’ (Stanford University Press 2003) 48. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Halkyard Andrew and Linghui Ren, ‘China’s Tax Incentives Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an 
Eassionian Analysis’, in Cockfield, Globalization and Its Tax Discontents : Tax Policies and International 
Investments : Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (2010) 4-5.  
425 The nominal tax rate was 33% (30% national tax and 3% local tax), but FIEs located in SEZs and some 
other special areas were taxed at a reduced rate of 15%. See Article 5 and Article 7 of the FEITL. 
426 Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection (expired), 
issued by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 1992. It was amended in 1995, 
2001, and 2013.  
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Compared to the previous stage of tax incentives, in this period, the government started to guide 
foreign investment on special industries, such as manufacturing, mining, communications, 
transportation, construction and installation etc.427 The most common tax incentives were tax 
holidays, reduced enterprise income tax rates, accelerated depreciation, favorable deduction rules 
for certain types of expenditure, reinvestment incentives, and exemptions from withholding tax on 
dividends paid by FIEs to foreign investors.428 However, the scale of regional tax incentives 
expanded so rapidly that the central government lost massive tax revenues. On the other hand, 
although the central government is the sole authority to authorize tax incentives, local governments 
in tax preferential regions discretionally granted tax incentives to compete for FDI, thus resulting 
in adverse tax competition among neighboring provinces.429 The discretionary local tax incentives 
began to impair the taxing power of the central government, triggering the 1994 tax sharing reform 
between the central and local governments.430  
4.3.3 1994-2007: tax incentives for FDI after the tax sharing reform and China’s accession 
to the WTO 
To transform into a socialist market economy, the tax system between the central and local 
government also changed. In 1994, China started the tax sharing reform, which classified taxes 
into central tax, local tax, and shared tax, with the purpose of strengthening the tax control of the 
central government.431 Central taxes were those necessary to protect the national interest and 
implement macroeconomic control; local taxes were those suitable for the local administration, 
and shared taxes were major taxes directly linked to economic development.432 
Following the 1994 tax sharing reform, the central government adjusted tax incentives 
accordingly. Local governments were warned to abolish discretionary tax incentives for FDI and 
                                                          
427 Article 1 of Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China Concerning 
Reduction and Exemption of Enterprise Income Tax and Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax for 
the Encouragement of Foreign Investment in China’s Open Coastal Economic Areas (expired), the Ministry 
of Finance [1988] No.91. 
428 Halkyard Andrew and Linghui Ren, ‘China’s Tax Incentives Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an 
Eassionian Analysis’, in Cockfield, Globalization and Its Tax Discontents : Tax Policies and International 
Investments : Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (2010) 8. See also Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct 
Investment 2-4.  
429 Cui, 'Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation' 461. 
430 Shen, Jin and Zou, 'Fiscal Decentralization in China: History, Impact, Challenges and Next Steps' 9. 
431 Guofa [1993] No.85, Decision Regarding the Implementation of the Tax Sharing System of Fiscal 
Management (the 1993 Decision), by the State Council, 15 December 1993. 




were forbidden to grant tax incentives by law.433 However, the FEITL and its implementation 
regulations were still effective. With the growth of the economy, tax incentives expanded more 
deeply to inland China including the central and western China.434   
Since the beginning of the granting of tax incentives for FDI, they concentrated in coastal areas, 
which have a long history of contact with the outside world.435 However, the regional disparity 
between the coastal region and the interior region increased tremendously. When the coastal area 
enjoyed easy access to external markets and investments, the interior region lagged behind in 
economic growth, living standards, and infrastructure, etc.436 Thus, it was necessary to decrease 
regional inequality and bolster the overall growth of the country.437 Except for the economic 
reasons to reduce the increasing gap between the coastal region and the interior regions, there were 
also political concerns for the promotion of the interior regions. More than half of the ethnic 
minorities were living in the western region, and if the living standard in these areas remained 
lower compared to the eastern region, it would be risky for the unity of the country.438  
In September 1999, China officially promoted the Western Development Strategy (WDS).439 
In 2000, the State Council issued a Notice on the Implementation of Several Policies of the 
Western Development, which explicitly pointed to grant tax incentives for the Western regions.440 
Subsequently, in 2001 and 2002, the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the State Administration of 
                                                          
433 Article 3 and Article 84, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection 
(LATC) (2015 Amendment), by the NPC, 24 April 2015. The Articles explicitly forbid the unauthorized 
tax reduction, exemption, refund, or non-collection or cessation of taxes; otherwise, the responsible 
governmental organs, entities or individuals shall be liable.  
434 Tax incentives expanded with the extension of the economic and technological development zones 
(ETDZs) to inland regions. See Zhihua Zeng, Building Engines for Growth and Cometitiveness in China, 
Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters (The World Bank 2010) 8-16.  
435  Hongyi Harry Lai, 'China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and 
Prospects' (2002) 28 Modern China 445-446. 
436 Ibid.  
437 Victor Shih, 'Development, the Second Time Around: The Political Logic of Developing Western China' 
(2004) 4 Journal of East Asian Studies 427-451.  
438 Lai, 'China's Western Development Program: Its Rationale, Implementation, and Prospects' 445-446.       
439 Western regions include Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, 
Xizang, Neimenggu, Guangxi, Xinjiang. Western regions are underdeveloped compared to teastern and 
central China. Most ethnic minorities live in these areas, which accounts for 56% of the nation’s ethnic 
minorities. See ibid 445-446.       
440 Guofa [2000] No.33, Circular of the State Council Concerning Several Policies on Carrying out the 
Development of China’s Vast Western Regions, by the State Council, 26 December 2000. 
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Taxation (SAT), and the General Administration of Customs (GAC) successively introduced 




    Nevertheless, the success of tax incentives for FDI encountered challenges when China joined 
the WTO in 2001. After the accession to the WTO, China was required to adjust its tax incentives 
in order to realize its promises of accession and fulfill its obligation as a Member, i.e. to open its 
domestic market fully from the inbound perspective and toremove trade barriers including 
subsidies for enterprises from the outbound perspective.442 Thus, the export- and import-orientated 
tax incentives for foreign enterprises and the preferential tax treatment for FDI became the focus 
of the debate. After the accession to the WTO, China had a five-year transitional period from 2001 
to 2006 to change the debated tax incentives. It indeed lowered rates for tariffs, eliminated certain 
trade barriers, but substantial tax incentives for foreign enterprises still existed.443 
                                                          
441 The major tax incentives are reduced tax rates and tax exemptions. See Caishui [2001] No.202, Notice 
on Tax Incentives Issues Related to the Western Development, by the MoF, the SAT, and the General 
Administration of Customs, 30 December 2001 (expired); Caishui [2002] No.47, Notice on the 
Implementation of the Relevant Taxation Policies for the Western Development, by the SAT, 5 October 
2002 (expired).  
442  The Protocol of China’s Accession to the WTO. See 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#chn. 
443 This period was regarded as “the fall” of Chinese tax incentives for FDI by some scholars. See Li, 'The 
Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' 677-678; Chen, 
China's Integration with the Global Economy, WTO Accession, Foreign Direct Investment and 
International Trade 29.  
On the left of the black line:  
Western regions covered by the WDS 
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4.3.4 2007-2013: tax incentives after the New Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) 
After the five-year transitional period in the WTO, it was time for China to fulfill its obligations 
to rearrange the tax law system comprehensively. Meanwhile, the Chinese government considered 
that the time was ripe to implement the reform, considering the outcomes of the efforts of the 
previous decades in relation to economic development. As some authors pointed out, the 
government was confident that even without those preferential tax incentives, China’s special 
advantages established attractive factors for FDI, such as a stable investment environment, a large 
and fast-growing domestic market, low labor costs, abundant and well-educated human resources, 
good infrastructure, rich natural resources, strong economic growth trends, etc.444  
At the same time, China promulgated the new Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law) in 
2007.445 The new EIT Law terminated the situation that foreign and foreign-invested enterprises 
enjoyed more preferential tax incentives than domestic Chinese enterprises.446 After this new law, 
official tax incentives were no longer granted only to foreign enterprises, as any enterprise 
satisfying certain conditions was eligible for the tax incentives stipulated in the EIT law. It not 
only unified the FEITL and the Interim EIT Regulations, but it also introduced new concepts and 
provisions. It had realized “four unifications”: unification of the income tax law applicable to both 
domestic and foreign-funded enterprises, unification of the tax rates, unification and 
standardization of the deductions in computing taxable income, and unification of tax 
incentives.447  
                                                          
444 Chunlai Chen, 'The development of China’s FDI laws and policies after WTO accession' (2009) Rising 
China: Global Challenges and Opportunities 93-94; Jinyan Li, 'Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax Reform 
in China: Motivations and Majore Changes' (2007) December Bulletin for International Taxation 522. 
According to the 2005 Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index (A.T. Kearney 2005), China was 
ranked as the most attractive FDI location in the world, and it maintained this position until 2007. The 2005 
Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index, A.T. Kearney Global Business Policy Council, 2005, cited 
by Chen, 'The development of China’s FDI laws and policies after WTO accession' 93-94.   
445 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax, by the NPC, 16 March 2007. For 
official English translation, see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471133.htm. 
446 The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises and its implementation rules were repealed by the new EIT law.  
447 In order to ease the fear of foreign investors who previously enjoyed preferential tax treatment, the new 
law allowed existing FEs and FIEs to continue to enjoy the tax preferences until 2013 or until the specified 




The changes in the tax incentives for FDI for the past decades are a demonstration of the 
tremendous development of China’s economy and society. Tax incentives for FDI have undergone 
a process of “rise and fall”.448 Initially, tax incentives were introduced to SEZs as a trial to draw 
FDI; when tax incentives displayed effects for FDI and economic growth, the government adopted 
the incentives as a tool to guide the direction of investment, such as exportation, and expanded the 
scope of the incentives. Therefore, before 2007, the time can be considered as “the rise” of tax 
incentives for FDI. The evolution of tax incentives in this period presented some specific 
characteristics. First, most tax incentives were in the form of direct incentives such as lower tax 
rates, tax exemptions or reductions, tax holidays, and so on, which seemed efficient to attract FDI, 
but they also caused problems of revenue loss and intensified local tax competition. Additionally, 
tax incentives were concentrated in specific regions for export-oriented enterprises. Furthermore, 
there was no order or unified code of tax incentives for FDI.  
However, many factors called for the reform of these incentives, the most significant of which 
were China’s strengthening economic power and the WTO requirements. When China decided to 
join the WTO, it was prepared to open its domestic market to engage in international competition, 
but preferential tax treatment for FDI not only harmed the competition on its domestic market, but 
it also affected outbound competition with other countries. Thus, after the five-year transitional 
period permitted by the WTO, in 2007, it was time to unify differential tax treatment for foreign 
and domestic enterprises and to terminate most foreign related and regional tax incentives. 
Consequently, the EIT Law announced “the fall” of Chinese tax incentives. 
4.4 Internal benchmark: a level playing field for competition in China 
4.4.1 The background of the socialist market economy 
To understand the concept of the socialist market economy, the premise is to comprehend the 
socialist system of China. According to the Constitutional Law, China is a socialist state under the 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and 
peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of China.449 The basis of the socialist economic 
system of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by 
                                                          
448 Li, 'The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates' 669-
712. 
449 Article 1, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
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the whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The Constitution also confirms 
that the state-owned economy is the leading force in the national economy, and therefore the state 
ensures the consolidation and growth of the state-owned economy. However, considering the 
economic situation of China, the Constitution allows diverse forms of ownership to coexist.450 
Therefore, it has provided the legal basis for the existence of private ownership and mixed 
ownership, which are the main elements of a market economy. 
The original objective of introducing the market economy system into China was to promote 
economic growth, thereby changing from a centrally planned economy with major public 
ownership to private ownership. China mainly adopted Karl Marx’s theory of historical 
materialism, i.e. the relationship between the productive forces and the productive relations, to 
justify the transition to the market economy.451 Based on this theory, a market economy is just a 
form of productive relations that reflects and matches the development of the productive forces in 
capitalist countries, but it does not solely belong to capitalism. The same form of productive 
relations can exist in different social systems once it fits with the level of the productive forces 
there. In China’s situation, once the market economy matches the level of productive forces in 
China, not only can it survive there, but it can also contribute to the development of the productive 
forces as a form of productive relations.452 Therefore, once the market was established in China, 
the major rules of market operation also apply.  
China’s transition to a market economy was a “gradualist” approach.453 China takes a step-by-
step approach by adopting some market-oriented reforms while maintaining much of the socialist 
                                                          
450 Article 6, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment): “in the primary stage of 
socialism, the State upholds the basic economic system in which the public ownership is dominant and 
diverse forms of ownership develop side by side and keeps to the distribution system in which distribution 
according to work is dominant and diverse modes of distribution coexist”. 
451 Based on this theory, productive forces are facilities for creating or making usable material goods, 
facilities that are necessary to meet the physical demands of the production process. Productive relations 
are “relations of effective power over persons and productive forces, which govern processes of production”. 
The level of development of the productive forces is the determining factor for the development of society. 
The relationship between productive forces and productive relations is mutually active. Productive forces 
determine the level of productive relations, while productive relations react to productive forces. Karl Marx, 
Friedrich Engels and C. J. Arthur, The German ideology. Part one (Electric Book Co. 2001) 32, 56, and 63.  
452 Mingxing Cao, Differentiation of the Generation on the Modern Tax Law, Pole Analysis and Case 
Commentaries of the Background Elements for China and the United States (China Taxation Press 2009) 
(in Chinese) 48-51. 
453 The “gradualist” approach means a step-by-step transition compared to the “big bang” approach adopted 
by the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. It entails changing all elements of the centrally-
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planned economy systems for the transitional period. During this process, China initiated reforms 
targeting at the core problem of the relationship between the government and the market. The 
major actions were reforming the existing state-owned enterprises (SOEs), promoting new private 
enterprises (mainly small and medium enterprises), and establishing the rule of law.454 This reform 
process was accompanied by a flourishing FDI as well. In order to open the economy to the world 
and to attract FDI, China had to integrate into the world economy and to accept the Western market 
economy model and its common rules. It requires a transformation of the government’s role from 
ordering and planning to macro-control in general. 455  Moreover, the accession to the WTO 
accelerated the progress of China’s integration into the world.  







            
             
            Market economy in China                        Market economy in the West 
Chart 4 
                                                          
planned economy as quickly as possible into a capitalist economy by the privatization of property and 
enterprises, freeing prices by market forces, eliminating monopolies, fostering market competition, and 
opening the market to the outside world, etc. For the distinction between the “big bang” approach and the 
“gradualist’ approach, see Martin King Whyte, 'Paradoxes of China's economic boom' (2009) 35 Annual 
Review of Sociology 371. 
454 Yingyi Qian and Jinglian Wu, 'China's Transition to A Market Economy', How Far Across the River? 
Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium (How Far Across the River? Chinese Policy Reform at the 
Millennium, Standford University Press 2003) 48-61.  
455 Michael W. Bell, Hoe Ee Khor and Kalpana Kochhar, China at the Threshold of A Market Economy 
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4.4.2.1 Differences: the market operates under the state’s macro control (SOEs) 
    Although China officially announced that it introduced a market economy since 1993, the 
question is whether or not this market economy is identical to the Western idea of a market 
economy. In the Western model of a market economy, despite the fact that relationship between 
the market and the government is consistently in a dynamic process, the market always plays an 
essential role in resource allocation, and the government plays a subsidiary role to the 
market. 456 Nevertheless, the degree of government intervention is growing due to market 
failures.457 As illustrated in Chart 4, the state plays an increasing role to achieve efficiency and 
equity in the market, but it still functions under the framework of the market.  
In contrast, China uses the concept of a socialist market economy to distinguish from the 
common one. Under the socialist system, the market operates under the framework of the state, 
which is within the control of the state’s governance. In the period of the centrally planned 
economy, the state had absolute control over all business activities. Even after the introduction of 
the market economy in China, the market still operates under a framework in which that state-
owned enterprises (SOEs, public ownerships) and collective ownerships are the main forces. 
However, the scope of the market and the freedom of the market participants are expanding with 
less and less government intervention. As announced by the government, the trend is to let the 
market play a more and more decisive role in the allocation of resources with macro-regulation by 
the state.458  
Compared to the market economy system in the West, the market in China is not fully a free 
market, since there is limited market access for private and foreign enterprises in certain areas that 
are only open to SOEs, such as electricity, coal, civil aviation, petroleum and petrochemical, 
                                                          
456 See the efficiency requirement in the market in Section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2. 
457 John Maynard Keynes was a pioneer who was critical about the free market economy and advocated 
governmental regulation of the market during the time of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Chapter 6 goes 
into a further analysis of this issue. See John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire (Leonard & 
Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press 1926). 
458 At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 
12 November 2013, the Committee approved the Decision of the Central Committee of the CCP on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (the 2013 Decision). The 2013 Decision 
announced, “let the market decide the allocation of resources, the primary task is to build an open and 
unified market with orderly competition”. For a non-official English version of the 2013 Decision, see the 
English version of the 2013 Decision, China Daily (18 November 2013) 
<http://language.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2013-11/18/content_17112855.htm> accessed 10 March 2016. 
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telecommunications, and the like.459 Under the current framework of a socialist market economy, 
the state maintains sole ownership or absolute control over the strategic industries and a strong 
control position with regard to the pillar industries.460 In 2006, the state-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), the institution authorized by the state Council to 
administer and supervise state-owned assets, identified seven “strategic industries” and five “pillar 
industries”. Strategic industries include defense, electricity generation and distribution, petroleum 
and petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and waterway transport, while pillar 
industries include machinery, automobiles, information technology, construction, steel, base 
metals and chemicals.461 Due to the significance of these industries, the central government has 
strong control over the market access to them.462 Thus, the major enterprises in these industries 
are SOEs. In summary, the market still operates under the state’s macro control.  
4.4.2.2 Similarities: basic function of the market is the same 
The two systems share similarities. Although the market operates under the state’s macro 
framework in China, it is still a market in which the basic rules of the market are also applicable. 
As analyzed in Chapter 2, the key feature of a market economy is the private ownership, i.e. 
resources are owned by private individuals, which make both trading parties better off.463 In order 
to protect individuals’ private ownership, to increase efficiency and equity in the market, it is 
necessary to introduce the rule of law to guarantee fair competition in the market.  
With further integration into the world economy, the market economy system is also becoming 
mature and complete in China. Comparing the basic elements of China’s market economy with 
the Western market economy, it is obvious that they are the same. The protection of private 
ownership and the respect for the individual’s choice are fundamental issues for the market’s 
operation. Therefore, despite the fact that the function of the state differs in degree and scope, 
                                                          
459 Andrew Szamosszegi and others, 'An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China' 
(2011) 33-34. 
460 Absolute control normally means the majority of ownership, but strong control means 30 to 50 percent 
shares of ownership. Andrew Szamosszegi and others, An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State 
Capitalism in China (Capital Trade, Incorporated for US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission 2011) 33. 
461 Ibid 33-34. 
462 For foreign investment, a list of market access to different industries can be found in the Catalogue for 
the Guidance of Foreign Invested Enterprises (amended in 2015). There are three categories of foreign 
investment: encouraged, restricted, and forbidden. See Section 4.6.2.2 in Chapter 4.  
463 Sobel, 'Welfare Economics and Public Finance' 21-22. 
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within the framework of the market economy, the basic function of the market is the same for both 
systems.   
4.4.3 Internal benchmark: a level playing field in China 
4.4.3.1 A level playing field for tax competition  
Under the socialist market economy in China, in order to keep the economic growth and to 
further integrate into the world economy, it is necessary to protect the market efficiency. Therefore, 
there should also be a level playing field for competition in the market. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to regulate the granting of tax incentives that distort the establishment of such a level playing field 
in domestic China. Legal regulation, i.e. the rule of law, is a strong guarantee to maintain such fair 
competition. It further involves a systematic internal legal control of tax incentives in China.  
There is not yet a unified legal regulation of the granting of tax incentives in China. The current 
laws that can be applied to regulate the de facto tax competition in China are the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China Concerning the Tax Administration and Tax Collection (LATC)464 
and Anti-unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (AUCL).465 The AUCL aims 
at safeguarding the development of a socialist market economy, thus encouraging and protecting 
fair competition.466 The objective of the LATC is to regulate tax collection and to forbid the 
discretionary granting of tax incentives.467 Nevertheless, neither law has detailed rules for the 
systematic regulation of tax incentives.  
 After the implementation of the EIT Law, China realized the importance of creating a level 
playing field in the domestic market by further regulating the use of tax incentives. In 2013, China 
officially promoted the reform of the taxation systems in order to optimize resource allocation, 
                                                          
464 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection (2015 Amendment) 
(LATC), by the NPC, 24 April 2015.  
465 Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (AUCL), by the NPC, 2 September 
1993.  
466 Article 1 of AUCL: this law is drawn up in order to safeguard the healthy development of the socialist 
market economy, encourage and protect fair market competition, prohibit unfair competition, safeguard the 
legal rights and interests of managers. 
467 Article 1 of LATC: this law has been formulated with a view to strengthening the administration of tax 
collection, regulating tax collection and payment, guaranteeing the tax revenue of the State, protecting the 
legitimate rights and interests of taxpayers and promoting economic and social development. Article 3 of 
LATC: no governmental organs, entities or individuals may be permitted without authorization, by violating 
laws or administrative regulations, to make decisions regarding the collection of tax or the cessation thereof, 
the reduction, exemption or refund of tax, the payment of tax dodged or overdue or decisions in conflict 
with other tax laws or administrative regulations.  
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maintain market unity, and promote social equity, etc.468 Most importantly, it was pointed out that 
to promote equality in relation to tax burdens and fair competition, the central government would 
have to strengthen governance in relation to tax incentives, especially regional tax incentives. All 
tax incentives would be made clear in tax laws and regulations. In addition, it would clean up the 
existing forbidden tax incentives and improve the collection and management system of central 
and local taxes.469 
In 2014, the Chinese State Council issued a Notice on the Clearance of Tax and Other 
Incentives.470 It was the first time that an official document pointed out the adverse effects of tax 
incentives to the international trade. “Some tax incentives have disturbed the order of the market, 
affected the effect of national macro-economic control, and are likely to breach China’s promises 
to foreign countries thereby triggering international trade disputes”.471 In 2015, the SAT issued a 
directory synthesizing all the official tax incentives that are effective until September 2015.472 It 
greatly strengthened the transparency of the current tax incentives and made them more convenient 
for taxpayers to enjoy.  
                                                          
468  The 2013 Decision confirmed that it was necessary to improve legislation, clarify powers and 
responsibilities, reform the taxation system, stabilize tax burdens, have transparent budgets, increase 
efficiency, and establish a modern fiscal system to stimulate the initiative of both the central and local 
governments. See V of the 2013 Decision. The fiscal reform is accompanied by a balance between the role 
of the government and that of the market. It is important to let the market play a decisive role in allocating 
resources. See I (3) of the 2013 Decision.  
469 V (18) of the 2013 Decision. As explained by the Minister of Finance, the current tax incentives, 
especially regional tax incentives were excessive. Some local governments discretionally render tax relieves 
through disguised methods, which has seriously affected the State’s tax regulation and fair competition in 
the market. They must be cleaned up and consolidated. No new regional tax incentives would be approved 
in principle because they will be regulated uniformly by tax laws and regulations. Discretionary tax 
incentives were strictly forbidden. See Lou Jiwei, Eliminate the Drawbacks of the Fiscal System, Establish 
a Modern Fiscal System, Xinhua News (21 November 2013) 
<http://www.MoF.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/201311/t20131121_1014330.html> accessed 21 
August 2014. 
470 Guofa [2014] No.62, Notice on the Clearance of Tax and Other Incentives, by the State Council, 27 
November 2014.  
471 Ibid. 
472 The SAT notice [2015] No.73, Notice on the Issuing of the Code Directory of Tax Incentives, by the 
SAT, 29 October 2015; the SAT notice [2015] No.76, Notice on the Issuing of Administrative Regulation 
of Corporate Tax Incentives, by the SAT, 12 November 2015. 
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In summary, under the socialist market economy, fair competition in the market should be 
respected in China, and therefore the creation of a level playing field for competition in the market 
should also be the internal benchmark for regulating Chinese tax incentives.  
4.4.3.2 The content of a level playing field  
The creation of fair competition should be the benchmark for evaluating China’s granting of tax 
incentives. However, considering China’s economic and social background, the concept of a level 
playing field needs further clarification.  
In China’s circumstances, to understand the meaning of a level playing field, one should refer 
to the principle of equality, i.e. treating equals equally and unequals unequally, which was already 
introduced in the external benchmark in Chapter 3.473 Considering the imbalanced development of 
different regions and industries in China, there should be different treatment with respect to tax 
incentives as well.474  This rational is similar to compatible State aid in the EU. In order to 
safeguard a common market and fair competition, the concept of the level playing field in the State 
aid regime takes into account the situation of disadvantaged regions and activities or enterprises 
that require more governmental support due to the market’s inefficient functioning. It treats the 
same situations identically but different situations differently. When defining the concept of a level 
playing field as the internal benchmark in China, this rationale is the same. For instance, with 
respect to regional disparities in China, the level playing field shall grant certain exemptions or 
possibilities of compatibility to some areas with certain conditions.475 To control the scope of 
exemptions, the principle of proportionality is also applicable.  
4.4.3.3 The internal benchmark shares the same essence with the external benchmark 
Comparing the internal benchmark with the external benchmark, it is obvious that the two 
benchmarks share the same essence. The external benchmark derives from the economic rationale 
of regulating tax incentives, which is also the common object and purpose of the two legal systems, 
the WTO’s subsidy rules and the EU State aid law. It reflects the relationship between the 
government and the market under most Western countries’ market economy systems.  
                                                          
473 See Section 3.2.4.2 of Chapter 3.  
474 Joseph M. Dodge, 'Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay 
Principles' (2004-2005) 58 Tax Law Review 399-461.  
475 Frans Vanistendael, 'Fiscal Federalism, Are There Lessons to be Learnt for China?' (2011) 17 Asia-
Pacific Tax Bulletin 419, 426.   
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The concept of a level playing field actually represents what should be China’s position towards 
tax incentives in the context of the international trade and competition. Despite the differences on 
the function of the state and the market, the operation of the market requires basic common rules, 
i.e. fair competition in the market that is guaranteed by the law. During China’s reform and opening 
process, the basic framework of the market economy has been established across the entire 
country.476 A market economy requires a fair competition environment and mechanisms that 
balance competing interests and, thus, a mature and well-functioning legal system is necessary to 
guarantee the operation of the market economy. Although the social and political background in 
China is different from many Western countries, the creation of a level playing field is essential 
for economic growth and the well-being of the people.  
Therefore, the concept of a level playing field in both the external and the internal benchmarks 
should be interpreted via the same fundamental principles, the principle of equality and the 
principle of proportionality. The specific content of the level playing field in each benchmark may 
vary due to the concrete circumstances, such as the different situations between the international 
standard and China’s particular economic background. Nevertheless, the pursuit and maintenance 
of fair competition in both the international and China’s domestic market should be the common 
benchmark to evaluate the function and position of Chinese tax incentives in the context of 
international trade and competition.  
4.4.3.4 Conclusion 
The context of establishing an internal benchmark for the evaluation of tax incentives in China 
is to understand the socialist market economy. The relationship between the state and the market 
under such a system is different from its counterpart in a Western market economy system. In 
China, the market operates under the framework of the state, and the state has greater intervention 
into the market. State ownership is still the leading force of the economy, so there is limited market 
access for private ownership in certain areas. However, the basic market rules still should be 
applicable in the market in China, especially with the growth of the market system. The efficiency 
and equity considerations in the market require China to create a level playing field for competition. 
The concept of this level playing field shares the same essence with the external benchmark 
                                                          
476 Athar Hussain and Juzhong Zhuang, Enterprise Taxation and Transition to a Market Economy, in Donald 
J.S. Brean, Taxation in Modern China (Routledge 2013) 43-68.  
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meaning that, when interpreting fair competition, the principle of equality and the principle of 
proportionality should be taken into account. In China’s circumstances, the level playing field 
should cover regional disparities and the imbalanced development of various industries.  
4.5 Matrix of tax incentives in China from 1949 to 2015 
Time  Background of the time Tax measures 
1949-1978 Establishment of the PRC 
Socialist system 
Planned economy 
Political campaigns  
Isolated from the world economy 
Fiscal system: a central controlled 
system 
Unified revenue collection and unified 
spending 
Diminished role of taxation 
1978 Reform and Opening  
Reform domestic economy and open to 
the outside world 
Start to introduce market economy and 
to attract FDI 
Necessary to introduce a new and 
comprehensive tax system to the 
economic changes 
1980-1991 Attraction for FDI Beginning of tax incentives in China 
1980: Income tax law of the PRC on 
Chinese foreign equity joint ventures 
(EJV income tax law) 
1981: Income tax law on foreign 
enterprises in the PRC (FEIT) 
Tax incentives for FDI in SEZs (trial to 
open the door) 
1984: more tax incentives for FDI in 
SEZs and 14 coastal cities 
1991: Income tax law of the PRC for 
enterprises with foreign investment and 
foreign enterprises (FIETL): 
unification of CIT for foreign invested 
enterprises and foreign enterprises 
1993 Official announcement of the transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a 
socialist market economy 
 
1980-1993: fiscal contracting system 
The revenues were divided as central-
fixed revenues, local-fixed revenues, 
and shared revenues 
The local revenue was divided between 
the central and provincial governments 
according to pre-determined sharing 
schemes. 
1994 To establish a system of free and 
competitive enterprises wherein the 
nature of the government-business 
relationship is changed into an arm’s 
length relationship 
 
Tax sharing reform:  
Central tax, local tax, and shared tax 
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1999 Western Development Strategy 
 
Tax incentives for Western regions 
2001-2006 Accession to the WTO  
Five-year transitional period 
Fulfillment of the obligation as a WTO 
Member 
Changes of tax incentives  
2007-2013 To further fulfill the obligations in the 
WTO 
China’s increasing confidence on 
attracting FDI without differential tax 
incentives  
 
2008: the new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law  
Five-year transitional period for the 
former foreign-favored tax incentives 
2013-2014 The 18th Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
 
Further reforms of tax incentives  
To create fair competition in the market 
2014 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 
Eighteenth Central Committee of the 
CCP 
The establishment of the socialist rule 
of law with Chinese characteristics 
Notice on the Clearance of Tax and 
Other Incentives 
To establish and maintain an open and 
competitive market system 
 
2015 Further cleaning of tax incentives  The SAT issued a directory 
synthesizing all the official tax 
incentives 
4.6 The present direct tax incentives 
This section introduces the present direct tax incentives after the promulgation of the EIT Law. 
The main sources of the tax incentives are laws, regulations, or circulars issued by the SAT or the 
MoF. Discretionary tax incentives granted by local governments are not in the discussion due to 
the limited availability of data. In 2015, the SAT compiled all the official tax incentives that were 
effective until 2015.477 It provides a relatively comprehensive and authoritative source of tax 
incentives for further testing. The present tax incentives introduced in this section are mainly from 
the SAT’s inventory.   
In order to conduct the testing of Chinese tax incentives with the subsidy rules of the WTO and 
EU State aid law, the tax incentives are classified according to their specificity, the essential 
criteria to determine whether they are subsidies or State aid. Both of the WTO and EU State aid 
                                                          
477 The SAT notice [2015] No.73, Notice on the Issuing of the Code Directory of Tax Incentives, by the 
SAT, 29 October 2015; the SAT notice [2015] No.76, Notice on the Issuing of Administrative Regulation 
of Corporate Tax Incentives, by the SAT, 12 November 2015. 
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systems classify specificity as either industrial or enterprise specificity and regional specificity. 
Hence, it is important to categorize Chinese tax incentives based on these criteria.   
4.6.1 Introduction of the EIT law regime 
Before discussing specific direct tax incentives, this section introduces the general direct tax 
incentives under the EIT law regime. It serves as a background to understand the extent of the tax 
incentives in China.  
4.6.1.1 Residence 
Enterprises are subject to enterprise income tax under the EIT Law and residence is the factor 
to determine the status of the enterprise for taxation. Resident enterprises are subject to tax on their 
income from inside and outside China; non-resident enterprises are subject to tax only on their 
income sourced in China. According to Article 2 of the EIT Law, a resident enterprise is an 
enterprise established in China or an enterprise that is created under a foreign law but has a place 
of effective management in China.478 FIEs registered in China are tax resident enterprises. FEs 
with the place of effective management in China are also classified as tax resident enterprises. An 
FE without its effective management based in China is taxed according to whether it has a 
permanent establishment in China or not.479 
4.6.1.2 Taxable income 
The sources of taxable income include the sale of goods, the provision of services and transfers 
of property, dividends, interest, rents and royalties, and donations and other types of income.480 
Non-taxable income includes funds received from government finance departments and fees 
collected for services provided by government agencies, non-profit enterprises or social 
organizations in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations. Excluded income also includes 
                                                          
478 Enterprise established in China means an enterprise, non-profit entity, social organization or other type 
of entity that derives income and is created in accordance with Chinese laws or administrative regulations. 
See Article 3 of the EIT Law. Place of effective management refers to the place where the substantial and 
overall management and control of the production and business operations, personnel, finances, assets and 
other matters are executed. See Article 4 of the EIT Law. For a further explanation, see Article 4 and 5, 
Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (RIEITL), by the State Council, 6 
December 2007. For more introduction, see Jinyan Li and He Huang, 'Tansformation of the Enterprise 
Income Tax in China: Internationalization and Chinese Innovations' (2008) July Bulletin for International 
Taxation 276-277. 
479 Article 3 of the EIT Law. 
480 Other types of income include income derived from assets, amounts payable that cannot be settled, 
collections from accounts receivable that were previously written off as bad debts, income from debt-
restructuring, subsidies, damages for breach of contract, exchange gains, etc. See Article 22 of the RIEITL.  
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other amounts designated as non-taxable by the SAT or the MoF.481 Exempt income includes 
interest on state bonds, dividends received from a resident company, dividends that are effectively 
connected to an establishment or site in China of a non-resident enterprise, and income derived by 
qualifying non-profit organizations.  
Costs, expenses, non-income taxes, losses and other outlays are deductible when calculating 
taxable income. Costs and expenses include costs of wages, salaries, bonuses and contributions to 
basic pension plans, basic medical insurance plans, basic unemployment insurance plans, workers’ 
compensation plans, family-planning insurance plans, housing provident funds, and other social 
insurance plans. Non-deductible items include dividends, taxes paid under the EIT Law, late-
payment penalties, fines and penalties, sponsorships, unverified reserves, and other amounts 
incurred for non-income-producing purposes.482  
4.6.1.3 Tax rate 
The general rate is 25%, which unified the dual-track rates for domestic and foreign enterprises. 
Before the EIT Law, due to tax incentives for FDI, FIEs and Fes have enjoyed a preferential tax 
regime compared to domestic Chinese enterprises, meaning that the effective tax rates for them 
are lower than for domestic enterprises, i.e. 10 percentage points lower to a nominal rate of 33% 
for domestic enterprises.483  The 25% tax rate in the EIT Law was considered as an average 
corporate tax rate and internationally competitive.484 Thus, even without designated lower tax rates 
for FIEs or FEs, the unified rate was believed as providing preferential treatment and attracting 
FDI in tax competition with other countries.   
4.6.1.4 Tax incentives  
There is a separate chapter in the EIT Law particularly focusing on Chinese tax incentives. The 
general principle for granting tax incentives is that the state grants tax incentives to industries and 
projects that are specifically supported and encouraged. The State intended to use tax incentives 
                                                          
481 Article 26 of the EIT Law. 
482 Li and Huang, 'Tansformation of the Enterprise Income Tax in China: Internationalization and Chinese 
Innovations' 279. 
483 Li, 'Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax Reform in China: Motivations and Majore Changes' 521-522.  
484 Ibid. In 2007, the average enterprise income tax rate was 28.6% in 159 countries around the world and 
26.7% in China’s 18 neighboring countries. Thus, the rate of 25% was regarded as conducive to enhancing 
enterprise competitiveness and attracting foreign investment. See Jin Renqing, former Minister of Finance, 
Explanation on Draft Enterprise income Tax Law, the full text of the speech in English is available at 
<www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm> accessed 26 November 2015.  
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to direct investment towards state-supported industries and projects, which has replaced the former 
system of region-oriented tax incentives. Compared to the pre-2008 region-oriented tax incentives, 
the new tax incentives regime was considered to be more industry-oriented, limited geography-
based.485 There were diverse forms of tax incentives such as tax exemptions, tax reductions, 
reduced tax rates, accelerated depreciation, weighted deductions, etc. Enterprises qualified to enjoy 
tax incentives include SLEs, high-technology (high-tech) enterprises, and non-profit enterprises. 
Tax-preferred projects include investments in agriculture and fishing, infrastructure, venture 
capital, environmental protection and production safety, as well as investments in autonomous 
regions.486 The industry-oriented incentives in the EIT Law are aimed at encouraging investments 
in state-supported industries and projects, such as technological development, environmental 
protection, energy conservation, production safety, venture capital, agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, fishery, and infrastructure development.487 Therefore, for FDI, tax incentives are used 
to guide the direction of the investment. 
4.6.2 Industry-oriented tax incentives 
4.6.2.1 High-tech enterprises 
To be qualified as high-tech enterprises, there are several conditions to be satisfied.488 Once an 
enterprise is identified as a high-tech enterprise, it can receive several types of tax incentives under 
the EIT Law, including a reduced tax rate of 15%; exemption of income from the transfer of 
                                                          
485 Andrew Halkyard and Ren Linghui, 'China's Tax Incentives Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an 
Eassionian Analysis' in Arthur Cockfield (ed), Globalization and Its Tax Discontents: Tax Policies and 
International Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson (Globalization and Its Tax Discontents: Tax 
Policies and International Investments: Essays in Honour of Alex Easson, University of Toronto Press 2010) 
35-59.  
486 Jinyan Li and He Huang, 'Transformation of the Enterprise Income Tax in China: Internationalization 
and Chinese Innovations' (2008) July Bulletin for International Taxation 276-277. 
487 Jin Renqing, former Minister of Finance, Explanation on Draft Enterprise income Tax Law, the full text 
of the speech in English is available at <www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm> accessed 26 
November 2015. 
488  Article 11, Guokefahuo [2016] No.32, Administrative Measures for Determination of High-tech 
Enterprises, issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the MoF, and the SAT, 29 January 2016 
(the 2016 Guidelines). The general conditions: (1) the enterprise must have been registered for over one 
year; (2) products (services) are within the scope prescribed in the high-tech Sectors Eligible for Key 
Support from the State; (3) the proportion of R&D expenditures to sales revenue is not lower than a 
prescribed ratio; (4) the proportion of the revenue derived from high-tech products (services) to the total 
revenue of the enterprise is not lower than a prescribed ratio; (5) the proportion of the number of research 
and development personnel to the number of all employees is not lower than a prescribed ratio, etc.  
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technology; 489  additional deductions for R&D expenses, i.e. 150% of the actual expense is 
deductible as a current expense or amortized as a capital expenditure;490 accelerated depreciation; 
special deductions for eligible investors in high-tech enterprises, for instance, if a venture capital 
enterprise invests in the shares of a new private small or medium sized high-tech enterprise and 
holds the shares for two or more years, 70% of the investment may be deductible. The deductions 
may be carried over to the following years.491 
In addition, to simplify the procedure of receiving such tax incentives, the SAT confirms that 
once an enterprise is identified as a high-tech enterprise, it can enjoy corresponding tax incentives 
without the assessment of the tax administration, but they must keep a report in their 
administration.492   
4.6.2.2 Software industry and integrated circuit (IC) industry 
After the promulgation of the EIT Law, the government revised the Catalogue for the Guidance 
of Foreign Investment Enterprises (the Catalogue) to guide the investments in FEs and FIEs.493 
According to the Catalogue, industries for FDI are classified as encouraged, restricted, and 
prohibited. The main categories of sectors that are encouraged by the Catalogue are (I) agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; (II) mining industry; and (III) manufacturing industries. 
Compared to the investment categories before the EIT Law, the new Catalogue added banking and 
telecommunications back-office services, software development and related contracting 
businesses, logistics and outsourcing, venture capital enterprises, intellectual property services, 
and the manufacturing of key components of new-energy vehicles to the encouraged investment 
category. 
                                                          
489 It was confirmed in the 2016 Guidelines for Identification of High-tech Enterprises that a high-tech 
enterprise identified under the Guidelines may apply for tax incentives according to the EIT Law, the 
RIEITL, the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (LACT), and the detailed rules on the 
Implementation of the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection. See Article 4 of the 2016 Guidelines. 
See also Caishui [2010] No. 111, Notice on Related Corporate Income Tax Issues of Resident Enterprise’s 
Technology Transfer, issued by the MoF and the SAT, 31 December 2010. 
490  Detailed rules can be found in Guoshuifa [2008] No.16, the Administration Guidelines for Tax 
Deductions for Enterprise’s R&D Expenses (Tentative), issued by the SAT, 10 December 2008. 
491 Li and Huang, 'Transformation of the Enterprise Income Tax in China: Internationalization and Chinese 
Innovations' 276-277.  
492 The SAT notice [2015] No.76, Notice on the Issuing of Administrative Regulation of Corporate Tax 
Incentives, by the SAT, 12 November 2015. 




Following the Catalogue, to promote investment in the encouraged sectors, the MoF and the 
SAT issued special tax incentives for software industry and integrated circuit (IC) industry.494 
Qualified IC production enterprises can enjoy tax exemptions for the first few years starting from 
the first profit-making year or a reduced tax rate of 15%.495 
4.6.2.3 Small and low-profit enterprises (SLEs) 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are an important power in promoting the state’s 
economic development and market prosperity, especially under the system of a market economy. 
They are also essential to create employment and to maintain social stability. Moreover, they are 
pioneers for the promotion of technology.496 The EIT law has specific tax incentives for small and 
low-profit enterprises (SLEs). Once an enterprise is identified as a SLE, it enjoys a reduced tax 
rate of 20%. 497  In order to further support the development of SLEs, the government has 
consistently expanded the tax incentives. For instance, the threshold for qualification is lowering. 
The latest tax preference is that, from 1 October 2015 to 31 December 2017, for SLEs whose 
annual income is lower than 200,000 RMB, the taxable income is calculated as 50% of the annual 
income and is taxed at the rate of 20%.498 Compared to the previous threshold of 60,000 RMB,499 
it includes more SLEs to enjoy the preferential tax treatment.  
                                                          
494 Guofa [2011] No.4, Notice on the Issuance of Policies on the Further Encouragement on Software 
Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry, by the State Council, 28 January 2011; Caishui [2012] No.27, 
Notice on Enterprise Income Tax Policy for the Further Encouragement on Software Industry and 
Integrated Circuit Industry, by the MoF and the SAT, 20 April 2012; Caishui [2015] No.6, Notice on the 
Further Encouragement on Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry, by the MoF, the SAT, 
National Development and Reform Commission, and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 9 
February 2015. 
495 Ibid. 
496 Official answers of the MoF and the SAT to journalists’ questions on the enterprise income tax incentives 
for SLEs, (15 September 2015) <http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c1808384/content.html> 
accessed 10 December 2015. 
497 Article 92 and 93 of the RIEITL. Conditions for enterprises to be identified as SLEs: (1) for industrial 
enterprises, the taxable income for the year shall not exceed RMB 300,000, total employees shall not exceed 
100, and total assets shall not exceed RMB 30 million; (2) for all other enterprises, the taxable income for 
the year shall not exceed RMB 300,000, total employees shall not exceed 80, and total assets shall not 
exceed RMB 10 million.  
498 The degree of the incentive is expanding in the sense that for SLEs whose annual income is between 
200,000 and 300,000 RMB, they enjoy the same tax treatment as those enterprises whose annual income is 
lower than 200,000 RMB. See Caishui [2015] No.34, Notice on Issues Related to Enterprise Income Tax 
Incentives for Small Low-profit Enterprises, by the MoF and the SAT, 13 March 2015; Caishui [2015] 
No.99, Notice the Further Expansion of Enterprise Income Tax Incentives for Small and Low-profit 
Enterprises, by the MoF and the SAT, 2 September 2015. 
499 Caishui [2011] No.117, Notice on issues Related to Enterprise Income Tax Incentives for Small Low-
profit Enterprises, by the MoF and the SAT, 29 November 2011. 
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4.6.2.4 Energy-saving services enterprises 
Preferential tax incentives are granted to energy-saving service enterprises who assist customers 
to implement energy performance contracting projects to save energy. This type of tax incentive 
serves the objective of environmental protection.  
For qualified enterprises, 500 there are tax exemptions for the first three years starting from the 
first profit-making year and, from the fourth to the sixth year, tax shall be cut half based on the 
standard 25% enterprise income tax rate. 501 
4.6.3 Regional tax incentives  
4.6.3.1 Autonomous regions 
(1) Background of autonomous regions 
There are 56 officially recognized ethic groups (nationalities) in China. The largest ethnic group 
is the Han nationality, which constitutes over 90% of the whole population.502 The rest of the 
population is identified as comprising minority nationalities, which include the Zhuang nationality, 
Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Uighurs, etc. A number of areas associated with one or more 
ethnic minorities are designated as autonomous regions within China. There are five autonomous 
regions in China, including the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 
and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Most of these areas are located on the border of China, which 
makes up over 50% of the whole territory of China. The prosperity of these regions is directly 
related to China’s unification, internal stability, and national defenses. 503  These areas are 
recognized in the Constitution and are nominally given a number of rights not accorded to other 
administrative divisions. As stipulated in the Constitution, there are autonomous regions, 
prefectures, counties, and banners in China.504  
                                                          
500 Caishui [2010] No.110, Notice on Value Added Tax, Business Tax, and Enterprise Income Tax Policies 
of the Promotion of Energy-saving Services Industries, by the MoF and the SAT, 30 December 2010. The 
eligibility includes the enterprise must be an independent legal entity with a registered capital of no less 
than one million Yuan and can provide diagnostic energy situation, energy project design, financing, 
renovation, operational management, personal training and other services, etc.  
501 Ibid.  
502 Xiaohui Wu, 'From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in China's National 
Autonomous Regions' (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 57-58.  
503 June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions : Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the 
People's Republic of China (Harvard University Press 1976) 377. 
504 Article 94 of the RIEITL. See also the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National 
Autonomy (2001 Amendment), by the Standing Committee of the NPC, 28 February 2001. 
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As confirmed by the Constitution, regional autonomy is the basic system in China that people 
of minority nationalities living in concentrated communities enjoy autonomy in that region. In 
these areas, organs of self-government are established to exercise the power of autonomy.505 These 
regions enjoy a wide range of autonomous powers, such as political autonomy,506  economic 
autonomy, and language, educational and cultural rights,507 etc.  
With respect to economic autonomy, the organs of self-government of the national autonomous 
areas have the power of autonomy in administering the finances of their areas. All revenues 
accruing to the national autonomous areas under the financial system of the state shall be managed 
and used by the organs of self-government of those areas on their own.508  Because of their 
autonomy, they are also granted the discretionary power to reduce or exempt tax on the part of the 
enterprise income tax payable by an enterprise located in their region.509 The central government’s 
attitude towards the autonomous regions is rather preferential in such a way that the state provides 
financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to help accelerate their 
economic and cultural development.510  
The autonomous region system has its historical and geographic origins in China.511 Before the 
establishment of the first Chinese Imperial dynasty in 221 B.C. by the Kingdom of Qin,512 ethnic 
groups used to live in the regions where they are living today, the borderlands. The Han people 
resided in most parts of mainland China. Those minority groups were considered “barbarians” 
                                                          
505 Article 4, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
506 Constitution guarantees that among the chairman and vice-chairman of the standing committee of the 
people’s congress of an autonomous region, one or more citizens of the nationality or nationalities shall 
exercise regional autonomy in the area concerned and the administrative head of an autonomous region 
shall also be a member of the nationality, or of one of the nationalities, exercising regional autonomy. 
Moreover, the autonomous authorities exercise the same functions and powers of local organs of State, but 
within the limits of their authority as prescribed by the Constitution. See Article 113 and 114, Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
507 National minorities have the right to use and develop their own languages and freedom to preserve their 
own customs. In autonomous regions, court hearings should be conducted in their native spoken and written 
languages. See Article 134, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
508 Article 117, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
509 Article 29 of the EIT Law.  
510 Article 122, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
511  X. Wu, 'From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in China's National 
Autonomous Regions' (2014) 13 Chinese Journal of International Law 55. 
512 The Qin dynasty was the first imperial dynasty of China, lasting from 221 BC to 206 BC. It was formed 
by the state of Qin who had conquered the other six states. Morris Rossabi, A History of China (John Wiley 
and Sons 2014) 59. 
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compared to the Han people, as they were considered to be inferior to them in relation to the 
economy, technology, and culture.513 Since the Qin dynasty, the Chinese empire started to attract 
and control the remote territories inhabited by the minority groups via both military forces and 
cultural assimilation. In order to maintain a central control, the minority’s political leaders were 
allowed to exercise autonomous power in their territory, which was the initiation of the 
autonomous system.514 From that time on, the minority groups started to integrate with the Han 
people by pluralistic forms, thereby accelerating the strengthening of a unified China.     
After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the government had a more tolerant attitude towards 
national minorities. Domestically, the government hoped to build a unitary multinational country 
or “one big co-operative family” to contribute to the construction of a socialist state; internationally, 
the stability of minority areas is crucial for the defense of borders. Geographically, the regions of 
the ethnic groups take up over a half of China’s territory, most of which are border areas, so they 
have strategic importance for China’s defense.515 When China started the Reform and Opening 
policy in 1978, the focus shifted to economic development and full implementation of the 
autonomous region system. At that time, the regions were among the poorest and least-developed 
but with the richest deposits of natural resources, and therefore an autonomous system was 
expected to accelerate the economic growth of those regions. Subsequently, the Law of People’s 
Republic of China on Autonomous Regions was passed in 1984 to guarantee the legal rights of 
those regions. 
(2) Tax incentives in autonomous regions 
According to Article 29 of the EIT Law, the autonomous authority of a national autonomous 
region may decide on the reduction or exemption of the local portion of the EIT to be paid by 
enterprises within the region.516 Compared to former region-oriented tax incentives, in the EIT 
Law, the discretion to grant tax incentives has only been delegated to local governments of 
                                                          
513 Ibid.  
514  Dreyer, China's Forty Millions : Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's 
Republic of China. 
515 Colin Mackerras, China's Minorities : Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (Oxford 
University Press 1994) 150-153. 
516 Tax reductions or exemptions decided on by an autonomous prefecture or county shall be subject to 
approval by the people’s government of a province, autonomous region or municipality directly under the 
central government. See Article 29 of the EIT Law. 
129 
 
autonomous regions, which are historically underdeveloped.517 Although it is easier for the central 
government to monitor the implementation of discretionary tax incentives, there are still concerns 
about the transparency and accountability of the discretion that may lead to another round of sub-
national tax competition.518   
4.6.3.2 Western Development Strategy (WDS) 
    From 2001 to 2010, the Western Development Strategy was considered to play an effective role 
in stimulating the economic and social development in the western region.519 Therefore, after the 
expiry of the strategy, the central government decided to extend the tax incentives for a new round 
from 1st January 2011 to 31st December 2020.520 The Western Development Strategy (WDS) 
covers the area of 15 regions, which are mainly located in the western part of China, including five 
autonomous regions. As explained before, these regions are historically less developed than the 
eastern and central regions, and the disparity between regions is still increasing. 
Although the EIT Law abolished most region-oriented tax incentives, these particular tax 
incentives for Western Development were reserved. The regional disparity still existed and was 
enlarging, compared to the eastern and central regions of China, despite the fact that it had 
experienced rapid economic growth due to the 10-year Western Development Strategy support.521 
To continue encouraging investment in the western region, investment in state-encouraged 
industries, the regional enterprise income tax rate can be reduced to 15%.522 Moreover, the scope 
                                                          
517 Due to the opening process of China to the world economy, the eastern coastal region develops faster 
than the central and western regions. There is huge regional disparity in China. All the autonomous regions 
are located in the western or central part of China, thus are less developed even after the Reform and 
Opening in 1978. 
518 Halkyard and Linghui, 'China's Tax Incentives Regimes for Foreign Direct Investment: an Eassionian 
Analysis' 28.  
519 The average GDP of western regions increased from 1.8728 trillion Yuan to 5.8257 trillion Yuan from 
2001 to 2008, making the average annual growth rate 12%. See China Statistical Yearbook 2001 and 2008, 
cited by Yucai Xiao, 'The Effect of Tax Preferential Policy and Its Future Direction in Western 
Development' (2012) 3 Finance and Economics 87 (in Chinese).   
520 Caishui [2011] No.58, Notice of Tax Policy Issues Regarding Further Implementation of the Western 
Development Strategy, by the MoF, the General Administration of Customs (GAC), and the SAT, July 27, 
2011. 
521 Shenggen Fan, Ravi Kanbur and Xiaobo Zhang, 'China's Regional Disparities: Experience and Policy' 
(2011) 1 Review of Development Finance 47-56; Huan Zheng and Xingming Fang, 'An Evaluation on the 
Effects of the Policy of the Great Campaign of Western Development of China in the First 10 Years-Based 
on the Kuznets Regional Inverted-U Theory' (2013) 12 Chinese Business Review 661-672.  
522 To be qualified for the tax incentive, the main business income of the enterprise shall be more than 70% 
of the enterprise’s overall annual income. The State-encouraged industries are included in Catalog of 
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of the western region has enlarged, so more regions can enjoy similar tax incentives referring to 
the western region.523 
The reasons to implement the WDS are partially similar to the those for autonomous regions, 
since the autonomous regions are included in the areas for the WDS. There is great disparity 
between the coast area and the inland region and between the rural and the urban regions in 
China.524 Zhang and Zou (2012) identify specific causes for the phenomenon. The opening started 
from the coastal areas to the inland areas since the 1978 reform, which determined the order for 
the development. What is more, the central government adopted more urban-biased policies to 
stimulate economic growth in the eastern part. Additionally, there was more unemployment in 
less-developed regions caused by the reform of SOEs. Furthermore, tax revenue was transferred 
from the poor regions to the rich regions during tax competition triggered by fiscal decentralization. 
Other reasons included the influence of more FDI and export, better public infrastructures, 
educational opportunities in the coastal regions, and restricted labor migration from the inland to 
the coastal areas, etc.525   
In order to control the potential social and political instability derived from the regional 
inequality, the government launched the WDS to stimulate the development of western China.  
 
Chart 5 
                                                          
Western Region Encouraged Industries. See Article 2 of the Notice of Tax Policy Issues Regarding Further 
Implementation of the Western Development Strategy, by the MoF, the GAC, and the SAT, July 27, 2011. 
523 Article 4, ibid.  
524 Fan, Kanbur and Zhang, 'China's Regional Disparities: Experience and Policy'; Chao Li and John Gibson, 
'Rising Regional Inequality in China: Fact or Artifact?' (2013) 47 World Development 16; Qinghua Zhang 
and Heng-fu Zou, 'Regional inequality in contemporary China' (2012) 13 Annals of Economics and Finance 
113. 
525 Zhang and Zou, 'Regional inequality in contemporary China'. 
Provinces with a star sign:  
Autonomous regions 
The part left of the black line: 
Western regions covered by the WDS 
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4.6.3.3 Comprehensive Experimental Zones (CEZs) 
In 2014, new tax incentives were granted to special regions named as comprehensive 
experimental zones (CEZs) including Hengqin New District in Guangdong (Hengqin), Pingtan 
Comprehensive Experimental Zones in Fujian (Pingtan), and Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone (Qianhai). They are located next to Macau, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong respectively.526  
Hong Kong and Macao are special administrative regions (SARs) of China because the Qing 
Government (1644-1912), the predecessor of the People’s Republic of China, leased both of them 
to foreign countries (UK and Portugal). On 1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999, Hong Kong and 
Macao returned to China but retained their own capitalism systems under the idea of “one country, 
two systems”.527  
The establishment of the CEZs intended to form a mutual beneficial situation between the 
mainland and the SARs. On the one hand, the CEZs can provide support for the prosperity of the 
SARs to enhance the position of Hong Kong as an international financial center and to create 
diversified opportunities for Macau. Most importantly, the CEZs can compensate for the limited 
natural resources and labor forces.528 On the other hand, the CEZ area can benefit tremendously 
from the SARs, which will create new economic growth points for the Pearl River Delta Region. 
The ultimate goal is to form a win-win situation for the mainland and the SARs. The establishment 
                                                          
526 Hengqin is an island located at Zhuhai city in the Guangdong province, which is next to Macau. On 14 
August 2009, the State Council approved the General Development Plan of Hengqin to explore a new model 
of cooperation between Guangdong, Macau, and Hong Kong; Pingtan is also an island in the Fujian 
province, which is the closest part of Mainland China to Taiwan. Its construction and development will 
promote the communication and cooperation between Mainland China and Taiwan. The National 
Development and Reform Commission issued the Overall Development Plan of Pingtan Comprehensive 
Experimental Zone in November 2011; Qianhai, located in Shenzhen SEZ, is close to Hong Kong and is 
also a combination point for Guangdong-Shenzhen-Hong Kong development area. In 2012, the State 
Council approved the proposal to further develop the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service 
Industry Cooperation Zone, See Guohan [2012] No.58, Reply of the State Council on the Relevant Policies 
Supporting the Development and Opening-up of the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service 
Industry Cooperation Zone, by the State Council, 27 June 2012. 
527 It is a constitutional principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping. He suggested that there would be only one 
China, but distinct Chinese regions such as Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan could retain their own capitalist 
economic and political systems, while the rest of China uses the socialist system.  
528 Guohan [2012] No.58, Reply of the State Council on the Relevant Policies Supporting the Development 
and Opening-up of the Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone, by the 
State Council, 27 June 2012. 
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of Pingtan CEZ exhibits the government’s ambition to intensify communication and cooperation 
with Taiwan.529 
Considering the special location advantages of the three comprehensive experimental zones, 
they were authorized to grant more preferential tax incentives even than SEZs, including a 15% 
tax rate for enterprises investing in the state’s encouraged industries in the three zones starting 
from 1st January 2014 to 31st December 2020.530 The prosperity of these regions has not only 
economic effects but also political considerations for China. On the one hand, new incentives of 
the regions not only can promote the development of the regions themselves, but they can also 
provide more services for the development of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, thus achieving the 
expected “win-win” results. On the other hand, taking into account the special political positions 
of the three islands with China, tax incentives are considered to be reasonable instruments to 
promote the prosperity of the new zones and to maintain political stability of the areas.  
4.6.3.4 Free Trade Zones (FTZ) 
A free trade zone (FTZ) is a geographic area within one country’s territory in which the import 
or export of goods is free from customs’ intervention. It can be considered as “outside the customs 
territory but within one country’s territory”.531 There are four FTZs in China at present, including 
Shanghai FTZ, Guangdong FTZ, Tianjin FTZ, and Fujian FTZ.532 The main objectives of the FTZs 
                                                          
529 Taiwan has been separated for the mainland since 1949, but the PRC intends to implement the policy of 
“one country, two systems” to Taiwan as well. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, The 
Cambridge History of China: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 
1966-1982, vol 15 (Cambridge University Press 1991) 813-874. 
530 Caishui [2014] No.26, Notice on Enterprise Income Tax Incentives and Catalogue for Guangdong 
Hengqin New District, Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zones, and Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone, by the MoF and the SAT, 7 May 2014. 
531 There are different forms of free trade zones, such as foreign trade zones, duty free zones, export 
processing zones, and special economic zones, etc. See Raul A. Torres, 'Free Zones and the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures' (2007) 2 Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 217. 
532  Shanghai FTZ was the first FTZ in China, which was established in 2013. In 2015, the central 
government announced the approval of the other three FTZs, which were located in the province of 
Guangdong, Fujian, and Tianjin municipality. Guangdong FTZ contains the area of Hengqin CEZ, and 
Fujian FTZ contains the area of Pingtan CEZ. See Guofa [2013] No.38, Notice on the Framework Plan for 
the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 18 September 2013; Guofa [2015] No.18, 
Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 
April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.19, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade 
Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.20, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China 
(Fujian) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.21, Notice on the 
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are to reduce administrative interventions in those trial areas, ease restrictions on investments, 
further open up the financial system, and internationalize the currency to boost shipping, logistics, 
and commerce, etc.533 It is regarded as a major reform step for China to further integrate into the 
world economy through liberalization and to provide more market access in different sectors.534 
To achieve the objectives, a series of reforms are implemented in the FTZs, including a high level 
of legal autonomy, expanded opening-up of service industries, new mode of administrative 
approval for FDI, and the innovation of tax policies, etc.535 Compared to the beginning stage of 
the Reform and Opening in 1978, the background of the new reform is different. The establishment 
of SEZs in the 1980s were to initiate the opening of China to the world economy, the attraction of 
FDI was essential to draw new capital, technology, and talents to stimulate economic growth. 
Therefore, a large number of tax incentives were granted to FIEs in those SEZs. Actually they 
distorted fair competition in the market. In contrast, the context of the FTZ is that China does not 
have to rely on large quantities of tax incentives to attract FDI, but it hopes to carry out reforms to 
upgrade its economic structure and release more productivity forces.536 Thus, the FTZ is a trial to 
liberalize the market further and gain experiences that can be repeated spread over the country. In 
summary, the emphasis of the reform is not on tax incentives but on further opening the market. 
                                                          
Further Implementation of the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the 
State Council, 8 April 2015.  
533 For instance, as stated in the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, the overall 
objectives of the FTZ were that “the FTZ shall accelerate the transformation of government functions, 
actively promote the expansion of opening-up of the service industry and reform of the foreign investment 
management system, vigorously develop the central economy and new trade forms, accelerate the 
exploration of convertibility under capital accounts and full opening-up of the financial service industry, 
explore the establishment of a categorized regulation mode based on the status of goods, strive to form a 
policy support system promoting investment and innovation, pay particular attention to cultivating an 
internationalized and regulated business environment, strive to become a pilot free trade zone meeting 
international standards and featuring investment and trade facilitation, free convertibility of currencies, 
efficient and convenient regulation, and satisfactory legal environment, and explore new ideas and new 
channels for furthering opening-up and reform in China and better serving the whole country.” Guofa [2013] 
No.38, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 
18 September 2013. 
534  Zheng Wan and others, 'Policy and Politics behind Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone Program' (2014) 34 
Journal of Transport Geography 1. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Jianwen Liu, ‘On the Development of Shanghai Free Trade Zone Reform in the Perspective of the Rule 
of Fiscal and Tax Law’, (2014) 3 Legal Forum 88-89 (in Chinese); Hongmei Sun and Mengyin Guo, 
Research on the Feasibility of Levying 15% Enterprise Income Tax in the Chine (Shanghai) Free Trade 
Zone, (2014) 27 China Market 94 (in Chinese).    
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However, the granting of tax incentives, on the contrary, just demonstrates the government’s 
intervention in the market.  
There are certain tax incentives only granted in the FTZs, so the focus of the FTZ policies is 
more on the opening-up of financial sectors, and thus the tax incentives are not as preferential as 
they were expected to be. 537  A significant reason is that the central government hopes that 
measures implemented in the FTZ can form a replicable experience to be implemented by other 
regions. If the central government grants too much preferential tax treatment in the FTZ, it will be 
difficult to spread them widely. Most importantly, it goes against the object of the new round of 
the reform, namely, to adjust the relationship between the government and the market towards a 
more market-oriented economy with the rule of law. 538  In the official documents, it is also 
emphasized that tax policies in the FTZs should not lead to base erosion and profit shifting 
according to international customs.539  
Forms of tax incentives in the FTZs include tax deferral, same treatment of export tax rebate, 
preferential import VAT policies, and a choice of paying the import duties on the inputs or paying 
the duties for the finished product. Actually, there is only one direct tax incentive; the others are 
                                                          
537 Before the issuing of the Frame Work Plan for the China (Shanghai) Free Trade Zone, there were 
discussions on granting a lower enterprise income tax rate of 15% for enterprises established in the FTZ, 
which was implemented in those comprehensive experimental zones. However, the Frame Work Plan tried 
to avoid forming an unleveled playing field (tax marsh) compared to other regions that can distort fair 
competition in the market. The concept of “tax marsh” was used by the present Minister of Finance Lou 
Jiwei in an explanation on the ideas of deepening the fiscal reform after the 18th National Congress of the 
CCP. See Jianwen Liu, 'On the Development of Shanghai Free Trade Zone Reform in the Perspective of 
the Rule of Fiscal and Tax Law' (2014) 3 Legal Forum 88-89 (in Chinese); Hongmei Sun and Mengyin 
Guo, 'Research on the Feasibility of Levying 15% Enterprise Income Tax in the China (Shanghai) Free 
Trade Zone' (2014) 27 China Market 94 (in Chinese).     
538 Liu, 'On the Development of Shanghai Free Trade Zone Reform in the Perspective of the Rule of Fiscal 
and Tax Law' 88-89.  
539 Guofa [2013] No.38, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by 
the State Council, 18 September 2013; Guofa [2015] No.18, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China 
(Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.19, Notice on 
the Framework Plan for the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; 
Guofa [2015] No.20, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the 
State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.21, Notice on the Further Implementation of the Framework 
Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015.  
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indirect tax incentives related to import or export, because the prior function of the FTZ is a free 
trade port for logistics.540   
4.6.4 Matrix of specific direct tax incentives 
Subject Highlights of the incentives Eligibility 
High-tech 
enterprises 
15% CIT rate;  
exemption of income from the 
transfer of technology;  
additional deduction for R&D 
expenses;  
accelerated depreciation;  
special deductions for eligible 
investors in high-tech enterprises, etc. 
(1) products (services) are within the 
scope prescribed in the High-tech 
Sectors Eligible for Key Support 
from the state; 
 (2) the proportion of R&D 
expenditures to sales revenue is not 
lower than a prescribed ratio; (3) the 
proportion of the revenue derived 
from hi-tech products (services) to 
the total revenue of the enterprise is 
not lower than a prescribed ratio;  
(4) the proportion of the number of 
research and development personnel 
to the number of all employees is not 
lower than a prescribed ratio;  






Tax exemptions for the first few years 
starting from the first profit-making 
year; 
or 15% CIT rate 
IC lines the width of which is less 
than 0.8 microns (inclusive), have 
been identified before 31st 
December 2017; 
IC lines the width of which is less 
than 0.25 microns or the investment 
amount is over 8 billion RMB; 
Key software enterprises and IC 





Tax exemptions for the first three 
years starting from the first profit-
making year, and from the fourth to 
the sixth year, CIT shall be cut half 
based on the 25% CIT rate 
Independent legal entity with a 
registered capital of no less than one 
million yuan and can provide 
diagnostic energy situation, energy 
project design, financing, 
renovation, operational 
management, personal training and 
other services 
Small and low 
profit 
1. 20% CIT rate 1. (1) Industrial enterprises:  the 
taxable income for the year shall not 
exceed RMB 300,000, total 
                                                          
540 Guofa [2013] No.38, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by 
the State Council, 18 September 2013. The other FTZs may imitate the tax incentives that have been 





2. The taxable income was 
calculated as 50% of the annual 
income and 20% CIT rate 
employees shall not exceed 100, and 
total assets shall not exceed RMB 30 
million; 
(2) Other enterprises: the taxable 
income for the year shall not exceed 
RMB 300,000, total employees shall 
not exceed 80, and total assets shall 
not exceed RMB10 million. 
2. Until 31st December 2017 




May decide to reduce or exempt tax 
on the part of the enterprise income 
tax payable by an enterprise located at 
the said region 





15% CIT rate until 31st December 
2020 
Engaging in a wide scope of 
encouraged industries (e.g. 
agriculture, services, 
manufacturing, natural resources, 
public infrastructure, IT, etc.) which 
are set out in various catalogues to 






15% CIT rate until 31st December 
2020 
State-encouraged industries, 
including, modern logistics, 
information service, technology 
service, and cultural and creative 
industries, etc. 
Pilot Free Trade 
Zones (FTZs) 
Enterprise income tax paid by 
installments over five years 
On the appraised asset appreciation 
arising from external investment of 
non-monetary assets and other asset 
restructurings 
4.6.5 Conclusion 
Tax incentives in the EIT Law demonstrate China’s intention to promote the development of 
higher value-added sectors, such as high and new technology, high-end manufacturing, 
environmental protection industries, etc.541 In addition, it also pays more attention to the disparity 
between regions, thereby resulting in regional tax incentives for less developed regions, including 
autonomous regions and western regions. The tax incentives in the CEZs and FTZs serve not only 
China’s policy goals of promoting business activities in these areas but also the further opening up 
                                                          
541 Suwina Cheng and Shanshan Shi, 'The Impact of New Income Tax Law on Foreign Invested Enterprises 
in China' (2012) January-February Internatinal Tax Journal 24.  
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of the market to the world economy. As summarized by some authors, “China intends to use 
foreign investment rather than be used by foreign investors”.542 
4.7 The present value-added tax (VAT) incentives 
4.7.1 Overview of the VAT system in China 
The current Chinese indirect taxes, levied on turnovers of goods and services, include three 
main types of taxes: value-added tax (VAT), business tax (BT), and consumption tax. Compared 
to direct taxes, indirect taxes are the main tax revenue sources in China.543  
Value-added tax (VAT) was introduced in China in 1984 as a tax for a small number of 
manufactured goods.544 The current VAT system originated from 1994.545 It applied to the sale of 
all goods (except for intangible and immovable property), and the provision of processing, repair 
and replacement services. Compared to VAT systems in other countries, the VAT system in China 
does not cover all service areas. Other services, transfers of intangibles and immovable properties 
were taxed as BT.546  
However, the current VAT system is under reform, which aims to transform items levied as BT 
to VAT. From 1 May 2016, the items that were previously subject to BT are now subject to VAT, 
which covers most service industries, including architecture, real estate, finance, etc. The transfer 
of intangibles and immovable properties will be subject to VAT as well. 547  
There are two types of taxable persons in the VAT system according to the size of their business 
operations and the sophistication of their accounting systems, namely regular taxpayers and small-
scale taxpayers.548 Taxes are levied on regular taxpayers based on a regular computation method 
                                                          
542 Ibid. 
543  According to China Statistical Yearbook (2015). The overall tax revenue of China in 2014 was 
119175.31 billion Yuan, tax revenue from VAT was 30855.36 billion Yuan, and from business tax was 
17781.73 billion Yuan. Indirect taxes have taken 40.81% of the overall tax revenue in 2014.  
544 Regulation on Value Added Tax (Draft), by the State Council, 18 September 1984 (expired).   
545 Interim Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Value Added Tax (Interim Regulation on VAT), 
by the State Council, No.134, 13 December 1993, revised by the State Council Order No. 666, 6 February 
2016.  
546 Interim Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Business Tax (Interim Regulation on BT), by 
the State Council, No.136, 13 December 1993, revised by the State Council Order No. 540, 10 November 
2008. 
547 Caishui [2016] No.36, Notice on Completely Promoting the Transformation of Business Tax to Value 
Added Tax Pilot, by the MoF and the SAT, 23 March 2016.  
548 Article 3, the Notice on Completely Promoting the Transformation of Business Tax to Value Added Tax 
Pilot (2016); Article 11, 12 of the Interim Regulation on VAT.    
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that deducts input VAT from output VAT..549 In contrast, tax is levied on small-scale taxpayers 
based on a simplified computation method at a lower tax rate and they may not deduct the input 
VAT or issue VAT invoices themselves to purchasers.550 
4.7.1.1 BT transformed into VAT 
Since 1984, VAT has been separated from BT when it is first levied. Until the VAT reform in 
2009, BT existed as an indirect tax imposed on the provision of services, the transfer of intangible 
property and the supply of immovable property.  
However, the problems stemmed from the separation of VAT and BT so that a reform of the 
BT to VAT was implemented. The main problem was double taxation. BT was still a cascading 
tax that meant that the tax imposed on inputs could not be deducted from the tax imposed on 
outputs, but the taxes were collected at each stage of process of production and distribution.551 The 
double taxation problem also hindered the development of service industries covered by BT. 552 
However, in comparison with developed countries, the ratio was still low. In order to stimulate 
economic growth and upgrade the industrial structure, the importance of promoting service 
industries was highlighted. The reform of the BT could play a significant role.553    
The main objective of transforming BT to VAT was to solve the problem of double taxation in 
most service industries and to further stimulate the development of those industries. 554 
Consequently, a new round of VAT reform has been implemented since 2012 in Shanghai, 
extending the scope of VAT to transportation and modern service industries that were previously 
subject to BT. Under this reform, VAT would be passed on to customers, after the input VAT is 
deducted from the output VAT in those pilot industries. For small-scale taxpayers, a lower tax rate 
was still applicable, which was generally lower than the corresponding BT rate.555 The reform was 
                                                          
549 Article 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Provisional Regulations on VAT.  
550 Article 18, 19 of the Notice on Completely Promoting the Transformation of Business Tax to Value 
Added Tax Pilot (2016). 
551 A cascading turnover tax is imposed every time that goods are transferred in the process of production 
and distribution to the final consumer. It cannot be reclaimed by the purchaser and therefore the tax 
component of the price of goods becomes larger and larger the more stages there are between producer and 
consumer, with obvious distortionary effects between highly integrated enterprises and other enterprises. 
Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 3. 
552 China Statistical Yearbook (2012). 
553 Wei Cui, 'Business Tax: China's Quasi-VAT' (2009) July/August International VAT Monitor 294-295.  
554 Report of the MoF and the SAT’s Officials’ answers to Journalists’ Questions on BT to VAT Pilot 
Program, 17 November 2011.   
555 Peter Law, 'The pilot value added tax reform' (2012) September/October Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 374.  
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aimed at reducing the double taxation burden under the BT regime and promoting the export of 
services, thereby accelerating the development of service industries in China.556 Between 2012 
and 2015, the transformation gradually expanded to the whole nation on a step-by-step basis.557 
Subsequently, in 2016, all the items that are subject to BT are to be subject to VAT. 
The substantial benefit of the reform is the reduction of tax burden for taxpayers since the input 
VAT can be deducted compared to the previous BT system. Moreover, small and medium sized 
enterprises’ tax burdens are lower even when they are treated as small-scale taxpayers.558 
4.7.1.2 Export VAT refund 
As for exports, like many other countries, China adopts zero rating for exported goods, which 
means that VAT imposed on goods should be refunded at the time of exportation.559 The rationale 
behind this is the destination principle and neutrality principle that personal consumption should 
be taxed in the country of consumption560 and goods should enter the international market without 
the distortion of tax.561  
However, a zero rate is difficult to operate in China. Normally, neutral refunds should be equal 
to the VAT paid on the exported goods, but China has a partial refund system, with a refund rate 
less than or at most equal to the collection rate.562 For different types of products, the refund rates 
are different, which results in less or deferred export refunds than what taxpayers could expect.563 
Additionally, the government frequently adjusted the refund rates according to the changes in 
international trade, such as trade conflicts with other nations. As a result, the government treated 
VAT export refunds as incentives to encourage or discourage trade activities in various sectors.564 
                                                          
556 Ibid.  
557 Wei Cui, 'China's Business-Tax-To-VAT Reform: An Interim Assessment' (2014) 5 British Tax Review 
617. 
558 The VAT rate for small-scale taxpayers is 3%, which is lower than the corresponding BT rate. 
559 Article 15 (4) the Notice on Completely Promoting the Transformation of Business Tax to Value Added 
Tax Pilot (2016).  
560 Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 35.  
561 James Mirrlees and others, Tax By Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford University Press 2011) 33-35.  
562 There are several export refund rates, such as 17%, 13%, 11%, 8%, and 5% for different types of products. 
See Xuepeng Liu, Huimin Shi, and Michael J. Ferrantino, Tax Evasion through Trade Intermediation: 
Evidence from Chinese Exporters (August 12, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2494054. 
563 J. Whalley and L. Wang, 'Evaluating the Impure Chinese VAT Relative to a Pure Form in a Simple 
Monetary Trade Model with an Endogenous Trade Surplus' (2007) Working paper series .  
564 Xu Yan, 'Reforming Value Added Tax in Mainland China: A Comparison with the EU' (2011) 20 
Revenue Law Journal 4 16.   
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From the 1994 tax reform to 2009, the refund tax rates were adjusted eleven times to serve the 
government’s macro control of the economy.565  
4.7.2 VAT incentives 
4.7.2.1 Methods of VAT incentives  
(1) Exemptions 
    The first frequently used VAT incentive is exemption. It means that the output VAT is exempted, 
but the input tax is not creditable.566 The exemption method is aimed at reducing tax burdens for 
the seller or reducing prices for consumers, but it is likely to cause the opposite effects when 
granted at different stages of the VAT chain. 
As a type of tax incentive, exemptions are granted for particular reasons.567 The main reason is 
that, for some transactions, the output is difficult or impractical to tax. In the case of small-sized 
taxpayers, especially when the number is very large, costs for administering the output can be 
extremely high, and therefore exemption becomes a realistic solution. From the perspective of the 
tax authority, with exemption they do not need to monitor the output tax or the recovery of input 
tax, which is less costly.568 
However, considering the effects of exemptions, the disadvantages shall also be taken into 
account. As analyzed by Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and Summers (2001), exemptions cannot always 
reduce the price for consumers.569 If the exemption is granted prior to the final consumption, it can 
reduce tax for the seller because the value added at the final stage is not taxed, thus resulting in 
revenue loss. Nevertheless, instead of reducing prices for consumers or revenue for the government, 
exemptions break the VAT chain when they are granted in the intermediate stage, and they actually 
increase consumer prices and VAT revenue over the amounts that would occur if those items were 
taxable.570 The cascading effects of tax on inputs lead to the result that “the price charged by 
downstream firms using the exempt item rises in order to cover their increased costs, so the tax on 
                                                          
565  The Budget Committee of China’s National People’s Chinese Budget Committe of the NPC, A 
Comparative Study of the Legal System of VAT (China Democracy and Legal System Press 2010) 143-146.  
566 Liam P Ebrill, The Modern VAT (International Monetary Fund 2001) 83.  
567 Ibid 90-91; Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 268-270; the Budget 
Committee of China’s National People’s Chinese Budget Committe of the NPC, A Comparative Study of 
the Legal System of VAT 123-124.  
568 Ibid. 
569 Ibid. 
570 Schenk and Oldman, Value Added Tax-A Comparative Approach 268-270.  
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output downstream increases”.571 In summary, the value added prior to the exempt stage is taxed 
more than once.  
In summary, “exemptions are abhorrent to both the logic and the functioning” of the VAT, as 
commented by some economists,572 because they might undermine a VAT and distort the order of 
the economy if they are not granted in the final stage but in the intermediate stage. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of VAT exemptions is still debatable.  
(2) Collect and return 
 Another important way of granting tax incentives is called “collect and return”, i.e. first collect 
and afterwards return (xian zheng hou fan) and immediately collect and immediately return (ji 
zheng ji tui).573 The VAT collected will be returned to the regular taxpayer afterwards. The effect 
of this “collect and return” is equal to a partial or complete tax exemption, which is similar to 
subsidies to taxpayers by the government in order to achieve policy goals.574  
Collect and return is a special method for granting tax incentives in China. Compared to 
exemptions, it does not break the VAT chain with non-recoverable input taxes. Although it is 
different from zero rate, taxpayers indeed pay less taxes. Normally, this kind of VAT incentive is 
used to support certain industries or enterprises.  
4.7.2.2 Specific VAT incentives 
From the perspective of an enterprise, there are different categories of VAT incentives to enjoy. 
Similar to direct tax incentives, they are classified by their specificity and the source of the 
incentives is mainly the SAT’s inventory.  
(1) Industry-oriented VAT incentives 
a. Software industry 
A regular taxpayer who sells self-developed software products, after being taxed at 17% VAT, 
the actual VAT burden which surpasses 3% will be granted the incentive of immediate taxation 
and immediate refund.575 It means that the taxpayer could get a refund of 14% VAT that was levied. 
                                                          
571 Ebrill, The Modern VAT 85.  
572 Ibid 100. 
573 Wei Cui and Alan Wu, 'The Chinese VAT' in Michael Lang (ed), the Future of Indirect Taxation: Recent 
Trends in VAT and GST Systems around the World (the Future of Indirect Taxation: Recent Trends in VAT 
and GST Systems around the World, Kluwer Law International 2012) 179-180.  
574 Ibid.  
575 Article 1, Caishui [2011] No. 100, Notice on VAT Policies for Software Products, by the MoF and the 
SAT, 13th October 2011. 
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In addition, if a regular taxpayer sells imported software products after the localization 
transformation, the product can enjoy the incentive of immediate taxation and immediate refund.576 
b. Animation industry 
Animation enterprises, being regular taxpayers who sell self-developed software products, after 
being taxed at 17% VAT, will be granted the incentive of immediate taxation and immediate refund 
of the amount of the actual VAT burden which surpasses 3%.577 As a result, taxpayers will get a 
14% refund of the VAT that has been paid. 
c. Energy-saving service enterprises 
Energy saving enterprises who implement energy performance contracting and enterprises that 
transfer the goods subject to VAT to energy consumption enterprises are exempted from VAT.578 
d. Small and low-profit enterprises (SLEs) 
In order to further support the development of small and low profit enterprises (SLEs), VAT 
exemptions were granted to SLEs. If a SLE’s monthly sale is lower than 20,000 RMB, it can enjoy 
the VAT exemption as a small-scale taxpayer. Before 31st December 2017, if a SLE’s monthly 
sale is between 20,000 and 30,000 RMB, it can enjoy the VAT exemption as a small-scale 
taxpayer.579 These incentives were promulgated together with the other CIT incentives that were 
aimed at reducing the tax burdens of SLEs and stimulating their expansion.580 
(2) Regional VAT incentives 
Under the Western Development Strategy, VAT is exempted for imported self-used equipment 
within the lump sum investment in state-encouraged industries, encouraged industries for FDI, and 
projects of competitive industries.581 
                                                          
576 Article 2 Ibid. Localization transformation means redesign, improvement, conversion of the products, 
etc. However, purely transforming the imported software products into Chinese characters are not included.   
577 Article 1, Caishui [2013] No.98, Notice on Value Added Tax and Business Tax on the Animation 
Industry, by the MoF and the SAT, 28 November 2013. The identification of animation software refers to 
Notice on VAT Policies for Software Products (Caishui [2011] No.100). The tax incentive is valid from 1st 
January 2013 to 31st December 2017.  
578 Article 1 and 2, Caishui [2010] No.110, Notice on Value Added Tax, Business Tax, and Corporate 
Income Tax Policies for the Promotion of Energy Saving Industries.   
579 Notice on Completely Promoting the Transformation of Business Tax to Value Added Tax Pilot (2016); 
Caishui [2014] No.71, Notice on Value Added Tax and Business Tax Policies on Further Support for Small 
and Low Profit Enterprises.  
580 Ibid. 
581 Caishui [2011] No.58, Notice of Tax Policy Issues Regarding Further Implementation of the Western 
Development Strategy, by the MoF, the GAC, and the SAT, 27 July 2011.  
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Enterprises located in Comprehensive Experimental Zones (Hengqin and Pingtan) also enjoy a 
VAT exemption for the income from selling goods among enterprises within the CEZs.582  
In Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs), financial leasing enterprises registered in the FTZ shall be 
covered by the pilot program of export tax rebates for finance leasing; necessary goods imported 
by production enterprises and producer service enterprises shall be exempted from import tax; 
enterprises can choose to pay tax according to the imported materials or parts or according to the 
actual inspection declaration status.583 
4.7.2.3 Matrix of specific VAT incentives 
Subject Eligibility Methods of VAT incentives 
Software  
industry 
1. A regular taxpayer who sells the self-
developed software products, after being 
taxed at 17% VAT, will enjoy a refund of the 
actual VAT burden that surpasses 3% (14% 
refund);  
2. Import VAT exemption for imported self-
used production materials and consumables 
1. Immediate taxation and 
immediate refund; 
2. Exemption of import VAT 
Animation 
enterprises 
1. A regular taxpayer who sells the self-
developed software products, after being 
taxed at 17% VAT, will enjoy a refund of the 
actual VAT burden that surpasses 3% (14% 
refund);  
2. Products which must be imported can 
enjoy an exemption for import tariffs and 
import VAT 
1. Immediate taxation and 
immediate refund; 
2. Exemption of import VAT 
                                                          
582 Caishui [2014] No.51, Notice on VAT and Consumption Tax Policy in Hengqin and Pingtan, by the 
MoF, the GAC, and the SAT, 11 June 2014.  
583 Guofa [2013] No.38, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by 
the State Council, 18 September 2013; Guofa [2015] No.18, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China 
(Guangdong) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.19, Notice on 
the Framework Plan for the China (Tianjin) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the State Council, 8 April 2015; 
Guofa [2015] No.20, Notice on the Framework Plan for the China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade Zone, by the 
State Council, 8 April 2015; Guofa [2015] No.21, Notice on the Further Implementation of the Framework 




Small and low 
profit enterprises 
(SLEs) 
1. The monthly sales of a SLE is below 
20,000 RMB 
2. Before 31st December 2017, the monthly 







Qualified energy-saving service enterprises 
implement energy performance contracting 
projects and transfer the VAT taxable goods 





Imported self-used equipment within the 
lump sum investment in state-encouraged 
industries, encouraged industries for FDI, 
and projects of competitive industries; 





The income from selling goods among 
enterprises within the CEZs 
Exemption  
Pilot Free Trade 
Zones 
Necessary goods imported by production 
enterprises and producer service enterprises 
Exemption of import VAT 
4.7.3 Conclusion 
The present VAT incentives reflect the government’s support for the development of certain 
industries and regions. Compared to direct tax incentives, the government does not grant many 
VAT incentives to specific enterprises or regions. The industries and regions that enjoy specific 
VAT incentives are those state-supported enterprises and regions, which also enjoy direct tax 
incentives. In the context of the transformation of BT to VAT, a modern VAT system is to be 
established in China. In order to maintain a complete VAT chain, the adoption of VAT incentives 
to achieve governmental goals does not seem to be sound. The aim of VAT incentives is to reduce 
certain taxpayers’ burdens for particular objectives. However, VAT exemptions in different stages 
of the chain have different effects, which would not necessarily lead to the reduction of tax and 




This chapter introduced Chinese tax incentives, in mainly two parts. The first part provided a 
chronological review on the evolution of direct tax incentives in China from the establishment of 
the PRC until the promulgation of the EIT Law. The historical review presented the “rise and fall” 
of tax incentives for FDI in China. Based on this knowledge, the chapter subsequently established 
an internal benchmark for the evaluation of China’s granting of tax incentives, namely, the creation 
of a level playing field in the domestic Chinese market. This benchmark was established in the 
context of China’s socialist market economy. There are differences and similarities between 
China’s socialist market economy system and the western market economy system. The key is the 
relationship between the state and the market. In China, the market operates under the framework 
of the state and the state has a greater intervention into the market. As state ownership is the leading 
force of the economy, there is limited access for private ownership in certain areas. However, the 
similarities implicate that the basic market rules still should be applicable in China’s market. Thus, 
to maintain efficiency and equity in the market, it is necessary to create a level playing field for 
competition. The content of the level playing field actually shares the same essences with the 
external benchmark and it should be interpreted according to the principle of equality and the 
principle of proportionality. Thus, the level playing field in China should take into account regional 
disparities and the imbalanced development of industries. This internal benchmark offers a 
foundation for a further evaluation of the Chinese tax incentives.  
The second part analyzed the present direct tax incentives and VAT incentives in China. They 
are classified according to the criteria of industrial and regional specificity, which is the main 
standard to identify a subsidy in the ASCM of the WTO or a State aid under EU State aid law. All 
of the incentives are sourced from official laws, regulations, and circulars issued by the 
government. The current direct tax incentives, mainly corporate tax incentives, focus on high-tech 
industries, SLEs, environmental friendly projects, and specific regions. The VAT incentives are 
analyzed under the background of the reform of establishing a modern VAT system in China, i.e. 
transforming BT to VAT. The reform is still underway. The current VAT incentives have the same 
focus with corporate tax incentives, and therefore those specific industries and regions enjoy both 
corporate tax and VAT incentives.  
The overview of the present direct and indirect tax incentives in China provides a further insight 
into China’s attitude towards the granting of tax incentives by concentrating on different industries 
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and regions. Reforms and changes to tax incentives not only promote the economic and social 
development in China, but they also demonstrate the trend to integrate into the world economy. 
However, whether or not these incentives satisfy the WTO’s subsidy rules still have to be tested. 
A comparative testing under EU State aid law may shed light on the application of the WTO’s 



























Chapter 5 Testing Chinese Tax Incentives against the ASCM and EU State Aid 
Law 
5.1 Introduction 
    After the accession to the WTO, China faced an increasing number of international trade 
disputes with other Members in the area of subsidies and countervailing measures. In the past ten 
years, China became the country facing the biggest number of countervailing investigations in the 
world.584 Since 2004, when Canada launched the first countervailing investigation against China, 
more and more Members in the WTO adapted the subsidy rules to solve trade disputes with 
China.585 Countervailing measures, which are a seldom-used method for solving international 
trade disputes, are becoming the main means for Members in the WTO to deal with trade disputes 
with China. 
Among all the countervailing investigations towards China, the main complaints were Chinese 
tax incentives such as specific tax reductions and exemptions, or specific tax preferences related 
to exports or imports. The first case on Chinese tax incentives in the WTO was brought by the 
United States in 2004 on China’s preferential value-added tax (VAT) for domestically-produced 
or designed integrated circuits.586 In 2007, the United States requested consultations in the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in another case on certain Chinese measures granting refunds, 
reductions or exemptions from taxes.587 Subsequently, the European Union also joined the group, 
in the coated fine paper dispute of April 2010, in which the European Commission claimed that 
Chinese tax incentives constituted subsidies under the ASCM in the WTO law.588 Therefore, it is 
                                                          
584 Until 31st December 2014, China had faced 90 countervailing investigations: 46 were from the US, 20 
were from Canada, 10 were from Australia, 9 were from the EU, 2 were from India, 1 was from Mexico, 
and 1 was from South Africa, and 1 was from Egypt. See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Gateway, 
Statistics on subsidies and countervailing measures, countervailing initiations: reporting Member vs 
exporting country, 01/01/1995-31/12/2014> accessed 20 November 2015. See also Appendix I.  
585  Canada was the first country that started a countervailing investigation against China. The first 
investigation was launched on 13th April 2004 on the product of self-standing barbeques for outdoor use. It 
was a combined countervailing and anti-dumping investigation. For more information, see 
<www.cbsa.gc.ca> (Canada Border Service Agency): Anti-dumping and Countervailing-Investigations, 
accessed 20 November 2015.  
586 WT/DS309/1, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, 23 March 2004, Panel Report.  
587 WT/DS358/1, China-Taxes, 7 February 2007.  
588 On 17th April 2010, the European Union also joined the trend of investigating subsidies from China, on 
the product of coated fine paper. See Notice of Initiation of An Anti-subsidy Proceeding Concerning 
Imports of Coated Fine Paper Originating in the People’s Republic of China [2010] OJ C99/13. 
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important to examine the relationship between Chinese tax incentives and subsidy rules in the 
WTO and to check whether or not certain Chinese tax incentives constitute subsidies under the 
WTO agreements. Furthermore, it contributes to evaluating the impacts of certain Chinese tax 
incentives on fair competition in the international trade domain. Considering China’s rapid 
development in the world economy, it is also significant to understand China’s attitude towards 
those tax incentives, the rationale behind the granting of them, and the position of China in the 
international trade.  
On the other hand, a comparative analysis from the perspective of EU State aid law can shed 
some light on the interactions between the WTO’s regulation of subsidies and China’s attitude 
towards tax incentives. This chapter conducts a hypothetical analysis on the application of the 
State aid rules to Chinese tax incentives. The aim of the comparative testing is to find some 
inspirations for both Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules from the reference to EU 
State aid law. Therefore, the conclusion of the hypothetical testing is not necessarily absolute, 
since China indeed is not an EU Member State. Nevertheless, the reality provides an example for 
the feasibility of the comparative testing. The EU concluded a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with 
Korea in 2009. 589  It is the EU’s first FTA with a trading partner in Asia that has included 
comprehensive and enforceable subsidy rules to deal with trade disputes via a bilateral agreement. 
The FTA includes strong competition rules to safeguard fair competition.590  With respect to 
subsidies, the bilateral FTA is regarded as an expansion of State aid rules to a third country outside 
the EU.591 A substantial objective of the FTA is to create free and open trade between the two 
partners by introducing more comprehensive disciplines on subsidies. It also provides a new model 
under the current WTO’s subsidy system to realize a global regulation for subsidies, namely 
expanding the stringent State aid control of the EU to other countries via bilateral or even 
multilateral means.592 Some authors predicted that the EU would continue with the steps to gain 
                                                          
589 Council Decision of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional 
application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part [2011] OJ L127/1.  
590 European Commission, EU-South Korea Trade Agreement 10 Key Benefits for the European Union, 
June 2011 <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea> assessed 21 
November 2015.  
591 James Harrison, 'The European Union and South Korea the Legal Framework for Strengthening Trade, 




more market access in Asian countries, such as China, through bilateral FTAs.593 Therefore, the 
FTA also provides the possibility for China to apply the EU State aid law, as a testing standard, to 
Chinese tax incentives.  
This chapter first carries out the testing of selected Chinese tax incentives against the subsidy 
rules in the WTO (the ASCM) through the testing steps outlined in Chapter 3. Subsequently, it 
conducts the comparative testing against EU State aid law. In order to make the comparison clear, 
each part of the testing directly follows the WTO’s testing analysis. Afterwards, the chapter 
reviews the testing with both external and internal benchmarks that are established in Chapter 3 
and 4, thereby presenting testing results. 
5.2 Testing Chinese tax incentives against the ASCM and EU State aid law 
Chapter 3 has developed concrete testing steps under the ASCM and EU State aid law for the 
identification of tax incentives as subsidies or State aid. The testing in this section follows the 
testing steps outlined in Chapter 3. Additionally, Chapter 4 described specific tax incentives in 
China, which are the subject of the testing in this chapter.   
It has to be admitted at the beginning that there are similarities of the rules that identify a 
measure as a subsidy or State aid in the two systems. These form the basis of the comparison, but 
the research does not carry out a duplicate analysis due to identical testing steps or methods in the 
two systems. In contrast, the research focuses more on the differences in the testing steps and 
analysis, because even if some testing steps are similar, there are still differences in details, 
especially in the analysis. Hence, the testing analysis demonstrates both the similarities and 
differences in the identification of subsidy or State aid.   
5.2.1 The WTO: financial contribution made by a government or any public body & the EU: 
aid granted by a Member State or through state resources 
5.2.1.1 The WTO: financial contribution 
A subsidy consists of a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the 
territory of a Member. The first testing step is to examine the existence of a financial contribution. 
The ASCM has listed major forms of financial contributions, one of which is closely linked with 
tax incentives: government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected. Chapter 3 




established that a tax incentive is a form of financial contribution.594 Tax incentives mean that the 
government gives up a certain amount of tax revenue to achieve some policy goals by granting a 
tax exemption, refund, or credit, etc. If the granting of tax incentives leads to a decrease of 
government revenue compared to the normal situation, a financial contribution would be deemed 
to exist in the form of government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected.  
With respect to Chinese tax incentives, no matter what form they take, they should be collected 
due to or the compulsory feature of taxation, but the non-collection of taxes causes a loss of 
revenue for the government. For instance, for corporate tax, the calculation of the amount of 
taxable income is stipulated in Article 22 of the EIT Law. “The amount of tax payable by an 
enterprise shall be equal to the enterprise’s taxable income times its applicable tax rate, less the 
amount of its allowable reductions, exemptions, and tax credits pursuant to the provisions of this 
law on tax incentives”. Therefore, the amount of the tax incentive is deducted from the total amount 
of the revenue, which enables the enterprises to pay less tax. Therefore, it constitutes a “financial 
contribution” according to the ASCM.  
5.2.1.2 The EU: aid granted by a Member State or through state resources 
Similarly, State aid in the form of tax measures would trigger a loss of revenue, which is 
equivalent to a consumption of state resources. Tax measures fulfill the requirement of being 
granted through state resources. Thus, the effect is the same as with a “financial contribution” in 
the form of government revenue that is otherwise due which is foregone or not collected under the 
ASCM.  
5.2.2 The WTO: benefit conferred & the EU: economic advantage 
5.2.2.1 The WTO: benefit conferred 
To determine the existence of a benefit, it is necessary to examine whether the financial 
contribution placed the recipient in a more advantageous position than it would have been 
otherwise.595 It is an effect-based test. According to the case law, a comparison must be conducted 
between the benefits received from the government and the benefits that would have been obtained 
under normal market conditions.  
                                                          
594 See Section 3.3.1.1 financial contributions in Chapter 3.  




Tax incentives enable taxpayers to pay less taxes compared to the situation without them. They 
offer taxpayers the opportunity to deviate from the normal benchmark, taxes that should be paid, 
to gain a competitive advantage. These benefits are offered intentionally by the government to 
achieve particular goals. However, it is difficult to measure whether the incentives actually benefit 
the taxpayers or not, and therefore the comparison helps to establish whether the tax incentive puts 
the recipient in a more favorable position than other non-recipients. A lower tax liability is indeed 
beneficial to taxpayers compared to other taxpayers who pay the full tax amount. Thus, tax 
incentives are beneficial for their recipients.  
In the situation in China, a distinction is made between benefits granted through direct and 
indirect tax incentives. Direct tax incentives provide advantages to the receiving enterprises, since 
the recipients gain more than they would have gained under normal market conditions. The effect 
is identical to granting subsidies. For example, in the EIT Law, qualified SLEs shall enjoy a 
reduced tax rate of 20% and qualified high-tech enterprises can also enjoy a reduced tax rate of 
15%, as opposed to the standard tax rate of 25%. A reduced tax rate actually means that the 
enterprise pays less tax, thus resulting in a lower financial burden and more possibilities of an 
advantageous competitive position compared to other enterprises that do not benefit from the 
reduced tax rate. 
With regard to indirect tax measures, the effects differ as there are different methods of 
providing these incentives. As analyzed in Chapter 4, the most frequently used form of VAT 
incentives, exemptions, is not always beneficial to the recipients if it is granted in the intermediate 
stage of the VAT chain. If exemptions are granted prior to final consumption, they can benefit the 
seller, as VAT is not levied at the final stage. However, if they are granted in the intermediate 
stage, they will actually break the VAT chain, thereby leading to increased consumer prices and 
double taxation due to the VAT levied prior to the exempt stage. Therefore, in this situation, the 
granting of VAT exemptions will not benefit the recipients and is not sufficient to constitute a 
subsidy. The Chinese VAT exemption for energy saving enterprises provides a good example.596 
The exemption is provided when transferring VAT taxable goods to energy consumption 
enterprises, if the products are sold to consumers. This exemption benefits the seller or the 
producer, as they do not have to pay the VAT that is otherwise due. However, once the sale is to 
                                                          
596 See Section 4.7.2.3 Matrix of specific VAT incentives in Chapter 4.  
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downstream enterprises instead of the final consumers, the downstream enterprises have to 
increase the price to cover the cost of the input VAT that cannot be deducted when received from 
the upstream seller because of the exemption. To test Chinese VAT exemptions, it is necessary to 
analyze whether or not the exemptions are granted merely prior to the final consumption stage and, 
if so, they will likely result in benefits for the taxpayers because they do not have to pay the output 
VAT that is otherwise due. However, if this is not the case, it can be determined on a case-by-case 
basis whether a benefit is actually conferred on the recipients.  
5.2.2.2 The EU: economic advantage 
The method of identifying whether there is an advantage is identical in the State aid regime as 
it also takes an effect-based approach. To be specific, testing whether there is an advantage is 
subject to more concrete standards in order to compare the financial situation of the undertaking 
before and after it receives the tax incentive. It is based on an analysis of whether or not the 
preferential tax treatment can make the undertaking better off, such as due to an improvement of 
the financial situation or the prevention of financial loss. Hence, the analysis of Chinese tax 
incentives against State aid rules is similar to the examination under the ASCM. Direct tax 
incentives grant advantages to the recipient, but the effect of VAT incentives is clear only after a 
case-by-case analysis.    
5.2.3 The WTO: specificity & the EU: selectivity 
5.2.3.1 The WTO: prohibited subsidies & the EU: State aid  
An essential testing step in examining subsidies is the identification of specificity, which 
distinguishes measures that favor specific enterprises from general measures. However, 
considering the harmful effects of export subsidies and import-substituting subsidies, once they 
can be categorized as prohibited subsidies, they are automatically deemed to be specific. They do 
not have to be analyzed for specificity. 
(1) The WTO: prohibited subsidies  
a. Export subsidies  
I. Direct tax incentives  
The illustrative list of export subsidies of the ASCM lists direct tax incentives that constitute 
export subsidies: (e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to 
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exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial 
enterprises.597  
Since the Reform and Opening Policy in 1978, China has launched a number of tax incentives 
toward FIEs to attract FDI, including some export-oriented tax incentives.598 Applying the ASCM 
rules to those export-oriented tax incentives, they can easily be identified as export subsidies. The 
reason for this is that qualified export-oriented enterprises may enjoy a reduced tax rate, the effect 
of which is similar to “the full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to 
exports, of direct taxes”. What is more, they are contingent upon export performance.  
    However, these export-oriented tax incentives expired after the launch of the new EIT Law.  
Actually, after its further integration into the world economy, China abolished most of the tax 
incentives favoring foreign enterprises after the implementation of the new EIT Law, including 
those for export-oriented enterprises. Only some tax incentives were reserved for a transitional 
period of five years to offer foreign investors the time to adapt to the new EIT Law regime. When 
the transitional period was over in 2013, those tax incentives were also terminated.599  
Currently, there are few tax incentives for exports. As described in Chapter 4, the present 
corporate tax incentives are not specifically export-oriented but rather they focus more on state-
supported industries or regions. It seems that China has also learned lessons from the investigations 
in the WTO and has cancelled the official export-oriented tax incentives. 
                                                          
597 See the illustrative list of export subsidies of the ASCM. 
598 For instance Article 75 (7) of the Rules for Implementation of the FEITL, it was stipulated that “export-
oriented enterprises invested in and operated by foreign business for which in any year the output value of 
all export products amounts to 70% or more of the output value of the products of the enterprise for that 
year may pay enterprise income tax rate specified in the tax law reduced by one half after the period of 
enterprise income tax exemptions or reductions have expired in accordance with the provisions of the tax 
law”. 
599 Article 57 of the EIT law: “an enterprise set up upon approval prior to the promulgation of this Law that 
enjoys the preferential policy of a low tax rate in accordance with the laws and administrative regulations 
governing taxation of the time may, pursuant to the relevant regulations of the State Council, gradually go 
over to the tax rate prescribed by this Law within five years after this Law goes into effect; an enterprise 
that enjoys the preferential policy in the form of regular tax exemption or reduction may, pursuant to the 
relevant regulations of the State Council, continue enjoying such policy after this Law goes into effect, until 
the period for such policy expires; however, if it has not enjoyed such policy because it fails to make any 
profits, the period for such policy shall be calculated from the year this Law goes into effect”. 
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II. VAT incentives 
The rebate of indirect taxes on exports is not an export subsidy, as it can be justified by the 
destination principle. As introduced in Chapter 3, under the ASCM, only the excessive exemption, 
remission, or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes in respect of the production and 
distribution of exported products are considered to be export subsidies. In China’s VAT export 
refund practice, generally, there is no full VAT refund, not to mention the excess of tax refund. 
Therefore, the general VAT export refund regime cannot be considered to constitute an export 
subsidy. 
In China’s situation, although China adopted zero rates for export refunds, in practice it was 
difficult to realize a complete VAT refund for exportation for the following reasons. On the one 
hand, it causes the central government a heavy fiscal burden to rebate all the VAT on exportation. 
Exportation increased rapidly after the zero rate regime in 1994. After China’s accession to the 
WTO in 2001, the export refund claims surged so tremendously that the central government felt it 
as a great burden on the budget. Therefore, it had to change the refund rates.600 On the other hand, 
the export refund was utilized by the government as an instrument of trade policy.601 The frequent 
adjustments of the refund tax rates indicated that the government adopted the regime as tax 
incentives or subsidies to encourage or discourage the export of different industries. However, as 
long as the export refund is used by the government as an instrument of trade policy, there is a 
great possibility that excessive export refunds will be granted which will fall within the scope of 
export subsidies.  
b. Import-substituting subsidies  
Among the present tax incentives, there is no explicit incentive for the use or purchase of 
domestic goods over imported ones. It seems that China is more and more familiar with the WTO 
standards and knows how to avoid granting tax incentives that are inconsistent with the WTO rules, 
particularly with regard to incentives provided for in official legislation. This is not only a 
requirement for China to fulfill its obligations as a WTO Member, but it is also a demonstration 
of China’s changing attitude towards FIEs, from being eager to increase FDI by providing 
                                                          
600 J. Whalley and L. Wang, Evaluating the Impure Chinese VAT Relative to a Pure Form in a Simple 
Monetary Trade Model with an Endogenous Trade Surplus, NBER Working Paper No. 13581, 2007.  
601 Wei Cui and Alan Wu, the Chinese VAT, in Thomas Ecker, M. Lang and I. Lejeune, The Future of 
Indirect Taxation: Recent Trends in VAT and GST Systems Around the World (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, Kluwer Law International 2012) 159-189. 
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numerous FDI-favored tax incentives to having confidence in being able to attract FDI without 
granting preferential tax treatment.  
Before the new EIT Law, there were also tax incentives encouraging FIEs to use or purchase 
domestic goods instead of imported goods, which may constitute import-substituting subsidies. In 
the China-Taxes case in 2007, Mexico claimed that Chinese tax incentives for FIEs were import-
substituting subsidies since they appeared to provide tax refunds on the condition that those FIEs 
purchased domestic rather than imported goods.602 For instance, they found that FIEs in China that 
purchased domestic equipment were qualified to enjoy tax credits.603 It is obvious to see that this 
kind of tax incentive is offered to FIEs that purchase domestic equipment and if FIEs purchase 
imported or foreign equipment, they cannot enjoy such a tax credit. Thus, it favors the use of 
domestic over imported goods, which are likely to be identified as import-substituting subsidies 
under the ASCM. However, with the effectiveness of the new EIT Law, all these import-
substituting subsidies which were contested by Mexico have expired or have been terminated.  
(2) The EU: material selectivity 
One distinction between a subsidy in the ASCM and State aid is that the State aid system does 
not distinguish export or import-substituting measures from other measures. This means that 
prohibited subsidies under the ASCM still have to go through the selectivity test under the State 
aid regime. After the testing under the ASCM, it seems that export subsidies are quite few at 
present. For the general VAT refund in China, the analysis is similar to the one under the ASCM, 
which is not selective either. Thus, it is not likely to be considered as State aid. 
5.2.3.2 The WTO: actionable subsidies & the EU: State aid 
Specificity is an essential characteristic of actionable subsidies. If a tax incentive is limited to 
certain enterprises or groups of enterprises, or industries, but it is not available to all enterprises or 
                                                          
602  WT/DS359/1, China-Taxes, Mexico’s Request for Consultations in the WTO, 26 February 2007. 
Mexico listed evidence of Chinese law providing tax incentives, including tax refunds, tax credits, tax 
exemptions, and tax reductions, to FIEs for the investment in Chinese domestic or homemade equipment. 
On 7 February 2008, China and Mexico informed the DSB that they had reached an agreement in relation 
to this dispute, in the form of a memorandum of understanding.  
603 Article 1, Caishuizi [2000] No.49, Circular of the MoF and the SAT Concerning the Issue of Tax Credit 
for Business Income Tax for Homemade Equipment Purchased by Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises, 14 January 2000 (expired). There were similar provisions in other legal documents, 
which were listed by Mexico as evidence in the China-Taxes case. See WT/DS359/1, China-Taxes, 
Mexico’s Request for Consultations in the WTO, 26 February 2007.  
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industries, it shall be considered specific. In addition, regional specificity focuses on subsidies in 
a designated geographical region. There is a classification between de jure and de facto specificity 
to include all forms of specific subsidies and not only the subsidies set out explicitly in the law as 
being specific. Subsidies that are specific due to the factual situation have to be examined for 
adverse effects.  
(1) The WTO: Enterprise or industry specificity  
a. De jure specificity 
As introduced in Chapter 4, both direct and indirect tax incentives are granted to specific 
enterprises or industries that are explicitly stipulated in the legislation, including high-tech 
enterprises, software industry and integrated circuit (IC) industry, energy-saving services 
enterprises, animation industry, and small and low profit enterprises (SLEs). 




15% CIT rate;  
exemption of income from the transfer 
of technology;  
additional deduction for R&D 
expenses;  
accelerated depreciation;  
special deductions for eligible 
investors in high-tech enterprises, etc. 
(1) products (services) are within the 
scope prescribed in the Hi-tech 
Sectors Eligible for Key Support 
from the state; 
 (2) the proportion of R&D 
expenditures to sales revenue is not 
lower than a prescribed ratio; (3) the 
proportion of the revenue derived 
from high-tech products (services) 
to the total revenue of the enterprise 
is not lower than a prescribed ratio;  
(4) the proportion of the number of 
R&D personnel to the number of all 
employees is not lower than a 
prescribed ratio;  







(1) Tax exemptions for the first few 
years starting from the first profit-
making year; 
(2) 15% EIT rate 
VAT incentives: 
(1) Regular taxpayer who sells the 
self-developed software products, 
after being taxed 17% VAT, the actual 
VAT burden that surpasses 3% will be 
granted the incentive of immediate 
EIT incentives: 
(1) a. IC lines the width of which is 
less than 0.8 microns (inclusive), 
have been identified before 31st 
December 2017; 
b. IC lines the width of which is less 
than 0.25 microns or the investment 
amount is over 8 billion RMB; 
(2) Key software enterprises and IC 





taxation and immediate refund (14% 
refund); 
(2) Import VAT exemption for 
imported self-used production 
materials and consumables 
 
 
(1) Regular taxpayers who sell self-
developed software products  
(2) Imported software products after 





Tax exemptions for the first three 
years starting from the first profit-
making year, and from the fourth to 
the sixth year, CIT shall be cut half 
based on the 25% CIT rate 
VAT incentives: 
Exemption of VAT 
EIT incentives: 
Independent legal entity with a 
registered capital of no less than one 
million yuan, and can provide 
diagnostic energy situation, energy 
project design, financing, 
renovation, operational 
management, personal training and 
other services 
VAT incentives: 
Qualified energy-saving services 
enterprises implement energy 
performance contracting projects, 
and transfer the VAT taxable goods 




1. Immediate taxation and immediate 
refund of VAT; 
2. Exemption of import VAT 
VAT incentives: 
1. Regular taxpayers who sell self-
developed software products, after 
being taxed at 17% VAT, are 
refunded the actual VAT burden 
which surpasses 3% (14% refund); 
2. Products that are necessary to be 
imported 





3. 20% EIT rate 
4. The taxable income was 
calculated as 50% of the annual 
income, and 20% EIT rate 
VAT incentives:  
Exemption of VAT  
EIT incentives: 
1. (1) Industrial enterprises:  the 
taxable income for the year shall not 
exceed RMB 300,000; total 
employees shall not exceed 100, and 
total assets shall not exceed RMB 30 
million; 
(2) Other enterprises: the taxable 
income for the year shall not exceed 
RMB 300,000, total employees shall 
not exceed 80, and total assets shall 
not exceed RMB10 million. 
2. Until 31st December 2017 





1. The monthly sales of a SLE is 
below 20,000 RMB 
2. Before 31st December 2017, the 
monthly sales of the SLE is between 
20,000 to 30,000 RMB 
    According to the specificity criteria in the ASCM, these tax preferences, both direct and indirect, 
are only granted to certain enterprises or industries but not to other enterprises or industries, and 
therefore they are specific. Furthermore, for software and IC industry, SLEs, and energy-saving 
service enterprises, both direct tax incentives and indirect tax incentives are granted. This has 
exhibited the state’s preferential attitude towards these industries or enterprises. The combination 
of tax incentives strengthens the power to achieve the objective. In order to promote the 
development of the software and IC industry, the government launched a series of beneficial 
measures to achieve the goal, and tax incentives are among those measures. This is the same for 
SLEs and energy-saving services enterprises.   
The first Chinese tax case in the WTO was a value-added tax case brought to the DSB by the 
US in 2004.604 In China-VAT on Integrated Circuits, the US claimed that, although China granted 
17% VAT on ICs, enterprises were entitled to immediate taxation and an immediate refund of the 
actual VAT that had surpassed 6%, thereby resulting in a lower tax rate on IC products. 605 
Although the US did not start subsidy investigations in this case, the ASCM can also be applied 
here since the VAT incentives would probably constitute actionable subsidies.606 In this case, the 
immediate taxation and immediate refund is a particular form of “collect and return” that aims at 
reducing the tax burden of IC enterprises. Therefore, it is specific to an enterprise or industry. 
Currently, there are still similar VAT incentives granted for IC enterprises. Similarly, they are 
likely to constitute actionable subsidies with industry specificity.   
                                                          
604 WT/DS309/1, China-Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, 23 March 2004, Panel Report. 
605 In addition, China also permitted immediate taxation and immediate refund of VAT that had surpassed 
6% to domestically designed ICs that were manufactured outside China for technological limitations. The 
US considered it as favoring imports from one Member than another, thus discriminating against other 
Members and violating the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment under Article 1 of GATT 1994. The case was 
solved by a mutually agreed solution that China had to abolish the VAT incentive for IC enterprises in 2005.  
606 Ying Liu, 'The Relationship between the ASCM and China's VAT Refund, Discussion from the Two 
Cases towards China in the WTO' (2008) 6 Legal Science (in Chinese).   
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I. Exemption of SLE’s specificity  
Article 2.1 (b) of the ASCM grants an exemption for specificity and this exemption is likely to 
be applicable to SLEs.  
“where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority 
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount 
of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic and that such 
criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled 
out in law, regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification.” 
As explained in the ASCM, objective criteria or conditions mean criteria or conditions which 
are neutral, which do not favor certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature 
and horizontal in application, such as the number of employees or the size of an enterprise.607 The 
size of SLEs is determined by the taxable income of the enterprises, the number of employees, and 
the total assets. It satisfies the objective criteria or conditions for the exemption. Moreover, the 
criteria are stipulated and confirmed in legal documents. Not all enterprises can be qualified as 
SLEs. Hence, if the criteria are strictly adhered to and the eligibility is automatic, these tax 
incentives cannot be deemed to be specific pursuant to Article 2.1 (b) of the ASCM.  
To conclude, the tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, for the software industry and IC 
industry, for energy-saving enterprises, and for animation enterprises are specific within the 
meaning of the ASCM. Nevertheless, tax incentives for SLEs should not be regarded as specific 
under the justification of Article 2.1 (b) of the ASCM. 
b. De facto specificity  
There are tax incentives that are not limited to specific enterprises or industries, but they can be 
considered de facto specific if they actually favor certain enterprises or industries. The ASCM lists 
situations that can be regarded as specific in fact, including the use of a subsidy program by a 
limited number of certain enterprises; the predominant use by certain enterprises; the granting of 
disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises; and the manner in which 
discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.608 
                                                          
607 See footnote 2 of the ASCM. 
608 Article 2.1 (c) of the ASCM.  
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With respect to direct tax incentives, in the EIT law, there are tax exemptions or reductions 
granted to state-supported projects: investments in projects for farming, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fisheries; investments in the operation of infrastructure projects that have the major support of 
the state; qualified projects or environmental protection on energy and water conservation; and 
qualified technology transfer etc.609 
I. Use of a subsidy program by a limited number of certain enterprises 
Although tax incentives are granted in the form of investments in different state-supported 
projects, they can benefit certain enterprises in practice. Nowadays, the specialization of 
enterprises is evolving so rapidly that most enterprises are specialized in individual industries or 
the production of certain goods. For instance, enterprises whose main business is technology 
transfer will probably become the major beneficiary of the incentives for income derived from 
these investments.610 Similarly, enterprises focusing on projects of environmental protection or 
energy and water conservation will benefit more from these incentives.611  
II. Predominant use by certain enterprises: SOEs 
    Major Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) will benefit more from the tax incentives for 
investments in infrastructure projects than other enterprises.612 According to Article 87 of the 
RIEITL, major state-supported public infrastructure facility projects refer to projects listed in the 
Catalogue of Enterprise Income Tax Incentives for Public Infrastructure Facility Projects, such as 
pier and dock projects, airports, railroads, roads, urban public transportation, electricity projects, 
water resources utilization projects, etc.613      
                                                          
609 Article 27 of the ETI Law. 
610 Article 27 of the EIT Law stipulates that there are tax exemptions or reductions granted to state-
supported projects: investments in an operation of infrastructure projects that have the major support of the 
state, qualified projects or environmental protection on energy and water conservation, and qualified 
technology transfer etc.  
611  According to Article 88 of the RIEITL, environmental protection, energy and water conservation 
projects include sewage treatment, public refuse treatment, comprehensive development and utilization of 
methane, technologies alternation for energy-saving and emission reduction, seawater desalination, etc. 
Enterprises engaged in these projects shall be exempted for the first to third years and allowed a 50% 
reduction in the fourth to sixth years beginning from the tax year the project derives its first production and 
operation income.  
612 This tax incentive is stated in Article 27 (2) of the EIT Law.  
613 In the case of income derived from those major state-supported public infrastructure facility projects, 
with effect from the first year to which manufacturing or business operational revenue earned from the 
project is attributable, a credit shall be allowed for the entire enterprise income tax on that income from the 
first to third years and a 50% credit from the fourth to sixth years. See Article 87 of the RIEITL.  
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Although it seems that the tax exemption or tax reduction is granted to any public infrastructure 
facility projects, the category of public infrastructures has excluded investment from private 
enterprises and foreign enterprises. It reflects that the state-owned economy is the leading force in 
the national economy.614  With respect to tax incentives provided to the public infrastructure 
facility projects, most of the projects fall within the scope of the strategic and pillar industries. 
Private enterprises have no access to those state-supported projects or sectors as they are only 
dominated by SOEs. 615  Therefore, SOEs are the main beneficiaries of these tax incentives, 
especially those whose main business involves the state-supported projects. In addition, as 
analyzed by Cui (2015), empirical evidence on a firm level showed that centrally owned SOEs had 
lower effective tax rates than or tax rates similar to private firms in certain sections. 616 
Consequently, these tax incentives are likely to be de facto specific to SOEs for the reason of 
predominant use by certain enterprises.  
(2) The EU: material selectivity 
In the State aid law system, as described in Chapter 4, there are concrete testing steps to identify 
the selectivity of tax measures. First, a general standard shall be determined; second, it has to be 
examined whether there is a deviation from the general standard; third, it has to be determined 
whether the tax measure at issue can be justified by the nature or general scheme of the system.617 
After these three testing steps, tax measures can be classified as materially selective or regionally 
selective.  
Following the selectivity standard, an analysis of Chinese tax incentives differs from the 
analysis for WTO regime. Firstly, the general or normal standard to determine selectivity is that 
taxpayers pay full taxes. Subsequently, it has to be established that those specific tax incentives 
are deviations from the normal benchmark. According to the EU case law, a deviation from the 
normal standard means demonstrating that the measure at issue “derogates from that common 
                                                          
614 Article 6, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
615 Lei Zheng, Benjamian L. Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt, 'SOEs and State Governance' in Benjamin L. 
Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt (eds), Regulating the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications of 
Chinese State Capitalism (Regulating the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications of Chinese State 
Capitalism, Oxford University Press 2015) 209. 
616  Wei Cui, 'Taxation of State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China' in 
Benjamin Liebman and Curtis Milhaupt (eds), Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications 
of Chinese State Capitalism (Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State 
Capitalism, Oxford University Press 2015) 119-120. 
617 The 2016 Notice, at para. 128. 
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regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the objective 
assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal 
situation”.618 These specific tax incentives grant possibilities for taxpayers not to pay the normal 
taxes compared to other taxpayers in comparative situations. They therefore can be regarded as 
deviations from the general standard of taxation, whether it is in the form of direct tax or indirect 
tax. The third step is to examine whether the derogation can be justified by the nature or general 
scheme of the system. As analyzed before, these tax incentives are granted for particular purposes, 
such as supporting the development of high-tech innovation, software industries, and SLEs, which 
are far from being necessary for functioning and effectiveness of the tax system. Therefore, it is 
difficult to establish that they are justified by the nature and general scheme of the system. In 
conclusion, after the three-step test, those tax incentives with enterprise or industry specificity 
under the WTO’s subsidy regime are also selective according to EU State aid law.   
(3) The WTO: regional specificity  
Except for enterprise or industry specificity, regional specificity is another significant factor in 
identifying subsidies. If a subsidy is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated 
geographical region within the granting authority’s jurisdiction, it can be categorized as a subsidy 
with regional specificity. The exact method of identification has been discussed in Chapter 3.  
With respect to Chinese tax incentives, before the EIT Law, a great number of tax incentives 
were granted to FIEs in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Economic and Technological 
Development Zones (ETDZs), coastal open economic areas (COEAs), etc.619 These tax incentives 
were limited to FIEs in designated regions, and thus probably constituted regional subsidies. 
However, under the current tax law regime, regional tax incentives are mainly granted within 
autonomous regions, the western region, comprehensive experimental zones (CEZs), and Free 
Trade Zones (FTZs), etc. 
a. Autonomous regions 
According to the definition of subsidies in the ASCM, it seems that the discretionary power of 
the autonomous regions to grant tax incentives is likely to result in regional subsidies if they are 
                                                          
618 CJEU Joined Cases C-78/08 to C-80/08 Paint Graphos and others [2011] ECR I-7611, at para. 49. See 
also CJEU C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline v Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke [2001] ECR I-8365, 
at para. 41.  
619 See the historical review of tax incentives for FDI in China in Chapter 4.  
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confined to certain enterprises only. To apply the regional specificity test here, firstly it is 
necessary to identify the granting authority. The granting authority here is the regional government. 
“With the jurisdiction of the granting authority”, if a tax incentive is not available to all enterprises, 
but only limited to certain enterprises, it is specific. On the contrary, if all enterprises in the 
autonomous regions have access to the incentive, it cannot be considered specific. Furthermore, 
Article 2.2 of the ASCM also provides an exemption for subsidies that would be regionally specific. 
The setting or change of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of government entitled to do 
so shall not be deemed to constitute a specific subsidy. Following this logic, provided that 
autonomous regions are allowed to set a lower income tax rate than the standard one, once this 
lower tax rate is applicable by all levels of governments in the whole area of the autonomous region, 
it will not be deemed to be specific. However, this Article only addresses one situation of tax 
incentives, the change of tax rates, thus leaving out other situations of tax exemptions or reductions, 
although they could have the same effect of reducing tax revenue. Hence, the other types of tax 
incentives still fall within the scope of regional specificity once they are granted to particular 
enterprises in autonomous regions.  
To conclude, if local governments in autonomous areas grant tax reductions or exemptions to 
all enterprises in the region, the reductions and exemptions cannot be deemed to be actionable 
subsidies; however, if the governments grant tax incentives to specific enterprises, they will 
probably constitute actionable subsidies with regional specificity.  
b. Western Development Strategy (WDS) 
As explained in Chapter 3, western regions are historically less developed than the eastern and 
central regions, and the disparity between the regions is still increasing. Similar to the 
identification of regional specificity in autonomous regions, firstly it is necessary to identify the 
granting authority. As introduced in Chapter 3, China is a unitary country in which the sub-national 
governments do not have discretionary power to grant tax incentives without the central 
government’s authorization. Although the WDS is aimed at promoting regional development, it is 
designed and announced at the central government level. All tax incentives are granted by the 
central government but only implemented by local governments. 620  Therefore, if “within the 
jurisdiction of the granting authority”, although the tax incentives are available to all enterprises 
                                                          
620 Tax incentives of the WDS are granted by the SAT, which represents the central government.  
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within the western regions, they are regionally specific since other regions in China do not enjoy 
such incentives. However, even within those autonomous regions where the local government has 
certain fiscal autonomy, under the framework of the WDS, tax incentives are still granted in the 
name of the central government.  
With respect to tax incentives in designated western regions, investment in the state-encouraged 
industries can enjoy a reduced enterprise income tax rate of 15%. VAT is exempted for imported 
self-used equipment within the lump sum investment in state-encouraged industries, encouraged 
industries for FDI and projects of competitive industries.621 The specificity lies in the fact that only 
investments in state-encouraged industries are eligible to enjoy these tax preferences and other 
industries are excluded. A Catalogue of Western Region Encouraged Industries has listed 
industries that are qualified for tax incentives engaging in a wide scope, such as manufacture, 
public infrastructure, financial services, IT industries, transportation, environmental protection, 
etc.622 It cannot be justified by Article 2.2 of the ASCM because the lower tax rate is not applicable 
to all enterprises in the region but is granted to limited eligible industries. Consequently, these 
major tax incentives of the WDS are likely to be identified as subsidies with regional specificity 
under the ASCM, even though it is a significant national strategy of China.  
c. Comprehensive Experimental Zones (CEZs) 
Direct tax incentives in the CEZs are similar to those granted in the WDS regions, i.e. 15% 
enterprise income tax rate for investment in the CEZs until 31 December 2020. When applying the 
standard of the ASCM to test the specificity of the measures, they are likely to be identified as 
regionally specific for the reasons similar to those for the WDS. The granting authority of these 
tax incentives is also the central government623 and the incentives are only available to enterprises 
in the CEZs and therefore they are regionally specific. Moreover, the fact that only state-
encouraged industries in the regions are qualified to enjoy the preferential treatment also makes 
the incentives regionally specific. The legal document of the CEZs has listed an inventory of 
                                                          
621 Caishui [2011] No.58, Notice of Tax Policy Issues Regarding Further Implementation of the Western 
Development Strategy, by the MoF, the GAC, and the SAT, 27 July 2011. 
622  Fagaiwei [2014] No.15, The Catalog of Western Region Encouraged Industries, by National 
Development and Reform Commission, 20 August 2014.  
623 Similar to tax incentives of the WDS, tax incentives for the CEZs are also granted by the SAT. 
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industries as state-encouraged industries for which investments can enjoy such a lower tax rate.624 
Hence, the testing here is identical to the testing carried out for the WDS incentives.  
All the three CEZs, Hengqin, Pingtan, and Qianhai, have special geographical advantages 
compared to Macao, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and thus the establishment of CEZs in these regions 
aims at strengthening the cooperation between mainland China and the three regions. Except for 
economic and financial reasons to promote the prosperity of the regions, political considerations 
are even more important. Although Hong Kong and Macao have been once again part of China for 
over 15 years, there are still challenges to ensure their political stability and continuous economic 
growth.625 Therefore, tax incentives in the CEZs are expected to contribute to the political stability 
of these regions.  
d. Pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZs) 
Under the framework of the ASCM, at present, the tax incentives provided in the FTZs are still 
likely to constitute actionable subsidies with regional specificity because only enterprises 
registered in the FTZs can enjoy them. All the measures in the FTZs are implemented by the State 
Council, the central government. However, the local governments also have the authority to design 
and introduce detailed rules to guarantee the implementation of those incentives. The State Council 
even granted a larger margin of discretionary power to these local governments for policy 
innovations. In this situation, both the central and the local government have participated in the 
granting of those tax incentives in the FTZs, and therefore the tax incentives still should be 
regarded as being granted by the central government, according to the interpretation the regional 
specificity in the ASCM. Hence, the benchmark for the determination of regional specificity is the 
whole country, the State Council’s range of power. If only enterprises in the FTZs can enjoy those 
tax preferences, although they are available for all enterprises in the FTZs, they are regionally 
specific. 
                                                          
624 According to the Catalog of Enterprise Income Tax Incentives for CEZs, state-encouraged industries 
include modern logistics, information services, technology services, cultural and creative industries, etc. 
See Caishui [2014] No.26, Notice on Enterprise Income Tax Incentives and Catalogue for Guangdong 
Hengqin New District, Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zones, and Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone, by the MoF and the SAT, 25 March 2014.  
625 Wilson Wai Ho Wong and others, 'Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics' (2012) 325-348; 
Fengxuan Xue, 'Macau through 500 years emergence and development of an untypical chinese city' (2013)  
166 
 
Nevertheless, after the trial operation of the FTZs, enterprises considered that they did not 
benefit much from those incentives.626 Some investors were even disappointed, especially foreign 
banks, because they did not experience many changes of liberalization in the financial market. 
From their observations, it took longer than expected to materialize the benefits of the policies.627 
This phenomenon confirms that the FTZ is not the next SEZ by granting tax incentives to draw 
FDI, but a testing ground for decentralization and economic reforms.628   
(4) The EU: regional selectivity 
a. Autonomous regions 
    The State aid regime takes a strict approach towards regional selectivity. If a tax measure does 
not apply to the whole territory of the country, it may be deemed to be selective for certain regions. 
However, the 2016 Notice has confirmed that tax measures provided in regions that have fiscal 
autonomy may not constitute State aid. To apply this justification, it is rather complicated to 
establish the existence of fiscal autonomy. As analyzed in Chapter 3, the identification of fiscal 
autonomy requires institutional autonomy, procedural autonomy, and financial autonomy.629  
In China’s situation, it is necessary to test the regional selectivity of autonomous regions. With 
respect to institutional autonomy, the 2016 Notice confirmed that an autonomous region must have 
its own separate political and administrative status and self-governing institutions and its own 
fiscal competence, especially with the power to adapt national fiscal provisions to regional 
particularities.630 The Chinese autonomous regions have their own self-government organs, which 
have the competence to exercise their fiscal powers.631 Thus, the requirement of institutional 
autonomy can be fulfilled. In addition, procedural autonomy means that the region can adapt a tax 
                                                          
626 Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone, Li who will not be obeyed, The Shanghai Free Trade Zone’s Frustrating 
first year, The Economist (11 October 2014) <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21623776-shanghai-
free-trade-zones-frustrating-first-year-li-who-will-not-be-obeyed> accessed 5 March 2015; Shanghai Free-
Trade Zone Struggles to Live up to its Hype, Financial Times (2 September 2014) 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6985580-324f-11e4-b929-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3TWUT7H9a> 
accessed 5 March 2015.  
627 Ibid.  
628 Wan and others, 'Policy and Politics behind Shanghai’s Free Trade Zone Program' 5-6. 
629 See Section 4.6.3.1 Autonomous regions in Chapter 4.  
630 CJEU Case C-88/03 Portugal v. Commission [2006] ECR I-7115, at para. 70. See also Draft Commission 
Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU [2014] p.39. 
631 It is confirmed by Article 95 of Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
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measure without the central government’s direct intervention in its content.632 Actually, the EIT 
Law has granted discretionary power to autonomous regions so that they may decide to reduce or 
exempt enterprise income tax within the regions.633 This discretionary power also connects to 
economic and financial autonomy. The interpretation of economic and financial autonomy is that 
the autonomous region bears responsibility for the political and financial consequences of tax 
reliefs, i.e. it has control of its own revenue and expenditure. In Chinese autonomous regions, tax 
exemptions or reductions have financial support from the regions since all revenues accruing to 
the regions are managed and used by the regions.634  
Therefore, under State aid law, it seems that Chinese autonomous regions could find 
justifications. The normal benchmark to decide selectivity should be the autonomous regions 
themselves instead of the country as a whole. As a result, even if there are tax reductions or 
exemptions in those autonomous regions, it is not a deviation from the general standard because 
the reference is the regions themselves. In conclusion, it can be established that tax incentives 
granted by the autonomous regions are not necessarily State aid. 
b. WDS, CEZs, and FTZs 
The implementation of these regional strategies has different purposes, but once they are not 
applied to the whole territory of the country, under the State aid law regime, they are regionally 
selective. Tax incentives granted in the regions of the WDS, the CEZs, and FTZs are only 
designated in these regions, but they are not available throughout the country. Thus, they are likely 
to be considered to be regionally selective in this testing step if State aid law applies.   
5.2.4 The WTO: adverse effects & the EU: affect competition and trade between Member 
States 
5.2.4.1 The WTO: adverse effects of actionable subsidies 
    Actionable subsidies are effect based. Except for the identification of financial contributions, 
benefits, and specificity, if the measure causes adverse effects to another Member’s interests this 
                                                          
632 CJEU Joined Cases C-428/06 to C434/06 UGT-Rioja and Others [2008] ECR I-6747, at para. 96 to 100. 
See also Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU [2014] p.39. 
633 The case law has also held that the mere fact that the tax exemptions or reductions are subject to judicial 
review does not in itself mean that the region lacks procedural autonomy, since it is a feature of the rule of 
law. CJEU Joined Cases C-428/06 to C434/06 UGT-Rioja and Others [2008] ECR I-6747, at para. 80 to 
83. See also Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU [2014] 
p.40. 
634 Article 117 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004). 
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establishes the existence of actionable subsidies. However, it is still complicated to prove the 
existence of those effects, although the ASCM has listed ways and some factors to be used for 
evaluation.635   
Normally, the other Member contesting the measure has the burden of proof to establish that it 
has suffered injuries or adverse effects, and the causal link between the subsidy measure and 
injuries. With respect to Chinese tax incentives, without real and concrete statistics, it is difficult 
to make a judgment on their effects on the other Members. Nevertheless, some effects can be 
predicted. As analyzed before, those tax incentives with industry or enterprise specificity or 
regional specificity are likely to enjoy a preferential status in the market as they pay less tax than 
other competitors, under the same circumstances. Consequently, they bear less costs of production, 
and thus have more possibilities to reduce the price of the products. When they export, their 
products are likely to have a more advantageous position on the market than the domestic products 
of other Members.636 In fact, once those tax incentives cause serious distortions to the competition 
in the market. according to the rules of the ASCM, they will constitute actionable subsidies. If the 
granting of those tax incentives distorts the level playing field of international trade, they are not 
compatible with the object and purpose of the subsidy control system in the WTO, and thereby 
they can face investigations or countervailing measures by other Members.  
5.2.4.2 The EU: affect competition and trade between Member States 
    State aid is also effect-based in such a way that it not only regulates actual distortions of 
competition but also potential distortions. This is a main reason that it has a notification procedure 
and pre-investigation process to evaluate the effects of aid measures. Once the tax measure has 
strengthened the financial position or opportunities of the recipient, it can be regarded as impairing 
competition with respect to other competitors. Moreover, the measure should also affect trade 
between Member States. However, the system includes a category of de minimis aid, which has 
little effect on competition and trade and therefore it is disregarded from a State aid perspective.  
                                                          
635 Adverse effects: injury to the domestic industry of another Member; nullification or impairment of 
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under the GATT 1994, in particular the benefits 
of concessions bound under Article II of the GATT 1994; and serious prejudice to the interests of another 
Member. When evaluating the effects, some factors can help: volume of subsidized imports, their effects 
on prices of the domestic like products, and the impact of the imports on domestic producers. See Article 5 
of the ASCM. 
636 See the economic analysis of tax incentives as subsidies in Chapter 2.   
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All the Chinese tax incentives analyzed before, regardless their forms, can strengthen the 
recipient’s position in the market to different degrees. The prediction on their effects is similar to 
the analysis conducted in the “adverse effects” analysis of the ASCM. Nevertheless, the 
application of the category of de minimis aid here deserves more discussion. The problem is how 
to evaluate the effect of tax incentives that can be determined as having a minimal effect on 
competition and trade, especially in the area of taxation. It is difficult to find a benchmark to decide 
the threshold of de minimis aid because the granting of such tax incentives means that there is a 
reduction in the tax revenue collected and qualified taxpayers are all eligible to enjoy those 
incentives. Hence, it is difficult to decide how much tax revenue is to be lost. The de minimis aid 
standard therefore is not easy to determine. However, the design of de mininis aid itself provides 
another perspective to examine the effects of aid measures, which contributes to the efficiency and 
costs of the administration.  
5.2.5 The WTO: Non-actionable subsidies & The EU: compatible State aid  
5.2.5.1 The WTO: Non-actionable subsidies  
Despite the fact that non-actionable subsidies have already lapsed due to the slow progress of 
negotiations, testing the incentives against the conditions of this category can shed light on the 
existing conditions and provide food for thought. According to the original category, non-
actionable subsidies include assistance for R&D activities, assistance to disadvantaged regions, 
and assistance for adapting infrastructure to new environmental requirements. Therefore, some tax 
incentives that are otherwise deemed as actionable subsidies may find justifications under this 
category.  
(1) Assistance for R&D activities 
To be qualified for this type of non-actionable subsidy, strict conditions shall apply.637 However, 
certain Chinese tax incentives can be perceived as assistance for R&D activities. For instance, 
among tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, there are additional deductions for R&D expenses. 
Although the assistance for R&D is confined to the research innovation process, the rationale 
deserves more attention. In fact, the overall incentives for high-tech enterprises aim at encouraging 
innovation of technology, which shares an identical objective with R&D activities.  
                                                          
637 See Section 3.3.2.3 Non-actionable subsidies in Chapter 3.  
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(2) Assistance to disadvantaged regions 
As analyzed earlier, the main purpose of tax incentives for autonomous regions and the WDS 
is to promote development of the relatively less-developed regions, thus decreasing regional 
disparity within China. The WDS addresses autonomous regions and other disadvantaged regions 
within a designated geographic area. Additionally, diverse economic indexes have shown that 
these regions are less developed compared to eastern and central China.638  Hence, the strict 
conditions for the determination of assistance to disadvantaged regions might be satisfied when 
conducting the testing.   
(3) Assistance for adapting infrastructure to new environmental requirements 
    The purpose of this type of non-actionable subsidies is to encourage environmental protection. 
Activities carried out by energy-saving service enterprises share the same rationale with this type 
of subsidy. This tax incentive attempts to assist energy-saving service enterprises to expand their 
business, i.e. helping more enterprises to adapt their infrastructures or strategies to save energy.  
Nevertheless, compared to the provisions addressing prohibited subsidies and actionable 
subsidies, the rules for non-actionable subsidies are not very detailed, and therefore the testing is 
still on a case-by-case basis. With respect to the legal framework for subsidy regulation, the 
existence of this category provides further reasons for Members of the WTO to offer tax incentives 
with a proper object and purpose. Despite the fact that they have to be proportional to achieve the 
aims, the design of this category seems sounder than the current system that only contains 
prohibited and actionable subsidies.  
5.2.5.2 The EU: Compatible State aid  
A major characteristic of State aid that is different from subsidies in the WTO is that there is an 
exemption of certain measures from the State aid rules, i.e. compatible State aid. Compatible State 
aid includes mandatory exemptions, discretionary exemptions, and the General Block Exemption 
Regulation (GBER). Mandatory and discretionary exemptions have to go through an ex-ante 
assessment by the European Commission, but measures that fall within the scope of the GBER are 
do not have to go through the notification procedure, and are thereby are compatible with the State 
aid law.  
                                                          
638 See Section 4.6.3 regional tax incentives in Chapter 4.  
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(1) Discretionary exemptions: regional aid 
A discretionary exemption that is applicable in China can be found in the provision of “sectoral 
aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities and regional aid to certain economic 
areas”.639  
This provision provides a legal basis for both sectoral aid and regional aid in terms of economic 
activities that do not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest. The rationale for permitting regional aid is that certain disadvantaged regions suffer 
serious economic difficulties that may require aid to stimulate their economic 
development.640According to the explanation of the GBER, regional aid can only be used to 
concentrate on the most disadvantaged regions of the EU, and therefore the permissible aid ceilings 
should reflect the relative seriousness of the problems affecting the development of the regions 
concerned. Moreover, regional aid should be effective in promoting the economic development of 
disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in 
those areas.641  
However, it is still complex to apply the provisions. It seems that only disadvantaged sectors or 
regions are eligible for this discretionary exemption. In order to qualify, thr tax incentives have to 
undergo a strict ex-ante assessment.642 In the context of China, regional aid under the WDS is 
likely to be exempted under the assessment. It has to be acknowledged that, without specific data, 
it is difficult to predict the precise effects of those tax incentives, but the testing itself may still 
shed light on the compatibility of the regional measures.   
The objective of the WDS is to decrease the regional disparity between the less developed 
regions and the other parts of China. The rationale for launching the WDS was introduced in 
previous sections, and it is similar to the rationale for compatible regional aid. Subsequently, the 
tax incentives have to follow the principle of proportionality, which means that they should be 
effective and proportional to achieve the objective. The WDS provides that investments in the 
                                                          
639 Article 107 (3) c of the TFEU.  
640 Hancher, Ottervanger and Slot, EU State Aids 790-791. 
641 European Commission Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020 [2013] OJ C209/1, at para. 6 and 
7. Each Member State shall provide the Commission a regional aid map and stick to the area in the map. 
See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:209:0001:0045:EN:PDF. 
642  The ex-ante assessment is based on the principle of proportionality, which includes consecutive 
questions. See Section 3.4.2.2.3 the Commission’s assessment in Chapter 3.  
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state-encouraged industries can enjoy a reduced EIT rate of 15% as opposed to the standard tax 
rate of 25%. This preferential tax treatment is not new for the western regions since it is an 
extension of the former strategy. Key economic indicators such as GDP growth rate, fiscal revenue 
growth rate, and urban and rural income have already shown that, after the implementation of the 
WDS, the economy has grown tremendously.643 Although it is difficult to establish a direct causal 
link between the effects of the strategy and the economic development, scholars maintain that 
positive effects triggered by the WDS cannot be ignored.644 Nevertheless, the proportionality issue 
is a controversial one, because there is no benchmark to decide whether the same effect will be 
achieved with fewer tax incentives. On the other hand, while there is economic growth in the 
western regions, the regional disparity between the western regions and the other parts of China is 
also increasing. Indeed, diverse factors contribute to the regional disparity, but the increased 
disparity reflects that the effectiveness of the tax incentives is limited.  
Another issue is the possibility of achieving the objective with fewer tax incentives and the 
distortion effects are minimal. Except for the WDS, almost all the previous regional tax incentives 
in the SEZs for FDI have been abolished. Thus, there must be reasons that show that it is necessary 
to maintain tax incentives for the western regions, at least in a short term.645 Actually, in China, 
the choice of instruments to achieve objects is not always free because it is always subject to the 
former experiences, and even cultural or systematic factors. As some authors pointed out, there is 
a path dependence for the adoption of tax incentives, just because the tax administration is familiar 
with the measure.646 Furthermore, only when tax incentives are able to match the objective of 
promoting the state-supported sectors are they proportional. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
that the granting of tax incentives is necessary to achieve the goals. Furthermore, the volume of 
tax incentives still deserves discussion. 
                                                          
643  Zheng and Fang, 'An Evaluation on the Effects of the Policy of the Great Campaign of Western 
Development of China in the First 10 Years-Based on the Kuznets Regional Inverted-U Theory'; Fan, 
Kanbur and Zhang, 'China's Regional Disparities: Experience and Policy'. 
644 Ibid.  
645 Bhajan S. Grewal and Abdullahi D. Ahmed, 'Is China's Western Region Development Strategy on Track? 
An assessment' (2011) 20 Journal of Contemporary China 161. 
646 Jinyu Ye and Derui Gu, 'Norms Review and Practrice Assessment of Tax Incentives: Principle of 
Proportionality as a Tool of Analysis' (2013) 35 Modern Law Science 178.  
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Consequently, the analysis comes down to a cost benefit analysis, which requires that the overall 
balance is positive with respect to the granting of tax incentives. It involves an economic analysis 
to measure the actual cost and benefit of the tax incentives, but the principle of equality plays an 
important role in determining the balance.647 The economy is such a dynamic process that, at the 
beginning of designing the tax incentives, it is not precisely predictable how much tax revenue 
will be lost. In China’s situation, eligible enterprises are qualified to apply for certain tax incentives, 
and thus it is the granting authority, i.e. the tax administration, that decides on the approval of tax 
incentives. In addition, as mentioned before, the major beneficiaries of the state-supported sectors 
are actually SOEs, compared with private enterprises or foreign enterprises. Under the WDS, the 
same situation arises, because the state-supported sectors are those related to public interest, such 
as manufacturing, public infrastructure, natural resources, etc. However, it cannot be denied that 
private and foreign enterprises play a significant role in stimulating economic growth, even bigger 
than some SOEs.648 Hence, there is no guarantee that the granting of tax incentives to state-
supported enterprises will definitely generate more benefits than providing the tax preferences to 
private or foreign enterprises.  
In conclusion, it is difficult to provide an absolute answer on the compatibility assessment of 
whether the WDS may be exempted or not. In general, the object of the WDS is in line with the 
requirement of regional development in order to promote equality. The most important factor is 
that the State aid regime includes such an assessment process in its system to verify and control 
the abuse of tax incentives.  
(2) General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
The general block exempted State aids include regional aid, small and medium-sized enterprise 
(SME) investment and employment aid, aid for environmental protection, and aid for research, 
development and innovation. The types of aid in this category are similar to non-actionable 
subsidies.  
a. Tax incentives for SLEs 
    According to the GBER, SMEs play a decisive role in job creation and act as a factor of social 
stability and economic growth. However, they often have difficulties raising capital or loans, 
                                                          
647 This section does not conduct an economic analysis without specific data.   
648 Curtis J Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, 'Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm' 
(2015) 103 Georgetown Law Journal 683-685. 
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especially for newly created SMEs, partially because their limited resources may often restrict 
their access to information. In order to facilitate the development of SMEs, it is reasonable to 
exempt certain categories of aid for SMEs.649   
If enterprises are qualified as SLEs in China, they can enjoy both direct and indirect tax 
incentives. The current tendency is that the central government is strengthening the intensity of 
support for SLEs, not only through tax incentives but also by other means, such as looser 
conditions for loans from the bank. The background is that China’s economy has entered a new 
stage, i.e. “the new normal”, as the government announced.650 “The new normal” means that the 
speed of growth of China’s economy is slowing down from high speed to medium high speed; the 
economic structure is upgrading and the forces for economic growth are transforming from 
production factors and investment to innovation.651 In such a context, in order to further liberate 
the economy, SLEs become a more and more important driving force for the economy. However, 
the slowing down of the economy means that SLEs need more assistance to thrive. Therefore, 
under the State aid regime, tax incentives for SLEs are likely to find justifications. 
b. Tax incentives for high-tech enterprises 
    The GBER explained that, based on the past experience in the EU, 652  aid for research, 
development and innovation (R&D&I) can contribute to economic growth, strengthening 
competitiveness and boosting employment in the EU. Given the restricted R&D capabilities of 
                                                          
649 The GBER defines that the category of SMEs is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 
persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet 
total not exceeding EUR 43 million. In addition, the aid intensity is limited; for small enterprises, it shall 
not exceed 20% of the eligible costs and for medium-sized enterprises, it shall not exceed 10%. See Article 
2 of Annex I, Commission regulation (ECU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of 
aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (General Block 
Exemption Regulation, GBER) [2014] OJ L187/1. 
650 The “New Normal” was first completely explained by President Xi on the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Summit on 9 November 2014. Xinhua News (9 November 2014) 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-11/09/c_1113175964.htm> accessed 23 March 2015.  
651 Yang Yao, A New Normal, but with Robust Growth: China’s Growth Prospects in the Next 10 Years, 
Think Tank 20: Growth, Convergence and Income Distribution: The Road from the Brisbane G-20 Summit 
< http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Interactives/2014/thinktank20/chapters/tt20-china-
growth-prospects-yao.pdf?la=en> accessed 15 April 2016; Angang Hu, Embracing China's "New Normal", 
Why the Economy is Still on Track (The Council on Foreign Relations 2015) < 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-04-20/embracing-chinas-new-normal> accessed 15 
April 2016.  
652 European Commission regulation (EC) No. 364/2004 amending Regulation (EC) No.70/2001 as regards 
the extension of its scope to include aid for research and development [2004] OJ L63/22. 
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both SMEs and large enterprises, market failures may prevent the market from reaching the 
optimal output, especially for SMEs who have difficulty in gaining access to new technological 
developments. Therefore, aid for R&D&I is exempted from the GBER.653 
An obvious tax incentive for R&D&I is an additional deduction for R&D expenses as a means 
of support for high-tech enterprises. Except for this, tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, for 
the software industry and IC industry can be considered as stimulating the development of 
technology. Thus, if these enterprises conduct R&D&I activities, these activities will be block 
exempted under State aid law.  
c. Tax incentives for environmental protection 
One of the major objectives in the EU is to maintain sustainable development, and for that a high 
level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment is necessary. However, the 
area of environmental protection is often confronted with market failures. Under normal market 
conditions, undertakings may not necessarily have an incentive to reduce their pollution due to the 
consideration of increasing their costs.654 For these reasons, to create incentives for environmental 
protection, certain aids are considered compatible. This rationale applies to tax exemptions for 
energy-saving service enterprises in China. The analysis is the same as it is for non-actionable 
subsidies. 
5.2.6 The WTO: remedies for actionable subsidies & the EU: remedies for unlawful State aid  
5.2.6.1 The WTO: remedies for actionable subsidies  
There are two levels of remedies provided for Members in the WTO when suffering from 
adverse effects of subsidies from other Members. At the DSB level, for prohibited subsidies, 
Members are recommended to withdraw the subsidies immediately; for actionable subsidies and 
non-actionable subsidies, Members are recommended to remove the adverse effects or withdraw 
the subsidies. Otherwise, the complaining Member can take countervailing measures against the 
subsidizing Member.  
Since China’s accession to the WTO, China has faced an increasing number of countervailing 
investigations from complaining Members about China’s subsidy measures, especially tax 
                                                          
653  The research and development project includes fundamental research, industrial research, and 
experimental development. See Article 25 aid for research and development projects, the GBER. 
654 See the economic analysis in Chapter 2. 
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incentives. After testing the selected current Chinese tax incentives against the subsidy rules in the 
WTO, some explanations can be offered. Indeed, certain tax incentives are not compatible with 
the WTO subsidy rules, and therefore China has to remove the adverse effects of those measures 
or withdraw the measures as remedies.  
5.2.6.2 Remedies for unlawful State aid  
The remedy is stricter in the State aid system. For unlawful State aid, which is granted without 
prior Commission authorization, the recovery is retroactive, meaning that the Member State has to 
recover the aid with interest. Although the testing of Chinese tax incentives against the State aid 
regime is hypothetical, it is valuable to see the differences in the available remedies. In terms of 
the Chinese tax incentives analyzed, if they cannot be justified as compatible State aid, it may be 
necessary for them to be recovered. For instance, these tax incentives include incentives for high-
tech enterprises, for software and IC industries, for animation enterprises, and for the CEZs, and 
the FTZ. The extent of the remedy is much more severe than its counterpart in the WTO. However, 
the remedies reflect the requirement that a level playing field has to be re-established prior to the 
granting of the aid. Although the testing is hypothetical, when taking creating a level playing field 
as the benchmark, China is likely to face stricter remedies. 
5.3 Matrix of the testing results 
   This section lists two matrices to present the testing results. The first matrix 5.3.1 shows the 
compatibility of selected Chinese tax incentives with the WTO’s ASCM. The testing results are 
listed according to the category of subsidies under the ASCM, i.e. prohibited subsidies, actionable 
subsidies, and non-actionable subsidies. Actionable subsidies are listed by the standard of 
specificity, including de jure specificity (enterprise or industry specificity), de facto specificity, 
and regional specificity. The second matrix 5.3.2 presents comparative testing results of the 
WTO’s ASCM and EU State aid law. It demonstrates similarities and differences in results when 
testing the same Chinese tax incentives to two regimes. This matrix classifies tax incentives 
according to specificity as well. The comparison reveals that certain tax incentives are likely to 
constitute both actionable subsidies and State aid. They include tax incentives for high-tech 
enterprises, for software industry and IC industry, for animation enterprises, and for energy-saving 
services enterprises; tax incentives for state-supported enterprises (SOEs); and tax incentives for 
autonomous regions, the WDS, the CEZs, and the FTZs. However, under EU State aid law, a 
number of tax incentives that are likely to constitute actionable subsidies under the ASCM, can be 
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justified and qualified as compatible State aid. This can be the case in respect of incentives for 
R&D, environmental protection, autonomous regions, and the development of the western region. 
In summary, the most controversial tax incentives are de facto incentives for SOEs; incentives for 
R&D activities demonstrated as support for high-tech enterprises, for software and IC industry, 
and for animation enterprises; and incentives for specific regions.   
5.3.1 Matrix of the testing results with the ASCM of the WTO   
 Export subsidies Import-substituting subsidies 
Prohibited 
subsidies  
The general VAT refund is not an 
export subsidy 
None 











15% CIT rate; exemption of income 
from the transfer of technology; 
additional deduction for R&D 
expenses; accelerated depreciation; 
special deductions for eligible 
investors in high-tech enterprises, etc. 
 Software industry and IC industry 
 
EIT incentives: 
(1) Tax exemptions for the first few 
years starting from the first profit-
making year; 
(2) 15% CIT rate 
VAT incentives: 
(1) Regular taxpayer who sells the self-
developed software products, after 
being taxed at 17% VAT, the actual 
VAT burden that surpasses 3% will be 
granted the incentive of immediate 
taxation and immediate refund; 
(2) Import VAT exemption for 
imported self-used production 
materials and consumables 
 Energy-saving services enterprises EIT incentives: 
Tax exemptions for the first three years 
starting from the first profit-making 
year and, from the fourth to the sixth 
year, CIT shall be cut half based on the 




Exemption of VAT 
 Animation enterprises VAT incentives: 
(1) Immediate taxation and immediate 
refund of VAT; 






Small and low profit enterprises 
(SLEs) 




(3) 20% CIT rate 
(4) The taxable income was calculated 
as 50% of the annual income, and 20% 
EIT rate 
VAT incentives:  
Exemption of VAT  
 2. De facto specificity   
 Use of a subsidy program by a limited 
number of certain enterprise 
Tax incentives for state-supported 
enterprises 
 Predominant use by certain 
enterprises 
SOEs are the main beneficiaries 
 3. Regional specificity   
 Autonomous regions May decide to reduce or exempt tax on 
the part of the enterprise income tax 
payable by an enterprise located in the 
said region  
 Western Development Strategy 
(WDS) 
EIT incentives: 
15% CIT rate until 31st December 
2020 
VAT incentives: 
Exemption of import VAT 
 Comprehensive experimental zones 
(CEZs): Hengqin, Pingtan, Qianhai 
EIT incentives:  
15% CIT rate until 31st December 
2020 
VAT incentives: 
Exemption of VAT 
 Pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZs) EIT incentives: 
CIT paid by installments over five 
years 
VAT incentives: 
Exemption of import VAT 






Assistance to disadvantaged regions Tax incentives for autonomous regions 
and for the WDS 
 Assistance for adapting infrastructure 
to new environmental requirements 
Tax incentives for energy-saving 
services enterprises 
 
5.3.2 Matrix of the comparable testing results 
 Chinese tax incentives Subsidies in the WTO EU State aid 









Tax incentives for high-tech 
enterprises; for software 
industry and IC industry; for 
animation enterprises; and 
for energy-saving services 
enterprises 
Actionable subsidies with 
industry or enterprise 
specificity 

















 Tax incentives for state-
supported enterprises 
SOEs as the main 
beneficiaries 
Actionable subsidies with 
de facto specificity 





Tax incentives for 
autonomous regions, the 
WDS, the CEZs, and the 
FTZs 
Actionable subsidies with 
regional specificity 




regions and the WDS 
Compatible State 
aid: autonomous 




Remedies   DSB level: members are 
recommended to 
withdraw the subsidy or 




Unlawful State aid 
shall be recovered 
with interest 
5.4 Reviewing the comparable testing with benchmarks 
5.4.1 Reviewing with the external benchmark 
As introduced in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, in order to analyze the status and problems of Chinese 
tax incentives, the research has established two benchmarks: the external benchmark and the 
internal one. The comparable testing conducted earlier was on the basis of the external benchmark, 
namely the subsidy rules in the WTO and EU State aid law. With the testing results of both systems, 
it is easier to review them against the general benchmark, i.e. the common object and purpose of 
the two systems which is the creation of a level playing field in the market. It has to be emphasized 
that the external benchmark serves here as a standard to evaluate the testing results, so it is not 
necessary to test Chinese tax incentives again following previous testing steps according to the 
external benchmark.  
Under the external benchmark, the question to be answered is of whether the selected Chinese 
tax incentives cause distortions to the creation and maintenance of a level playing field in the 
international trade market. Reviewing the testing results, it is clear that, according to the criteria 
of the ASCM, certain Chinese tax incentives indeed constitute actionable subsidies. This is the 
case in respect of tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, for software industry and IC industry, 
for animation enterprises, for energy-saving services enterprises, for autonomous regions, the 
WDS, the CEZs, and the FTZs. The subsidies qualified as actionable subsidies, particularly those 
that are de facto specific, actually grant advantages to specific beneficiaries. The most problematic 
tax incentives are those designed for state-supported industries but de facto benefit the SOEs. They 
are not fair to other investors, such as private or foreign enterprises. The same rational applies to 
all above mentioned specific tax incentives, since these tax incentives only grant benefits to 
designated beneficiaries, which enable them to enjoy more advantages than other non-beneficiaries 
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in the same market. Therefore, when testing against the external benchmark, these specific tax 
incentives will most likely harm fair competition in the market.655  
The testing results also demonstrate that EU State aid law provides different perspectives. In the 
hypothetical testing, tax incentives for R&D, environmental protection, autonomous regions, and 
the development of the western region can likely be justified and therefore be qualified as 
compatible State aid if certain conditions or assessment procedures are fulfilled. It appears that the 
State aid regime takes into account more scenarios regardless the distortive effects of tax measures.  
The differences of the testing results have been evaluated on the basis of the external benchmark 
itself. As analyzed in Chapter 3, the concept of a level playing field is a reflection of the principle 
of equality, which requires equal treatment of enterprises with equal status, but different treatment 
of enterprises with a different status. It has been demonstrated that the EU State aid regime embeds 
this concept in its lawmaking. For example, regional aid is provided in disadvantaged regions and 
can be justified as a means to realize a level playing field. Although the above-mentioned tax 
incentives may have distortive effects, they can be justified by their objectives which are in line 
with the interest of the common market. In this way, different situations are treated differently. 
Moreover, the State aid regime has designed a strict ex-ante assessment to verify the compatibility 
of the aid measures. Thus, on the issue of tax incentives, compared to the testing under the WTO 
rules, the EU State aid system includes better ways to realize the object and purpose of creating a 
level playing field.  
To conclude, the testing results expose problems existing in relation to Chinese tax incentives 
with respect to trade effects in the international trade market. Nevertheless, the comparative testing 
with the EU State aid system offers another perspective to consider this issue. Whether the relevant 
Chinese tax incentives cause distortions to international trade depends on the evaluation against 
the external benchmark. It is inspiring to see that, under the EU State aid regime, although some 
tax incentives have distortive effects, they can nevertheless be justified in order to realize a level 
playing field.  
                                                          
655 See the economic analysis in Chapter 2. 
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5.4.2 Reviewing with the internal benchmark 
    As a Member of the WTO, China has an obligation to ensure that its measures are in line with 
the requirements of the ASCM. However, granting tax incentives is also a matter of the tax 
sovereignty of China. External control is necessary, but it is also important to view those tax 
incentives from China’s own perspective.  
    On the one hand, as analyzed above, the internal benchmark shares the same essence of the 
external benchmark. In the context of reviewing the testing results against the internal benchmark, 
it must be noted that the internal benchmark has been based on s the same inspiration as the external 
benchmark. To achieve a level playing field, certain tax incentives could be justified. The most 
obvious incentives that could be justified because of the objective, are regional tax incentives. To 
be more specific, regional tax incentives that are aimed at decreasing regional disparity within 
China, if they fulfill certain conditions, can be exempted from being considered harmful subsidies. 
Thus, tax incentives adopted to support the national policy for supporting less-developed 
autonomous regions and western regions may be justified by the internal benchmark itself. This 
rationale is the same as the rationale applied in the context of the EU State aid system.  
    On the other hand, the evaluation of the internal benchmark reflects deeper problems of some 
selected Chinese tax incentives in respect of the creation of a level playing field in China’s 
domestic market. As discussed in Chapter 4, China has a special status compared to other Members 
of the WTO since it has adopted a socialist market economy. The starting point to review the 
compatibility of Chinese tax incentives is then different from the review as it would be carried out 
for a typical western market economy. With respect to the issue of SOEs, the fact that they are the 
main beneficiaries of certain tax incentives is not only caused by tax incentives themselves, but it 
also has its origin in China’s socialist system. The socialist system has determined that public 
ownership is the leading force of the economy and thus key industries are owned and operated by 
the state. There is no free market access for private or foreign enterprises to enter these industries, 
the most of which are state-supported industries. On the other hand, China is reforming the 
relationship between the government and the market so that there is more liberalization of the 
market with less governmental control. For instance, the establishment of the FTZs is a pioneer to 
experiment with a more liberalized market economy. Within the FTZs, there are only a few tax 
incentives, as the government tries to avoid causing new distortions. Therefore, taking into account 
the factual relationship between the government and the market in China, the evaluation under the 
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internal benchmark actually implies deeper problems of Chinese tax incentives. Even if these 
specific tax incentives are terminated in China right now, the tension with the WTO’s subsidy 
rules will continue. The reason is that the relationship between the government and the market in 
China differs from the common one in the WTO. The lack of market access and lack of legal 
control over the granting of tax incentives have become the true obstacles to the creation of a level 
playing field in China’s domestic market.    
In summary, reviewing from China’s domestic perspective, the creation of a level playing field 
should be the trend of the reform, because specific tax incentives can actually harm fair 
competition. However, the concept and interpretation of a level playing field is a complicated issue, 
since China also has its own political, economic, and cultural situations. Some tax incentives, such 
as those for less developed regions, for high-tech enterprises, and for energy-saving enterprises 
could be justified in order to create a level playing field in China. Moreover, it is China’s state-
oriented attitude towards tax incentives that impedes the realization of a level playing field in 
China.  
5.5 Conclusion 
After testing against both external and internal benchmarks, certain Chinese tax incentives are 
likely to constitute subsidies, and probably actionable subsidies, under the ASCM in the WTO. 
Considering their industry or enterprise specificity, they are tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, 
for the software industry and IC industry, for animation enterprises, and energy-saving service 
enterprises. With respect to their regional specificity, there are tax incentives for autonomous 
regions, the WDS, the CEZs, and the FTZs. Moreover, SOEs in China are de facto the main 
beneficiaries of the tax incentives for state-encouraged public infrastructure facility projects.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that, based on the common object and purpose, comparable 
testing under the EU State aid regime presents different consequences, especially with respect to 
compatible measures. Some actionable subsidies are exempted from the State aid regulation once 
required conditions are satisfied, including tax incentives for R&D activities in high-tech 
enterprises, the software industry and IC industry, for energy-saving services enterprises, and for 
autonomous regions and the WDS. The external benchmark of a level playing field contributes to 
the evaluation of the differences. In order to realize a level playing field, tax incentives for certain 
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industries or regions are functional to improve equality, such as regional tax incentives in less-
developed regions and tax reductions for SLEs.  
The internal benchmark in China shares the same essence with the external benchmark for the 
interpretation of a level playing field for competition. Both of the benchmarks should take into 
account the principle of equality and the principle of proportionality. Under these criteria, tax 
incentives for regional disparities, i.e. for autonomous regions and the WDS, and tax incentives 
for supporting R&D activities in high-tech enterprises, for encouraging estimated effects of 
environmental protection by energy-saving service enterprises, can be justified.  However, it is not 
argued that China can abuse the differences in the systems as excuses not to fulfill its international 
obligations. Another implication from the internal benchmark is that China has its own system 
with regard to the relationship between the government and the market. However, its state-oriented 
attitude towards tax incentives and the lack of legal control over tax incentives become obstacles 
to the creation of a level playing field in China’s domestic market. These could be tensions between 
China and the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid.   
In conclusion, it is necessary to examine the deeper tensions behind the comparative testing 
results. It is therefore helpful to highlight China’s attitude towards tax incentives, and to make 
recommendations for China’s position in international trade. In addition, it contributes to a further 












Chapter 6 The Origins of the Differences in the Testing Results 
6.1 Introduction 
The testing results in Chapter 5 demonstrate that certain Chinese tax incentives are likely to 
constitute actionable subsidies under WTO rules or State aid under EU law. This is the case in 
respect of tax incentives for high-tech enterprises such as software industry, IC industry, and 
energy-saving service enterprises, SOEs, and specific regions. The deeper reason for the measures 
to be identified as subsidies or State aid is probably due to tensions between the Chinese system 
and the international or the EU standards. Once the tensions exist, such incompatibility of the 
Chinese tax incentives with the WTO subsidy rules is likely to continue. Therefore, this chapter 
aims to analyze the origins of the tensions between the Chinese system and the Western system 
(the capitalist system of most of the WTO Members and EU Member States), in order to look for 
possibilities to alleviate the tensions. On the other hand, it intends to identify opportunities for the 
WTO in order to improve its system, especially when dealing with Chinese tax incentives, against 
the background of EU State aid law.  
It is necessary to provide explanations and delimitations of some terms in order to limit the 
discussion to the research questions. As explained in previous chapters, this research does not aim 
at triggering arguments on ideologies, but it intends to present differences between the two 
categories of systems in China and the major Members of the WTO. Considering the relationship 
between the government and the market, China is a more state-oriented country. In contrast, the 
majority of the WTO members are market-oriented countries.656 Thus, this research regards the 
major WTO Members as the West, in order to distinguish the West from China. The EU is also a 
Member of the WTO. Although the EU has its own path with regard to the development of State 
aid law, it shares common objectives and purposes with the WTO’s subsidy rules on creating a 
level playing field for trade and investment. The integration levels differ in the EU and the WTO, 
but the EU State aid law functions under the principles of a market economy,657 and therefore it 
could also be considered as the West when it is compared to China. In this research, the West 
particularly includes European countries, the United States, and other mainly English-speaking 
                                                          
656 According to the relationship between the state and the market, there are few socialist countries in the 
WTO. There are four official socialist countries in the World, namely, China, Cuba, North Korea, and 
Vietnam. Cuba and North Korea accessed the WTO in 1995 when they were still in the system of a planned 
economy. Vietnam accessed the WTO in 2006. 
657 See Section 3.2.4 and 3.5.3 in Chapter 3.  
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countries.658 This chapter first analyzes the tensions between China and the West in relation to 
granting tax incentives. Subsequently, it explores the origins of the differences between China and 
the West from a historical, economic, and cultural perspective. Afterwards, it looks for the 
possibilities of creating a common platform for both China and the West under the WTO’s subsidy 
framework. 
6.2 Tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the Western treatment of taxation 
6.2.1 China: state-oriented attitude towards taxation vs. the West: taxation for public finance  
China has a state-oriented attitude towards the granting of tax incentives. As commented by 
Cao (2009), the general object and purpose of taxation in China is to serve the state’s function in 
relation to income, expenditure, reallocation of revenue, and administration.659 The state plays an 
essential role in the allocation of public goods or social products. Accordingly, with respect to the 
granting of tax incentives, the Chinese government does not consider it as an intervention into the 
market but a way of macro-economic control that can realize the state’s function.660  
In comparison, the function of taxation in the West is different from its counterpart in China. 
Most Members of the WTO adopt the fundamental theories of public finance to serve as the basis 
of taxation, which maintains that taxation finances the supply of public goods. Taxation aims to 
provide public goods that the market cannot provide efficiently, thus focusing on the stabilization 
of economic activity, redistribution of income and wealth, and the allocation of resources.661 
Therefore, the starting point of the granting and control of tax incentives between China and the 
West are different. They present tensions between two different attitudes. 
 
 
                                                          
658 The WTO and the EU also contains Members of former Soviet Union countries that have experienced 
transition from a socialist system to a market system. However, this research distinguishes China from the 
West in general. The aim is to show that the starting point or background of China’s attitude towards tax 
incentives is different from the WTO and the EU. Thus, the research does not discuss reference from those 
former Soviet Union countries.   
659 Cao, Differentiation of the Generation on the Modern Tax Law, Pole Analysis and Case Commentaries 
of the Background Elements for China and the United States 80-87 (in Chinese). 
660 The function of taxation in China is originally based on the economic theory of Karl Marx. Auyeung, 
'Taxation Trends and Issues in the People's Republic of China: 1949 to 2006'. 




Matrix of the differences between the function of taxation in China and the West 
Taxation China The West 
Object and 
purpose 
To realize the state’s function To realize the function of the public 
needs (public finance) 
Subject The state and the society The government and the market 
Object Social product Public product 
Form The state’s allocation activity The government’s expenditure and 
administration 
Function The state’s function of income, 
expenditure, reallocation of 
revenue, and administration 
The stabilization of economic activity, 
redistribution of income and wealth, 
and the allocation of resources 
6.2.2 China: the lack of internal legal control over the granting of Chinese tax incentives vs. 
the West: instrumentality controlled by the rule of law  
The granting of Chinese tax incentives lacks an internal legal control, including legal 
assessment and remedies. It is common for governments to use tax incentives as instruments to 
achieve policy goals. Some authors consider the phenomenon as legislative instrumentality, i.e. 
employing the law as an instrument or means to achieve policy goals or ends.662 However, if the 
government only uses the law as a technique or a means to implement policy goals, this can easily 
turn to instrumentalism.663 Without legal control, such instrumentalism tends to infringe the basic 
legal principles of equality, certainty, and justice by causing unjustified discrimination. 664 
Therefore, under the WTO framework, such governmental actions are regarded as interference 
into the market, and thus should be restricted by the law.665 The subsidy system in the WTO 
provides for legal control over governmental activities. EU State aid law shares the same rationale. 
The Chinese government also has an instrumentalist attitude towards the use of tax incentives, 
namely adopting tax incentives to achieve certain economic or social goals. Nevertheless, such an 
                                                          
662 Hans Gribnau, 'Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax' (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 
92-93; Brian Z. Tamanaha, Laurien Talsma and Daphne van Mierlo, The Perils of Pervasive Legal 
Instrumentalism (Wolf Legal Publishers 2006). 
663 Robert S. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (Cornell University Press 1982) 59; 
Lon L. Fuller, 'Means and Ends' (2001) The Principles of Social Order : Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller 
61. 
664 Gribnau, 'Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax' 99-100. 
665 Ibid 92-93; Tamanaha, Talsma and Mierlo, The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism 30-34.  
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instrumentalist use of tax incentives lacks a legal assessment and remedies according to the 
standard that is widely shared by the Western societies. Although there are concrete criteria 
stipulated in the EIT Law to approve different tax incentives to qualified enterprises, the granting 
or the issuing of tax incentives per se lacks a legal assessment, such as an ex-ante or ex-post 
assessment.666 The evolution of tax incentives in China demonstrates that the Chinese government 
has realized the importance of integrating into the world economy by adapting to the international 
legal standards. However, it has not established an internal legal assessment system with regard to 
tax incentives nor a legal remedy system particularly for harms caused by tax incentives.  
Moreover, there is no consensus in China to restrict the use of tax incentives as is the case in 
the West. Even when the Chinese government has realized the importance of reducing the adverse 
effects of tax incentives, it does not mean that it is due to a concern for infringing the legal order 
that is based on the Western approach.667 Consequently, the tensions with the WTO will continue 
if adequate legal control is lacking in relation to the tax incentives in China.  
6.3 The West: the origin of the Western treatment of tax incentives as subsidies  
The starting point to depict the issue is the acknowledgement that the creation of the WTO and 
the EU per se is an outcome of a capitalist system. As analyzed in Chapter 2, with the expansion 
of international trade, in order to seek more profits and interests with a common perspective, more 
and more countries realize the importance of trade liberalization and the formation of the 
international market.668 Hence, the GATT, the predecessor of the WTO was established to reduce 
trade barriers and to level the playing field.669 This is also confirmed in the object and purpose of 
the WTO, which was discussed in Chapter 3.670 Therefore, all the rules designed in the WTO are 
                                                          
666 Xuhong Li, Legal Analysis of Tax Expenditure System (Law Press 2012) 129-132 (in Chinese); Howell 
H. Zee, Janet G. Stotsky and Eduardo Ley, 'Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy 
Makers in Developing Countries' (2002) 30 World Development 1497.  
667 In 2014, on the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), it was conveyed that the general target for next stage of the reform was to form a system 
serving “the socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics and build a country under the socialist rule of 
law”. See Randall Peerenboom, 'Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics!' (2015) 7 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 49-74; Sanzhu Zhu, 'Socialist Rule of Law in 
the 21th Century China' (2015) 7 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 75-81. 
668 See Section 2.2.1 premise in Chapter 2.  
669 Kyle W. Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (MIT Press 2002) 
43-48. 
670 See Section 3.2.4 external benchmark: the creation of a level playing field based on the common object 
and purpose of the WTO and the EU in Chapter 3.  
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rules associated with the development of capitalism, the basis of which is efficiency and equity in 
the market.671 The EU has a further integration level on the establishment of a single market.672 
However, this is also an outcome of the capitalist development. The economic rationale behind the 
single market is also efficiency and equity. 
In order to analyze the reasons for forming such a relationship between the market and the 
government in the context of the development of capitalism, this chapter first introduces a 
historical review on the West briefly. The current rules in the WTO reflect the attitude of most 
Western countries towards the market. However, this is still in a dynamic process. From a historical 
and sociological perspective, the history of capitalism can be divided into different stages. 
Although the classification differs according to different criteria, following a chronological order, 
capitalism has experienced a period of growth.673 The research does not aim at becoming entangled 
in the debates on the classification. The marking of several crucial events and the thoughts 
associated with them aims to present the transition of the relationship between the market and the 
government. To limit the scope of the discussion, a time span is presented. This part only covers 
the period from the origin of capitalism in Europe in the early 16th century when international trade 
became important to the time of the establishment of WTO in the 21st century. It selects 
representative scholars and their thoughts in their time as a means of presenting the origins of the 
Western treatment of tax incentives.  
6.3.1 The market-oriented system 
6.3.1.1 The evolution of the relationship between the market and the government reflected 
by economic thoughts 
(1) Early 16th Century: Adam Smith 
The modern form of Capitalist activities can be traced back to the early 16th century in early 
modern Venice, Genoa, and Pisa in the Mediterranean region. 674  Later on, England and the 
                                                          
671 See Section 2.2.1 premise in Chapter 2. 
672 Chris J. Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States (Oxfrod University 
Press 2012) 8-10. 
673 For instances, Marxists classify the evolution of capitalism into agrarian capitalism, merchant capitalism, 
industrial capitalism, and modern capitalism. It is the view of major Marxists, such as Rudolf Hilferding, 
Ernest Mandel, Paul Sweezy, etc. See Larry Neal and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 'The Cambridge History of 




Netherlands also commenced with similar business activities.675 Most historians called this time a 
mercantilism period, when commercial activities in those countries were in the form of trade, 
aiming for profits. This period was associated with the geographic exploration of foreign lands by 
merchant traders at the same time.676 Behind the geographic exploration and trade was the support 
from the ruling class of the countries who were eager for the strengthening of power and returns 
from capital investment.677 
However, mercantilism encountered criticism from economists. The main representative was 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) who doubted the mercantilist pattern of the state’s regulation aiming to 
increase economic growth. Adam Smith’s attitude towards national economic policy can be 
regarded as the origin shaping the relationship between the government and the market. He took 
economic growth as the fundamental goal of merchant countries, and thus any policy was 
evaluated according to this criterion. In his view, all governmental interventions were to divert 
economic activities, which could restrict the mobility of labor and the formation of new markets, 
and thereby they caused adverse effects for economic growth. Therefore, he virtually objected to 
any form of governmental regulation of the market, but he advocated free competition to maximize 
economic growth.678 
(2) Late 18th century to 19th century: David Ricardo 
In the late 18th century, the first Industrial Revolution679  changed the form of production 
completely by replacing the traditional handicraft skills with machines. 680  The large capital 
accumulated in the mercantilist stage made it possible to invest in factory production with 
                                                          
675 The commercial activities expanded in the Low Countries in the coastal region of Western Europe, 
including the Netherlands, Belgium, and the surrounding area. See ibid. 
676  David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires : England and the Netherlands in the Age of 
Mercantilism, 1650-1770 (Cambridge University Press 2003). 
677 The expansion of mercantilism was associated with colonization in this period. The examples were the 
British East India Company and the Dutch East India Company. They launched large-scale commercial 
activities in their colonies in that era. See ibid. 
678 W.J. Barber, A History of Economic Thought (Wesleyan University Press 2010) 23-51; Adam Smith and 
Jonathan B. Wight, 'An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations' (2007) . 
679 The first industrial revolution was the transition to new manufacturing processes from 1760 to 1840. It 
replaced humans and animals as the power sources of production with motors powered by fossil fuels 
(supplemented by waterpower and steam power). It was accompanied by the rise of the factory system. 
Moreover, it consisted of an increased scale in human organization of specialization and coordination at 
levels preindustrial groupings had rarely contemplated. See Peter N. Stearns, The Industrial Revolution in 
World History (Westview Press 2007) 6-7. 
680 P. M. Deane, First Industrial Revolution (2nd Edition) (Cambridge University Press 1980) 1-19. 
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machines, and thereafter productivity increased enormously. However, in order to deal with the 
surplus of products, more and more European countries were involved in international trade, thus 
accelerating the formation of the international market. As a result, international free trade gained 
more and more support. 
David Ricardo’s theory reflects the feature of this time. Like Smith, Ricardo (1772-1823) 
objected to the government’s intervention into the economy and endorsed a self-regulating market 
system. He developed a theory of comparative advantage to explain the benefits of free 
international trade.681 If each country had an absolute advantage in one product, it could produce 
greater quantities of one product more cheaply than the other country. Hence, trade between 
countries would accrue to all parties. This is also the theoretical origin of modern international 
trade.682  
(3) The end of the 19th century to the early 20th century: Karl Marx 
From the end of the 19th century to the early 20th century, most countries had completed the 
transformation to capitalism, which also stimulated the success of international trade, but triggered 
more conflicts.683 The First World War happened between 1914 and 1918. It occurred against the 
background of economic, political, and military power races in Europe.684 After the First World 
War, the German Empire, Russian Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire 
collapsed.685 As a result, Europe was in ruins. From an economic perspective, the war exposed the 
disadvantages of a fully free market system at this time. Opposed to capitalism, Russia established 
the first communist state in the world based on Karl Marx’s theory of socialism in 1917.686  
                                                          
681  John E. King, Great Thinkers in Economics : David Ricardo (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 81-106; 
William J. Barber, 'A History of Economic Thought' (2009) 76-93. See also Section 1.4.1 of Chapter 1, 
Premise of international trade: traditional theory of comparative advantages. 
682 See Section 2.2.1.2 in Chapter 2.  
683 Larry Neal and others, The Cambridge History of Capitalism. Volume 2, The Spread of Capitalism: 
From 1848 to the Present (Cambridge University Press 2014) 1-21. 
684 There were two opposing alliances: the Allies, which consisted of the British Empire, France and the 
Russian Empire; the Central Powers included Germany and Austria-Hungary. More nations joined the war 
during the time: Italy, Japan, and the US joined the Allies, while the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria joined 
the Central Powers. The Allies won the war. See Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford University Press 2007) 37.  
685 Ibid 113-119. 
686 H. Bentley Jerry, G. Smith Bonnie and R. Kelley Donald, 'Europe and Russia in World History' in Jerry 
H. Bentley (ed), The Oxford Handbook of World History Online (The Oxford Handbook of World History 
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Karl Marx (1818-1883) was the representative who established socialist theories against 
capitalism from the perspectives of economics, history, politics, and philosophy, etc.687 His main 
argument was that capitalism’s decline was due to conflicts between classes. Instead, socialism, in 
the economic form of public ownership, would replace capitalism, mainly with private means of 
ownership, to resolve the problems that occurred in capitalist countries.688  Although Marx’s 
theories faced a lot of debates from the beginning until now, it was widely admitted that he pointed 
out that the consequences of the economic process under capitalism was not always entirely 
benevolent. 689  
(4) Early 20th century to the mid-20th century: John Maynard Keynes 
After the First World War, from 1919 to 1929, most European countries started to repair their 
economies. Meanwhile, the US became an emerging strong power in the world.690 However, the 
imbalances between the supply and demand of goods during world trade triggered the Great 
Depression in the 1930s.691 Facing the economic crisis, governments of different countries tried 
various economic and political solutions to address the problems. In the US, Roosevelt initiated 
the New Deal by introducing more governmental intervention into the market for recovery.692 In 
Europe, many governments who failed to solve the crisis turned to political changes. Dictatorship, 
such as Fascism and Nazism rose to power, especially in Germany.693 Subsequently, the Second 
World War began in 1939 and ended in 1945. It was a devastating disaster for all nations, which 
caused a rethinking of the capitalist relationship between the government and the market.694 Facing 
the discussion of the drawbacks of capitalism, the state played an increasing role to steer the 
economic growth. 
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The most influential economist at this time was John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946). Having 
witnessed the Great Depression, Keynes held critical views towards the conventional laissez-faire 
theory, 695  which advocated that transactions between private parties should be free from 
governmental interference. He pointed out the enlargement of the government’s functions as a 
practical means of avoiding the destruction of the capitalist economic system.696 Additionally, he 
emphasized that governments had an important responsibility in relation to regulating the 
economic system in ways that would permit the market system to achieve its full potential.697 
Keynes’s theory was considered to be a rectification of capitalism, because it laid the intellectual 
foundations for the economic stability of most Western countries by introducing governmental 
regulation into the market.698 Most countries started to strengthen the state’s regulation of the 
economy and recovered from the Second World War. Accordingly, the relationship between the 
government and the market evolved into a new stage that the government played an increasing role 
in correcting market failures.  
(5) 1970s to the 21st century: Friedrich Hayek 
The economic “stagflation”699 in the 1970s led to a new round of debate on the relationship 
between the market and the government. More economists returned to advocating a more liberal 
market-oriented economic system. They blamed the “stagflation” to the over interference of the 
government and criticized the Keynesian economic model. The most active economists were 
Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) and Milton Friedman (1912-2006). 700 Market capitalism gained 
more and more support after the collapse of the former Soviet Union.701  
                                                          
695 Laissez-faire is a French term generalizing the classical economic theories advocated by Adam Smith 
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When entering into the 21st century of globalization, most capitalist economies had evolved into 
mixed economies including both market forces and governmental intervention, but the market 
played a decisive role in the allocation of resources, while the government intervened only when 
necessary.702 This is the current format of the relationship, which acts as the context of the WTO 
and EU systems.  
6.3.1.2 The origin of the state’s function in relation to the market 
As the relationship between the market and the government acts as the basis for understanding 
capitalism, it is necessary to understand the formation of the state in the West. Similar to the market, 
the idea of a modern state or government can also find its origin in capitalism.703 The success of 
capitalism, as the historian Fernand Braudel (1985) concluded, was in the fact that it became a 
necessary part of the state and even the state itself.704  
(1) Early 16th century: Niccolo Machiavelli 
The image of a powerful state became evident since the early 16th century, as an opponent of 
the religious ruling in the Middle Ages.705 Against the historical background of the Protestant 
Reformation706 and the Renaissance,707 the demand for a state aiming for business development 
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of the medieval period. See G. R. Elton, The Reformation, 1520-1559 (Cambridge University Press 1990); 
Eric Badertscher, Protestant Reformation (Great Neck Publishing 2009). 
707 The Renaissance lasted from the 14th century to the 17th century. It started as a cultural movement in 
Italy and spread throughout Europe. The most important idea since the Renaissance is its own invented 
version of humanism, which is embodied in art, literature, science, architecture, and politics. See Jerry 
Brotton, Renaissance (Oxford University Press 2006). 
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was increasing. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was the first materialist who objected to 
religious beliefs applying in politics and advocated a powerful leader or even a state as the 
safeguard for the people instead of putting hopes on religious powers. 708 His materialist ideas of 
politics were considered as the first encouragement for risk taking and the formation of new 
orders.709  
(2) 17th century: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke 
In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) promoted the ideas of building a political 
community based on a “social contract”, which was described in his book Leviathan.710 In this 
book, Hobbes depicted a model of a modern state, a “Common-wealth”, which advocated an 
absolute sovereignty and individual freedom. He held that the brute situation of the state of 
nature711 could only be avoided by a unified and powerful government. The establishment of the 
state should be in the form of a “social contract”. Citizens authorized and gave up right of 
government themselves to the government. In his opinion, there were three types of 
commonwealth and the best was monarchy, since, in this state, the private interest was the same 
as the public interest.712 Hobbes further sketched the outline of a well-functioning state, which 
came closer to the modern government serving the civil society.713  
John Locke (1632-1704) improved the theory of “social contract” by considering the state as 
the product of a social agreement by citizens who approved to transfer a part of their rights to the 
government. He thus claimed that foremost the government’s function was to guarantee citizen’s 
basic rights, especially the rights to property and liberty.714 He was regarded as the founder of 
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modern liberalism and was the first to come up with the idea of a civil society to safeguard citizens’ 
rights. Generally, the concept of a modern capitalist state started to be formulated since Locke.715  
(3) 20th century: Max Weber 
The development of a modern state is accompanied by the growth of capitalism, which requires 
a powerful government to serve for its expansion. 716 According to Max Weber (1864-1920), the 
modern state is a more general category of political associations. It has several features, including 
control of the means of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, constitutionality, impersonal power, 
the public bureaucracy, authority, and citizenship.717 Behind the establishment of the government 
are the requirement for the protection of rights, individual freedom, and demand for liberation from 
religious control.718 In the relationship between the market and the state, the state plays the role of 
protecting the market order and private ownership in the market.719  
(4) 21st century: states for the protection of human rights 
After the Second World War, more and more states in the West became concerned with the 
protection of human rights720 as an indispensable function of the state, in order to prevent the 
resurgence of Fascism and Nazism.721 To fulfill this function, the operation of the judiciary became 
necessary.722 In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was established, which 
acts as an independent court supervising and safeguarding the state’s responsibility towards 
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individuals.723 Some European countries evolved into modern welfare states,724 which aimed at 
promoting the social and economic well-being of their citizens, such as the Netherlands, Germany, 
France, and the Nordic countries, etc.725 States have developed the protection of human rights 
further, which leads to more governments orienting the market towards benefiting the well-being 
of citizens.726 
6.3.1.3 Conclusion 
According to the representative economic and political schools of thought in various stages of 
capitalist development in the West, it is evident to see that the capitalist development is a large-
scale, worldwide, organizational, and dynamic process, so that the relationship between the market 
and the government is changing with the economic needs. However, from the perspective of the 
market, the market still dominates economic growth, which is the foundation of a market economy. 
It can be summarized that market competition and free international trade is the outcome of 
capitalism. The establishment of the whole WTO system is aimed at securing a legal order for the 
proper functioning of international trade and market competition. The EU has a similar function 
in relation to the creation of a single market. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the state, the 
formation of a modern state also reflects the requirement of the capitalist development in the West. 
It represents the protection of individual rights and serves the public good.  
6.3.2 The rule of law 
The WTO’s system and EU State aid regime are both rule of law systems. Under the WTO’s 
subsidy regime, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the market, it is necessary to introduce 
the rule of law in relation to governmental actions. The introduction of the rule of law system 
contributes to the creation of a level playing field for all the Members, which is in line with the 
object and purpose of the organization. The EU State aid law shares the same rationale. This 
section does not intend to offer a definition on the rule of law, but it tries to illustrate elements that 
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contexts. Welfare states originated against the background of industrialization, the rise of capitalism, 
urbanization, and population growth in late 19th century. They normally present a combination of 
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are generally conceived as basic components of the rule of law system. They serve as a basis to 
see the differences between China and the West with respect to the attitudes towards tax incentives. 
In the West, regardless of the debates on the components, types, and degrees of the rule of law, 
the rule of law can generally be divided into two categories: the thin rule of law and the thick rule 
of law.727 The thin rule of law normally entails basic elements of positive law, such as general, 
public, prospective, clear, consistent, capable of being followed, stable, and enforced.728 The thick 
rule of law often embodies more morality and values compared to the thin one, such as justice, 
freedom, human rights, etc. It has more substantive values than the thin rule of law’s focus on 
procedures. 729  As some authors pointed out, the thick theory requires a complete moral and 
political philosophy that confirms the rule of law as the rule of good law.730 Therefore, the thick 
rule of law has a broader scope than the thin one, but it meets the minimum criteria of the thin 
theory.731 In comparison, the thin theory is easier to embed into different contexts that have 
different cultures, values, and institutions.732 The typical type of the rule of law in the modern West 
is a Liberal Democratic one, which entails free market capitalism, multiparty democracy, and a 
liberal interpretation of human rights.733  
Nevertheless, both theories share the common sense that the threshold conditions of the rule of 
law is to restrain the arbitrary and inequitable use of state power and to protect individual rights.734 
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This is normally the starting point of the Western rule of law, which is also the context of the 
subsidy control system in the WTO and EU State aid law. Therefore, although governments use 
tax incentives as instruments to achieve policy goals, such instrumentality should be strictly 
controlled by the law. 
6.3.3 The Western culture behind the development of the market 
6.3.3.1 Max Weber 
Max Weber was one of the most influential sociologists who officially promoted the term “the 
spirit of capitalism” and connected it to religious beliefs. In his book the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, 735  he advocated that Protestantism, the religious beliefs involving 
Calvinism736 and Puritanism,737 had formed the basis of the spirit of capitalism and had even 
resulted in the rise of capitalism itself.738 He connected the Puritan doctrine of the “calling” from 
God with the Predestination theory of Calvinism, thus justifying the belief that all Protestants 
should stick to the doctrine of the “calling”. 739  It laid the foundation for materialism and 
individualism, which were key sources of capitalism. Additionally, he claimed that, in order to 
fulfill the “calling”, it was encouraged to be rational and take risks to seek profits. Profit seeking 
continuously was not the means but the end itself. Thus, the employment of capital should be free 
from restriction. He upheld that Puritanism gave birth to Protestant ethic, because believers would 
organize tightly controlled, methodical-rational lives.740  
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 However, he also advocated asceticism and morality in the process of pursuing profits. In his 
opinion, Benjamin Franklin 741  (1706-1790) was the typical model of Puritan ideals, who 
endeavored to make profits in an honest way. The ideas of rationalism, seeking profit for its own 
sake, free competition, and adventurous spirit, and the like, eventually resulted in the development 
of capitalism.742 When applying these ideas to business practice, it was reasonable to require fair 
competition in the market with less governmental restrictions. Additionally, in order to guarantee 
the environment for business activities to gain the maximum profits, it was necessary to establish 
the legal institutions and legal order to make sure that the competition is fair. Thus, except for 
competition in the market, cooperation and mutual trust were also important to achieve the goal.743  
6.3.3.2 Discussion 
It was emphasized at the beginning that this part does not aim to judge the different theories, 
but rather this part will present selected thoughts and their influences on the formation of the 
relationship between the market and the government in the West. However, after reviewing 
Weber’s thoughts, it has to be admitted that they are the product of his time and thus they are 
shadowed by the limitations of the time. Although Weber’s theories on the spirit of capitalism had 
a great influence on the understanding of capitalist developments, they suffer from much criticism 
as well.744 It is not a convincing argument to conclude that the aforementioned capitalist spirit 
indeed caused the origin and development of capitalism, since it can be the other way around as 
well. Factors are always working mutually in relation to each other. Moreover, Weber promoted 
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his theories as a sociologist, views which could be distinct from those of economists, lawyers, and 
historians.  
However, the focus here is to show that, even among the different schools of thought, there are 
some common cultural elements that are shared in depicting capitalism, namely, the respect for 
the market, fair competition, and cooperation. Moreover, the respect and requirement for legal 
order and the rule of law has its origin in capitalism as well. As commented by some authors, early 
capitalism had certain technological characteristics that determined its development over the 
centuries: the wide extension of credit, impersonal management, and the pooling of service 
facilities, such as transportation and telecommunications, legal services, and insurance. 745 All the 
three conditions rely on credit, which further requires the guarantee of the law. Therefore, a market 
economy in capitalism was established under the rule of law. This is the reason that, both the WTO 
and the EU have the common object and purpose of creating a level playing field in order to 
guarantee fair competition.746  
6.3.4 Conclusion 
As an outcome of the development of capitalism, the WTO and the EU represent the expansion 
of the market economy system in the West. Although the relationship between the market and the 
government is a dynamic process, the change itself reflects the increasing reliance on a well-
functioning market system or the development of capitalism. Accordingly, the guarantee of the 
rule of law can also be regarded as the outcome of the capitalist culture. Thus, it contributes to the 
understanding in relation to the Western attitude toward tax incentives, i.e. although governments 
treat them as instruments to achieve governmental goals (instrumentality), they should also be 
controlled based on the rule of law. With respect to the function of taxation in the state, the public 
finance theory also has its origin in the development of capitalism. An important reason to use 
taxation to serve the public good of the state is that the state itself is created to fulfill the needs of 
the expansion of capitalism. Most importantly, the state is established to safeguard the rights of 
citizens. In conclusion, the respect for the market and the associated rules in the market have 
become a tradition, which is deeply rooted in Western culture.  
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746 A level playing field is the external benchmark derived in Chapter 3.  
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6.4 China: the origin of China’s attitude towards tax incentives  
China has a distinct attitude toward its state-oriented style of using tax incentives or even, 
broadly speaking, of implementing a market economy and the rule of law, compared to the attitude 
in the West. As analyzed in the section addressing tensions,747 tax incentives tend to be treated 
merely as policy instruments by the government without further consideration for legal control 
compared to the approach in the West. Many factors could result in such state-oriented 
characteristics. Similar to the analysis in the previous part, this part aimed to reveal the historical 
evolution in China, associated with various schools of thought, and to see how such state-oriented 
features are developed and how this differs from the West.  
China is a country with a very long history. Before the origins of capitalism in the West in the 
16th century, China had already developed an impressive civilization.748 Historically, China is the 
only large country that has never come under the rule of the West, and it is the only region where 
the ancient and traditional cultures have been passed on and flourished up until modern times.749 
In order to have a clear view on the comparison with the capitalist approach to the relationship 
between the market and the government, it is better to review China’s path according to its various 
historical periods. The most important division of historical periods can be seen between socialist 
China and traditional China, since, before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), China was mainly a feudal country.750 Compared to most Western countries, China has 
never experienced a period of capitalism in a true sense. Politically, it transferred directly from a 
feudal or semi-feudal society into a socialist society.751 This can already distinguish China from 
the most active countries in the WTO. Therefore, China has never been a market-oriented country 
and thus the starting point for China is different from the Western countries.  
However, traditional China is also extremely different from socialist China, and therefore it is 
better to review the two periods separately in order to have a clear overview of the development 
of the state-oriented and instrumentalist attitudes towards tax incentives. This part aims to present 
                                                          
747 See Section 6.2 in Chapter 6. 
748 Rossabi, A History of China. 
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the different path China has taken and to discover the origins, both historically and culturally, of 
the aforementioned Chinese means of treating tax incentives. Different from the approach to 
introducing the development in the West in chronological order, this part first starts with the recent 
developments of China’s state-oriented attitude in socialist China, because it refers to more recent 
times. In order to restrict the scope of the historical review, this part lists crucial elements in a 
generalized way.  
Furthermore, when analyzing cultural issues involving the traditional Chinese thoughts, it is 
difficult to express the original and exact meaning of the ideas written in the ancient Chinese 
literature, because there are limits of the translations available and therefore the understanding of 
the literature.752 The analysis is based on the meaning that has been traditionally accepted by the 
Chinese society and literature. 
6.4.1 China’s state-oriented attitude towards tax incentives  
6.4.1.1 Socialist China  
(1) 1949-1978 
    The state-oriented and instrumentalist characteristics of Chinese tax incentives date back to the 
establishment of the PRC, when China took over the socialist system. As introduced in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4, tax incentives were only adopted by the Chinese government after the Reform and 
Opening in 1978. The primary function of those tax incentives was to attract FDI, mainly to serve 
the goals of economic growth and opening to the world. Thus, they played the role of policy 
instruments from the beginning. With the progress of China’s further integration into the world 
economy, China gradually realized the problems of favoring certain enterprises over others and 
started to regulate the use of tax incentives.  
However, before the Reform and Opening in 1978, China had a closed-door period, except for 
its contact with the former Soviet Union before the 1960s. It experienced economic chaos and 
costly political campaigns.753 Taxation in this closed period was endowed with the characteristics 
of the time.  
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753 See Section 4.2 in Chapter 4.  
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After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the major tasks of the government were maintaining 
national unity, recovering the national economy, and remaining free from foreign interference.754 
Under the planned economy, the government had absolute control of business transactions. There 
was strong reliance on administrative commands to allocate resources and to set tasks.755 With 
respect to taxation, the major task in this period was the unification of taxes to support military 
expenses and the recovery of the national economy, and thus the government implemented the 
centrally controlled fiscal system, i.e. unified revenue collection and unified spending.  
After a short recovery of the economy, China started the first five-year plan,756 in 1953, focusing 
on a rapid industrialization and transformation to a socialist economy. In order to build a socialist 
economy, reforms were mainly in relation to private and individual enterprises, transforming them 
into public or state-controlled enterprises. Thus, the government used taxation to assist this 
transformation by taxing private and commercial businesses more heavily than public and 
industrial businesses.757 Additionally, another significant function of taxation was to raise revenue. 
The government found justifications in Marxism, which explained that taxes were the economic 
basis of the government machinery and of nothing else.758 Under this theory, taxes were regarded 
as a device to raise revenue for socialist industrialization. Consequently, at the end of the first five-
year plan, the socialist transformation was almost complete: the majority of the enterprises were 
public enterprises. The tax system was also simplified to accommodate the simplified economic 
structure for administrative cost considerations.759 However, in the period of economic chaos and 
political campaigns from 1958 to 1976, the tax system almost collapsed. The function of taxation 
was further diminished.760  
In summary, since the establishment of the PRC, the strong leadership of the government and 
the socialist system had resulted in the state-oriented features of taxation.  
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759 Li, Taxation in the People's Republic of China 12-13.  




Since the introduction of a market economy in China after the Reform and Opening, market 
forces have grown rapidly with respect to trade and investment in China.761 However, due to the 
socialist system itself, the state still has macro control over the whole economy, which typically 
results in more resources being available for the SOEs in the market. This state-oriented 
characteristic also results in tax incentives for SOEs.762  
As some authors pointed out, centrally controlled SOEs are more powerful in persuading 
governments to provide them with preferential tax treatment via special tax rulings.763 Centrally 
controlled SOEs are the government’s main source of profits, because they are owned by the 
government. Additionally, considering their national economic importance, centrally controlled 
SOEs can always bargain with the government to get special tax treatment. For instance, in 
corporate reorganizations, SOEs normally try to persuade the government to grant tax exemptions 
for the gains earned on the transfer of assets and stock. 764  Thus, special rulings for the 
reorganization of those large SOEs are issued.765 However, private and foreign enterprises are not 
in a position to benefit from such special tax treatment. Another example occurs in relation to the 
taxation of corporate consolidated groups. Generally, corporate groups are not allowed to compute 
tax liability on a consolidated basis or to offset losses against profits within a group due to the 
corporate income tax sharing between the central and the local governments.766 Nevertheless, the 
central government has permitted such consolidation more and more often for large SOEs, 
especially centrally controlled SOEs, from 1994 to 2009. 767  This kind of consolidation tax 
treatment is also a result of lobbying by the SOEs. A further consequence, which disturbs the 
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market order is that inefficient SOEs continue to survive in the market due to the tax incentives, 
thereby resulting in unfair competition.768  
In summary, the government takes it for granted that it may firstly satisfy the need of SOEs, 
even via unfair tax preferences, to guarantee the stability and prosperity of the national key 
industries. Additionally, SOEs are also a major revenue source of corporate income tax. 
Particularly, when encountering an economic crisis, the government tends to rescue SOEs as a 
priority by providing them with the largest support.769  Nevertheless, as pointed out by some 
authors, ownership is not the essential reason for the government to grant tax incentives to SOEs, 
since many other countries also have SOEs.770 The fundamental issue is that China has a state-
oriented attitude towards the granting of tax incentives, even after many reforms of the relationship 
between the government and the market.  
6.4.1.2 Traditional China: 16th century to 1949 
Although the state-oriented characteristics of tax incentives is a current issue, a historical review 
helps to explore the influences of the past which can shed light on the present.  
Traditional China covers the time of ancient China, Imperial China, and modern China before 
the establishment of the PRC.771 Since the Qin dynasty in 221 BC, despite the changes of dynasties, 
China had been a unified country, which had developed a strong and systematic political and social 
structure through the governance of the emperor, with the emphasis on the centralization of powers.  
                                                          
768 Cui, 'Taxation of State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China' 120-122. 
769 In order to confront the global economic crisis in 2008, the government issued a RMB 4 trillion fiscal 
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To present a clear view on differences between the two paths, it is better to make the comparison 
of the same time period. The capitalist market and state emerged in the early 16th century, while 
China was under the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). With the further development of capitalism in 
the West, China was under the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), the last dynasty of Imperial China, and 
the Republic China (1912-1948), the period before the establishment of the PRC.  
(1) The State 
The meaning and the function of the “state” is very different in traditional China. As analyzed 
previously, the role of the state in the West is to guarantee citizens’ basic rights and serves the 
public good. However, the traditional Chinese state is the emperor’s state, i.e. all under heaven 
belong to the emperor.772 The citizens are also considered to be subjects of the emperor. Hence, 
the role of the state is to guarantee the emperor’s ruling and power.773 This role of the state has its 
origin in ancient times. 
The formation of the ancient Chinese state, as observed by some authors, was a result of the 
upper class’s requirement to maintain a new social order. 774 The earliest development of state was 
greatly influenced by warfare and the traditions of the clan elders.775 Therefore, originally, the 
state was not the representative of the public power, but it served for the conquest and control of 
clans.776 From the Qin dynasty (221BC to 206 BC), when China was first unified as a whole 
country, the trend was to strengthen the power of the emperor at the central level, to maintain 
absolute rule and control over the country. During the entire period of Imperial China, regardless 
of the transition between dynasties and emperors, the most significant feature of the state was the 
centralization of powers at the hands of the emperor and the ruling class. In order to achieve the 
aim, the state was equipped with structured political, military, and fiscal systems for centralized 
management.777    
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When the West gradually developed capitalism, in China, the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) 
witnessed a great growth in Chinese civilization. The typical political feature of the Ming dynasty 
was a high degree of centralization. Since the founding of the dynasty, it had formed a strong, 
assertive, and politically centralized regime.778 Accordingly, the emperor himself controlled the 
empire’s finances as a whole. There was no clear distinction between the state’s income and the 
emperor’s personal income, vis-à-vis expenditure. Thus, it was difficult to distinguish between the 
emperor’s personal spending from the state’s expenditure. The ministry of revenue therefore 
developed into an Imperial accounting office.779 Subsequently, the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) 
succeeded the former dynasties’ tradition of political centralization, especially aiming to safeguard 
the minority’s control over the country.780  
Compared to the West in the same period, the political centralization was a significant factor to 
explain the state-oriented characteristics of the Chinese government. In the West, especially the 
Europe, before the development of capitalism, the countries were also feudal societies, which were 
under the rule of a king, but the power of the king was not as strong and centralized as the power 
of the emperor in China.781 There was pressure from the aristocracy and the church, which were 
delegated decentralized powers from the king. 782  Such decentralized power was regarded as 
enabling the capitalist class to take the power and to establish a modern State.783 Nevertheless, 
similar to the Western approach, the Chinese approach was also a dynamic process. For instance, 
China was not always a highly centralized state in modern times. After the end of Imperial China, 
the Republic period witnessed warlordism (1915-1928), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and 
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the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949).784 In that unstable period, it was difficult to maintain a strong 
centralized power by the government.  
(2) The market 
    The market economy originated in the West. As introduced in the previous part, capitalism 
emerged in the 16th century, because the state initially took a rather supportive attitude towards 
business development. In contrast, the ruling class of China consecutively had a pro-agriculture 
and anti-commerce policy, i.e. encouraging agricultural development but restricting commerce. 
This was the basic economic policy adopted throughout the Imperial history of China. For 
emperors, it was very beneficial to take this approach for their rule to be sustained. The most 
significant reason was that China was an agricultural country, which had a self-sufficient 
agricultural economic system. On the one hand, it was necessary to maintain enough agricultural 
products to guarantee the basic supply for the operation of the country. On the other hand, due to 
the large geographical area of the empire, it was convenient for the emperor to govern and control 
the people if they were reliant on the land. In addition, farmers were normally not well educated, 
and therefore it was easier to unify them and control them.785 Moreover, the development of 
commerce would result in  the labor force having to compete with agriculture, and thus in the 
social hierarchy, merchants were normally ranked at the bottom with the lowest social status.786  
    Although in Ming dynasty commerce was very active in the coastal area, the main businesses 
were still operated or monopolized by the government. The more developed the small businesses 
were, the heavier the tax that was levied.787 Even in the Qing dynasty when the emperor realized 
the importance of developing industries to cope with the Western forces after the Opium War,788 
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the major business areas and industries were owned and operated by the government. They were 
considered to be the prototype of the modern state-owned enterprises. 789 However, the existence 
of such commerce was also to serve the emperor’s rule. The merchants were actually official 
merchants, whose interests were closely linked with the ruling class.790 Without the existence of a 
free market, the state had a dominant role in every aspect of the economy. 
To summarize, compared to the Western evolution of the relationship between the market and 
the government, traditional China took a very different path. Firstly, the concept of the state is very 
different from the one in the West. The state functions as the emperor’s state, which has to fulfill 
the emperor’s ruling first. It has formed a highly centralized political system to strengthen the 
emperor’s and the state’s power. Accordingly, with respect to taxation, there is no clear separation 
between the emperor’s personal income and expenses and the state’s expenditure. In addition, the 
state has a dominant role in the administration of the economy by adopting the pro-agriculture and 
anti-commerce policy. Consequently, there was no comparable development of commerce in 
China at that time, not to mention the formation of a free market. Thus, all the factors contribute 
to the understanding of China’s state-oriented attitude towards a market economy system. 
6.4.2 The lack of internal legal control over the granting of tax incentives  
The function of law in China is different from the Western rule of law, or it is at least different 
from the Liberal Democratic rule of law. Of course, the concept and function of law has also 
evolved over time, but the instrumentalist characteristic of the Chinese tax incentives can find its 
origin in that evolution.  
6.4.2.1 Socialist China 
(1) 1949-1978 
Before the Reform and Opening in 1978, Marxist legal theories had the dominant position. The 
instrumentalist feature may result from the doctrinal interpretation of Marxism, the dominant 
thoughts advocated by the government. Since the establishment of the PRC, Marxism was regarded 
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as the national guiding ideology. However, it was difficult to conclude that China precisely 
transferred the original meaning of the theories, which were developed to deal with the 
circumstances of capitalist societies or at least industrial societies.791 As an agricultural country at 
that time, China faced a challenge of combining the theories with its domestic situation. Therefore, 
some scholars recommended the application of those theories as doctrinal interpretations of 
classics, especially when applying those theories to justify economic growth in the context of 
ideological confrontations with the outside world.792 For instance, according to Marx’s historical 
materialism, production forces always determine the relations of production, and thus the mode of 
production is based on the level of production forces. On the other hand, relations of production 
contribute to the degree and types of the development of production forces. To be specific, the 
economy is the key element of a production force, while the cultural and institutional factors of 
the society belong to the superstructure. 793  However, at that time, this theory was simply 
interpreted as economic determinism, i.e. the economic level determined the superstructure. 
Consequently, it was taken for granted that law, as a part of the superstructure, should play a role 
that was subordinate to the economy, even as a means to achieve the economic end. Yu (1989) 
summarized it as legal pragmatism, which was visible in the following aspects: it overemphasized 
the instrumental function of law; it regarded law as an outcome of reality; it treated law as a servant 
of policy. 794  Thus, from the beginning, not only taxation, but also the legal system itself, 
functioned as instruments of the government.795  
(2) 1978-present 
After the Reform and Opening and the introduction of a market economy into China, China 
adopted the rule of law gradually. The rule of law was firstly acknowledged as a national policy 
in 1997 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officially announced that it would be governing 
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the country according to law.796 Since then, China was marching towards a socialist rule of law 
state, which was incorporated to the Constitution in 1999.797 Subsequently, China implemented 
institutional reforms. For instance, the legislative reform emphasized the strengthening of the 
lawmaking function of the legislature and the quality of lawmaking. 798 Administrative reform 
focused on administration according to the law.799 As a result, the role of the government has been 
limited. There is an increase in limiting the arbitrary acts of government and in protecting 
individual rights. 800  Judicial reform started with goals of judicial fairness and efficiency. 801 
Moreover, reforms also aimed at enhancing the quality and professionalism of judges. There are 
attempts to increase the authority and independence of courts as well.802 In addition, the state 
intensified legal education and legal services to propagate the rule of law culture. 803  Most 
importantly, the CCP adopted the rule of law as a guiding principle for the party in 2002, i.e. 
“ruling the country according to the law.”804  
In 2014, China reemphasized that the purpose of the legal reforms was to establish a socialist 
rule of law with Chinese characteristics.805 There are five general principles: the leadership of the 
CCP, the supremacy of the interests of the people, the supremacy of the constitution and laws, the 
combing of the rule of law with the rule of virtue, and the need to find China’s own path.806 It 
seems that China is going further to establish a rule of law in more regimes, but it is not likely to 
be in the same way as the Liberal Democratic rule of law that is generally accepted by Western 
countries. The concept of “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics” clearly does not 
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transplant or copy the Western format, but it will adapt the so-called “international best practices” 
to fit its own circumstances.807  
With respect to tax incentives, previous analysis shows that different tax incentives serve 
different policy goals, which endows them with the characteristic of instrumentality for the 
government. However, even against the background of establishing a socialist rule of law, there is 
a lack of legal control over tax incentives. For instance, no specific law or regulation stipulates the 
legal procedure for granting tax incentives; there is no law on remedies for tax incentives, 
especially from the perspective of restricting the government’s power; and there is no law on the 
allocation of powers between the body granting tax incentives and the supervision body, etc. 
Although in 2015 the SAT published a notice on all the official and effective tax incentives until 
2015, it was only a list of tax incentives but not a regulation on tax incentives.808 There are only 
regulations on restricting of the benefits of tax incentives enjoyed by taxpayers, but there is no 
regulation on how the government grants tax incentives.809 To summarize, there is still a lack of 
legal control over tax incentives against the background of the great legal achievements that were 
accomplished under China’s socialist rule of law. 
6.4.2.2 Traditional China 
Ancient China and Imperial China were under the rule of emperors. Although there were 
codified laws, the role of law was simply to serve the emperor governing the state and people.  810 
The most influential classical legal theories in Ancient China include the Confucius rule by rituals 
(Li Zhi), and the Legalist rule by law (Fa Zhi).811 
Rule by rituals emphasized ruling by the ruler’s virtue and morality in order to achieve a humane 
and harmonious society. In Confucians’ view, law was only punishment, which forced people to 
comply externally. However, rule by rituals would lead people become humane people of good 
character, thereby finally forming a harmonious society.812 In contrast, the Legalist rule by law 
                                                          
807 Ibid.  
808 The SAT notice [2015] No.73, Notice on the Issuing of the Code Directory of Tax Incentives, by the 
SAT, 29 October 2015. 
809 The SAT notice [2015] No.76, Notice on the Issuing of Administrative Regulation of Corporate Tax 
Incentives, by the SAT, 12 November 2015. 
810 Zhiping, 'Explicating Law: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture' 89-90. 
811 Li Zhi and Fa Zhi are the Chinese pinyin.  
812 Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law 28-33. 
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advocated clearly codified laws that were publicly promulgated in order to strengthen the control 
of the ruler. However, such a legal theory was not the rule of law, but rather the rule by law, as 
observed by scholars.813 Laws were merely utilized as tools of the rulers to impose punishment 
and exercise administration over the people, and even to govern the behavior of officials. As a 
result, the rulers themselves were exempted from the control of the law, because the authority of 
the law came directly from the rulers. 814 Both these classical theories had a great influence on the 
role of law in each dynasty of Imperial China. Despite their different opinions, they have one 
common feature and that is to serve for the ruling of the ruler.  
Therefore, in traditional China, the law was mainly treated as an instrument to serve the interests 
of the emperor and the state, which was contrary to the Western fundamental idea of protecting 
individuals’ rights against the state. Despite the large quantities of legal orders and codes issued 
in different dynasties, most of them were penal laws used to punish and govern the people or 
administrative laws for the control of the government.  
In conclusion, the formation of the instrumentalist feature of tax incentives can find its origin 
in traditional China and the socialist period before the Reform and Opening. Compared to the 
Western tradition of the rule of law, China had a different path. Law was consecutively treated as 
instrument to fulfill the interests of the state rather than the interests of individuals. Thus, it 
contributes to understanding why the Chinese government was not used to take account of the 
granting of tax incentives for the legal control.  
6.4.3 Cultural influences: Confucianism 
Culture is another factor that can shed light on the different path China has taken. As commented 
by scholars, in traditional China, the law’s instrumentalist character in China is closely linked with 
the state’s function, which is paternalistic with respect to the relationship between the state and 
citizens.815 The paternalistic state considers the interest of the state to be more important than 
individual rights. Hence, in such a paternalistic Chinese Imperial state, rulers always maintain that 
the interests of the state can be in harmony with individuals’ interests.816  
                                                          
813 Ibid 33-34. 
814 Kenneth Winston, The Internal Morality of Chinese Legalism (Harvard University Press 2005); Zhiping, 
'Explicating Law: A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture' 89-90. 
815 Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law 43-46. 
816 Ibid.  
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When addressing traditional China’s paternalistic governments, the influence of Confucianism 
cannot be neglected. However, Confucianism is a very broad term, which contains a variety of 
theories, interpretations, and changes.817 Moreover, Chinese culture itself is also an extremely 
broad concept that it is not equal to Confucianism per se.818 It is hard to prove the direct causal 
link between Confucianism and the state’s development or the formation of socialism, but the 
reciprocal influences of Confucian culture and the social changes should not be overlooked. It has 
to be admitted that no other individual in Chinese history has influenced the Chinese mind and 
character so deeply.819 Nevertheless, through the long history of China, the original Confucius 
thoughts have already been changed a lot, and therefore the dominant Confucian culture in China, 
as commented by authors, is actually a mixed culture with diverse thoughts from different schools 
over the dynasties.820  
Confucian thoughts involve many disciplines, but it is not the purpose of this chapter to address 
the entire philosophies. The aim here is to analyze the influence of the Confucian school of thought 
on the relationship between the state and the people, and the role of law as well. In addition, its 
influence on Chinese culture can also help to understand from another facet why China takes such 
a distinct path of development compared to the overall Western world.  
6.4.3.1 An overview of Confucianism in traditional China 
(1) Confucianism in general 
Confucian thoughts formed in ancient China during the Warring Stats period (453-221 BC); the 
intensive influence of Confucianism in China had its roots in the Han dynasty (206 BC to 220 
AD).821 Since then, although the status of Confucianism experienced a fall and rise, Confucian 
                                                          
817 Ronnie Littlejohn, 'Confucianism an introduction = Ru' (2011) xi-xvi; Paul R. Goldin, Confucianism 
(Acumen 2011) 1-6. 
818 Ibid.  
819 Bary and Mei, Sources of Chinese Tradition 17. 
820  Confucius’ thoughts underwent changes. In Imperial China, there were later Confucianism, Neo-
Confucianism, New Confucianism, and Western disciples of Confucianism, etc. Therefore, one cannot 
easily reach the conclusion that Confucianism per se has greatly influenced the Chinese culture. See Wm. 
Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan and Burton Watson, Sources of Chinese tradition (Columbia University 
Press 1960). 
821  The Han dynasty was the first dynasty that officially confirmed Confucianism as the state’s sole 
authoritative philosophy. See ibid 161-164. 
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works and philosophies were passed on through the education and imperial examination system, 
which was the most important way to select governmental officials.822  
Confucius’ thoughts were mainly recorded in the books edited by his disciples.823 In fact, the 
core of Confucian philosophies was about virtues and the most important virtue, according to 
Analects,824 was humanity (Ren).825 Based on this core morality belief, rituals (Li)826 developed 
accordingly to direct people’s behaviors.827 However, the function of rituals was different from 
law at that time, since law was deemed to be used only as a punishment. Because Confucians 
believed that human beings have a character of self-cultivation, only virtue and ritual could allow 
people to cultivate better characters. The ultimate aim of Confucians was to create a peaceful world, 
which was to be realized through a step-by-step approach. The first step was to investigate things 
and, afterwards, one would be able to gain knowledge, make the intention sincere, rectify the heart, 
cultivate oneself, take care of the family, order the state, and eventually bring peace to the world.828 
Hence, the key function of the government was to correct people’s minds and to guide people to 
                                                          
822 Benjamin A. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (University of 
California Press 2000). 
823 The Four Books and Five Classics are considered as classic texts of Confucianism. The Four Books are: 
Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Analects, Mencius; the Five Classics include: Classic of Poetry, 
Book of Documents, Book of Rites, Book of Changes, and Spring and Autumn Annals. See Michael Nylan, 
'The Five "Confucian" Classics' (2001) .  
824 Analects is one of the Five Classics of the classic texts of Confucianism, but it has a central status among 
all the texts. Ibid. 
825 Ren is the Chinese pinyin. 
826 Chinese pin yin. 
827 The character of rituals is controversial. Some scholars consider rituals as a code of conduct for the 
guidance and restriction of behavior. However, others claim that it is just a format of embodiment of virtues 
that lead people to self-cultivation, rather than the mere function of rules. See Herbert Fingarette, Confucius : 
the Secular as Sacred (Harper & Row 1972); Goldin, Confucianism 19-21. 
828 It is from the Great Learning, one of the Four Books of Confucianism. The original text is “because the 
ancients desired to make their brilliant virtue shine throughout the world, they first ordered their States; 
desiring to order their States, they first regulated their families; desiring to regulate their families, they first 
cultivated themselves; desiring to cultivate themselves, they first rectified their hearts; desiring to rectify 
their hearts, they first made their intentions sincere; desiring to make their intentions sincere, they first 
brought about knowledge. Bringing about knowledge lies in investigating things. After things are 
investigated, knowledge is brought about; after knowledge is brought about, one’s intentions are sincere; 
after one’s intentions are sincere, one’s heart is rectified; after one’s heart is rectified, one cultivates oneself; 
after one has cultivated oneself, one’s family is regulated; after one’s family is regulated, the State is ordered; 
after the State is ordered, the world is at peace”. See Goldin, Confucianism 32; James Legge, The Four 
Books: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius 
(Paragon Book Reprint Corp. 1966) 310-313.  
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morality. Therefore, the ruler’s behavior had a great influence on his subjects.829 Under such a 
philosophy of governance, there was an order with respect to the relationship between people. The 
lord acts as a lord, the minister as a minister, the father as a father, and the son as a son.830 It 
presented an orderly role for each individual in the society. The philosophy put an emphasis on 
the virtue of “filial piety” (respect for parents, Xiao).831 Confucians advocated that filial piety was 
the first step of adherence to morality since it accommodated the step-by-step approach through 
regulating the family. Filial piety firstly meant moral behavior towards one’s parents. It was further 
developed in the Canon of Filial Piety.832 “The beginning of filial piety is serving one’s parents; 
the middle is serving one’s ruler; the end is establishing oneself.” 833   
(2) Neo-Confucianism 
After the Han dynasty, the status of Confucianism experienced declining periods, especially in 
the Tang dynasty (618-907).834 The revival of Confucianism started since the Song dynasty (960-
1279). It was called Neo-Confucianism, which created developments in relation to traditional 
thoughts. The main theory was that, in order to understand fully the true meaning of Confucian 
                                                          
829 As the ruler is the example for his subjects in virtues, the people will examine the ruler’s conduct and 
adjust their own accordingly. See Confucius, The Analects of Confucius (The Floating Press 2010) Book 
XIII-Tsze Lu VI. The Master said: “when a prince’s personal conduct is correct, his government is effective 
without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not 
be followed”. 
830  See ibid Book XII-Yen Yuan XI. The Duke Ching, of Ch’i, asked Confucius about government. 
Confucius replied, “there is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the 
father is father, and the son is son.” 
831 Chinese pin yin. 
832 Canon of Filial Piety is the Confucian classic about behavior towards the father, the brother, or the ruler. 
See Alan Kam-leung Chan and Sor-hoon Tan, Filial Piety in Chinese Thought and History 
(RoutledgeCurzon 2004);Norman Kutcher, Mourning in Late Imperial China : Filial Piety and the State 
(Cambridge University Press 1999). 
833 Ibid. It was abused by rulers in the imperial dynasties as an instrument to control people’s minds to 
strictly follow orders.  
834 In the Tang dynasty, Daoism and Buddhism enjoyed more preferences by emperors. Daoism generally 
is a philosophical school of thought that emphasizes living in harmony with the Dao. Dao means the way, 
path, or principle. See Livia Kohn, Introducing Daoism (Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books 2009). 
Buddhism originated in India and was introduced in China in the Eastern Han dynasty (58-75 AD). It 
flourished in the Tang dynasty, which emphasized the imperishability of the soul, or spirit, and causes and 
effects. There were different branches of Buddhism, but, as commented by some authors, it had adapted to 
the existing philosophical thoughts in imperial China, and thus was able to become popular. See Yijie Tang, 
Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture (University of Peking 1991) 89-136; 
Jungnok Park, How Buddhism Acquired a Soul on the Way to China (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies 
Monographs, Equinox Publishing Ltd 2012) 5-37. 
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philosophies, the best way was to read the classics of Confucianism.835 Accordingly, “investigate 
things”, the initial step of the self-cultivation approach to a peaceful world, was reinterpreted as 
figuring out the concrete meaning of the concepts of the Confucian thoughts.836  
6.4.3.2 The influence of Confucianism on the formation of China’s state-oriented attitude 
(1) Confucianism and governance in Traditional China 
Confucianism was the sole authoritative school of thought that dominated the Han dynasty, and 
many authors have already touched upon the tentative reasons for this.837 It is noticeable that 
Confucian thoughts actually accept a hierarchically-ordered society with a supreme ruler on the 
top. Although it emphasizes the ruler’s own virtues and morality, with restrictions and 
qualifications, it advocates a highly organized central government system under the ruler. In 
addition, the self-cultivation approach to a better human being actually helps to maintain an orderly 
society with a hierarchy. All of these are beneficial for the emperor to be able to control and govern 
the state and the people. Moreover, it is also worth noting that Confucianism has absorbed many 
other schools of thought into it, and thereby it could accommodate  the needs of the imperial 
ruler.838  
Since the Song dynasty, Confucian thoughts were manipulated by the rulers to build a structured 
society with a strict hierarchy. People’s minds were restricted as well, since they could only act 
according to the rituals written in the books. It helped to form the paternalistic way of the 
government until the end of imperial China. From this perspective, it was also considered to be a 
cultural factor that had cultivated obedient people in imperial China.839  
                                                          
835 Zhu Xi was the most active Confucian who advocated such a way of reading the classics. He was a 
leading Confucian scholar of the Neo-Confucianism in the Song dynasty.  
836 There was criticism of this way of understanding Confucianism in the Song dynasty as well. The most 
prominent was Lu Jiuyuan (1139-1193), who claimed that Li did not only exist in books. See Goldin, 
Confucianism 103-105.  
837 Bary and Mei, Sources of Chinese Tradition 264; Goldin, Confucianism 109-112. 
838 Ibid. 
839 Cezong Zhou, 'The Anti-Confucian Movement in Early Republican China' in Arthur F. Wright (ed), The 
Confucian Persuasion (The Confucian Persuasion, Stanford University Press 1960) 288-312.  
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(2) Confucianism in socialist China: rule of virtue 
In socialist China, since the official announcement of the rule of law in the 1990s, Confucianism 
was considered to have revived and modernized accordingly.840 Since 2004, an increasing number 
of Confucius Institutes have been established in 120 countries and regions around the world.841 
However, such modernization of Confucianism still has a state-oriented feature.  
A main characteristic of China’s socialist rule of law is the combination of rule of law with rule 
of virtue.842 Confucianism is a main source to support the government’s idea of the rule of virtue. 
The rule of virtue aims to guide government officials by putting people first and implementing a 
people-based administration. By emphasizing government officials’ morality, it also aims at 
creating benevolent governance.843 It seems to be a good combination with the rule of law to limit 
the government’s power. Nevertheless, it is also regarded as the government’s attempt to shape 
Confucianism to its goals. In an increasingly pluralistic society in current China, the revival of 
Confucianism actually represents the government’s aim of stabilizing the current social order. The 
core thoughts of Confucianism, such as humanity, filial piety, and self-cultivation, actually match 
the government’s purpose of establishing a “harmonious society” in China.844  Therefore, the 
revival of Confucianism has been promoted by the government.  
(3) Confucianism and Chinese culture 
Max Weber (1968) once attributed the failure of capitalism in China to Confucianism.845 
According to Weber, the tradition of reading classics in Confucianism since the Song dynasty 
impeded people’s creativity and curiosity for new things. In contrast, the puritan spirit of 
Protestants, the emphasis on asceticism and a moral way of pursuing profits had catalyzed people’s 
eagerness for the accumulation of wealth in capitalist countries.846 Similar to the analysis in the 
                                                          
840 Anja Lahtinen, 'China's Soft Power: Challenges of Confucianism and Confucius Institutes' (2015) 14 
Journal of Comparative Asian Development  Shufang Wu, '"Modernizing" Confucianism in China: A 
Repackaging of Institutionalization to Consolidate Party Leadership' (2015) 39 Asian Perspective 301. 
841 Lahtinen, 'China's Soft Power: Challenges of Confucianism and Confucius Institutes' 211. 
842 Peerenboom, 'Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics!' 60-61. 
843  Kelvin C. K. Cheung, 'Appropriating Confucianism: Soft Power, Primordial Sentiment, and 
Authoritarianism' in Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida C. Nedilsky and Siu-Keung Cheung (eds), China's Rise to 
Power, Conceptions of State Governance (China's Rise to Power, Conceptions of State Governance, 
Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 41-42. 
844 Peerenboom, 'Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics!' 61. 
845 Max Weber and Hans H. Gerth, The Religion of China : Confucianism and Taoism (Free Press ; Collier-
Macmillan 1968).  
846 Ibid.  
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previous part, theories are subject to the limitations of their times. Some authors have challenged 
Weber’s remarks that it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between the Protestant spirit 
and the origin of capitalism, and thus the same logic is relevant for the relationship between 
Confucianism and China’s development.847 Therefore, it is more rational to review the influence 
of Confucianism from the angle of how Confucianism was adopted by the rulers in imperial China 
to control the state and people.  
As commented by Shuming Liang (1999), a modern Confucian, Confucians always tried to 
adapt to the environment and the world rather than mastering or changing it.848 Therefore, the 
influence of Confucianism on Chinese culture was that it contributed to the tradition of 
intuitionism, which dealt more with mental and spiritual issues. Whereas the Western culture 
attempted to address people’s material needs first. Consequently, Western culture was more 
realistic. On the contrary, Confucians advocate on harmony and self-cultivation and this interacted 
with the Chinese attitude of adaption and adjustment, thereby leading to the possibility for Chinese 
people to live in an orderly society with hierarchy. This was not due to outside enforcement but to 
the willingness of the individual.849 Chinese philosophies, especially Confucianism, took active 
and human attitudes towards social reality, but they failed to adjust to the political reality in 
traditional China. Therefore, most of those ideal philosophical thoughts were manipulated by the 
rulers in each dynasty as instruments for their rule. In addition, although these philosophies 
emphasized humanism, they were seldom concerned with the basic rights of individuals, compared 
to the Western counterpart, and thus this hindered the development of personal character. Hence, 
it was difficult for such a traditional Chinese philosophy to develop into the Western model 
considering the relationship between the state and people.850   
                                                          
847 It is argued that Confucianism has played an important role in the economic development of other Asian 
countries, such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, etc. Huang, Capitalism and the 21st Century (Zi Ben 
Zhu Yi Yu Er Shi Yi Shi Ji); Chen H. Chung, Jon M. Shepard and Marc J. Dollinger, 'Max Weber Revisited: 
Some Lessons from East Asian Capitalistic Development' (1989) 6 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 
307. 
848 Shuming Liang, The Culture and Pholosophy of the East and the West (Shang Wu Press 1999) 205 (in 
Chinese); Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian : Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity 
(University of California Press 1979). 
849 Ibid.  




As analyzed at the beginning, it is not rational to attribute the paternalistic attitude of the 
government in imperial China to the sole influence of Confucianism. The philosophies have 
evolved over the entire history of China, so they have also deviated from the original ones. It is 
difficult to conclude that those philosophies were what was intended by Confucius. Even if they 
were, it is never easy to judge them, since, as philosophical thoughts, they are neutral and 
subjective. Only when they were employed, they developed more functions and power in relation 
to the formation of the traditional relationship between the state and people and the instrumentalist 
use of law.  
6.4.4 Conclusion 
The previous analysis has depicted factors that contribute to China’s state-oriented attitude 
towards taxation and the instrumentalist treatment of law. It is commented by some authors that 
China lacks a free market culture and the rule of law if evaluated from the Western standard.851 
However, cultural factors have their own limitations. They should not be regarded as obstacles to 
carrying out reforms. 
Although China’s total economy is huge and ranks rather high in the world, considering the 
sheer size of China, it can hardly be concluded that China has developed into a high-income 
country, not to mention the large regional disparity, and the gap between the wealthy and the 
poor.852 As the Chinese government has announced, China is in a crucial transitional period, from 
a middle-income country to a high-income country.853 Despite the fact that China is reforming the 
                                                          
851 Randall Peerenboom, 'Assessing the Implementatino of Law in China: What's the Standard?' in Mattias 
Burel  Marina Svennson (ed), Making Law Work (Making Law Work, Cornell University Press 2011).  
852 It is not the aim of the research to debate on China’s status as a developing country or not, since the 
criteria are not universal and are in flux. It is clear from economic indexes that China is not yet a high-
income country. This is based on statistics from the World Bank. It classifies countries into different income 
groups, i.e. high income countries, low income countries, lower middle income countries, and middle 
income countries. China belongs to the category of middle income countries. See data from the World Bank 
<http://data.worldbank.org/income-level/MIC>, accessed 25 April 2016.   
853 On the 22nd Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting (10th November 
2014), President Jinping Xi of China said that China is able to get through the “middle-income gap”. See 
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/ytjhzzdrsrcldrfzshyjxghd/t1209907.shtml>. In 2007, 
the World Bank first raised the term “middle-income trap” in the report An East Asian Renaissance: Ideals 
for Economic Growth. It describes the phenomenon that rapidly growing economies get stagnated at 
middle-income levels and fail to develop into the ranks of high-income countries, such as several Latin 
American and East Asian economies. See Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas, An East Asian Renaissance, 
Ideas for Economic Growth (The World Bank 2007).  
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state-oriented model of development and the instrumentalist attitudes towards law, especially tax 
incentives, it is unrealistic to expect that it can finish the transformation in the short term. On the 
other hand, the direction of the transformation in the legal area is not likely to be the same as the 
Western Liberal Democratic one.854     
Nevertheless, it is not argued that China can abuse all the above-mentioned factors as 
justifications to defend any incompatibility of its measures with the WTO agreements. Virtually, 
both the instrumentalism attitude towards tax incentives and the state-oriented style of treating the 
relationship between the government and the market can cause problems.855 For instance, the 
instrumentalist approach to tax incentives can increase uncertainty for taxpayers, since those 
incentives can easily be changed or removed. Moreover, such unjustified discrimination harms the 
principle of equality.856 With the further development of the market economy in China, more 
certain and transparent legal systems are necessary. Since the Chinese government admits that “a 
market economy is a rule of law economy”,857 thus, regardless of the differences between China 
and the West towards the treatment of tax incentives and the rule of law, under the framework of 
the market economy, something in common can be pursued and achieved.  
6.5 Matrix of the comparison between China and the West towards the treatment of tax 
incentives 
                                                          
854 Ibid.  
855 Tamanaha, Talsma and Mierlo, The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism; Brian Z. Tamanaha, 'The 
Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law' (2005) 33 Syracuse Journal of International 
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856  Gribnau, 'Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax' 99-100. Tamanaha, Talsma and 
Mierlo, The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism. 
857 In 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the CCP promulgated the 
CCP Central Committee Decision concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Promoting 
Governing the Country According to Law. The Decision announced the establishment of the socialist rule 
of law with Chinese characteristics and build a country under the “socialist rule of law”. 





1. Taxation serves public 
finance 
2. instrumentality controlled 
by the rule of law 
1. State-oriented attitude towards taxation 
2. Lack of internal legal control over the 




government intervenes only 
when necessary  
State-oriented, the market operates under 
the state’s macro control 
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market and the 
government 
The market  
(16th century to 
21st century) 
The WTO is the outcome of 
capitalism  
Origin and evolution of the 
market-oriented system: 
1. Early 16th century  
Adam Smith: no government 
intervention into the economy, 
free competition 
2. Late 18th century to 19th 
century 
David Ricardo: no 
government intervention into 
the economy; self-regulating 
market; comparative 
advantage for international 
trade 
3. After the Second World 
War:  
John Maynard Keynes: 
governmental interference 
into the market 
4. 1970s 
Friedrich Hayek  
Market capitalism, less 
government interference into 
the market 
5. 21st century 
The current WTO system  
Mixed economy: both market 
force and government 
intervention work, but the 
market plays a decisive role 
1. Socialist China  
(1) 1949-1978 
Planned economy 
No free market 
(2) 1987-present 
Market economy under the state’s macro 
control 
SOEs have main market access in key 
industries 
Tax preferences for SOEs 
2. Traditional China (16th century to 
1949) 
It has not experienced the period of 
capitalist development  
It was an agricultural country 





(16th century to 
21st century) 
The formation of the capitalist 
state:  
1. Early 16th century 
Machiavelli: objected to 
religious beliefs in politics; a 
powerful leader or state for 
people 
2. 17th century 
Hobbes: Leviathan, a well-
functioning state 
1. Socialist China  
(1) 1949-1978 





Tax preferences for SOEs 
2. Traditional China (16th century to 
1949) 




Locke: the state is the product 
of social contracts, so the 
government should guarantee 
citizens’ basic rights 
3. 21st century 
Modern state: protect 
individual rights and serve for 
the public good 
 
The state was the emperor’s state, which 
served the emperor’s rule  
Taxation: no separation between the 
emperor’s personal income/expenditure 




The rule of law is associated 
with the development of 
capitalism 
Respect for legal order and the 
rule of law 
Rule of law: thin and thick 
theories 
Aim: to restrain the arbitrary 
use of state power and to 
protect individuals’ property 
rights 
Liberal Democratic rule of 
law: free market capitalism, 
multiparty democracy and a 
liberal interpretation of human 
rights 
The instrumentalist use of law 
1. Socialist China 
(1) 1949-1978: Marxism  
Taxation and law, as a part of the 
superstructure, was subordinate to the 
economy 
(2) 1978-present: socialist rule of law 
with Chinese characteristics 
No legal control over tax incentives 
2. Traditional China 
Rule by rituals and rule by law 
Law was an instrument to serve the 
interests of the emperor and the state 
 
The culture Max Weber:  
Protestantism 




Respect for the market, fair 
competition, and cooperation 
State: protect individual rights 
and serve for the public good 
Interfere in the market when 
necessary 
Respect for legal order and the 
rule of law 
Rule of law:  










Self-cultivation: virtue and ritual 
Government: correct people’s mind, guide 
them to morality 
Social hierarchy: based on filial piety 
Advocated a highly organized government 
under the ruler 
 
Neo-Confucianism: reading classics 
Used by rulers to cultivate obedient people 
 
Confucianism in socialist China: 
Rule of virtue 
Harmonious society 
State-oriented 
Max Weber: reading classics impeded 




6.6 The common platform: possibilities to alleviate tensions 
China has undertaken a different path towards its market economy and the rule of law. Once 
the differences exist, it is not difficult to predict that the tensions with the WTO will continue. 
However, despite all those differences, it is a fact that China is a Member of the WTO. Every 
Member of this organization is under an obligation to follow its rules. Therefore, it is important 
for China to seek common ground with the WTO.  
After the analysis of these tensions and their origins, the question arises with regard to the 
possibility to alleviate them. Actually, the problems related to these tax incentives are not only 
specific for China, but they are also relevant for other Members of the WTO. For example, many 
countries have SOEs to which they provide tax incentives, and therefore this is not only a problem 
for the Chinese government. The specificity of the measures lies in the fact that the Chinese 
socialist system grants a priority status to SOEs. It involves not only a legal reform but also the 
liberalization of the market. Furthermore, it triggers a discussion on how important liberalization 
and fairness is to the Chinese market. The government can choose how to treat them, either 
maintaining the preferential treatment or treating them equal to other enterprises. With regard to 
the regional tax incentives and tax incentives for high-tech enterprises and other enterprises, it is 
necessary to consider the actual circumstances in China, but it is still possible to regulate the 
granting of tax incentives through an internal legal control system. It is not the intention to find an 
“all or nothing” approach to deal with the problem but to find a solution that both China and the 
WTO can accept.  
6.6.1 For China 
6.6.1.1 Fair competition in the market 
Although China’s socialist market economy system is different from the common market 
economy system among the other Members of the WTO, it is possible to look for common 
objectives that can serve as a common platform to alleviate tensions. The creation of fair 
competition in the international market is not only the main objective of the WTO’s subsidy regime, 
but it should also be the purpose of the operation of the market under China’s economic framework. 
For China, there is great motivation for it to further integrate into the world economy and benefit 
Philosophies:  
Adaption and adjustment to the 
environment and the world 
Mentality and spirits 
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from a better international trade environment.858  In order to maintain the economic growth, China 
has to explore more opportunities in both the domestic and international market. Considering the 
slowing down of the current economic growth,859 it is more urgent to pursue more opportunities 
in the international market, which requires mechanisms to ensure fair competition in China’s 
domestic market and China’s fair participation in the international market.860 The relationship 
between the government and the market is a dynamic process. Although the market operates under 
the state’s macro control, it does not deny the market’s role in the allocation of resources. Therefore, 
under China’s market system, the creation of fair competition should also be the objective in order 
to increase efficiency.861 In fact, China seems to realize the importance of strengthening the 
market’s role in order to keep its economic growth. In 2013, it officially announced that the central 
government would strengthen its governance in relation to tax incentives to promote equality in 
tax burdens and fair competition.862 Thus, based on the objective of creating fair competition in 
the market, it is possible to regulate the granting of tax incentives in China.  
As analyzed in the internal benchmark in Chapter 3, the principle of equality is also applicable 
in China. The common appreciation for equality can function as the basis for the creation of the 
common platform. The trend of the legal reform in relation to Chinese tax incentives has already 
provided evidence that fair treatment for taxpayers is gaining more attention. Therefore, under the 
common object and purpose of pursuing fair competition in the market, it is possible to build a 
further platform for those parties to reduce trade disputes.  
6.6.1.2 Internal legal control over tax incentives  
China’s instrumentalist use of tax incentives causes adverse effects, and therefore the 
introduction of an internal legal control is an effective way to tackle the problems. The 
                                                          
858 OECD, China's Emergence as a Market Economy: Achievements and Challenges (OECD contribution 
to the China Development Forum 20-21 March 2011), http://www.oecd.org/china/47408845.pdf.  
859 China’s GDP growth was 6.9% in 2015, which was the lowest in the past 25 years. Justin MacCurry, 
China Economy Grows at Slowest Pace in 25 years, Latest GDP Figures Show, the Guardian, 19 January 
2016,<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/china-economy-grows-at-slowest-pace-in-25-
years-latest-gdp-figures-show>, accessed 2 May 2016.  
860  Since the beginning of 2015, China’s economy faced more challenges, which made it difficult to 
maintain the high-speed growth. The government is planning to carry out further tax reforms to stimulate 
economic growth. 
861 Qian and Wu, 'China's Transition to A Market Economy' 48-61.  
862 The Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on Some Major Issues 
Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (the 2013 Decision). For the English version, see 
<http://english.cntv.cn/special/18thcpcsession/homepage/index.shtml>, accessed 23 November 2015. 
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instrumentalist treatment of tax incentives increases uncertainty for taxpayers, since those 
incentives can easily be changed or removed.863 Moreover, discrimination caused by tax incentives 
harms the equality between taxpayers.864  
Even as instruments, tax incentives are not good instruments to achieve governmental goals 
while fulfilling the criteria of transparency, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.865 An essential 
element to evaluate the instrument is the level to which it achieves these goals. Nevertheless, in 
the context of Chinese tax incentives, it is difficult to evaluate according to such a standard. The 
first problem is that the policy goals of certain tax incentives, such as tax incentives for decreasing 
regional disparity, are too broad or ambiguous. Tax incentives should serve specific objectives, 
thereby providing policy guidance; otherwise, they are too broad to promote certain activities. 
However, most tax incentives in China have broad and multiple objectives, which makes it difficult 
to carry out an assessment afterwards, due to the ambiguity of the objectives in the beginning.866 
This research focuses on tax incentives related to business investments in international trade. Such 
tax incentives should have clear and specific purposes in principle. Nevertheless, broad objectives 
cause conflicts and overlaps. For example, in relation to regional tax incentives for instance, the 
balance of regional disparity requires that the less developed Western and Central regions in China 
should enjoy more tax incentives, however, the policy to attract FDI determines that enterprises in 
eastern coastal regions actually enjoy more benefits from tax incentives.867 Another problem is the 
difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of those tax incentives. In order to know the result of tax 
incentives, a cost-benefit analysis is necessary. However, in China, there is a lack of empirical 
                                                          
863 Tamanaha, Talsma and Mierlo, The Perils of Pervasive Legal Instrumentalism 65-68; Tamanaha, 'The 
Tension between Legal Instrumentalism and the Rule of Law' 131.  
864 Gribnau, 'Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax' 99-100; ibid. 
865  Li, Legal Analysis of Tax Expenditure System 129-132 (in Chinese); Zee, Stotsky and Ley, 'Tax 
Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries'; Yaobin Shi, 
Establishing a Tax Expenditure Administrative System That Achieves a Sound Fiscal System in China, 
Shandong Sheng China International Forum on Tax Expenditures Weifang and others, Tax Expenditures--
Shedding Light on Government Spending through the Tax System Lessons from Developed and Transition 
Economies (World Bank 2004) 177-179. 
866 Guoqiang Ma, 'China's Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy Options' in Hana Polackova 
Brixi International Forum on Tax Expenditures , Christian Valenduc, Zhicheng Li Swift (ed), Tax 
Expenditures--Shedding Light on Government Spending through the Tax System Lessons from Developed 
and Transition Economies (Tax Expenditures--Shedding Light on Government Spending through the Tax 
System Lessons from Developed and Transition Economies, World Bank 2004) 196-198. 
867 Ibid 198. 
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analysis or evaluations of those incentives.868  The incentives are based on the government’s 
subjective anticipation of benefits, but without a systematic ex-ante assessment, not to mention an 
ex-post evaluation. 869 Moreover, the granting of tax incentives has “path dependence”, which 
lacks a full assessment but only extends measures that seem to have been effective in the past. This 
has increased the difficulty to make a judgment on the results of those incentives.870 With the 
further development of the market economy in China, a more certain and transparent legal system 
is necessary.  
In fact, since the promulgation of the Reform and Opening Policy, China has already made great 
achievements with respect to the establishment of legal systems. The tension arises in relation to 
which standard should be used to evaluate the function of the law.871 Although China has its own 
approach towards the establishment of the rule of law, it can still meet the criteria according to the 
thin rule of law. Consequently, bringing the granting of tax incentives into a more legalized system 
would not only achieve the goal of establishing the socialist rule of law for China, but it would 
also improve the compatibility of Chinese tax incentives with the WTO’s subsidy rules.872  
6.6.1.3 The cultural issues 
Western countries not only have a mature market economy and well-functioning legal system, 
but they also have the associated legal culture. It is a kind of awareness among people that they 
are willing to respect and follow the law in order to maintain fair competition in the market. 
According to the Western legal theories, law just reflects social values but does not create 
values.873 Social values are not granted by the government or the authority, but they are the natural 
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outcome of the society. In the evolution of the relationship between the market and the government, 
this kind of legal consciousness has already become an essential part of the culture itself.     
 In contrast, such legal awareness is comparatively lacking in China, but it is also increasing 
now.874 From the comparison above, it is obvious that the Chinese society has its own attitudes 
and rationale towards the government and the market. Nevertheless, cultural factors are always in 
flux, as it has already been emphasized before. With the further development, modernization and 
urbanization in China, legal awareness is increasing among individuals, especially in urban 
regions.875 Therefore, the dynamics demonstrate that at least there is an increasing space for 
Chinese people to accept the common rules that are shared by the international community. 
Cultural issues should be taken into account when looking for the common platform, but it should 
not become an obstacle or excuse to conduct further reforms.  
6.6.2 For the WTO 
The search for a common platform is not just one-dimensional. Except for China’s 
transformation, the WTO can also take into account the origin of the tensions for its own sake. As 
analyzed before, the market economy in the WTO system is in such a dynamic process that the 
associated rule of law is changing as well. In addition, the WTO is such a large international 
organization that not every WTO Member has a typical market economy and rule of law system, 
especially the Liberal Democratic rule of law. Initially, the establishment of the WTO was the 
outcome of the development of capitalism; however, with more and more Members joining the 
organization, it has also become diversified. Thus, it is possible for the WTO to adapt its rules to 
the changing circumstances. The tensions between China just provide an opportunity for the WTO 
to review its systems. Moreover, EU State aid can shed light on the improvement of the subsidy 
rules in the WTO with regard to the design of the legal control procedures and more detailed 
consideration for the compatibility issues.   
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the analysis of the testing results. The testing results show that regional 
tax incentives, tax incentives for SOEs, and tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, such as the 
software industry, IC industry, and energy-saving service enterprises in China are likely to be the 
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root of conflicts with subsidy rules in the WTO. Actually, they reflect deeper tensions between 
Chinese tax incentives and the Western treatment of tax incentives. China has a state-oriented 
attitude towards tax incentives, and there is a lack of internal legal control over the granting of tax 
incentives in China. In contrast, under the Western framework, tax incentives are a result of the 
government’s interference into the market, and therefore they should be controlled legally. The 
main reason behind the tensions is that the relationship between the government and the market in 
China is different from its counterpart in the West. The context in which WTO law and EU law 
have developed is the operation of a market economy. In the relationship between the government 
and the market, the market still plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources. In order to 
guarantee the functioning of the market, governmental intervention in the form of tax incentives 
should be regulated. However, China has a different economic system, a socialist market economy. 
The state has more power over the market. Taxation in China serves for the role of the state. The 
state plays an essential role in the allocation of public goods or social products. The government 
does not consider the granting of tax incentives as an intervention into the market but as a way of 
having macro control over the economy.  
Additionally, China’s attitude towards the rule of law has resulted in a lack of internal legal 
control over the granting of tax incentives. The WTO’s system and the EU State aid regime are 
based on the Western rule of law theories. In order to guarantee fair competition in the market, 
governmental actions should be controlled by the law. However, China takes an instrumentalist 
attitude towards the use of tax incentives. The rule of law in China is different from the Western 
Liberal Democratic rule of law. China has conducted legal reforms in many regimes, but the legal 
format is still different from the basic one under the Western system. Therefore, the granting of 
tax incentives in China lacks internal legal control in terms of the Western legal standard.  
This chapter also analyzes the origins behind the tensions by separately depicting the Western 
path towards its treatment of tax incentives as subsidies and China’s path and its attitude towards 
tax incentives. With regard to the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid law, the starting point of 
analyzing the market-oriented system is to acknowledge that they are the outcome of the capitalist 
development. The relationship between the market and the government has experienced changes 
from the early 16th century to the present time, which could be reflected by different economic 
schools of thought in different periods. However, from Adam Smith to Friedrich Hayek, the market 
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still plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources, and the government intervenes when 
necessary. The modern state is also an outcome of capitalist developments, since it requires a 
powerful government to protect individual rights and to serve the public good. The economic 
thoughts contribute to the understanding of the development of the Western market-oriented 
system. With respect to the legal regulation of tax incentives in the West, the WTO and the EU 
have a system based on the rule of law. Regardless of the diverse theories on the rule of law, 
associated with the development of the market economy, the basic objective of the rule of law is 
to prevent the arbitrary use of state power and to protect the market order. This also explains why 
subsidy rules in the WTO and State aid law in the EU, as legal regulations, restrict the use of tax 
incentives provided by governments. Furthermore, as advocated by Max Weber, for instance, there 
is even a capitalist spirit or Western culture that contributes to the development of the market-
oriented system and the respect for the rule of law. The philosophies, including being realistic, 
respect for individual rights, respect for fair competition and cooperation, and the like help to 
understand the issue deeper.  
Similarly, China’s state-oriented attitude towards tax incentives has historical roots. 
Considering China’s long history, this chapter limited the discussion to the period that is 
comparable to the capitalist development in the West by dividing the time into socialist and 
traditional China. In the time of socialist China, from the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the 
Reform and Opening in 1978, China had a planned economy and the socialist ideology. There was 
no free market and the state had absolute control over taxation. After the Reform and Opening, the 
state still has macro control over the whole economy, includes tax preferences for SOEs. In the 
time of traditional China, China did not experience the period of capitalist development that was 
comparable in the West. It was an agricultural country that always adhered to the policy of pro-
agriculture and anti-commerce, and therefore there was no free market from the Western 
perspective. As to the state’s function, taxation serves the state’s allocation of resources in socialist 
China. In traditional China, the state was emperor’s state, which served the emperor’s rule. There 
was no separation between the emperor’s personal income or expenditure and the state’s income 
or expenditure.  
The lack of an internal legal control over the granting of tax incentives in China can also find 
its origin in socialist and traditional China. In socialist China, before the Reform and Opening, 
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influenced by Marxism, taxation and law, as part of the superstructure, were subordinate to the 
economy. Thus, they were treated only as instruments to achieve economic goals. After the Reform 
and Opening, China attempted to establish a socialist rule of law system, which promoted intensive 
legal reforms in various areas. However, there is still a lack of legal control over the granting of 
tax incentives. In traditional China, law was an instrument to serve the interests of the emperor, 
which was also instrumental.  
A cultural influence for such a state-oriented style that could not be ignored is Confucianism. 
Confucianism experienced an evolution and there were limitations on explaining the relationship 
between Confucianism and the origin of the state-oriented style. However, they contribute to the 
understanding of this style. By advocating humanity and self-cultivation through virtue and ritual, 
Confucianism actually supports a highly organized government under the ruler. In socialist China, 
the modernization of Confucianism is also driven by the state. The government’s support of the 
Confucian rule of virtue is actually an attempt to maintain a harmonious social order according to 
the government’s cultural goal. In addition, the philosophies underline adaption and adjustment to 
the environment and the world rather than going against them. When understanding these 
philosophies, it is easier to understand China’s state-oriented attitude towards tax incentives.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to find a common platform for China and the West to alleviate 
tensions. The market rules are also applicable in China’s market. The creation of fair competition 
in the market can serve as the common objective between China and the West. Moreover, China’s 
instrumentalist attitude towards the granting of tax incentives has adverse effects. The legal control 
of tax incentives is in line with China’s reform towards the rule of law. Therefore, the common 
objectives that both China and the West intend to create a level playing field in the international 









Chapter 7 Recommendations for Chinese Tax Incentives and the Future for the 
WTO’s Subsidy Rules  
7.1 Introduction 
As analyzed in previous chapters, there are tensions between China’s treatment of tax incentives 
and the requirements of the WTO. These constitute the main reasons for trade disputes against 
China under the WTO’s subsidy regime, and the disputes will probably continue if the tensions 
continue to exist. However, there is space for each party to find a common platform to alleviate 
tensions, considering the creation of a level playing field for competition.  
This chapter has the purpose of answering the research questions. Firstly, it makes 
recommendations for China in relation to granting tax incentives to adapt to a proper position in 
the international trade and investment domain. In addition, it provides insight into the WTO and 
its subsidy regime with respect to the role of taxation. Based on a previous analysis, the EU State 
aid law acts as a reference for both China and the WTO for the improvement of the legal framework 
for the control of tax subsidies in certain aspects. In order to make recommendations for the 
Chinese tax incentives, the chapter returns to the benchmarks first, which serves as the starting 
point and basis for recommendations. The recommendations for the WTO also takes these 
benchmarks as the basis.   
7.2 Recommendations for Chinese tax incentives 
7.2.1 Basis for recommendations 
7.2.1.1 Fair competition in the market 
This research has established an external benchmark and an internal benchmark respectively in 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. The external benchmark is derived from the common objectives and 
purposes of the WTO’s subsidy system and the EU State aid regime. The creation of a level playing 
field in the supranational market follows from the requirement of efficiency and equity in the 
market. The internal benchmark justifies that there should be a level playing field for competition 
under China’s socialist market economy. Furthermore, the internal benchmark shares the same 
essence of the external benchmark for the pursuance of fair competition in the market. Although 
the starting points of establishing a fair market in the West differ from the counterpart in China, 
the benchmarks actually reflect that, in order to let the market function well for the allocation of 
resources, it is necessary to ensure the fundamental conditions for its operation.    
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With respect to Chinese tax incentives, it is important to bring them into line with fair 
competition. The testing results demonstrate that certain specific tax incentives are likely to 
constitute actionable subsidies under the WTO’s subsidy regime. They imply that they could harm 
the level playing field guaranteed by the WTO, thus causing adverse effects to other Members.876 
The testing results also reveal deeper tensions. In fact, the easiest recommendation for China is to 
remove all the incompatible tax incentives to meet the criteria of the WTO. Nevertheless, due to 
China’s state-oriented attitude towards the use of tax incentives and the lack of internal legal 
control over granting them, the tensions will continue. The reason is that the government’s 
arbitrary granting of tax incentives lacks legal assessment, which is guided by the objective of fair 
competition in the market. Such arbitrary granting of tax incentives will eventually conflict with 
WTO’s legal requirements and assessment. The direct result is that China will consistently face 
trade disputes with regard to its tax incentives. If China hopes to benefit more from the world 
economy, it is necessary to adjust its attitude towards tax incentives in line with the benchmarks.  
Therefore, it has to be emphasized that the recommendations of this research in respect of 
Chinese tax incentives is that they should contribute to the aim of guaranteeing a level playing 
field in China’s market, which also would enable China to participate in the fair competition in the 
international market.  
7.2.1.2 Rule of law over tax incentives 
To establish fair competition in both China’s domestic market and to meet the requirement of 
fair competition in the international market, it is important to introduce the rule of law as a 
guarantee. This is the original theory on which the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid law have 
been based, as discussed in previous chapters. To alleviate the tension, i.e. a lack of internal legal 
control over Chinese tax incentives versus the WTO’s subsidy regime established according to the 
rule of law, the direct solution should be the introduction of a legal control regime for Chinese tax 
incentives.   
                                                          
876 It has to be emphasized that the testing results are the outcome of the research, based on the research 
questions and methodologies. It just shows that certain tax incentives may potentially constitute actionable 
subsidies if they are identified as such according to the testing steps of the ASCM. However, it does not 
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The previous chapters demonstrate that China has accomplished impressive achievements with 
regard to the legalization of taxation, especially after China’s accession to the WTO.877  As 
discussed in Chapter 6, despite the fact that China does not have a Western Liberal Democratic 
rule of law system, it does not mean that it is not possible to establish an internal legal control 
system in the field of tax incentives.878 The introduction of an internal legal control system for tax 
incentives is essential to promote economic growth in China. As has been justified by some authors, 
a positive correlation exists between sustainable economic growth and the establishment of the 
rule of law. 879 China has identified economic growth as its major and long-term goal.880 If China 
intends to maintain its economic growth, the alleviation of tensions with the WTO rules will 
definitely help to reduce trade disputes. Moreover, it contributes to China’s further integration into 
the world economy by embracing more rules that are commonly accepted by the international 
market.881 Therefore, the introduction of a legal control regime over Chinese tax incentives serves 
well for the creation of fair competition in the market, which eventually contributes to the 
promotion of efficiency under a market economy system.  
The further focus should be on the type of legal control and the approach to establish such a 
legal regime. According to theories on the rule of law, an essential element of the rule of law 
system is to include procedural and institutional elements.882 These elements embody the role of 
the legislator, the administration, and the court.883 As pointed out by some authors, performing 
governmental duties according to the law first requires that the government makes decisions based 
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on statutory procedures. 884  The procedural elements could become the starting points when 
considering establishing a legal control over tax incentives in China. It has to be emphasized that 
recommendations in this chapter have been based on qualitative economic arguments rather than 
on quantitative economic arguments, which is also true for the economic analysis in Chapter 2. 
Thus, there is space for more quantitative economic research on testing of whether 
recommendations made in this chapter can contribute effectively to the creation of fair competition 
with regard to the granting of? tax incentives in China. However, this chapter focuses on 
recommendations that can sufficiently answer the research questions, which provides a starting 
point for China to adjust the treatment of tax incentives in order to better integrate into the world 
economy.   
7.2.2 Recommendations at a macro level: introduction of an internal legal control over tax 
incentives 
7.2.2.1 Reference from the tax expenditure system 
(1) Overview on the tax expenditure system 
A commonly adopted legal control method for tax incentives could be the introduction of a tax 
expenditure system, the concept of which was firstly developed by Stanley Surrey (1970) in the 
US, but it was widely accepted across various countries.885 As analyzed in section 2.3.3 of Chapter 
2, the most obvious feature of the notion is a deviation from a tax system benchmark.886 The 
benchmark normally includes the rate structure, accounting conventions, deductibility of 
compulsory payments, provisions to facilitate tax administration, and international fiscal 
obligations, etc.887  
Such a tax expenditure system is an internal legal control mechanism since it combines legal 
procedures on the control of tax incentives from the perspectives of legislation, administration, 
and evaluation. Firstly, it subjects tax incentives to a budgetary process, which entails a necessary 
legal assessment and authorization. Even though some countries do not include tax expenditures 
in the budget processes, they still have a separate evaluation process for tax expenditures.888Many 
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countries have established a tax expenditure system that brings tax incentives into the budgetary 
process. 889 Tax expenditures in different countries have different forms; some are in the form of 
an annex to the budget and some are independent documents.890 This is a higher stage for the 
administration of tax incentives in a legalized way.891 The purpose, costs and benefits, and effects 
for the granting of tax incentives are assessed by the legislative authorities at an initial stage, so 
that it forms a preliminary ex-ante assessment. In addition, most of those countries file tax 
expenditure reports regularly in order to provide transparent empirical information on their tax 
expenditures.  892 As a result, the reports could act as an ex-post assessment for the evaluation of 
implemented tax incentives. Thus, it is simple and efficient for tax authorities to administer and 
supervise the enforcement of those incentives. Moreover, it increases transparency in relation to 
the allocation of public revenue.893 Most countries consider it as a legal obligation and publish it 
annually. In general, the system forms a procedural guarantee for the implementation of the law 
on tax incentives. In such a system, governments or tax authorities, as the subjects for the 
implementation, are also accountable. It therefore creates a regulation of the government’s 
arbitrary power of granting tax incentives and increases the government’s accountability. For 
instance, in the US, there is an independent institution that regularly evaluates tax expenditures.894 
Furthermore, as a part of the budget, taxpayers have the right to know them and the right to seek 
remedies.895 In summary, the purpose of the establishment of a tax expenditure system is to control 
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and evaluate tax incentives effectively and in a legalized way. It contains the basic procedural 
elements as a means of legal control, i.e. the legislative assessment, the government’s 
accountability, and an evaluation that enables taxpayers to seek remedies.    
(2) Necessity of tax expenditures in China 
A tax expenditure system can increase transparency. The tax expenditure report, either as an 
annex to the budget or as an independent document, can increase the transparency and 
predictability of governmental expenditure on tax incentives. The transparency should not only be 
based on the legal basis but also on economic consequences and administrative procedures.  896 
Taxpayers can rely on the documents to adjust their behaviors, and therefore they do not have to 
worry about sudden changes. For the government, it can better manage and supervise the revenue 
on a macro level. Furthermore, it contributes to the reduction or prevention of the discretionary 
granting of tax incentives by local governments, thereby creating a level playing field in domestic 
China. With respect to the WTO, the transparency of tax incentives can greatly assist China to 
fulfill its obligations in the WTO, especially the obligation of the subsidy notification to the WTO. 
Wang (2012) pointed out that a tax expenditure system is actually a legal framework balancing the 
interests between the state and taxpayers. On the one hand, it manages the state’s fiscal revenue 
with the budget system, while, on the other hand, according to transparent budget reports, it 
protects taxpayer’s legitimate expectations in relation to the benefits to be gained from those 
incentives. Thus, this legal system is beneficial for both the state and taxpayers.897 
In addition, with such a legal control framework, it is easy to anticipate and evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of adopted tax incentives. It relies on the establishment of a cost-
benefit analysis and proportionality test. Normally, the granting of tax incentives bears different 
costs, including distortions between incentive receivers and non-receivers, forgone revenue, 
administrative resources, and the social costs of corruption or rent-seeking activities derived from 
abuse, etc.   898 If, before the granting of tax incentives, the tax authorities can evaluate all these 
costs and anticipate the relevant benefits generated, the targeting of certain tax incentives can be 
more clear and specific. Furthermore, the proportionality test helps to control the degree of tax 
                                                          
896  Zee, Stotsky and Ley, 'Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in 
Developing Countries' 1510. 
897 Wang, On Legal System of Tax Incentives: Perspective for the Normative and Legitimacy Requirements 
of Law 116-118 (in Chinese). 
898 Ibid 1501-1502. 
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incentives within a proper scope to achieve the objective. Furthermore, an ex-post assessment is 
beneficial for the authorities to supervise the effects of those incentives, so that they can terminate 
or extend incentives more flexibly.899   
(3) Elements of a legal framework for tax expenditures 
The procedural elements for designing a tax expenditure system include an ex-ante assessment 
of tax expenditures, a cost-benefit analysis, an ex-post assessment with the criteria of effectiveness 
and efficiency, proportionality test, transparent report, etc.900  
When facing an investigation on the compatibility of a tax incentive with the WTO agreements, 
an important issue is the specificity of the tax incentives. Even when the granting of a tax incentive 
has undergone all the assessments in the tax expenditure regime, it can still constitute a subsidy 
under the ASCM due to its specificity, i.e. limited only to certain enterprises, industries, or regions, 
de jure or de facto. Tax incentives, in the form of tax expenditures, indeed are deviations from the 
tax system benchmark, but they do not have to be specific to certain recipients. Hence, it is 
important to emphasize that the tax expenditure system should also take into account the specificity 
of tax incentives. Despite the fact that they serve specific social or economic goals, they should 
not cause discrimination among recipients. This means that they should impact the level playing 
field as little as possible, and therefore the introduction of such a legal control system should take 
fair competition in the market as the main principle.   
(4) Feasibility of tax expenditures in China 
The legal control over tax incentives can be considered as a part of the rule of law process in 
China, which requires basic institutional and procedural elements that could support the system. 
The Chinese tax law system has developed in various ways, and therefore certain conditions are 
in place to satisfy those requirements. When matching the existing institutional elements in China 
with the basic conditions of the tax expenditure system, it is obvious to see the feasibility of 
introducing such a system to China.  
a. Legislative elements 
A tax expenditure system requires a regulation on the granting of tax incentives arbitrarily by 
the government, and therefore the power for granting tax incentives should be limited to legislative 
                                                          
899 Burton and Sadiq, Tax Expenditure Management a Critical Assessment 55-58. 
900 Li, Legal Analysis of Tax Expenditure System 134-136. 
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authorities. The NPC is the supreme legislative entity in China. However, most tax incentives are 
granted by the MoF and the SAT, which are not in the form of official legislation. They do not 
really go through an ex-ante assessment or the assessment procedure is not transparent. Since 
China has legislative institutions and it also has a Budget Law, 901 it is feasible to include tax 
expenditures in the Budget Law or promulgate separate legislation or a regulation on tax 
expenditures. The most essential issue in this process is that an ex-ante assessment for the granting 
of tax expenditures is included. 
b. Budget process 
Tax expenditures in the form of a budget report require a budget process that could include tax 
expenditures. It not only requires subjects or authorities to be responsible for including the tax 
expenditures, but it also requires legislation that confirms the validity of such a process. With 
respect to China, the Budget law of China could form a basis for such a legal control. It regulates 
the powers for budget management, the scope of budgetary revenues and expenditures, budget 
compilation, examination and approval of budgets, implementation and adjustment, final accounts, 
supervision, and legal responsibility, etc.902 However, the new amendment does not specifically 
take tax incentives into the legal regulation.903 Nevertheless, it still provides a basis for including 
tax expenditure. Article 4 of the new Budget Law stipulates, “a budget consists of budgetary 
revenues and budgetary expenditure. All government revenues and expenditure shall be included 
in a budget”. Tax incentives are also expenditures of government revenues, and therefore should 
be included in the budget. Additionally, the Budget Law also stipulates that the State Council is 
entitled to draft the central budget and final accounts and report to the NPC.904 The NPC has the 
power to review and approve the central and local budgets.905 The review procedure from the NPC 
should constitute an ex-ante and ex-post assessment for tax expenditures.  
                                                          
901 Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment). The Budget Law was promulgated 
in 1995 and was amended in 2014.  
902 Ibid.  
903 Article 27 stipulates that, by function, the expenditure in a general public budget includes expenditure 
on general public services, expenditure on diplomatic affairs, public security, and national defense, 
expenditure on agriculture and environmental protection, expenditure on education, science and technology, 
culture, health, and sports, expenditure on social security and employment, and other expenditure. It does 
not separate tax expenditure from other expenditures.  
904 Article 23, Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment). 
905 Article 20, Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment). 
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c. Administrative elements 
A tax expenditure system requires administrative institutions that can implement and supervise 
the system. China has established a relatively mature administrative system for managing the tax 
expenditure system. Firstly, fiscal power is centralized at the central government level and is 
actually efficient for the administration of tax expenditures.906 The central government is capable 
of coordinating the implementation of this system with the local governments. In addition, tax 
authorities have some experience in relation to the assessment of tax incentives. For instance, in 
certain projects of tax reductions or exemptions, the tax authorities have conducted a basic ex-ante 
and ex-post assessment, such as the immediate collection and immediate return of VAT.907 With 
respect to the identification of tax expenditures, the existing approaches could continue. Three 
methods are at issue: automatic identification, identification after the assessment of tax 
administrations, and identification with the assistance of agents.908 With these experiences, tax 
administrations could go further in the management of tax expenditures.909     
d. Supervisory elements 
    An important characteristic of a tax expenditure system is an independent institution that could 
supervise the implementation of tax expenditures. It mainly involves an ex-post assessment, which 
evaluates the fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness of tax expenditures. To perform such an 
evaluation, the independence of the institution should be highlighted. It should be independent 
from the government who proposes and implements tax incentives. In China, the NPC and its 
standing committee has the supervisory power for tax expenditures, and the government has to 
report to the NPC. 910  Except for the NPC and its standing committee’s supervision, the 
implementation of the budget, tax revenue and expenditure of governments are subject to 
independent auditing by the National Audit Office (NAO). As confirmed by the Constitution, the 
NAO is an independent auditing body that exercises its power of supervision in accordance with 
the law.911 However, its independence is conditional, which is still subject to the overview of the 
                                                          
906 Article 3, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Tax Collection (2015 
Amendment). 
907 Li, Legal Analysis of Tax Expenditure System 132-133. 
908 Ibid 102-103. 
909 Ma, 'China's Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy Options' 199-202. 
910 Article 92, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
911 Article 91, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). The State Council 
established an auditing body to supervise, through auditing, the revenue and expenditure of all departments 
under the State Council and of the local governments at various levels and the revenue and expenditure of 
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Premier of the State Council. This means that it is still a department of the government, the State 
Council. At the local levels, local audit offices are departments of local governments. Therefore, 
the system is subject to the risk that the NAO will not be independent due to interference from its 
higher authority, the government. Nevertheless, it is an institution that could become a supplement 
to the NPC and its standing committee’s supervision over tax expenditures, considering its 
experience and expertise in auditing. Further reform could focus on increasing its independence 
from the government.   
e. Judicial elements 
As a legal control procedure, the system should be guaranteed by judicial institutions.912 Most 
countries that have the tax expenditure system also have evaluation procedures to examine the 
accountability of the government. Accordingly, there are approaches to remedies, which have two 
major tracks.913 The first track is to seek administrative remedies by applying for administrative 
reconsideration within the administrative system. Since the granting of tax expenditures is a 
governmental administrative act, the direct remedy is towards the granting act itself. It has to 
emphasize that the institution responsible for administrative reconsideration is independent from 
the tax authority that implements the specific administrative act. The second track is a judicial 
remedy. It requires that there are independent courts that could deliver judgments and decide on 
compensation. Normally, in countries where a tax expenditure system exists, taxpayers have rights 
to administrative litigation against a government’s action, and therefore judicial independence is a 
necessary condition for safeguarding taxpayer’s rights.914  
China has its own circumstances with respect to these judicial elements. Tax incentives are 
governmental administrative actions. Most tax incentives in China are issued by the SAT and the 
MoF in the form of regulatory documents, such as decisions and circulars. The main remedy 
mechanisms in China for administrative actions are administrative reconsideration and 
                                                          
all financial and monetary organizations, enterprises and institutions of the state. Under the direction of the 
Premier of the State Council, the auditing body independently exercises its power of supervision through 
auditing in accordance with the law, without interference by any other administrative organ or any public 
organization or individual.  
912  Yuwen Li, The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives : Administrative Litigation Systems 
in Greater China and Europe (Routledge 2016) 2. 
913 Ibid 19-20. 
914 Ma, 'China's Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy Options' 9-11; Randall Peerenboom, 




administrative litigation.915 Plaintiffs may choose either of the two ways to seek a remedies. They 
could go to the administrative organ at the next higher level for administrative reconsideration or 
they could go directly to the courts.916  
With regard to administrative litigation, the new amendment on Chinese Administrative 
Litigation Law (ALL) permits courts to review regulatory documents917 when plaintiffs litigate 
against concrete administrative actions. Therefore, this provision endows on taxpayers the right to 
litigate against specific tax measures implemented by governments together with a claim for 
reviewing the legality of the regulation that such a tax measure relies on. It is considered to be an 
improvement which will contribute to increasing the government’s accountability. 918  This 
provision provides the possibility to include legal remedies for establishing the legal system of tax 
expenditures.  
However, direct litigation against administrative regulations or decisions or orders of general 
binding force will not be accepted by courts. 919  The rationale behind this is that these 
                                                          
915 Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009 Amendment) (ARL); 
Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment) (ALL). See also Li, 
The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives : Administrative Litigation Systems in Greater 
China and Europe 19-20. 
916 Ibid. 
917 See Article 53 of the ALL. Where a citizen, a legal person, or any other organization deems that a 
regulatory document developed by a department of the State Council or by a local people’s government or 
a department thereof, based on which the alleged administrative action was taken, is illegal, the citizen, 
legal person, or other organization may concurrently file a request for review of the regulatory document 
when filing a complaint against the administrative action. The term “regulatory document” as mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph does not include administrative rules. For the English version of the ALL, see 
www.lawinfochina.com.  
918 As to the application of the ALL, the Supreme People’s Court published an interpretation. Article 21 of 
the interpretation states a people’s court shall not rely on an illegal regulatory document to determine the 
legality of an administrative action and shall state so in its legal reasoning. A people’s court issuing an 
effective ruling shall provide the enacting authority of the regulatory document with recommendations and 
may also send copies to the people’s government at the corresponding level or the administrative agency at 
the level immediately above. See Interpretation No.9 [2015] of the Supreme People’s Court, 20 April 2015. 
For an English translation, see Chen Benjamin Minhao and Li Zhiyu, 'Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of "Administrative Litigation Law of the 
People's Republic of China"' (2016) 25 Washington International Law Journal 133. See also Chen Benjamin 
Minhao and Li Zhiyu, 'Explaining Comparative Administrative Law: the Standing of Positive Political 
Theory' (2016) 25 Washington International Law Journal 87, 116-117. 
919 Article 13 of the ALL. The courts shall not accept complaints filed by citizens, legal persons, or other 
organizations against the following: (2) administrative regulations and rules or decisions and orders with 
general binding force developed and issued by administrative agencies.  
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administrative regulations are stipulated by the State Council, which could be reviewed by 
legislative bodies through its supervisory system. As an independent supervisory institution, the 
NPC is capable of reviewing and annulling administrative regulations.920 
As pointed out by some authors, there has been a long debate on the distinction between 
litigation against regulations or regulatory documents by governments at different hierarchies.921 
The provision assumes that a government’s administrative actions will only harm individuals’ 
rights through concrete administrative actions. Therefore, as the source of a concrete 
administrative action, such an administrative regulation could be reviewed by the courts. 922 
However, if a plaintiff could not show that their rights are directly harmed by the general 
regulations themselves, they could not challenge the regulation directly. Supporters maintain that 
if plaintiffs could challenge a law or a State Council administrative regulation directly, there would 
be an abuse of such a right.923 In addition, the courts in China, especially the lower courts, lack the 
resources and competence to solve such cases due to a lack of expertise and experience.924 
Moreover, the courts will not be able to handle the increased caseload. In contrast, opponents claim 
that legal guarantees are lacking in order to merely rely on legislative supervision.925  
In summary, there are judicial elements to support the introduction of a legal control system in 
relation to tax incentives. The focus should be on how to consider legal remedies that could embed 
such a legal control into China’s current judicial system. 
                                                          
920  There is no constitutional court in China. The NPC is the supreme organ that has the legislative 
supervisory power. Its standing committee has the power to annul those administrative rules and regulations, 
decisions or orders of the State Council that contravene the Constitution or the law. See Article 67 (7), 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
921 Li, The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives : Administrative Litigation Systems in 
Greater China and Europe 22-23; Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China : Lessons for Global Rule 
of Law Promotion 131-132. 
922 Taxpayers could also apply for administrative reconsideration. Article 7 of the ARL: if a citizen, legal 
person or any other organization considers any of the following provisions, which is the basis of a specific 
administrative act of an administrative organ, to be illegal, he or she or it may, when filing an application 
for administrative reconsideration on a concrete administrative act, file an application to the administrative 
reconsideration organ to review the provisions: provisions of departments under the State Council; 
provisions of local people’s governments at or above the country level and their departments; provisions of 
people’s governments of towns or townships.  
923 Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China : Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion 94. 
924 Ibid 79. 
925 Li, The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives : Administrative Litigation Systems in 
Greater China and Europe 22. 
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7.2.2.2 Reference from EU State aid law: procedures and institutions 
EU State aid law is originally a part of EU competition law, which was not designed for 
regulating tax incentives per se. However, it regulates selective tax aid that infringes fair 
competition in the internal market of the EU. As pointed out by some authors, State aid control is 
not a panacea that can be used to solve all the problems of tax competition. There is still space for 
the EU to limit the abuse of State aid law to combat the disadvantages of tax competition.926    
However, if taking the objectives of maintaining a level playing field in the internal market as a 
standard for evaluation, State aid law is rather effective.927 It has a systematic  set of rules and 
procedures to control the harm of preferential tax incentives in the internal market. The system is 
a good example to show how well the procedural and institutional mechanism can play a role in 
protecting efficiency and equity in the market.  
China is a unified country, but the EU is a supranational organization. In the EU, each Member 
State still has tax sovereignty. Thus, the starting point of the State aid regime is the common 
interest of the internal market, which is the common agreement between Member States. 
Obviously, the idea of the common interest is not applicable in China. Nevertheless, China has its 
own interests in its own market and its position in the international market. It is possible for China 
to refer to the State aid regime. What is more, the difficulties of implementing State aid control 
among EU Member States are likely not to cause concern for China, because it is easier to carry 
out reforms on its own tax system in a unified country.  
(1) The identification of a tax aid 
The State aid regime has relatively clear steps to identify a State aid measure, since it has 
provided a concrete definition of State aid. Additionally, there are Commission regulations and 
case law that assist in the actual identification of a State aid measure. Although the applicability 
                                                          
926 Schön, Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid-A Review of Five Years of European Jurisprudence, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2707049; Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives 
under EU and WTO Law 458-462; Edoardo Traversa, 'Tax Incentives and Territoriality within the European 
Union: Balancing the Internal Market witht he Tax Sovereignty of Member States' (2014) 6 World Tax 
Journal 332-337. 
927 For instance, the European Commission decided that selective tax advantages for Fiat in Luxembourg 
and Starbucks in the Netherlands were illegal under EU State aid rules in 2015. On 19 May 2016, the 
European Commission published a Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107 (1) TFEU. 
It explains how to identify tax rulings and tax settlements as State aid. For details, see footnote 21, 22 in 
Chapter 1.  
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of State aid law to taxation is evolving, it has to be acknowledged that it is effective in controlling 
the adverse effects of selective tax aid in the internal market. It has established a systematic 
procedure for the assessment of aid measures, which involves basic elements for tax expenditures. 
What can be gained from this for China is that, when designing the tax expenditure system, it is 
necessary to provide a clear definition of a tax expenditure that is subject to legal enforcement. 
This concept should reflect that there is a deviation from the benchmark tax system in rendering 
tax benefits. It is also important to clarify the benchmark system or provide instructions on how to 
identify the benchmark system. Furthermore, since the design of such a tax expenditure system in 
China is in order to create fair competition in the market, it can refer to the notion of selectivity in 
State aid law so that the targets of regulating discriminatory specific tax incentives are clear. With 
respect to the identification of a tax measure’s selectivity, the testing steps in the State aid regime 
are inspiring for China. There are three basic steps to determine selectivity. Firstly, fix a normal 
tax benchmark; subsequently, examine whether there is a deviation from the general benchmark; 
and lastly, determine whether the measure can be justified based on the nature or general scheme 
of the system. With these basic testing steps, the identification of specific tax incentives will 
become enforceable.   
(2) Compatible State aid: the Commission’s assessment 
a. The ex-ante assessment 
The State aid regime has taken into account the category of compatible State aid, which provides 
justifications for certain tax incentives under a balancing test.928 The test enables the Commission 
to conduct an ex-ante assessment, so that it can effectively regulate the harmful effects of unlawful 
State aid. As introduced in Chapter 3, the Commission’s assessment includes consecutive 
questions for the balancing test. Those questions actually embody the principle of proportionality, 
cost-benefit analysis, and transparency.929  
                                                          
928 Section 3.4.2.2.3 the Commission’s assessment of Chapter 3. 
929 The questions are 1. Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest, like an 
efficiency objective, equity objective, or transition to better functioning markets? 2. Is the aid well-designed 
to deliver the objective of common interest, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market failure or other 
objectives? Is State aid an appropriate policy instrument? Is there an incentive effect, i.e. does the aid change 
the behavior of firms? Is the aid measure proportional, i.e. could the same change in behavior be obtained 
with less aid? 3. Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade limited, so that the overall balance 
is positive? 4. Is the aid transparent that Member States, the Commission, economic operators, and the 
public have easy access to all relevant acts and information about the aid? Ibid.  
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For China, when introducing the legal system of tax expenditures, it is inspiring to refer to this 
ex-ante assessment from the regulation of State aid. In the context of the EU, the balancing test 
takes the common interest of the internal market as the benchmark for balancing harms and 
benefits estimated by the aid measure. However, China could establish its own benchmark to 
design the ex-ante assessment.  
As discussed in relation to the internal benchmark in Chapter 4, the concept of a level playing 
field is ambiguous. There can be different interpretations of fairness. Referring to the basic 
principle of equality which requires that those who are unequal to be treated unequally, and 
considering the special circumstances in China, to ensure a level playing field in China’s market 
the regional disparities and the imbalanced development of industries should be taken into account. 
To ensure a level playing field per se, development of less developed regions and for those 
activities the market mechanism does not allocate the resources properly is required. For instance, 
R&D activities, environmental protection activities, big infrastructure projects, and the promotion 
of SMEs, etc. all must be supported. Therefore, it is possible to tax incentives in China that are 
justifiable, and therefore the balancing test for Chinese tax incentives should take into account the 
need for these regions and activities to be supported.930 When evaluating the tax incentive, the 
objective of the measure should also be assessed. Afterwards, the proportionality test contributes 
to the cost and benefit analysis of the measure, thus determining whether the measure should be 
granted or not.  
(2) The institution: the Commission  
The institutional guarantee for the State aid control is the EU Commission. The complete and 
systematic controlling procedure provides the Commission with the power to administer and 
supervise the effect of aid measures. The Commission is not only the authority to conduct an ex-
ante assessment on notified State aid, but it also has the power to investigate any tax measure 
provided by Member States that is likely to constitute State aid. Most importantly, it is an 
independent institution on the EU level, which has supremacy over Member States. Thus, its 
decisions are authoritative for Member States and may require them to adjust or regulate their tax 
measures. 931  
                                                          
930 Vanistendael, 'Fiscal Federalism, Are There Lessons to be Learnt for China?' 426-427. 
931 August Reinisch, Essentials of EU Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 58-76. 
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China can be recommended to establish an independent authority, which has the power to assess 
and supervise tax expenditures. This authority should have legislative power that is at the highest 
level. In China’s circumstance, the NPC is the supreme organ of state power, which has legislative 
power and supervisory power. It is an appropriate institution for controlling tax expenditures. The 
governmental branches of the SAT and the MoF could also be authorized institutions, which assist 
in the administration of tax expenditures. 932  Furthermore, independence of the authority is 
essential for assessing and supervising. If the NPC is the authority who decides on tax expenditures, 
there should be another independent auditing organ which supervises the implementation of tax 
expenditures. This organ should conduct ex-post assessment of tax expenditures and report to the 
NPC. Currently, there is no such institution in China, but it is recommended to set one up to 
guarantee that the system could really regulate tax expenditures.  
b. Remedies  
The remedies available in State aid law allow the Commission to carry out an ex-post assessment 
on the impact of aid measures, especially for unnotified new aid. on the Commission has an 
important advisory role when Member States intend to introduce specific tax aid measures, 
because once the measure is identified as a State aid, the beneficiaries have to return the benefits 
with interest. Moreover, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) acts as a supreme 
court of the EU, exercising judicial review over both the EU and Member States. It could review 
the legality of legislative acts of the Commission, which include regulations, directives, and 
decisions. The decisions of the CJEU are covered by the principle of the supremacy of EU law and 
therefore they must be followed by the Commission or Member States. Since it is an independent 
judicial institution, it has absolute authority.933 The Commission and the Court always take a very 
strict attitude towards the recovery of incompatible aid. It makes the State aid regulation effective 
in reality and provides for a powerful legal control over the adverse effects of unlawful aid 
measures.  
In China’s circumstance, in the short term, there are concerns about implementing such a strict 
recovery of tax incentives. On the one hand, it requires the establishment of institutions to perform 
and supervise the enforcement of the recovery, which is costly. On the other hand, when involving 
                                                          
932 Li, Legal Analysis of Tax Expenditure System 144-145. 
933 Reinisch, Essentials of EU Law 77-89. 
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tax issues, they can be technical and therefore the cases always require experts. At present, there 
is no tax court in China, and there are no real tax experts in the courts.934 However, in the long run, 
it is necessary for taxpayers to have rights to litigate against harmful tax incentives that infringe 
fair competition in the market. Therefore, remedies in the form of recovery could be a powerful 
solution. Accordingly, there should be associated institutions, such as an independent supervisory 
authority and independent courts, which could assist in the implementation of the remedies. 

















(1) Legislative elements 
In order to ensure the legal enforcement of the tax expenditure system, it is suggested to embed 
tax expenditures into the Budget Law with amendments or to promulgate separate legal 
regulations.935 This would subject tax expenditures to high legislative authority. In the short term, 
                                                          
934 In fact, tax litigation is rather rare in China. Some authors attribute this phenomenon to the uncertainty 
and inconsistencies caused by the rapid changing tax laws and the abuse of discretionary power in tax 
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including tax expenditures in the Budget Law could achieve the basic goal of implementing legal 
control. However, the Budget Law itself has to be amended in many respects, considering the 
complexity of stipulating all the relative provisions related to tax expenditures. It seems costly and 
time-consuming to implement such amendments. Thus, this way could work merely in a short term. 
In the long term, it is recommended to issue a separate regulation on tax expenditures, which could 
explicitly and comprehensively include all elements of the legal control.   
With respect to the promulgation of a separate regulation on tax expenditures, in principle, the 
legislation should embrace the aim of creating a level playing field in the market. In addition, such 
an objective should fit China’s circumstances, i.e. creating a level playing field in China’s market. 
As a result, tax expenditures in China should not be specific to limited enterprises or regions. 
Nevertheless, as discussed previously, the market level in China differs from the international level 
with respect to its imbalanced economic development. Therefore, a level playing field should 
permit support for undeveloped regions and industries. This rationale is also justifiable under the 
EU State aid regime. When designing legislation on tax expenditures, it should take into account 
procedures for the approval of compatible tax incentives in China.  
With regard to the content of the regulation, it should not only take into account the legal control 
elements, such as procedural and institutional elements, but it should also specify different 
institutions’ responsibilities in order to enforce and supervise tax expenditures. Moreover, it should 
contain legal repercussions for the abuse of tax incentives. Once the tax expenditure system is 
enforceable according to the law, it could form a legal restriction for the government.  
To be specific, the content of the regulation should include: (1) aim and principle of tax 
expenditures, with a guiding principle on creating fair competition in the market; (2) scope of the 
regulation, definition of a tax expenditure, and methods of identification; (3) allocation of powers 
between institutions, including legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions; (4) process of 
designing and approving tax expenditures, which should involve ex-ante assessment; (5) 
supervision and evaluation, which should include ex-post assessment; (6) responsibilities of each 
institution; (7) legal remedies; etc. The lawmaking is rather technical, which requires more 
expertise. This recommendation only depicts a framework containing essential elements that are 
necessary to form a legal regulation of tax expenditures. 
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(2) Institutional elements  
With respect to the responsibilities of institutions, there should be an allocation of powers 
between different organs for the implementation of the tax expenditure system. 936  The body 
drafting the tax expenditures should be the government. As a part of the budget control, the drafting 
of tax expenditures should be in line with the overall budgeting process. The government is 
responsible for the budget. With respect to tax incentives, the MoF and the SAT can take the main 
role in drafting tax expenditures, since most previous tax incentives were issued by these two 
institutions. In addition, local governments and local bureaus of the tax administration could assist 
in drafting the tax expenditures by reporting local tax expenditure requirements to the central 
government.  
The authorization power of tax expenditures should be with the NPC and its standing 
committee.937 According to the Budget Law, the NPC and its standing committee are the organs 
responsible for the authorization of the budget. In order to strengthen the legal control on tax 
incentives, it is necessary to go through an ex-ante assessment by the supreme legislative authority. 
Even when promulgating a separate regulation on tax expenditures, the NPC and its standing 
committee should be the institution that evaluates and approves tax expenditures. Most importantly, 
the ex-ante assessment should embrace testing the specificity of the tax incentives, which could 
refer to the testing steps used in EU State aid law.938 Furthermore, the assessment should also 
contain procedures that are subject to testing based on criteria of proportionality, effectiveness, 
efficiency, and transparency, etc. Specific assessment standards could be flexible according to the 
objectives of the tax expenditure system, but the assessment process itself should include these 
basic elements. If a tax incentive could satisfy the basic ex-ante assessment, the NPC and its 
standing committee could approve the granting of such an incentive. On the other hand, with regard 
to the authorization of compatible tax incentives, the NPC and its standing committee should rely 
on this ex-ante assessment procedure or the balancing test to make decisions on the compatibility 
of certain tax incentives.   
                                                          
936 Wang, On Legal System of Tax Incentives: Perspective for the Normative and Legitimacy Requirements 
of Law 118-120.  
937 The NPC is the supreme organ of state power in China. See Section 4.1 Introduction in Chapter 4. 
938 See Reference from EU State aid law, the identification of a tax aid in Section 7.2.2.2.  
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With regard to enforcement and administration, the power should be in the hands of the tax 
administrations at different levels. Tax administrations, including state tax bureaus and local tax 
bureaus, are entities that are in charge of the collection of tax revenue. 939  They should be 
responsible for granting and managing the expenditures.  
The supervising power can be divided into two parts. The first is external supervision from the 
legislative authority, the NPC and its standing committee. Independent from the government, the 
NPC and its standing Committee has the authority to conduct both ex-ante and ex-post assessments 
of tax incentives. In addition, the NAO could play a more important role in auditing tax 
expenditures independently. It is recommended to increase the power of the NAO that would 
enable it to audit tax expenditures and report directly to the NPC and its standing committee. 
Accordingly, it does not have to be subject to the interference of the government. The second part 
is the internal supervision by the tax administrations themselves, the higher tax authorities, the 
MoF and the SAT at a national level, could supervise local tax authorities. The main purpose of 
this internal supervision is to prevent local protectionism through the abuse of tax expenditures at 
the local level. With regard to the content of the supervision, an ex-post assessment is necessary. 
The design of the legal control system is based on the objective of creating a level playing field in 
China’s market, and therefore it is necessary to evaluate tax expenditures after implementation to 
examine whether or not the incentive de facto harms fair competition in the market. Normally, tax 
incentives serve policy goals, and therefore it is logical to examine their effectiveness. 
Consequently, the NAO and the government should both report the implementation to the NPC 
and its standing committee. Accordingly, the NPC and its standing committee could publish 
reports on tax expenditures regularly.   
(3) Judicial elements 
The tax expenditure system, as a means of legal control, should also allow individuals and 
companies to have recourse to legal remedies against harmful tax incentives. When the 
governments illegally issue or implement tax incentives, individuals or companies are entitled to 
go to the court to make their claims.940 Therefore, the court, as an independent and separate 
institution, makes a decision on the legitimacy of tax incentives. The law should clarify the 
                                                          
939 Cui, 'Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation' 461-462. 
940 Xu, 'Tax Dispute Resolution, Judiciary Independence and Property Rights'.  
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function of the court and remedies for the government’s illegal actions in relation to tax 
expenditures. The ALL of China actually provides access to remedies for government’s 
administrative actions. However, it has limits, as discussed previously. Therefore, with further a 
stipulation on remedies in the law, it would provide a direct guarantee for taxpayer’s rights and 
legal control of government’s actions. 
(4) Practical concern: judicial independence for administrative litigation 
As part of a legal control system, judicial remedies aim to ensure for the government’s 
accountability. It requires that courts can independently decide cases on government’s 
administrative actions. The ALL de jure stipulates that courts could review regulatory documents 
associated with a plaintiff’s complaint on concrete administrative actions. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that courts de facto could make independent judgments.941 Judicial independence 
is a very broad and vague concept that has no single model.942 Nevertheless, it entails general ideas 
that judges have the ability to decide cases independently according to the law and without 
interference from other parties or entities.943  
As observed by Peerenboom (2009), judicial independence could be reviewed from internal and 
external perspectives. Internal independence means judges could decide cases without interference 
from internal administrative hierarchy or senior judges. External independence refers to judges 
being able to decide cases without interference from external sources, such as the government, the 
military, or the society.944 In China, as analyzed by some authors, the independence of the courts 
has been strengthened overall with respect to litigations in relation to administrative actions since 
the promulgation of the ALL in 1989. 945   From the internal perspective, appointments and 
promotions of judges are more merit-based, which gives more authority to the court. Judges could 
make decisions by resisting other forms of nonsystematic interference. 946  From the external 
                                                          
941 Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China : Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion 131-132. 
942 Ibid 71-72. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid 71. 
945 Ibid 87-88, 129-132. 
946 Ibid 100-101. 
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perspective, studies show that, except for politically sensitive cases,947 judges are generally able 
to make their own decisions, especially in relation to the outcome.  
Nevertheless, there are still concerns with regard to the independence of judges in relation to 
administrative litigation on tax expenditures. The major influence is likely to be from the 
government, who is the defendant in such cases. This is especially a concern at the level of local 
courts, which are inclined to engage in local protectionism for local governments. The reason for 
this is that local courts are funded by local governments, and the human, financial, and material 
resources are controlled by the local authorities. 948  When accepting cases against local 
governments, local courts are less likely to be able to ensure independence from local governments. 
Additionally, local people’s congresses could influence the independence of local courts as well, 
because the local people’s congress has the authority to appoint and remove chief justices from 
office.949 The standing committees of the local people’s congress could supervise courts within 
their administrative jurisdiction.950 Therefore, without reforming the relationship between the local 
courts and local governments and the relationship between local courts and local people’s 
congresses, there can be concerns about the independent function of judges, particularly in 
undeveloped regions.951  
In summary, if promoting the sustainable development of the market economy in China is the 
primary objective, it is necessary to introduce such a legal control system for tax incentives in 
order to maintain fair competition in the market. As a result, independent courts are essential legal 
guarantees for this system. The system has already been established, and therefore more reforms 
for establishing independent courts are expected.952  
                                                          
947 Politically sensitive cases are normally complicated and courts may be influenced from various sources. 
Thus, courts often limit access to such cases and steer disputes to other channels of settlement. See R. P. 
Peerenboom, China Modernizes : Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford University Press 2007) 
100-118. 
948 Keping Yu, Democracy and the Rule of Law in China (Brill 2010) 257-258. 
949 Article 101, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
950 Article 104, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2004 Amendment). 
951 Yu, Democracy and the Rule of Law in China 261-265. 




7.2.3 Recommendations at a micro level 
In the long term, the introduction of an internal legal control over Chinese tax incentives could 
be an ideal solution to alleviate tensions. In the short term, the testing results demonstrate a 
potential incompatibility of specific tax incentives with the WTO’s subsidy rules, and therefore 
there could be recommendations with respect to the specific issues. 
Tax incentives with industry or region specificity are likely to constitute actionable subsidies 
under the ASCM, and thus it is recommended to modify or change them. These incentives cover 
two major governmental goals, i.e. support for R&D activities and for less developed regions. 
Support for R&D activities are tax incentives for high-tech enterprises, for the software industry 
and IC industry, and for animation enterprises. Assistance for less-developed regions are designed 
as tax incentives for the WDS and autonomous regions. Although China has its justifications for 
granting these incentives, under the current ASCM regime, without the existence of non-actionable 
subsidies, China could not find convincing justifications. However, if a tax expenditure system 
could be introduced in China, these tax incentives could be justified in the name of leveling the 
level playing field if they could not be in line with the ex-ante and ex-post assessment requirements.  
The major issue exposed from the testing results is that SOEs enjoy de facto tax incentives. Tax 
incentives for SOEs are mainly determined by the dominating status of SOEs in China. They are 
likely to constitute actionable subsidies with enterprise specificity. As analyzed before, those tax 
incentives are prima facie granted to any enterprise participating in state-supported activities or 
industries and they are de facto beneficial to SOEs. The reason is that there is no market access for 
private or foreign investment in those state-supported areas.953  
Under China’s socialist market economy system, the status of SOEs is a factual situation, but 
the government’s attitude towards SOEs is changeable. This is the place where legal regulations 
can play a role. Rules of fair competition should be applicable to SOEs as well. On 24th August 
2015, the State Council issued a document on deepening the reform of SOEs.954 It has confirmed 
further reform for developing mixed-ownership for SOEs by permitting and introducing non-state-
                                                          
953 See Section 4.2.3.3.1.2 De facto specificity. 
954 Zhongfa [2015] No.26, The Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises 
(the Guiding Opinions), by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, 
24 August 2015. See also ‘China Urges SOE Modernization through Mixed Ownership Reform’, China 
Daily (25 September 2015) <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-09/25/content_21979076.htm> 
accessed 13 May 2016.   
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owned investment into SOEs, especially in those industries usually limited to SOEs. 955  The 
investments can be diverse. Moreover, the document has introduced a classification of SOEs into 
two types, business oriented SOEs and non-profit-oriented SOEs. For business-oriented SOEs, 
more competition is encouraged. SOEs whose main business is in industries with full competition 
should introduce other types of investments ,whose main business is in the key industries and 
leading areas would maintain as holding shareholders, but should support non-state-owned capital 
participation.956 The document indicates that the government’s attitude towards SOEs could be 
changed. With the further opening of the market and the reform on SOEs, SOEs will not be the 
only beneficiaries of those tax incentives, because more and more private and foreign investments 
are able to conduct business activities in those areas as well. Therefore, it is necessary to abolish 
the favorable tax treatment for SOEs and let them compete with other enterprises on a level playing 
field. 
7.3 Future of the WTO’s subsidy rules 
7.3.1 Reviving non-actionable subsidies  
7.3.1.1 The WTO’s tension with Chinese tax incentives: non-actionable subsidies  
As analyzed before, the WTO is an outcome of the capitalist development. It is also a 
representation of the evolution of the relationship between the market and the government and the 
tensions arise here for China. The alleviation of tensions can not only rely on China’s cooperation 
and reform. The WTO also has space for improvement if it hopes to function better. Returning to 
the research question, both the alleviation of tensions and a better position for China in 
international trade also require the WTO to also react at the same time.  
The testing results demonstrate that the same Chinese tax incentives can have different 
compatibility results under the two systems. The main differences are due to the existence of 
compatible State aid, whereas non-actionable subsidies under the ASCM have lapsed.957 Without 
the justification of non-actionable subsidies under the ASCM, Chinese tax incentives for 
autonomous regions and the Western Development Strategy (WDS), for R&D activities, and for 
environmental protection activities can all fall within the scope of actionable subsidies. It triggers 
                                                          
955 Article 17 of the Guiding Opinions states that in the area of oil, gas, electricity, railway, telecom, 
resource exploration, public utilities, and the like, the government will promote and open projects for non-
state-owned investments. Ibid.  
956 Article 4 and 5 of the Guiding Opinions. Ibid. 
957 See Section 4.3 Matrix of the testing results in Chapter 4.  
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a rethinking of the validity of non-actionable subsidies, if the creation of a level playing field is 
taken as the benchmark. 
7.3.1.2 Basis for reviving non-actionable subsidies: the creation of a level playing field 
As analyzed previously, the Aristotelian paradigm of treating unequals differently should be 
taken into account when defining the level playing field, but the question is how to ensure the 
unequal treatment avoids infringing equality itself. Rawls’ ideal theory on the conceptualization 
of fairness can be a reference.958 When discussing the external benchmark in Chapter 3, it was 
explained that there are two principles to understand fairness. Firstly, each person has the same 
indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties as is compatible with the 
same scheme of liberties for all. Secondly, social and economic inequalities must satisfy two 
conditions. They are attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity, and they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. The first principle should 
take priority over the second and, within the second principle, the first condition should take 
priority over the latter.959   
When matching these principles with the WTO’s subsidy rules, non-actionable subsidies could 
find some theoretical support. The creation of a level playing field actually means the first principle, 
which advocates equal opportunities for all participants in the market. The design of non-
actionable subsidies actually reflects the second principle that addresses the issue of inequalities, 
with the purpose of realizing fairness. According to the second principle, if there are inequalities, 
such as if non-actionable subsidies were reinstated, they should favor the least advantaged. 
Regional subsidies for less developed regions can be a good example. The situation less developed 
regions not the same as in more developed regions, either economically or socially. If, without 
governmental intervention, the disparity between regions will continue to increase, it will thereby 
result in greater inequality. In order to create a level playing field, it makes sense to treat unequals 
differently. As some authors have contended, there are three ways to realize equality in this 
situation. Bring the worst-off and everyone in between up to the level of the best off; or bring the 
best off and everyone in between down to the level of worst off; or bring the worse off up and the 
better off down so that they meet in between.960 In the context of regional subsidies, obviously 
                                                          
958 Rawls, A Theory of Justice 4.    
959 Van Roermund, 'Fairness'. 
960 Pojman and Westmoreland, Equality : Selected Readings 5.  
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governments would like to bring the less developed regions up to the level of the best off. At least, 
they do not want to sacrifice the already developed regions just for the maintenance of fairness. 
Therefore, subsidies for less-developed regions are actually justified under the objective of fair 
competition. The same rationale applies to other types of non-actionable subsidies, including 
assistance for R&D activities and for adapting infrastructures to new environmental requirements. 
They are also likely to become least-disadvantaged areas for investment in the market due to 
market imperfections.961   
7.3.1.3 Reference from EU State aid law: compatible State aid  
Compatible EU State aid can be a reference to reconsider non-actionable subsidies. Under the 
EU State aid regime, there are three categories of compatible State aid which are exempt, 
disregarding their adverse effects, namely mandatory exemptions, discretionary exemptions, and 
the measures under the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER).962 Comparing the content 
of compatible State aid with non-actionable subsidies, it is easy to find that they are similar. The 
three types of non-actionable subsidies all have counterparts in the category of compatible State 
aid, and the State aid regime even contains more compatible measures. The main justification for 
compatible State aid is the community interest and the common objective of the internal market. 
Some authors therefore raise the point that non-actionable subsidies can also be reconsidered under 
the global community goals in the WTO.963 
If non-actionable subsidies are to be revived, a consensus among scholars is that it is necessary 
to improve procedures in terms of transparency, proportionality, and the prevention of abuse in 
order to achieve best results.964 To conduct the reform, EU State aid could become a point of 
                                                          
961 See economic analysis in Chapter 2.  
962 See Section 3.4.2 Compatible State aid in Chapter 3.  
963 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, 'Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global 
Subsidiarity?' (2003) 16 Governance 73-94; Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, 'Will International Rules 
on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?' (2006) 96 American Economic Review 877-895. 
964 Sadeq Z Bigdeli, 'Resurrecting the Dead-The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering 
Question of Green Space' (2011) 8 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law  36-37; Luca Rubini, 
'ASCM Disciplines and Recent WTO Case Law Developments: What Space for ‘Green’ Subsidies?' (2015) 
3 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No RSCAS  13-14; Robert Howse, 'Do 
the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense? : the Case for Legalizing 
Some Subsidies' in Kyle. Bagwell, George A. Bermann and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), Law and Economics 
of Contingent Protection in International Trade (Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in 
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reference. Actually, State aid control is more effective due to the fundamental role of the European 
Commission. Except for de minimis aid and GBER, every Member State has the obligation to 
notify the Commission of any aid measure that is to be implemented. The Commission has to go 
through preliminary investigations and further formal investigations to assess whether the measure 
falls within the scope of mandatory or discretionary exemptions.  
In contrast, the WTO lacks such a powerful institution to undertake stringent control of 
subsidies. Although Members in the WTO have the obligation to notify subsidies, the subsidy 
committee does not have a strict supervisory control over them, not to mention a stringent ex-ante 
assessment that is similar to the European Commission. Therefore, without a powerful entity to 
assess non-actionable subsidies beforehand, it is more significant to include certain and clear rules 
on the application of non-actionable subsidies. 
Thus, the balancing test in the State aid assessment is also of value for the WTO. Similarly, the 
revival of non-actionable subsidies in the WTO could take into account the elements in the 
balancing test to ensure that this type of subsidy is not abused. However, the degree of the control 
still depends on how far Members in the WTO intend to reach in order to achieve fair competition. 
It is the key motivation behind the reform in relation to the multilateral disciplines. 
7.3.2 Future of the WTO’s role in relation to taxation  
7.3.2.1 More influence of the WTO in relation to taxation 
Although the WTO’s subsidy rules are not aimed at regulating tax incentives, once they function 
as a controlling instrument, the rules can definitely be improved and clarified for better 
functioning.965 Scholars always comment that subsidy rules are notoriously uncertain.966 This is a 
                                                          
Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of Its Time or Time for Reform?' (2010) 44 Journal of World 
Trade 794-796. 
965 Some authors suggest that the WTO must take greater responsibility to tackle tax problems associated 
with the development of international trade. The efficient way is to clarify and improve its present role on 
taxation through clarification and guidance in relation to tax provisions, and the establishment of a 
Committee on trade and taxation. See Farrell, 'The Interface of International Trade Law and Taxation : 
Defining the Role of the WTO 227-244; Micheau, State Aid, Subsidy and Tax Incentives under EU and 
WTO Law 486-500. 
966 Rubini took public support to electricity as an example and listed uncertain parts of the subsidy rules: 
what amounts to a financial contribution? What is the status of tax incentives? What is status of “regulatory” 
measures? What does “any form of income or price support” actually mean? What does “benefit” mean? Is 
the specificity test really “specific”? How difficult is it to prove adverse effects? By listing these questions, 
he claimed that ambiguity must be permissive but not divisive. See Rubini, 'ASCM Disciplines and Recent 
WTO Case Law Developments: What Space for ‘Green’ Subsidies?' 
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general remark on the ASCM itself, which has not covered the issue on taxation. With respect to 
tax, the ASCM has only included tax subsidies in the form of export subsidies, which has a rather 
narrow application. It leads to the result that most tax incentives would fall within the scope of 
actionable subsidies, and would therefore be regulated by the general rules without specific 
reference to taxation. Thus, from the general rules to specific rules on tax subsidies, the ASCM 
lacks certainty and clarification that can guide Members’ domestic tax policies.  
7.3.2.2 Reference from the EU State aid law 
a. Clarify the definition of subsidies  
Most critics of the ASCM focus on the unclear definition of a subsidy. Although the ASCM has 
formulated testing steps for the identification of subsidies, they are still ambiguous, particularly 
when facing tax issues. In the definition of a subsidy, the ASCM fails to explain the notion of “the 
foregoing of government revenue otherwise due”. When applying this provision to tax measures, 
Members always have their own interpretations, which are always different. Additionally, the key 
controversy is the identification of specificity. Despite the fact that the ASCM has classified 
enterprise, industry, and regional specificity, it lacks an interpretation of the same terms and fails 
to establish a test to identify them. For instance, the identification of regional subsidy is complex, 
since there are autonomous regions in many countries which have the authority to administer 
regional affairs. There are also distinctions between unitary and federal countries on the 
administration of regions. Without clear criteria to define regional specificity, it triggers more 
arguments when disputes occur.  
In contrast, the State aid regime has provided more explanations on the notion of State aid, 
including identification methods for fiscal measures. Additionally, the case law in the EU has 
contributed to the clarification of these terms. State aid law has been applied in a large number of 
cases. With the expansion of State aid law to taxation, there are more cases involving tax issues.967 
Hence, the EU is able to compile those relevant cases and provide further clarifications on the 
application of State aid law. Furthermore, based on the development of case law, the Commission 
works efficiently on adding new interpretations, thereby guiding Member States more 
specifically.968   
                                                          
967 Schön, Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid-A Review of Five Years of European Jurisprudence. 
968 The 2016 Notice. 
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Referring to the State aid law, the ASCM could work on its legal texts and offer a clearer 
definition of subsidies. The interpretations do not have to be the same as those in the EU, since the 
WTO has its own concerns, but nevertheless the EU’s way of clarifying notions is inspiring. WTO 
law is also clarified by case law. There are many interpretations of provisions in a number of cases. 
Thus, the WTO can synthesize the opinions in those judgments as references or sources to provide 
further clarifications.  
b. Tax subsidy rules 
Another issue that can be referred to from the State aid regime is the promotion of separate tax 
subsidy rules, just as in the 2016 Notice that has taken fiscal measures into account.969 The separate 
rules can not only give clear and certain definitions on tax subsidies, but they can also provide the 
steps for determining them. Compared to the fiscal State aid regime, an essential issue is whether 
or not to include compatible tax subsidies, i.e. non-actionable subsidies, into the rules. The overall 
State aid system has taken into account compatible situations, and thus the fiscal State aid regime 
coherently contains exceptional circumstances. If separate tax subsidy rules are to be implemented, 
it would be reasonable to think of including non-actionable tax subsidies. If so, the parameters of 
assessment in the State aid law can also become references for the new rules.970  
c. A committee of tax experts 
To enforce the rules, it is suggested to establish a committee composed of a group of tax experts 
who particularly solve tax subsidy disputes in the Dispute Settlement Body.971 This committee 
could be a separate and independent entity in the DSB that handles disputes on tax subsidies. The 
methods for solving disputes could include discussions, negotiation, mediation, and final 
recommendations. The procedures are similar to the general dispute settlement procedures. The 
highlight of this committee is that it composes tax experts who have more expertise on tax issues, 
especially in cases of tax subsidies. Thus, they could settle tax-related disputes more efficiently. 
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Moreover, as an independent committee, the committee’s recommendations are authoritative. 
Members of disputes could rely on such an independent third party to mitigate conflicts. 
Considering the large membership of the WTO, tax experts of this committee should be selected 
from both developing and developed countries. Accordingly, the committee could provide an equal 
voice to developing and developed countries for solving disputes on tax subsidies.972 Additionally, 
the committee can also become a consultative body for Members with respect to potential conflicts 
between domestic tax policies and subsidy rules. By providing technical assistance on tax subsidies, 
especially to developing countries, the committee contributes to preventing disputes on tax 
subsidies. The State aid system does not have such a separate body of tax experts who merely 
focus on fiscal aid measures. However, the European Parliament (EP) has formed temporary 
committees, i.e. the Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Measures Similar in Nature or Effect 
(TAXE Committee 1 &2) that files reports to the EP with the purpose of combating tax evasion 
and aggressive tax planning.973 Moreover, the development of the case law might promote more 
functionality in this regard.974   
7.3.2.3 China’s role in the new process  
The reposition of the WTO and even suggestions on the improvement of the current subsidy 
rules must take into account the multilateral circumstances in the organization. China could play a 
role in reshaping the rules. 975 The current rules not only fail to address sufficiently the concerns 
of developing countries in relation to tax competition, but they also do not take into account the 
requirement of a different economic system, namely China’s socialist market economy.976 Thus, 
                                                          
972 Althunayan, Dealing with the Fragmented International Legal Environment-WTO, International Tax 
and Internal Tax Regulations 229. 
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the reconsideration of tax subsidy rules should not only be driven and controlled by the few 
influential Western capitalist countries, but they should also involve China and other developing 
countries to announce their concerns. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to answer the main research questions. On the one hand, it provides legal 
recommendations for Chinese tax incentives with respect to China’s position in the international 
trade domain. On the other hand, it depicts the potential future developments for the WTO in 
relation to its subsidy rules and its role in taxation based on its interactions with China. For both 
China and the WTO, the EU State aid law could play a role in providing inspiration in developing 
the benchmarks of fair competition in the market.  
For China, the basis for recommendations are the benchmarks derived in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4. The testing results reveal that there are tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s 
subsidy rules. The possibility to alleviate tensions relies on China changing its state-oriented 
attitude towards tax incentives by introducing an internal legal control over the granting of tax 
incentives. It is feasible because, under the socialist market economy system, the fundamental 
market rules should also be applicable in China. Thus, it is the requirement of China’s market 
system to create a level playing field for domestic competition. In addition, with China’s further 
integration into the world economy, it is necessary for China to adjust itself into a proper position 
to participate in the competition at an international level, namely under the WTO’s framework, 
which requires fair competition.  
The main recommendations for Chinese tax incentives are at a macro level, which suggest to 
introduce the tax expenditure system in China. One way to do this is to include the granting of tax 
incentives into the budget process or to promulgate separate regulations on tax incentives. The EU 
State aid law could become a reference point considering its effectiveness in achieving the law’s 
objectives. On the one hand, the State aid regime provides a relevant clear notion of State aid, 
especially fiscal State aid. It contributes to the identification of a tax aid measure. On the other 
hand, it has a systematic controlling procedure that guarantees the implementation of the law. The 
procedure includes an ex-ante assessment, which contains all the necessary elements required by 
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a tax expenditure system. Moreover, it has an independent and authoritative institution, the 
European Commission, which is delegated with the power to enforce the law. Another feature of 
State aid law is its remedies. Its authoritative position in relation to the Member States makes the 
law rather effective to safeguard the level playing field in the internal market.  
The concrete recommendations for China are to embed tax expenditures into the Budget Law 
or to promulgate separate legal regulations on tax incentives. The legislation should embrace the 
aim of creating a level playing field in the market, and therefore it should take into account 
procedures for the approval of compatible tax incentives in China. With regard to the content of 
the legislation, it should not only contain the legal control elements, such as procedural and 
institutional elements, but it should also clarify different institutions’ responsibilities. Therefore, 
there should be an allocation of powers between different organs to implement the tax expenditure 
system. The government, including the MoF and the SAT, could be the drafting body of tax 
expenditures. The NPC and its standing committee should authorize and supervise the tax 
expenditures. They have to go through ex-ante and ex-post assessments of tax expenditures, which 
should include evaluations on specificity, effectiveness and efficiency, proportionality, and 
transparency of tax expenditures. Moreover, to implement the law, there should be an allocation 
of powers among different organs to conduct and supervise the enforcement of the legal control. 
Accordingly, citizens and companies should have access to legal remedies against harmful tax 
incentives. Tax administrations at different levels should be responsible for the enforcement and 
administration of tax expenditures. Moreover, with respect to the supervising power, except the 
supervision from the NPC and its standing committee, the NAO could play an increasing role as 
an independent auditing organ to conduct an ex-post assessment of tax expenditures. Within the 
tax administrations, the national tax authorities could also supervise the local tax authorities. There 
should be remedies for tax incentives as well. The legislation should clarify the access to courts 
for administrative litigation for remedies for tax expenditures. Nevertheless, there are practical 
concerns with regard to judicial independence in administrative litigation, especially at local levels 
due to local protectionism. More reforms are expected to promote the independence of courts.  
There are also recommendations at a micro level, which focus on tax incentives for R&D 
intensive industries, for less developed regions, and for SOEs. These tax incentives are likely to 
constitute actionable subsidies under the ASCM. If China aims to avoid disputes with other 
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Members of the WTO on the issue of tax incentives as subsidies, it should take legal actions against 
the specific tax incentives granted to these industries or regions, especially de facto incentives 
provided to SOEs. With the further integration into the world economy, it is important to provide 
fair treatment to foreign and private enterprises, compared to SOEs.  
For the WTO, it is also inspiring to rethink the subsidy rules and its role in relation to taxation. 
It could rethink reviving the category of non-actionable subsidies and establish more specific rules 
for taxation measures. The testing results reveal that some Chinese tax incentives, including tax 
incentives for autonomous regions, for the WDS, for R&D activities, and for environmental 
protection activities, could be justified under the EU State aid system due to the existence of the 
category of compatible State aid. However, under the WTO’s subsidy regime, the lapse of non-
actionable subsidies makes those tax incentives actionable. Referring to the objective of creating 
a level playing field, the interpretation of fairness actually supports the reviving of non-actionable 
subsidies. According to Rawls’ theory on justice, inequalities should benefit the least-advantaged 
in the society. Assistance for R&D activities, for disadvantaged regions, and for adapting 
infrastructures to new environmental requirements could fall within the scope in the context of 
business investment in the market. When reconsidering non-actionable subsidies, EU State aid 
regime can be a reference point as well, especially the compatible State aid category. Furthermore, 
considering the WTO’s influence on tax competition, it is better to establish very clear legal rules 
for tax subsidies. Although its does not aim specifically at regulating tax subsidies, it functions as 
a powerful institution to influence Members’ tax policies. With respect to subsidy rules, it could 
clarify the definition of subsidies, especially in terms of taxation. On the other hand, it could form 
a committee composed of tax experts to address tax disputes. Therefore, the EU State aid regime 
also has factors to refer to. During the progress of reshaping the WTO’s role in taxation, China 









Chapter 8 Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This research started with the aim of analyzing the relationship between Chinese tax incentives 
and the subsidy rules of the WTO against the background of EU State aid law. China, as a Member 
of the WTO, encounters trade disputes towards its tax incentives in the WTO. There are tensions 
between specific Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules. Considering the similarity 
of the EU State aid law with the WTO’s subsidy rules, a comparative analysis from the EU State 
aid law perspective contributed to a better understanding of this issue. In the context of the tensions, 
the research intended to provide recommendations for the alleviation of the tensions by answering 
the two main research questions:  
What is and what should China’s position be towards tax incentives in the international trade 
domain based on comparative studies between subsidy rules of the WTO and EU State aid law? 
What should the WTO’s position be towards China and taxation with respect to subsidy rules 
based on the studies on Chinese tax incentives and EU State aid respectively?  
   To answer the main research questions, the research raised several sub-questions and embedded 
them into each chapter. Chapter 2 provided a basic economic analysis on the rationale for granting 
and regulating tax incentives as subsidies. Chapter 3 introduced the WTO’s subsidy rules, the EU 
State aid law, and their relation with and application to taxation. An external benchmark was 
derived from the common objects and purposes of the two legal systems. Chapter 4 was an 
introduction to Chinese tax incentives. It developed an internal benchmark based on China’s 
domestic market system. Chapter 5 conducted a comparative testing of specific Chinese tax 
incentives against the WTO’s subsidy rules and EU State aid respectively. Chapter 6 analyzed the 
tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules based on the testing results. 
It further explored the origins of the tensions from the perspective of history, economic thoughts, 
and culture. Chapter 7 provided legal recommendations for Chinese tax incentives and the WTO’s 
subsidy rules to alleviate the tensions, thus answering the research questions. 




8.2 Summary of the research 
8.2.1 Tax incentives as subsidies in the context of international trade and competition: 
rationale for granting and regulating 
The context of this research is international trade and competition. Under the market economy 
system at an international level, the staring points are efficiency and equity in the market. In order 
to maintain a well-functioning market system, it is necessary to establish a level playing field in 
the market. Governments always use tax incentives as subsidies to achieve different economic or 
social objectives. It is a way of governmental intervention into the market. The analysis on the 
effects of tax incentives demonstrates that they can play a role to realize governmental goals, such 
as correcting market failures, supporting infant industries, stimulating exportation, attracting FDI, 
and improving equality. However, they cause harmful effects as well. Tax incentives for the 
correction of market failures can cause more welfare losses and new failures; tax incentives for the 
support of infant industries can prompt them to become monopolists in the market; export 
subsidies could trigger subsidy competition and a race to the bottom; tax incentives for improving 
equity actually is discriminatory. Therefore, in order to guarantee efficiency and equity in the 
market, it is essential to control the use of tax incentives as subsidies. Moreover, considering the 
transnational effects of tax incentives, it is necessary to regulate tax incentives at an international 
or supranational level. This regulation should be in the form of the rule of law, which normally 
entails an ex-ante and ex-post assessment of tax incentives.  
8.2.2 Subsidy rules of the WTO and State aid in the EU 
The WTO is the world’s most influential trade organization, which has specific legal regulations 
on subsidies, the ASCM. The EU, as a supranational organization, also has a stringent internal 
subsidy regime, State aid law. They have their own systems to regulate tax incentives as subsidies. 
The two legal systems on the regulation of subsidies include the requirement of the market 
economy. Thus, the research derives an external benchmark from the common objects and 
purposes of the two systems, which is a basis of providing recommendations for Chinese tax 
incentives and the WTO’s subsidy rules. The external benchmark is the creation of a level playing 
field for competition in the international market by regulating the abuse of governmental subsidies. 
Under this common objective and purpose, the two legal systems have similarities in identifying 
subsidies. However, a comparative study shows that EU State aid law develops further since it 
takes into account compatible State aid based on the rationale of equity and a strict procedure for 
ex-ante assessment. It also entails strict remedies that make the law more effective.  
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8.2.3 Chinese tax incentives 
The introduction on Chinese tax incentives has two parts. The first part provides a chronological 
review on the evolution of direct tax incentives in China. The time span is from the establishment 
of the PRC to the promulgation of the EIT Law in 2007. The historical review introduces the “rise 
and fall” of tax incentives for FDI in China. It shows China’s changing attitude towards tax 
incentives, from arbitrarily using them to attract FDI to gradually reducing and regulating the use 
of them with China’s integration into the world economy.  
In such a context, an internal benchmark is also developed for the evaluation of China’s granting 
of tax incentives. It justifies the creation of a level playing field for competition in China’s 
domestic market, which is under a socialist market economy system. There are differences and 
similarities between China’s socialist market economy and the Western market economy. The 
main difference is the relationship between the state and the market. In China, the market operates 
under the framework of the state and the state has more power to intervene in the market. State 
ownership is the leading force of the economy, and therefore there is limited access for private 
ownership in certain areas. Nevertheless, the market system shares similarities with the Western 
counterpart. The protection of private ownership and the respect for an individual’s choice are the 
fundamental issues for the market. These basic market rules should also be applicable in China’s 
market. Therefore, it is the market’s own requirement on efficiency and equity to create a level 
playing field for competition in China. Moreover, the internal benchmark shares the same essence 
with the external benchmark. The interpretation of a level playing field should take into account 
the principles of equality and of proportionality. Thus, when evaluating Chinese tax incentives 
against the benchmarks, it should consider regional disparities and the imbalanced development 
of industries in China’s current circumstances.  
The second part introduces the present tax incentives in China, including corporate tax 
incentives and VAT incentives. They are classified according to the criteria of industrial and 
regional specificity, which are the main criteria to identify a subsidy in the WTO or a State aid in 
the EU. The main corporate tax incentives are for high-tech industries, SLEs, environmentally 
friendly projects, and specific regions. The VAT incentives have been introduced against the 
background of transforming BT to VAT. The present VAT incentives actually focus on the same 
industries or regions that enjoy corporate tax incentives.   
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8.2.4 Testing of Chinese tax incentives against the ASCM and EU State aid law 
Following the testing steps summarized in the ASCM and the EU State aid law respectively, 
the testing results demonstrate that certain Chinese tax incentives are likely to constitute subsidies, 
particularly actionable subsidies, under the ASCM in the WTO. The industry or enterprise specific 
tax incentives are for high-tech enterprises, for software industry and IC industry, for animation 
enterprises, and energy-saving service enterprises. The regionally specific tax incentives are for 
autonomous regions, the WDS, the CEZs, and the FTZs. In addition, SOEs are de facto the main 
beneficiaries of tax incentives for state-encouraged public infrastructure facility projects.  
In contrast, the comparable testing in the State aid regime shows different results. Due to the 
existence of compatible State aid, some actionable subsidies could be exempted from being 
identified as State aid if certain conditions are satisfied. They include tax incentives for R&D 
activities in high-tech enterprises, software industry and IC industry, for energy-saving service 
enterprises, for autonomous regions and the WDS. When assessed against the external benchmark, 
it is clear to conclude that certain tax incentives, such as those for less-developed regions and for 
SLEs are actually used to achieve a level playing field. Thus, these tax incentives could be justified 
under the benchmarks.  
8.2.5 The origins of tensions between Chinese tax incentives and the Western standards 
    The testing results on the incompatibility of certain Chinese tax incentives reflect deeper 
tensions between China’s attitude towards tax incentives and the WTO’s subsidy system and the 
EU State aid regime respectively. China has a state-oriented attitude towards tax incentives and 
there is a lack of internal legal control in relation to the granting of tax incentives. In contrast, the 
Western systems operate under a market-oriented system, which requires legal control over the 
government’s intervention into the market. Hence, the granting of tax incentives is regulated by 
the Western systems. 
    Different origins explain the tensions from the perspective of China’s path and the Western path. 
The starting point of understanding the Western market-oriented system is acknowledging that it 
is outcome result of the development of capitalism. In the evolution of the relationship between 
the market and the government, the market still plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources 
and the government intervenes when necessary. The modern state is also a result of the 
development of capitalism, since it requires a powerful government to protect individual rights 
and to serve the public good. With respect to the Western legal regulation on subsidies, it has to 
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be emphasized that the Western systems are based on the rule of law. Regardless of the diverse 
theories on the rule of law, the rule of law in the Western systems aims to limit the arbitrary use 
of state power and to protect the market order. From the angle of cultural analysis, Western culture 
is behind the development of the market-oriented system and the respect for the rule of law. These 
cultural elements include the Western philosophies of being realistic and the respect for fair 
competition and cooperation, etc.  
    In contrast, China’s state-oriented attitude towards tax incentives and the lack of internal legal 
control over the granting of tax incentives also have their origins in history. In the time of socialist 
China, before the Reform and Opening, China had a planned economy. There was no free market 
and the state had absolute control over taxation. With respect to the state’s function, the state only 
used taxation as an instrument to realize its allocation of resources. In addition, influenced by 
Marxism, taxation and law were considered as part of the superstructure, which was subordinate 
to the economy. They were only used as instruments to achieve economic goals. After the Reform 
and Opening, China introduced a market economy, but the state still had macro control over the 
whole economy. SOEs are leading forces of the economy, and therefore they have more tax 
preferences from the government. China also attempted to establish a socialist rule of law system 
which promoted reforms in various areas. However, there is still a lack of legal control over the 
granting of tax incentives. In the time of traditional China, it was an agricultural country that was 
under the policy of pro-agriculture and anti-commerce and there was no free market. The state was 
an emperor’s state, which served the emperor’s rule. There was no separation between the 
emperor’s personal income and expenditure with the state’s. The law was only an instrument of 
the emperor, and therefore the rule of law was not in the sense of the West. In addition, there was 
a cultural factor to understand China’s state-oriented style, i.e. Confucianism. By advocating for 
humanity and self-cultivation through virtue and ritual, Confucianism actually supports a highly 
organized government under the ruler in traditional China. Although in socialist China, 
Confucianism was modernized, its revival was still oriented by the government with the purpose 
of maintaining a harmonious social order. Moreover, the philosophies of Confucianism underline 
the adaption and adjustment to the environment and the world, rather than going against them. It 
contributes to the understanding of the formation of a paternalistic government in China.  
271 
 
8.3 Conclusions and recommendations  
    It is possible to find a common platform to alleviate tensions by returning to the benchmarks. 
To answer the research questions, there are legal recommendations for Chinese tax incentives with 
respect to its position in the international trade domain. In addition, the research depicts the 
potential developments for the WTO in relation to its subsidy rules and its role in taxation.  
For China to alleviate its tensions with the WTO, it has to change its state-oriented attitude 
toward tax incentives by introducing an internal legal control over the granting of tax incentives. 
Returning to the benchmarks established in this research, it is a requirement of the market operation 
under China’s market system to create a level playing field for domestic competition. Furthermore, 
with China’s further integration into the world economy, it is necessary for China to adjust to a 
position that enables it to participate in international competition more fairly. Therefore, the main 
recommendations for Chinese tax incentives at a macro level is the introduction of a tax 
expenditure system which includes the granting of tax incentives into the budget process or 
promulgates separate regulations on tax incentives. The EU State aid law could be a reference 
given that it is effective to achieve the objective of maintaining fair competition in the internal 
market. To be specific, it is recommended for China to embed tax expenditures into the Budget 
Law or to promulgate separate legal regulations on tax incentives. The law should include an ex-
ante and ex-post assessment, cost-benefit analysis, evaluation on effectiveness and efficiency, 
proportionality test, and transparency report, etc. Moreover, to implement the law, there should be 
an allocation of powers among different organs to conduct and supervise the enforcement of the 
legal control. Accordingly, citizens and companies should have access to legal remedies against 
harmful tax incentives. The recommendation at a micro level is to take legal action against specific 
tax incentives granted to R&D intensive industries, to regions, and de facto to SOEs, considering 
their possibility of constituting actionable subsidies under the ASCM.  
For the WTO, it could also play a role to alleviate the tensions with China. It is suggested to 
rethink reviving the category of non-actionable subsidies and making more specific rules in 
relation to taxation. According to the benchmarks, the creation of a level playing field supports the 
reviving of non-actionable subsidies. Assistance for R&D activities, for disadvantaged regions, 
and for adapting infrastructure to new environmental requirements could find theoretical support 
from the interpretation of the benchmarks. Similarly, the EU State aid could become a reference 
point, especially the compatible State aid. With respect to the WTO’s role in taxation, it could 
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improve its subsidy rules relevant for taxation, since its plays an essential role in influencing 
Members’ tax policies. It could clarify the definition of tax subsidies and the steps of their 
identification. Moreover, it could form a committee composed of tax experts to address tax 
disputes. The EU State aid law could be a reference point in certain aspects as well. China could 
play a more important role in this process.  
In conclusion, the evolution of Chinese tax incentives, the WTO’s subsidy rules, and the EU 
State aid law are in flux. On the issue of tax incentives, China has a long way to go. The WTO’s 
requirement and the EU’s inspiration offer China new opportunities to march towards a more 
legitimate system. If further integrating into the world economy is the trend, China has to prepare 
for a more open market with an internal legal control over its tax incentives. Simultaneously, as 
an emerging power, China should also find its own way of establishing a legal system for tax 
incentives, thus gaining a better position in the international trade domain. Furthermore, to create 
a better international trade environment, the WTO, the world’s largest trade organization, has to 
review its legal system according to the practical needs. At present, the EU appears to be more 
developed in terms of its legal framework for controlling tax incentives, and therefore, it could 













Appendix I: Matrix of subsidy investigations against China in the WTO 
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number 
Case title Filing date Compliant(s) Settlement status 
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DS414 China-Countervailing and 
Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Grain Oriented Flat-rolled 




US Full compliance 
DS419  China-Measures Concerning 
Wind Power Equipment 
22 December 
2010 
US In consultations 
DS427  China-Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Broiler 




US Full compliance 
DS440 China-Anti-Dumping and 
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Certain Automobiles from 
the United States 
5 July 2012 US No further action 
required 
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US In consultations 
DS451 China-Measures Relating to 
the Production and 




Mexico In consultations 
DS489 China-Measures Related to 
Demonstration Bases and 
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